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Workload Identity in Multi System Environments              Y. Rosomakho
Internet-Draft                                                   Zscaler
Intended status: Standards Track                              J. Salowey
Expires: 26 April 2027                                Palo Alto Networks
                                                         23 October 2026


                          Workload Identifier
                     draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-04

Abstract

   This document defines a canonical identifier for workloads, referred
   to as the Workload Identifier.  A Workload Identifier is a URI that
   uniquely identifies a workload within the context of a specific trust
   domain.  This identifier can be embedded in Workload Identity
   Credentials, including X.509 certificates and JWT-based tokens, to
   support authentication, authorization, and policy enforcement across
   diverse systems.  The Workload Identifier format ensures
   interoperability, facilitates secure identity federation, and enables
   consistent identity semantics.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-wg-
   wimse.github.io/draft-ietf-wimse-identifier/draft-ietf-wimse-
   identifier.html.  Status information for this document may be found
   at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-identifier/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Workload Identity in
   Multi System Environments mailing list (mailto:wimse@ietf.org), which
   is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/.
   Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-identifier.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.



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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 April 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Workload Identifier Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.   URI Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Scheme Specific Portion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Trust Domain Association  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  The "wimse" URI Scheme  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Stability and Uniqueness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.6.  Workload Identifier Origin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Identifier Interpretation and Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Usage in Credentials and Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  URI Parsing and Processing Considerations . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Identifier Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.3.  Trust Domain Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.4.  Identifier Reuse and Collision  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.5.  Information Disclosure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.6.  Wildcard and Prefix Matching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  URI Scheme Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14



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   Appendix B.  Changelog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     B.1.  since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-00  . . . . . . . . . .  14
     B.2.  since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-01  . . . . . . . . . .  14
     B.3.  since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-02  . . . . . . . . . .  15
     B.4.  since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-03  . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   In modern distributed systems, workloads such as services,
   applications, or containerized tasks require cryptographically
   verifiable identities to support secure communication, access
   control, and auditability.  As systems scale across trust domains,
   administrative boundaries, and heterogeneous platforms, the need for
   a consistent and interoperable identifier format becomes critical.

   This document defines the Workload Identifier, a URI-based [URI]
   identifier intended to uniquely represent a workload within the
   context of an issuing authority.  The identifier is designed to be
   stable, unique within a given trust domain, and suitable for use in
   digital credentials such as X.509 certificates, JSON Web Tokens (JWTs
   [JWT]), and other security artifacts.

   The Workload Identifier format is simple yet expressive.  It enables
   organizations to define trust boundaries, delegate identity
   management, and identify workload instances and logical workloads in
   a uniform way across service meshes, cloud environments, and on-
   premises infrastructure.  This specification defines the Workload
   Identifier used by the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments
   (WIMSE) architecture [ARCH].  The format is defined in a general
   manner so that it can also be used by other systems that require
   stable, URI-based workload identifiers.

   The primary goals of this specification are:

   *  To define the syntax and semantics of a Workload Identifier.

   *  To establish requirements for issuers and consumers of such
      identifiers.

   *  To promote interoperability across different identity systems and
      domains.

   This document does not prescribe how identifiers are issued or
   verified.  Instead, it focuses on the identifier's format, uniqueness
   guarantees, and its relationship to trust domains.





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2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Terminology

   The following terms are used throughout this document:

   Workload:  A workload is an independently addressable and executable
      software entity.  A workload is a logical entity rather than
      necessarily a single running process.  It may be implemented by
      one or more workload instances and may expose, consume, or
      participate in one or more services.  Examples include
      microservices, containers, virtual machines, serverless functions,
      or similar components that initiate or receive network
      communications.  A workload typically interacts with other parts
      of a larger system.

   Workload Identifier:  A URI-based identifier assigned to a workload.
      A Workload Identifier can refer to a logical workload consisting
      of multiple instances, or to a specific workload instance,
      depending on the policy of the trust domain.  The identifier is
      intended to be included in Workload Identity Credentials
      (Section 1 of [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS]) and interpreted as a complete
      URI according to the applicable URI scheme and policy of the trust
      domain.

   Trust Domain:  A logical grouping of systems that share a common set
      of security controls and policies.  A trust domain establishes its
      own rules for identity issuance, validation, and policy
      enforcement.

   Issuer:  An entity authorized by a trust domain to assign Workload
      Identifiers.

   Consumer:  An entity that evaluates, verifies or uses a Workload
      Identifier for authentication, authorization, or auditing
      purposes, typically after obtaining it from a validated Workload
      Identity Credential.  This includes relying parties, verifiers,
      and policy enforcement points.







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4.  Workload Identifier Specification

   A Workload Identifier is a URI [URI] that uniquely identifies a
   workload.  It encodes both the trust domain and a workload-specific
   path, enabling unambiguous identification of workloads across
   administrative and organizational boundaries.  Since there is no
   global authority for trust domains, trust domains must be validated
   as described in Section 7.3.

   The identifier is designed to be stable and suitable for inclusion in
   digital credentials such as X.509 certificates and security tokens.
   This section defines the format, structure, and associated
   requirements for Workload Identifiers.

4.1.   URI Requirements

   A Workload Identifier MUST be an absolute URI, as defined in
   Section 4.3 of [URI].  In addition, the URI MUST include a non-empty
   authority component that identifies the trust domain within which the
   identifier is scoped.

   A Workload Identifier MUST contain a non-empty path component.

   A Workload Identifier MUST NOT contain a path segment that is "." or
   "..", either literally or after decoding percent-encoded unreserved
   characters.  Consumers MUST reject such identifiers before performing
   dot-segment removal.

   The URI format allows different schemes (e.g., spiffe as defined in
   [SPIFFE-ID], wimse defined in Section 4.4) depending on deployment
   requirements.  Example identifiers:

spiffe://incubation.example.org/ns/experimental/analytics/ingest
wimse://trust.corp.example.com/workload/af3e86cb-7013-4e33-b717-11c4edd25679

   A Workload Identifier URI MUST NOT contain a query component, a
   fragment component, user information, or a port component.

   Implementations that generate, parse, or otherwise process Workload
   Identifiers MUST support identifiers with a total length of at least
   2048 bytes.  Workload Identifiers SHOULD NOT exceed 2048 bytes in
   length.

   Individual Workload Identifier schemes MAY define additional syntax
   or processing requirements, provided they do not conflict with the
   requirements defined in this document.





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4.2.  Scheme Specific Portion

   This specification defines common requirements for Workload
   Identifiers and the wimse URI scheme (Section 4.4).  Trust domains
   are opaque strings formatted according to Section 3.2.2 of [URI],
   subject to the URI syntax and normalization rules defined in this
   document.  A particular scheme may define additional semantics and
   constraints for the trust domain.  The same trust domain may have
   different meaning within different schemes.  The structure of the
   path component can be constrained by the scheme.  Its contents are
   deployment-specific and are interpreted according to the scheme and
   the policy of the trust domain, as implemented by the issuer or
   issuers authorized for that trust domain.  The issuer defines the
   granularity at which identifiers are assigned.

   A Workload Identifier MAY represent a specific workload instance, or
   a logical workload consisting of multiple instances that share the
   same identity within the trust domain.

   Multiple instances MAY share the same Workload Identifier when they
   are intended to be treated as the same workload for the purpose of
   authentication, authorization, and auditing.

   The path component of the URI MAY be an opaque value that is only
   meaningful to the issuing authority, or it MAY encode structured
   information used within the trust domain.

   Some examples of these concepts are given below:

   *  Opaque identifier

   spiffe://prod.trust.domain/89a6ec51-f877-44c0-9501-b213597f2d1d

   *  Application role

   spiffe://prod.trust.domain/ns/prod-01/sa/foo-service

   *  Specific instance of application role

spiffe://prod.trust.domain/ns/prod-01/sa/foo-service/iid-1f814646-87b5-4e26-bb55-1d13caccdd8d

   *  Opaque identifier of a specific workload instance within an
      application role

spiffe://prod.trust.domain/foo-service/instance/89a6ec51-f877-44c0-9501-b213597f2d1d






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   Other concepts may be represented in the Workload Identifier
   depending on what is important in the system and what information is
   available when the identity is issued.  The path component is
   interpreted according to the policy of the trust domain, subject to
   any syntax or semantic constraints defined by the URI scheme.

4.3.  Trust Domain Association

   The authority component of the URI defines the trust domain which is
   responsible for issuing, validating, and managing Workload
   Identifiers within its scope.  The trust domain SHOULD be a fully
   qualified domain name belonging to the organization defining the
   trust domain to help provide uniqueness for the trust domain
   identifier.  While IP addresses are allowed as host names in the URI
   encoding rules, they SHOULD NOT be used to represent trust domains
   except in the case where they are needed for compatibility with
   legacy naming schemes.

   When a trust domain is an internationalized domain name, its
   internationalized labels MUST be represented as A-labels as defined
   in Section 2.3.2.1 of [IDNA].  U-labels and their percent-encoded
   UTF-8 representations MUST NOT be used.

   Workload Identifiers are interpreted as URIs, including the trust
   domain carried in the authority component.  The identifier denotes
   the workload identity at the granularity assigned by the issuing
   trust domain, which may correspond to a service, workload class,
   deployment, individual workload instance, or another deployment-
   defined concept.  Consumers MUST compare and authorize Workload
   Identifiers using the complete URI, rather than relying only on
   individual components such as the path.

   For identifier comparison, consumers MUST apply the syntax-based
   normalization specified in Section 6.2.2 of [URI] and then compare
   the complete normalized URIs byte-for-byte.  Percent-encoded
   unreserved characters MUST be decoded before case normalization.  No
   additional scheme-specific or protocol-based normalization is
   performed for this comparison.  Identifiers with different schemes
   after normalization are distinct.  These rules also define
   equivalence for issuer uniqueness requirements and authorization
   decisions.

   Individual schemes MAY further restrict valid identifier syntax.
   Normalization MUST NOT be used to make an otherwise invalid
   identifier acceptable.  Comparison alone does not establish validity
   under a particular scheme.





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   Each trust domain MUST coordinate Workload Identifier assignment
   across all of its issuers to ensure that different workloads are
   assigned distinct Workload Identifiers.

4.4.  The "wimse" URI Scheme

   A Workload Identifier using the wimse scheme has the generic form:

   wimse://<trust-domain>/<path>

   The URI MUST satisfy all requirements defined in Section 4.1.

   The structure of the path component is deployment-specific and is not
   interpreted by this specification.

   Examples:

 wimse://trust.example.com/service/payment
 wimse://trust.example.com/service/payment/instance/1234
 wimse://prod.corp.example/workload/89a6ec51-f877-44c0-9501-b213597f2d1d

4.5.  Stability and Uniqueness

   Workload Identifiers are intended to be stable over time.  An
   identifier assigned to a workload SHOULD NOT be reassigned to a
   different workload unless explicitly intended by the policies of the
   trust domain.  Multiple workload instances MAY share the same
   Workload Identifier when they represent the same logical workload
   within the trust domain.

4.6.  Workload Identifier Origin

   A Workload Identifier Origin is a specification of a namespace under
   which a Workload Identifier is meaningful for a given use case.  An
   origin consists of the URI scheme and trust domain components of a
   Workload Identifier, omitting the path component.

   A Workload Identifier Origin has no path component and is therefore
   not itself a valid Workload Identifier.

   A Workload Identifier Origin is distinct from the Web Origin concept
   defined in [WEB-ORIGIN].  It identifies a workload namespace and does
   not imply the same-origin policy or origin-processing rules defined
   for the Web.

   Workload Identifier Origins serve as hints about the set of
   identifiers an entity may present in a particular protocol instance
   or usage context without revealing a specific identifier.



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   Examples of Workload Identifier Origins:

   spiffe://prod.trust.domain
   wimse://trust.corp.example.com

5.  Identifier Interpretation and Mapping

   Workload Identifiers are carried in credentials and tokens and are
   used for authentication, authorization, and auditing.  However, the
   identifier itself does not define how a workload is reached over the
   network.

   In many deployments, workloads are accessed using external handles
   such as DNS names, service names, load balancer addresses, or routing
   paths.  These handles are deployment-specific and do not necessarily
   match the Workload Identifier presented in credentials.

   To enable correct authentication decisions, WIMSE credentials MUST be
   validated and WIMSE identifiers MUST be processed according to the
   deployment policy.

   In some cases a system may use a mapping function to derive the WIMSE
   identifier for a peer using various pieces of information such as a
   service name and a trust domain.  In this case the correctness of the
   mapping function and the integrity of the mapping information is
   critical.  Failure to ensure the integrity and correctness can result
   in spoofing of workloads.  Consumers MUST NOT assume that the
   Workload Identifier can be derived from network-layer information
   such as IP address, DNS name, or request path without such mapping.

   This mapping is outside the scope of this specification and may be
   provided by configuration, service discovery systems, orchestration
   platforms, or other local policy mechanisms.

   The mapping MAY also be conveyed within a Workload Identity
   Credential, where supported by the credential format and deployment
   policy.  For example, a Workload Identity Certificate can contain
   both a DNS name and a Workload Identifier in its SubjectAltName
   extension (Section 6.1 of [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS]).  WIMSE consumers
   relying on such a mapping MUST validate the credential and check that
   the WIMSE identifier matches the identifier of the system they
   intended to connect to.  It is assumed that the issuer validates the
   binding between the external handle and the Workload Identifier so
   the consumer SHOULD also validate the external handle in the
   credential matches the corresponding external handle arrived at in
   the mapping function.





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   Deployments using Workload Identifiers with the WIMSE credential
   formats defined in [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS] MUST ensure that a consistent
   mapping exists between workload access handles and the Workload
   Identifiers contained in credentials.

6.  Usage in Credentials and Tokens

   Workload Identifiers are designed to be embedded in cryptographic
   credentials and security tokens that are used to assert the identity
   of workloads during authentication, authorization, and auditing.  The
   representation of Workload Identifiers in WIMSE credential formats is
   defined in [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS].

7.  Security Considerations

   A Workload Identifier is intended to be used as a stable identifier
   for a workload identity.  It is not, by itself, verifiable; instead,
   it can be carried in cryptographic credentials, such as X.509
   Workload Identity Certificates (Section 6.1 of [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS])
   or Workload Identity Tokens (Section 5.1 of [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS]),
   that bind the identifier to key material.  Because such credentials
   rely on correct interpretation of the Workload Identifier,
   identifiers need to be protected against spoofing, ambiguity, and
   misinterpretation.  This section outlines security considerations for
   issuers, consumers, and system designers.

7.1.  URI Parsing and Processing Considerations

   Workload Identifiers are encoded as URIs and therefore rely on
   correct and secure URI parsing.  Implementations MUST parse URIs
   according to Section 4.

   Incorrect URI parsing can result in misinterpretation of identifier
   components, security policy bypass, or inconsistent trust domain
   evaluation across implementations.

   Implementations MUST enforce the URI requirements defined in this
   document, including the absence of query, fragment, user information,
   and port components.  Failure to validate these constraints may allow
   identifiers to carry unintended or ambiguous semantics.











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   Implementations MUST validate the received URI before normalization
   can remove evidence of prohibited syntax.  Percent-decoding for
   comparison MUST be limited to unreserved characters and MUST NOT be
   applied repeatedly.  Percent-encoded reserved characters, such as %2F
   (slash), MUST remain encoded during identifier comparison.  All
   components involved in identifier validation and authorization MUST
   apply the comparison rules consistently; inconsistent processing can
   allow authorization checks to be bypassed.

   Implementations MUST also take care to handle Workload Identifiers of
   the maximum supported length without causing excessive memory
   allocation, resource exhaustion, or denial-of-service conditions.
   Implementations MUST NOT reject an otherwise valid Workload
   Identifier on the basis of length if its total length is at most 2048
   bytes.  Implementations MAY reject Workload Identifiers longer than
   2048 bytes according to implementation-defined limits.

7.2.  Identifier Authenticity

   Workload Identifiers MUST only be considered authenticated when
   presented in a credential or token that has been cryptographically
   verified.  An identifier received outside such a context, such as a
   plaintext string in a request, MUST NOT be treated as authenticated.

   Consumers MUST treat a Workload Identifier as authenticated only when
   it is obtained from a credential or token that has been successfully
   validated according to the rules of the credential format and the
   deployment policy.

   Validation requirements for credentials carrying Workload Identifiers
   are defined in [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS] and in the protocols that use
   those credentials.

7.3.  Trust Domain Validation

   Consumers MUST validate that the trust domain in the Workload
   Identifier matches an expected or explicitly trusted domain.  Failure
   to do so may allow identifiers from unauthorized domains to be
   accepted as legitimate.

   Using an FQDN as a trust domain does not itself prove domain
   ownership or authority to issue credentials for that domain.
   Consumers MUST validate credentials using trust anchors associated
   with authorized issuers for that trust domain, as described in
   Section 3 of [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS].

   Where appropriate, consumers SHOULD maintain an allowlist of trusted
   domains or trusted issuing authorities.



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   Trust-domain allowlist matching MUST use the ASCII representation and
   the comparison rules defined in this document.  Displaying
   internationalized names as Unicode can introduce confusion between
   visually similar names; such visual similarity does not establish
   trust-domain equivalence.

7.4.  Identifier Reuse and Collision

   Issuers SHOULD ensure that Workload Identifiers are not reused across
   different workloads unless such reuse is intentional and well-scoped.
   Reassignment of identifiers to unrelated entities can result in
   privilege escalation or confusion in audit trails.

   Consumers SHOULD assume that identifiers are permanent within their
   domain of interpretation and treat unexpected reuse with suspicion.

7.5.  Information Disclosure

   Because Workload Identifiers may encode topological or semantic
   information, they may inadvertently reveal deployment details.
   Issuers and system designers SHOULD take care not to expose sensitive
   naming conventions in externally visible identifiers.

   Descriptive identifier paths are allowed and may be useful for
   auditing, authorization, and operations.  However, deployments that
   use descriptive paths SHOULD evaluate the information disclosure
   trade-offs and avoid exposing details that are not intended to be
   visible to consumers.

7.6.  Wildcard and Prefix Matching

   Consumers SHOULD NOT interpret Workload Identifiers using wildcard or
   prefix matching unless explicitly specified by policy.  For example,
   treating all identifiers under prefix of spiffe://example.org/ns/db/
   as equivalent may lead to incorrect authorization.

8.  IANA Considerations

8.1.  URI Scheme Registration

   IANA is requested to register the "wimse" scheme to the "URI Schemes"
   registry [IANA-URISCHEMES]:

   Scheme name:  wimse

   Status:  permanent

   Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:  any application



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      and protocol interacting with Workload Identifiers.

   Contact:  IETF Chair chair@ietf.org

   Change controller:  IETF

   CRI Scheme Number:  TBA from the First Come First Served range

   References:

   Section 4.4 of this document.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [IDNA]     Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
              RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [URI]      Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.

   [WIMSE-CREDENTIALS]
              Campbell, B., Salowey, J. A., Schwenkschuster, A.,
              Sheffer, Y., and Y. Rosomakho, "WIMSE Workload
              Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-wimse-workload-creds-02, 2 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              workload-creds-02>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [ARCH]     Salowey, J. A., Rosomakho, Y., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE)
              Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-



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              ietf-wimse-arch-08, 6 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              arch-08>.

   [IANA-URISCHEMES]
              IANA, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes>.

   [JWT]      Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

   [SPIFFE-ID]
              "The SPIFFE Identity and Verifiable Identity Document",
              January 2025,
              <https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/
              SPIFFE-ID.md>.

   [WEB-ORIGIN]
              Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6454>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   Authors would like to thank Evan Gilman for his review of the initial
   text of this document and his guidance.

Appendix B.  Changelog

   *RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to publication
   of a final version of this document.

B.1.  since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-00

   *  Defined Workload Identifier Scope

   *  Replaced specifics of usage in credentials and tokens with a
      reference to s2s-creds draft

   *  Added URI requirements

B.2.  since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-01

   *  Changed the term "Scope" to "Origin"

   *  Added wimse URI scheme definition




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   *  Added more alignement and reduced overlap with draft-ietf-wimse-
      workload-creds

   *  Clarified separation of specific workload instances and logical
      workloads

B.3.  since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-02

   *  Soften Information Disclosure considerations

   *  Clarified various definitions

   *  Synced up terminology with other documents

B.4.  since draft-ietf-wimse-identifier-03

   *  Editorial: consistent capitalization of the defined terms
      "Workload Identifier" and "Workload Identity Certificate",
      aligning with draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds and the WIMSE
      protocol drafts

   *  Fixed stale section references into draft-ietf-wimse-workload-
      creds

   *  Updated Identity Mapping section

   *  Workload uniqueness clarifications

Authors' Addresses

   Yaroslav Rosomakho
   Zscaler
   Email: yaroslavros@gmail.com


   Joe Salowey
   Palo Alto Networks
   Email: joe@salowey.net













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