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Workload Identity in Multi System Environments               B. Campbell
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track                              J. Salowey
Expires: 3 May 2027                                   Palo Alto Networks
                                                      A. Schwenkschuster
                                                        Defakto Security
                                                              Y. Sheffer
                                                             Independent
                                                            Y. Rosomakho
                                                                 Zscaler
                                                         30 October 2026


                       WIMSE Workload Credentials
                   draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03

Abstract

   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
   most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
   tenant deployments.

   This document defines the credentials that workloads use to represent
   their identity.  They can be used in various protocols to
   authenticate workloads to each other.  To use these credentials,
   workloads must provide proof of possession of the associated private
   key material, which is covered in other documents.  This document
   focuses on the credentials alone, independent of the proof-of-
   possession mechanism.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-wg-
   wimse.github.io/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol/draft-ietf-wimse-
   workload-creds.html.  Status information for this document may be
   found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-workload-
   creds/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Workload Identity in
   Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list
   (mailto:wimse@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/.





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   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Deployment Architecture and Message Flow  . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Workload Identifiers and Authentication Granularity . . .   6
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Establishing Trust Anchors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  One Workload Identity per Credential  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Application-Layer Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  The Workload Identity Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.1.1.  The WIT HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       5.1.2.  Including Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.1.3.  Validating the WIT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Audience of Application-Layer Proofs  . . . . . . . . . .  13



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     5.3.  Error Conditions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  Coexistence with JWT Bearer Tokens  . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Transport-Layer Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  The Workload Identity Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Client Authorization Using the Workload Identity  . . . . . .  15
   8.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     9.1.  Workload Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     9.2.  Trust Domain Membership and Peer Authentication . . . . .  17
     9.3.  Workload Identity Token and Proof of Possession . . . . .  18
       9.3.1.  Limiting Workload Identity Token Lifespan . . . . . .  18
       9.3.2.  Limiting Proof of Possession Lifespan . . . . . . . .  19
       9.3.3.  Limiting Proof of Possession Scope  . . . . . . . . .  19
       9.3.4.  Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       9.3.5.  Binding to TLS Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.4.  Workload Identity Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       9.4.1.  Limiting Workload Identity Certificate Lifespan . . .  20
     9.5.  Workload Identity Key Management  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.6.  Transport Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   10. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     11.1.  Media Type Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       11.1.1.  application/wit+jwt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     11.2.  Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name
            Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       11.2.1.  Workload-Identity-Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Appendix A.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.1.  draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03  . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.2.  draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-02  . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     A.3.  draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-01  . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     A.4.  draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-00  . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     A.5.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07  . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     A.6.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-06  . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     A.7.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-05  . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     A.8.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-04  . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     A.9.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-03  . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     A.10. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-02  . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     A.11. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-01  . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     A.12. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-00  . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31







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1.  Introduction

   This document defines credentials to facilitate authentication and
   authorization in the context of interaction between two workloads.
   This is the core component of the WIMSE architecture
   [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch].  This document focuses on the credentials that
   carry workload identity and bind the key material to the identity.
   The presentation of the proof of possession of the key material is
   part of other documents and out of scope for this one.

   In this document, two credentials are defined:

   *  The Workload Identity Token (WIT) is a JWT that represents the
      identity of a workload and binds a public key to that identity.

   *  The Workload Identity Certificate (WIC) is an X.509 certificate
      that represents the identity of a workload and binds a public key
      to that identity.

   The Workload Identity Token is targeted for application-layer
   protocols.  The Workload Identity Certificate is targeted for
   transport-layer protocols, primarily mutual TLS.  Presenting a WIT
   over a TLS-protected channel, or binding an application-layer proof
   of possession to TLS session properties (see Section 9.3), does not
   make the WIT a transport-layer credential: mutual TLS authentication
   uses the Workload Identity Certificate, not the WIT.  This does not
   preclude the use of the WIC in application-layer protocols or the WIT
   in transport-layer protocols, but these are the primary intended
   uses.

   The various protocol bindings that use these credentials to
   authenticate workloads to each other are specified in separate
   documents and are out of scope for this document.  Each such binding
   defines how a workload proves possession of the key material bound to
   its credential in order to authenticate to another workload.  At the
   time of writing, three such protocol bindings are defined:

   *  Transport-layer authentication using mutual TLS with the Workload
      Identity Certificate, specified in [I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls].

   *  Application-layer authentication using the Workload Identity Token
      in conjunction with a JWT-based proof of possession, the Workload
      Proof Token (WPT), specified in [I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt].

   *  Application-layer authentication using the Workload Identity Token
      in conjunction with HTTP Message Signatures, specified in
      [I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature].




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1.1.  Deployment Architecture and Message Flow

   This architecture and message flow is part of the broader flow as
   described in Section 3.3 of the WIMSE architecture
   [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch].

   Independent of the transport between the workloads, we assume that
   workloads hold credentials from the same trust domain and that
   following architecture applies:

   +------------+               +------------+
   |            |      (1)      |            |
   |            |<=============>|            |
   |            |               |            |
   | Workload A |      (2)      | Workload B |
   |            |==============>|            |
   |            |               |            |--+
   |            |               |            |  | (3)
   |            |               |            |<-+
   |            |      (4)      |            |
   |            |<==============|            |
   +------------+               +------------+

                      Figure 1: Sequence of Operations

   The high-level message flow is as follows:

   1.  A transport connection is established using TLS server
       authentication for Workload B, optionally incorporating mutual
       TLS (mTLS) with Workload A's Workload Identity Certificate for
       client authentication.

   2.  Workload A prepares to call Workload B.  This may include adding
       application-layer authentication information, such as the
       Workload Identity Token and proof of possession.  Workload B
       authenticates Workload A.

   3.  Workload B authorizes Workload A and the call.

   4.  Workload B returns a response to Workload A, which may be either
       a success or an error response.

   Depending on the protocol, the workload authentication may happen
   during step (1) at the transport-layer or at step (2) at the
   application-layer, or both.






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1.2.  Workload Identifiers and Authentication Granularity

   The Workload Identifier is a URI and its baseline syntax and
   processing requirements are defined in [WIMSE-ID].  While deployments
   define how they assign identifiers and what the path portion means,
   implementations are expected to conform to the URI requirements
   outlined in Section 4.1 of [WIMSE-ID].

   To enable granular authentication between workloads, i.e.,
   authenticate a peer as a specific workload, the following must be in
   place:

   *  Each workload must know its own identifier.

   *  A callee must be able to verify that a request is intended for it.

   *  A caller that authenticates the callee must know the identifier it
      expects the callee to present.

   Once these conditions are met, the methods described in this document
   can be used for the caller and callee to authenticate one another.
   At the transport layer, the client validates the server certificate
   against that expected identifier as described in "Verifying Service
   Identity" of [RFC9525].  At the application layer, the callee
   verifies the audience of the proof of possession (Section 5.2).

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   All terminology in this document follows [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Establishing Trust Anchors

   Trust anchors used to validate Workload Identity Certificates and
   Workload Identity Tokens are associated with a trust domain, as
   discussed in Section 3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch].  They are
   provisioned to consumers together with trust domain metadata for that
   domain.  Trust anchors can be represented in different ways depending
   on the deployment; for example, as a set of public keys (such as a
   JWKS), as an X.509 certification authority used to validate
   certificate chains, or as other deployment-specific material.





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   This document does not define a mechanism for discovering trust
   anchor information.  Consumers MUST associate each trust domain with
   a known, preconfigured issuer (or set of issuers) and with the
   corresponding trust anchors.  That mapping MUST be distributed via a
   secure out-of-band mechanism.  A credential MUST be validated only
   against the anchors bound to the trust domain named in its Workload
   Identifier.

   To validate a WIT, the receiving workload verifies the JWS signature
   using key material from the trust anchors configured for the trust
   domain in the sub claim.  Trust anchor material for WIT validation
   MAY include more than one public key so that operators can rotate
   signing keys.  In practice, the alg header parameter would identify
   an algorithm that the validator accepts for that trust domain, and
   the signature would be checked under a key drawn from the configured
   trust anchors.  If the JWS header contains a kid parameter, the
   validator would use the key in the trust anchor material with the
   same kid value.  If kid is absent, deployment policy would need to
   provide unambiguous key selection (for example, when only a single
   key is configured for that trust domain).  Recipient processing of a
   presented WIT is specified in Section 5.1.3.

   For Workload Identity Certificates, validators use the trust anchors
   for the peer's trust domain to validate the X.509 chain and the
   Workload Identifier in the certificate, as described in Section 6.1
   and in companion specifications such as [I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls].

4.  One Workload Identity per Credential

   Each WIMSE credential carries exactly one Workload Identifier
   ([WIMSE-ID]) that is used for authentication and authorization.
   Requiring a single identifier per credential keeps authorization and
   auditing unambiguous and aligns with common practice for workload
   X.509 certificates (for example, a single URI in an X.509-SVID).

   For a Workload Identity Token, that identifier is the value of the
   sub claim.  For a Workload Identity Certificate, that identifier is
   carried in the single URI SubjectAltName described in Section 6.1.
   Multiple credentials of the same Workload Identifier may be
   differentiated using other fields such as the optional jti claim.

5.  Application-Layer Credentials

   In many deployments communication between workloads cannot use end-
   to-end transport security such as TLS.  For these deployment styles,
   this document proposes a credential that can be used at the
   application-layer.




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5.1.  The Workload Identity Token

   The Workload Identity Token (WIT) is a JWS [RFC7515] signed JWT
   [RFC7519] that represents the identity of a workload.  It is issued
   by the Identity Server and binds a public key to the workload
   identity.  See Section 9.5 for security considerations.

   A WIT MUST contain the following content, except where noted:

   *  in the JOSE header:

      -  alg: An identifier for a JWS asymmetric digital signature
         algorithm (registered algorithm identifiers are listed in the
         IANA JOSE Algorithms registry [IANA.JOSE.ALGS]).  The value
         none MUST NOT be used.

      -  typ: the WIT is explicitly typed, as recommended in
         Section 3.11 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-rfc8725bis], using the wit+jwt
         media type.

   *  in the JWT claims:

      -  iss: The issuer of the token, which is the Identity Server,
         represented by a URI.  The iss claim is RECOMMENDED but
         optional; See Section 5.1.2 for details.

      -  sub: The subject is the Workload Identifier as defined in
         [WIMSE-ID], constrained to exactly one per credential
         (Section 4).

      -  exp: The expiration time of the token (as defined in
         Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519]).  WITs should be refreshed
         regularly, e.g., on the order of hours.

      -  jti: A unique identifier for the token (as defined in
         Section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519]).  This claim is OPTIONAL.  The jti
         claim is useful for auditing the issuance of individual WITs,
         and it is needed to identify individual tokens in deployments
         that operate an optional token status or deny-list mechanism
         (Section 9.3.1).  Some token generation environments do not
         support it.

      -  cnf: A confirmation claim referencing the public key of the
         workload.

         o  jwk: Within the cnf claim, a jwk key MUST be present that
            contains the public key of the workload as defined in
            Section 3.2 of [RFC7800].  The workload MUST prove



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            possession of the corresponding private key when presenting
            the WIT to another party.  As such, it MUST NOT be used as a
            bearer token and is not intended for use in the
            Authorization header.

            +  alg: Within the jwk object, an alg field MUST be present.
               Allowed values are listed in the IANA "JSON Web Signature
               and Encryption Algorithms" registry established by
               [RFC7518].  The presented proof MUST be produced with the
               algorithm specified in this field.  The value none MUST
               NOT be used.  Algorithms used in combination with
               symmetric keys MUST NOT be used.  Also encryption
               algorithms MUST NOT be used as this would require
               additional key distribution outside of the WIT.  To
               promote interoperability, the ES256 signing algorithm
               MUST be supported by general purpose implementations of
               this document.

   As noted in [WIMSE-ID], a Workload Identifier is a URI that includes
   a trust domain in the authority component.  The runtime environment
   often determines which URI scheme is used, e.g., if SPIFFE is used to
   authenticate workloads, it mandates spiffe URIs.  For deployments
   that do not use an environment-specific scheme, the wimse URI scheme
   can be used; it is defined in [WIMSE-ID].

   An example WIT might look like this:

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ikp1bmUgNSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjb\
   mYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTkiLCJjcnYiOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia3R5IjoiT\
   0tQIiwieCI6IjFDWFh2ZmxOX0xWVnNJc1lYc1V2QjAzSm1sR1dlQ0hxUVZ1b3VDRjkyY\
   mcifX0sImV4cCI6MTc0NTUxMjUxMCwiaWF0IjoxNzQ1NTA4OTEwLCJqdGkiOiJ4LV8xQ\
   1RMMmNjYTNDU0U0Y3diX2wiLCJzdWIiOiJ3aW1zZTovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3NwZWNpZ\
   mljLXdvcmtsb2FkIn0.4kNF4FP1dshxHrFub2kRusiV9qK_xrGi0pbLG5hpOS3fR0izY\
   Zu5lPHei94TTvOvORJPT9jSVT-C6IIBattDbg

             Figure 2: An example Workload Identity Token (WIT)

   The decoded JOSE header of the WIT from the example above is shown
   here:

   {
     "alg": "ES256",
     "kid": "June 5",
     "typ": "wit+jwt"
   }




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                     Figure 3: Example WIT JOSE Header

   The decoded JWT claims of the WIT from the example above are shown
   here:

   {
     "cnf": {
       "jwk": {
         "alg": "Ed25519",
         "crv": "Ed25519",
         "kty": "OKP",
         "x": "1CXXvflN_LVVsIsYXsUvB03JmlGWeCHqQVuouCF92bg"
       }
     },
     "exp": 1745512510,
     "iat": 1745508910,
     "jti": "x-_1CTL2cca3CSE4cwb_l",
     "sub": "wimse://example.com/specific-workload"
   }

          Figure 4: Example WIT claims, including an `iat` claim,
                     demonstrating WIT's extensibility

   The example omits the recommended iss claim; see Section 5.1 and
   Section 5.1.2.

   The claims indicate that the example WIT:

   *  is valid until Thu Apr 24 2025 16:35:10 GMT (represented as
      NumericDate Section 2 of [RFC7519] value 1745512510).

   *  identifies the workload to which the token was issued as
      wimse://example.com/specific-workload.

   *  has a unique identifier of x-_1CTL2cca3CSE4cwb_l.

   *  binds the public key represented by the jwk confirmation method to
      the workload wimse://example.com/specific-workload.

   *  requires the proof to be produced with the Ed25519 signature
      algorithm.

   For elucidative purposes only, the workload's key, including the
   private part, is shown below in JWK [RFC7517] format:







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   {
    "kty": "OKP",
    "crv": "Ed25519",
    "x": "1CXXvflN_LVVsIsYXsUvB03JmlGWeCHqQVuouCF92bg",
    "d": "sdLX8yCYKqo_XvGBLn-ZWeKT7llYeeQpgeCaXVxb5kY"
   }

                      Figure 5: Example Workload's Key

   The example WIT is signed with one of the Identity Server's signing
   keys; the JOSE header kid identifies which key was used.  Validators
   use the Identity Server's public keys from the trust anchors
   configured for that trust domain to verify the signature (see
   Section 3).  The Identity Server's public key from this example is
   shown below in JWK [RFC7517] format:

   {
    "kty": "EC",
    "kid": "June 5",
    "crv": "P-256",
    "x": "kXqnA2Op7hgd4zRMbw0iFcc_hDxUxhojxOFVGjE2gks",
    "y": "n__VndPMR021-59UAs0b9qDTFT-EZtT6xSNs_xFskLo"
   }

                   Figure 6: Example Identity Server Key

5.1.1.  The WIT HTTP Header

   A WIT is conveyed in an HTTP header field named Workload-Identity-
   Token.

   ABNF [RFC5234] for the value of Workload-Identity-Token header field
   is provided in Figure 7:

   ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z
   DIGIT = %x30-39 ; 0-9
   base64url = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_")
   JWT =  base64url "." base64url "." base64url
   WIT =  JWT

            Figure 7: Workload-Identity-Token Header Field ABNF

   The following shows the WIT from Figure 2 in an example of a
   Workload-Identity-Token header field:







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   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   Workload-Identity-Token: eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ikp1bmUgNSIsInR\
   5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTkiLCJjcnYi\
   OiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwieCI6IjFDWFh2ZmxOX0xWVnNJc1lYc1V2QjAz\
   Sm1sR1dlQ0hxUVZ1b3VDRjkyYmcifX0sImV4cCI6MTc0NTUxMjUxMCwiaWF0IjoxNzQ1\
   NTA4OTEwLCJqdGkiOiJ4LV8xQ1RMMmNjYTNDU0U0Y3diX2wiLCJzdWIiOiJ3aW1zZTov\
   L2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3NwZWNpZmljLXdvcmtsb2FkIn0.4kNF4FP1dshxHrFub2kRusiV\
   9qK_xrGi0pbLG5hpOS3fR0izYZu5lPHei94TTvOvORJPT9jSVT-C6IIBattDbg

       Figure 8: An example Workload Identity Token HTTP Header Field

   Note that per [RFC9110], header field names are case insensitive;
   thus, Workload-Identity-Token, workload-identity-token, WORKLOAD-
   IDENTITY-TOKEN, etc., are all valid and equivalent header field
   names.  However, case is significant in the header field value.

5.1.2.  Including Additional Claims

   The WIT contains JSON structures and therefore can be trivially
   extended by adding more claims beyond those defined in the current
   document.  This, however, could result in interoperability issues,
   which the following rules are addressing.

   *  To ensure interoperability in WIMSE environments, the use of
      Private claim names (Section 4.3 of [RFC7519]) is NOT RECOMMENDED.

   *  In closed environments, deployers MAY freely add claims to the
      WIT.  Such claims SHOULD be collision-resistant, such as
      example.com/myclaim.

   *  A recipient that does not understand such claims MUST ignore them,
      as per Section 4 of [RFC7519].

   *  Outside of closed environments, new claims MUST be registered with
      IANA [IANA.JWT.CLAIMS] before they can be used.

   It is RECOMMENDED that the WIT carries an iss claim for the auditing
   and operational uses described above.  Validators are not required to
   use iss when validating the WIT or establishing the workload
   identity: the trust domain and workload identity are carried in the
   mandatory sub claim ([WIMSE-ID]).

5.1.3.  Validating the WIT

   Verification of a WIT follows [RFC7515] and the JWT best practices in
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-rfc8725bis], with the WIMSE-specific requirements
   below.  To validate a WIT, the recipient MUST ensure the following:



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   *  The token is a single well-formed JWT using JWS compact
      serialization ([RFC7515], [RFC7519]).

   *  The sub claim is present and is a single Workload Identifier
      ([WIMSE-ID], Section 4).  The recipient uses the trust domain of
      that identifier to select the configured trust anchors
      (Section 3).

   *  The typ JOSE header parameter conveys a media type of wit+jwt.

   *  The JWS signature is valid under those trust anchors, as described
      in Section 3.

   *  The cnf claim is present and contains a jwk object with an alg
      member as specified in Section 5.1.

   *  Additional claims that are not understood are ignored, as
      specified in Section 5.1.2.

   See Section 9.3.1 for WIT lifetime considerations.

5.2.  Audience of Application-Layer Proofs

   The Workload Identifier in a WIT identifies the sender.  The audience
   of the proof of possession that accompanies the WIT identifies the
   intended recipient.  A recipient MUST verify that the audience refers
   to it, using trusted configuration rather than request fields such as
   Host, because intermediaries may rewrite the request URI.  Each
   proof-of-possession mechanism defines how the audience is set and
   validated; see "Audience validation" in [I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt] and "The
   wimse-aud Signature Parameter" in [I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature].

5.3.  Error Conditions

   Errors may occur during the processing of the WIT.  If the WIT
   validation fails for any reason, such as an invalid signature, an
   expired validity time window, or a malformed data structure, an error
   is returned.  Typically, this will be in response to an API call, so
   an HTTP status code such as 400 (Bad Request) is appropriate.  This
   response could include more details as per [RFC9457], such as an
   indicator that the wrong key material or algorithm was used.  Using
   the HTTP status code 401 is only recommended for this purpose when an
   acceptable HTTP authentication mechanism exists that can be returned
   with the WWW-Authenticate HTTP header.







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5.4.  Coexistence with JWT Bearer Tokens

   The WIT defines new HTTP headers.  It can therefore be presented
   along with existing headers used for JWT bearer tokens.  This
   property allows for transition from mechanisms using identity tokens
   based on bearer JWTs to proof-of-possession-based WITs.  A workload
   may implement a policy that accepts both bearer tokens and WITs
   during a transition period.  This policy may be configurable per-
   caller to allow the workload to reject bearer tokens from callers
   that support WITs.  Once a deployment fully supports WITs, then the
   use of bearer tokens for identity can be disabled through policy.
   Implementations should be careful when implementing such a transition
   strategy, since the decision which token to prefer is made when the
   caller's identity has still not been authenticated, and needs to be
   revalidated following the authentication step.

   The WIT can also coexist with tokens used to establish security
   context, such as transaction tokens
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens].  In this case a workload's
   authorization policy may take into account both the sending
   workload's identity and the information in the context token.  For
   example, the identity in the WIT may be used to establish which API
   calls can be made and information in the context token may be used to
   determine which specific resources can be accessed.

6.  Transport-Layer Credentials

   As noted in the introduction, for many deployments, transport-layer
   protection of application traffic is ideal.

6.1.  The Workload Identity Certificate

   The Workload Identity Certificate is an X.509 certificate.  The
   Workload Identifier used for WIMSE authentication and authorization
   MUST appear in exactly one SubjectAltName extension of type URI, as
   required by Section 4.  The certificate MUST NOT contain more than
   one URI SAN that carries a Workload Identifier.

   When the certificate is also used for TLS server authentication, it
   is RECOMMENDED to include SubjectAltName extensions of type DNSName
   with the appropriate DNS names for clients that validate the server
   by host name rather than by workload identity.  The certificate MAY
   contain SubjectAltName extensions of other types for PKIX or local
   policy, but only the URI SAN above is the WIMSE workload identity.







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7.  Client Authorization Using the Workload Identity

   The receiving application uses the authenticated peer's Workload
   Identifier in authorization, accounting, and auditing.  For example,
   the full Workload Identifier may be matched against ACLs to authorize
   actions requested by the peer and the identifier may be included in
   log messages to associate actions to the client workload for audit
   purposes.  A deployment may specify other authorization policies
   based on the specific details of how the Workload Identifier is
   constructed.  The path portion of the Workload Identifier MUST always
   be considered in the scope of the trust domain.  See Section 1.2 on
   additional security implications of Workload Identifiers.

   How the receiving application obtains the Workload Identifier depends
   on the credential used to authenticate the peer:

   *  Application-layer: After successfully validating the WIT, the
      receiving application retrieves the Workload Identifier from the
      sub claim.

   *  Transport-layer: When the client is authenticated with a Workload
      Identity Certificate, the receiving application retrieves the
      Workload Identifier from the client certificate's SubjectAltName
      extension of type URI.

   A workload MAY use other standard and deployment specific fields in
   the workload credential for accounting or authorization purposes.

8.  Implementation Status


   // Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section, as well as the
   // reference to RFC 7942, before publication.

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this document at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.





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   According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

   SPIFFE (Standard)

   *  Organization: CNCF

   *  Maturity:

      -  Workload Identity Certificate: fully compatible with the
         X509-SVID and widely used.

      -  Workload Identity Token: beta

   *  Coverage: Workload Identity Certificate, WIT

   *  Contact: SPIFFE sig-spec community
      (https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/tree/main/community/sig-spec)

   Defakto Security

   *  Organization: Defakto Security (prior SPIRL)

   *  Maturity:

      -  Workload Identity Certificate: production

      -  Workload Identity Token: alpha

   *  Coverage: Workload Identity Certificate, WIT

   *  Contact: arndt@defakto.security

   Teleport - Machine & Workload Identity

   *  Organization: Teleport

   *  Maturity:

      -  Workload Identity Certificate: production

      -  Workload Identity Token: research

   *  Coverage: Workload Identity Certificate



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   *  Contact: noah@goteleport.com

   wimsey

   *  Organization: independent

   *  Implementation: https://github.com/kanywst/wimsey
      (https://github.com/kanywst/wimsey)

   *  Maturity:

      -  Workload Identity Token: alpha

      -  Workload Identity Certificate: alpha

   *  Coverage: WIT, Workload Identity Certificate

   *  Contact: kanywst on GitHub (https://github.com/kanywst)

9.  Security Considerations

9.1.  Workload Identity

   Workload Identifiers ([WIMSE-ID]) are scoped to a trust domain (the
   URI authority component) and MUST be interpreted in that trust domain
   context.  Using a Workload Identifier without taking into account the
   trust domain could allow one domain to issue tokens to spoof
   identities in another domain.  Similarly, a validator that obtains
   key material from the credential itself, for example by resolving the
   iss claim of a WIT to a key set, would accept credentials from any
   entity able to operate an issuer.  The pre-configured binding of
   trust domains to authorized issuers and trust anchors described in
   Section 3 prevents both attacks.

9.2.  Trust Domain Membership and Peer Authentication

   Validating a peer's credential against the trust anchors for a trust
   domain establishes that the peer belongs to that trust domain, but
   does not by itself establish which workload the peer represents.  The
   additional identity comparison described in Section 1.2 is required
   to make that distinction.  This affects both sides of a call,
   workloads acting as clients and workloads acting as servers.

   Proof of possession does not mitigate this vulnerability.  It shows
   that the peer holds the private key for the credential it presented
   (Section 9.3), but it does not prove the identity itself.  The same
   consideration applies when a Workload Identity Certificate is used at
   the transport layer.



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   Deprovisioning a workload instance or stopping credential issuance
   does not invalidate its existing WITs or WICs.  If the corresponding
   private key remains usable, these credentials can still support
   authentication until expiry, including any permitted clock skew,
   unless relying parties reject them earlier, for example through
   revocation.  Credential lifetimes therefore affect the residual
   exposure after deprovisioning or detection of compromise.  If
   multiple instances use the same Workload Identifier, the identifier
   alone cannot distinguish them for authorization or auditing.

9.3.  Workload Identity Token and Proof of Possession

   The Workload Identity Token (WIT) is bound to a secret cryptographic
   key and is always presented with a proof of possession (PoP) as
   described in Section 5.1.  The WIT is a general purpose token that
   can be presented in multiple contexts.  The WIT and its PoP are used
   for application-layer authentication; they are not used as the client
   or server credential for mutual TLS, which uses the Workload Identity
   Certificate (Section 6.1).  The WIT MUST NOT be used as a bearer
   token.  While this helps reduce the sensitivity of the token it is
   still possible that a token and its PoP may be captured and replayed
   within the PoP's lifetime.  The following are some mitigations for
   the capture and reuse of the WIT and its PoP:

9.3.1.  Limiting Workload Identity Token Lifespan

   The WIT MUST have a limited lifetime expressed through the exp claim.
   If both a WIT and its corresponding private key are compromised, an
   attacker can impersonate the workload until the WIT expires.  Because
   JWT-based credentials such as the WIT are not revocable on demand, a
   short expiration is the primary mitigation against continued use of a
   compromised WIT and key.  WITs SHOULD therefore be short-lived,
   typically on the order of hours, with the chosen lifetime balancing
   the operational cost of frequent refresh against the window of
   exposure if a credential is compromised.

   This document does not define a revocation mechanism for WITs and
   does not rely on one; validators are not required to consult any
   token status service.  Deployments MAY nevertheless operate such a
   mechanism as a defense in depth measure, for example a Token Status
   List [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list] or a deny-list of jti values.  A
   deployment that does so MUST include the jti claim (Section 5.1) in
   every WIT, because a WIT without a jti cannot be identified
   individually.  Such mechanisms are subject to a propagation delay
   during which a revoked WIT may still be accepted, and their use does
   not relax the requirement for short WIT lifetimes.





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9.3.2.  Limiting Proof of Possession Lifespan

   The PoP MUST be time limited.  A PoP should only be valid over the
   time necessary for it to be successfully used for the purpose it is
   needed.  This will typically be on the order of minutes.  PoPs
   received outside their validity time MUST be rejected.

9.3.3.  Limiting Proof of Possession Scope

   In order to reduce the risk of theft and replay the PoP should have a
   limited scope.  For example, a PoP may be targeted for use with a
   specific workload and even a specific transaction to reduce the
   impact of a stolen PoP.  In some cases a workload may wish to reuse a
   PoP for a period of time or have it accepted by multiple target
   workloads.  A careful analysis is warranted to understand the impacts
   to the system if a PoP is disclosed allowing it to be presented by an
   attacker along with a captured WIT.

9.3.4.  Replay Protection

   PoP mechanisms should include replay protection to prevent reuse of a
   captured PoP.  Without it an attacker can replay a captured PoP
   within its validity period.

9.3.5.  Binding to TLS Endpoint

   The PoP MAY be bound to a transport layer sender such as the client
   identity of a TLS session or TLS channel binding parameters.  The
   mechanisms for binding are outside the scope of this document.

9.4.  Workload Identity Certificate

   The Workload Identity Certificate carries the Workload Identifier in
   a single URI SubjectAltName (Section 6.1).  As with the WIT, the
   identifier is meaningful only within its trust domain.  A relying
   party MUST validate the certificate against the trust anchors
   configured for the peer's trust domain (Section 3) and MUST reject
   the certificate if the Workload Identifier is not within that trust
   domain and the trust anchor used.  Evaluating the path or other
   components of the identifier without also considering the trust
   domain and the trust anchor can allow one trust domain to impersonate
   workloads in another.  Protocol-specific certificate validation
   requirements are defined in [I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls].








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9.4.1.  Limiting Workload Identity Certificate Lifespan

   Workload Identity Certificates are frequently issued to dynamic and/
   or short-lived workloads.  Deployments SHOULD use certificate
   lifetimes appropriate to the workload environment, typically on a
   similar scale to WITs (Section 9.3).  Long-lived certificates
   increase the impact of private-key compromise.  As with WITs, short
   certificate lifetimes are the primary mitigation against continued
   use of a compromised key; this document does not rely on certificate
   revocation lists (CRLs) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
   [RFC6960] for WICs, although deployments MAY use them as a defense in
   depth measure.

   The lifetime of Workload Identity Certificates is bounded by the
   lifetime and rotation cadence of the trust anchors of the trust
   domain (Section 3).  Compromise of a trust anchor permits issuance of
   certificates for the trust domain for as long as that anchor remains
   trusted.  Deployments should therefore consider leaf and trust-anchor
   lifetimes together rather than the leaf lifetime in isolation.

9.5.  Workload Identity Key Management

   Both the Workload Identity Token and the Workload Identity
   Certificate carry a public key.  The corresponding private key:

   *  MUST be kept private

   *  MUST be bound to a single Workload Identifier ([WIMSE-ID])

   *  MUST NOT be used once the credential is expired

   *  SHOULD be regenerated for each new Workload Identity Token or
      Certificate, unless the key is sufficiently protected, e.g., non-
      exportable and hardware-bound.

   For purposes of this section, keeping the private key private means
   that the private key is not intentionally disclosed outside the
   workload instance or an authorized signing component, is not placed
   in credentials, logs, images, configuration artifacts, or bearer
   tokens, and is not made available to intermediaries except as part of
   an explicitly trusted signing service.  Compromise or disclosure of
   the private key invalidates the security assumptions of the
   associated WIT or WIC.  This document does not require a particular
   key-protection mechanism; deployments that require stronger
   properties such as non-exportability, hardware-backed protection, or
   binding to a measured runtime need additional deployment-specific
   evidence or profile requirements.  Verifiers must not infer such
   stronger properties from the WIT or WIC alone.



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9.6.  Transport Security

   An attacker observing or intercepting the communication channel can
   view the Workload Identity Token and its PoP and attempt to replay
   them to gain an advantage.  To prevent this, the WIT and its PoP MUST
   be sent over a secure, server-authenticated TLS connection unless a
   secure channel is provided by some other mechanism.

   In some deployments the Workload Identity Token and PoP may pass
   through multiple systems.  Communication between systems is over TLS,
   but the token and PoP are available in the clear at each
   intermediary.  While an intermediary cannot modify the token or the
   information within the PoP, it can attempt to capture and replay the
   token or modify data not protected by the PoP.  Mitigations listed in
   Section 9.3 can reduce this risk.  Deployments should analyze their
   situation to determine whether it is appropriate to trust and allow
   traffic to pass through a middlebox.

10.  Privacy Considerations

   WITs and PoPs may contain private information such as user names or
   other identities.  Care should be taken to prevent the disclosure of
   this information.  The use of TLS helps protect the privacy of WITs
   and PoPs in transit.  Workload Identity Certificates likewise expose
   the Workload Identifier, and any attributes carried in the
   certificate, to the peer, to any TLS-terminating intermediary, and to
   logs; in particular, client-certificate authentication discloses the
   client's workload identity to the server during the TLS handshake.

   WITs and certificates with Workload Identifiers are typically
   associated with a workload and not a specific user, however in some
   deployments the workload may be associated directly to a user.  While
   these are exceptional cases a deployment should evaluate if the
   disclosure of WITs or certificates can be used to track a user.

11.  IANA Considerations

11.1.  Media Type Registration

   IANA is requested to register the following entries to the "Media
   Types" registry [IANA.MEDIA.TYPES]:

   *  application/wit+jwt, per Section 11.1.1.

11.1.1.  application/wit+jwt

   Type name: application




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   Subtype name: wit+jwt

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: Encoding considerations are identical to
   those specified for the application/jwt media type.  See [RFC7519].

   Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of
   RFC XXX.

   Interoperability considerations: N/A

   Published specification: RFC XXX, Section 5.1.

   Applications that use this media type: Identity Servers that issue
   Workload Identity Tokens, and workloads that use these tokens to
   authenticate to each other.

   Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   Additional information:

   Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

   Magic number(s): N/A

   File extension(s): None

   Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   Person & email address to contact for further information:

   See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC XXX.

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC XXX.

   Change controller: Internet Engineering Task Force (iesg@ietf.org).

11.2.  Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registration

   IANA is requested to register the following entries to the "Hypertext
   Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" [IANA.HTTP.FIELDS]:



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   *  Workload-Identity-Token, per Section 11.2.1.

11.2.1.  Workload-Identity-Token

   *  Field Name: Workload-Identity-Token

   *  Status: permanent

   *  Structured Type: N/A

   *  Specification Document: RFC XXX, Section 5.1.1

   *  Comments: see reference above for an ABNF syntax of this field

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-rfc8725bis]
              Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. B. Jones, "JSON Web Token
              Best Current Practices", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-oauth-rfc8725bis-10, 21 August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              rfc8725bis-10>.

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls]
              Salowey, J. A. and Y. Rosomakho, "Workload Authentication
              Using Mutual TLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-wimse-mutual-tls-03, 24 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              mutual-tls-03>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.






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   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

   [RFC9525]  Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS",
              RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.

   [WIMSE-ID] Rosomakho, Y. and J. A. Salowey, "Workload Identifier",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-
              identifier-04, 23 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              identifier-04>.

12.2.  Informative References









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   [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list]
              Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
              List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              status-list-21>.

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens]
              Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman,
              "Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11, 30 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              transaction-tokens-11>.

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch]
              Salowey, J. A., Rosomakho, Y., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE)
              Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-wimse-arch-08, 6 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              arch-08>.

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature]
              Salowey, J. A. and Y. Sheffer, "WIMSE Workload-to-Workload
              Authentication with HTTP Signatures", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08, 20
              October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08>.

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt]
              Campbell, B. and A. Schwenkschuster, "WIMSE Workload Proof
              Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              wimse-wpt-02, 27 August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              wpt-02>.

   [IANA.HTTP.FIELDS]
              IANA, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name
              Registry", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields>.

   [IANA.JOSE.ALGS]
              IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose>.

   [IANA.JWT.CLAIMS]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.




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   [IANA.MEDIA.TYPES]
              IANA, "Media Types",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.

   [RFC9457]  Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details
              for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, DOI 10.17487/RFC9457, July 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457>.

   [RFC9864]  Jones, M.B. and O. Steele, "Fully-Specified Algorithms for
              JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object
              Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9864,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9864, October 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9864>.

Appendix A.  Document History


   // RFC Editor: please remove before publication.

A.1.  draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03

   *  Replace the access-path-to-identifier mapping API with conditions
      for caller and callee, and add a short subsection on the audience
      of application-layer proofs (#173, #175).

   *  Added a section to describe the security considerations of
      granular authentication.

   *  Use the fully-specified Ed25519 algorithm identifier in the
      examples instead of the deprecated EdDSA ([RFC9864]).

   *  Add a WIT validation procedure for recipients (#290, #294).

   *  Clarify that WIT/PoP are application-layer credentials and are not
      used for mutual TLS; TLS binding does not change that (#256).

   *  Simplify the one-Workload-Identifier-per-credential section
      (#395).

   *  State the WIC revocation stance: short lifetimes like WITs; no CRL
      reliance (#270).




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   *  State the WIT revocation stance and resolve the conflicting jti
      description: the document does not rely on revocation, but
      deployments may operate a token status list or jti deny-list, in
      which case jti is required in every WIT (#269).

   *  Editorial: consistent use of "proof of possession"/"PoP", with the
      abbreviation expanded on first use, and consistent capitalization
      of the defined term "Workload Identifier".

   *  Remove superfluous 'Use In Other Protocols' subsection that
      basically just said what amounts to "other specs can reference
      this"

   *  Retitle Application-Layer and Transport-Layer Workload-to-Workload
      Authentication to Application-Layer and Transport-Layer
      Credentials to clarify that these are credentials, not
      authentication protocols.

   *  say what it means to keep the private key private and that reuse
      of a key is probably okay when it's non-exportable and hardware-
      protected

   *  Reduce some normative and definitional duplication

   *  Point to draft-ietf-wimse-arch's "Trust Domain" from "Establishing
      Trust Anchors"

   *  Define sub a little more cleanly

   *  fix various editorial nits

   *  Try to clarify always server and sometimes client authentication
      in the transport bullet of the Message Flow breakdown

   *  Attempt some clarification of the Authentication Granularity
      section and reference RFC9525 for server certificate name
      validation

   *  Allow HTTP 401 for WIT errors when a WWW-Authenticate mechanism
      exists (#402).

   *  Validate credentials only against their trust domain's anchors
      (#370).

   *  Simplify iss text; remove iss-based key distribution (#411).

   *  Add exposure window after deprovisioning or compromise (#393).




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   *  Remove Identity Server, PEP and PDP from the architecture diagram
      (#303).

A.2.  draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-02

   *  Add a section requiring exactly one Workload Identifier per
      credential (the sub claim for a WIT, a single URI SubjectAltName
      for a WIC).

   *  Add a Trust Anchors section and clarify WIT validation, key
      selection, and key rotation.

   *  Rework the Security Considerations, including WIT lifetime, WIC
      validation and lifetime, and privacy of the workload identifier.

   *  Generalize client authorization to cover both the WIT and the WIC.

   *  Reference the protocol binding documents (mutual TLS, WPT, and
      HTTP Message Signatures).

   *  Rename "level" to "layer" throughout.

A.3.  draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-01

   *  Clarify that the iss claim is RECOMMENDED in part for auditing and
      operations, and that validation of workload identity uses sub, not
      iss.

   *  Remove the wimse URI scheme definition and IANA registration from
      this document; both are specified in [WIMSE-ID].

A.4.  draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-00

   *  Remove WPT, HTTP-Sig and mutual TLS sections, which are going to
      be covered by individual documents.  This includes re-phrasing of
      various sections to focus on the credentials only.

A.5.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07

   *  Rework the WPT's oth claim.

   *  update the media types.

   *  Discuss extensibility of WIT and WPT.

   *  Clarify error handling, specifically why not HTTP 401.

   *  Correct the code examples.



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   *  Add registration request content for a wimse URI scheme.

   *  New section on key management.

   *  Use of the Accept-Signature header.

A.6.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-06

   *  Explicit definition of the Workload Identity Certificate.

   *  Definition of the validation of workload identifiers as part of
      workload authentication.  Still work in progress.

A.7.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-05

   *  Removed the entire Workload Identity section which is now covered
      in the Architecture document.

   *  Content-Digest is mandatory with HTTP-Sig.

   *  Some wording on extending the protocol beyond HTTP.

   *  IANA considerations.

A.8.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-04

   *  Require cnf.jwk.alg in WIT which restricts signature algorithm of
      WPT or HTTP-Sig.

   *  Replay protection as a SHOULD for both WPT and HTTP-Sig.

   *  Consolidate terminology with the Architecture draft.

A.9.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-03

   *  Consistently use "workload".

   *  Implement comments from the SPIFFE community.

   *  Make iss claim in WIT optional and add wording about its relation
      to key distribution.

   *  Remove iss claim from WPT.

   *  Make jti claim in WIT optional.

   *  Error handling for the application-level methods.




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A.10.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-02

   *  Coexistence with bearer tokens.

   *  Improve the architecture diagram.

   *  Some more ABNF.

   *  Clarified identifiers and URIs.

   *  Moved an author to acknowledgments.

A.11.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-01

   *  Addressed multiple comments from Pieter.

   *  Clarified WIMSE identity concepts, specifically "trust domain" and
      "workload identifier".

   *  Much more detail around mTLS, including some normative language.

   *  WIT (the identity token) is now included in the WPT proof of
      possession.

   *  Added a section comparing the DPoP-inspired app-level security
      option to the Message Signature-based alternative.

A.12.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-00

   *  Initial WG draft, an exact copy of draft-sheffer-wimse-s2s-
      protocol-00

   *  Added this document history section

Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Pieter Kasselman for his detailed
   comments.

   We thank Daniel Feldman for his contributions to earlier versions of
   this document.

   Additional thanks to the WIMSE working group for the feedback and
   discussions that helped shape this specification, including, but not
   limited to, Andrii Deinega, Flemming Andreasen, Jean-François "Jeff"
   Lombardo, Karthik Rampalli, and Songbo Bu.





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Authors' Addresses

   Brian Campbell
   Ping Identity
   Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com


   Joe Salowey
   Palo Alto Networks
   Email: joe@salowey.net


   Arndt Schwenkschuster
   Defakto Security
   Email: arndts.ietf@gmail.com


   Yaron Sheffer
   Independent
   Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com


   Yaroslav Rosomakho
   Zscaler
   Email: yrosomakho@zscaler.com


























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