Workload Identity in Multi System Environments B. Campbell
Internet-Draft Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track J. Salowey
Expires: 3 May 2027 Palo Alto Networks
A. Schwenkschuster
Defakto Security
Y. Sheffer
Independent
Y. Rosomakho
Zscaler
30 October 2026
WIMSE Workload Credentials
draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03
Abstract
The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from the
most basic ones up to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-
tenant deployments.
This document defines the credentials that workloads use to represent
their identity. They can be used in various protocols to
authenticate workloads to each other. To use these credentials,
workloads must provide proof of possession of the associated private
key material, which is covered in other documents. This document
focuses on the credentials alone, independent of the proof-of-
possession mechanism.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-wg-
wimse.github.io/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol/draft-ietf-wimse-
workload-creds.html. Status information for this document may be
found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-workload-
creds/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Workload Identity in
Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list
(mailto:wimse@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/.
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Deployment Architecture and Message Flow . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Workload Identifiers and Authentication Granularity . . . 6
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Establishing Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. One Workload Identity per Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Application-Layer Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. The Workload Identity Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. The WIT HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.2. Including Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.3. Validating the WIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Audience of Application-Layer Proofs . . . . . . . . . . 13
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5.3. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4. Coexistence with JWT Bearer Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Transport-Layer Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. The Workload Identity Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Client Authorization Using the Workload Identity . . . . . . 15
8. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1. Workload Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.2. Trust Domain Membership and Peer Authentication . . . . . 17
9.3. Workload Identity Token and Proof of Possession . . . . . 18
9.3.1. Limiting Workload Identity Token Lifespan . . . . . . 18
9.3.2. Limiting Proof of Possession Lifespan . . . . . . . . 19
9.3.3. Limiting Proof of Possession Scope . . . . . . . . . 19
9.3.4. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.3.5. Binding to TLS Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.4. Workload Identity Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.4.1. Limiting Workload Identity Certificate Lifespan . . . 20
9.5. Workload Identity Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.6. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.1.1. application/wit+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.2. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name
Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.2.1. Workload-Identity-Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.1. draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03 . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.2. draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.3. draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.4. draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.5. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.6. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.7. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.8. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.9. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.10. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A.11. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A.12. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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1. Introduction
This document defines credentials to facilitate authentication and
authorization in the context of interaction between two workloads.
This is the core component of the WIMSE architecture
[I-D.ietf-wimse-arch]. This document focuses on the credentials that
carry workload identity and bind the key material to the identity.
The presentation of the proof of possession of the key material is
part of other documents and out of scope for this one.
In this document, two credentials are defined:
* The Workload Identity Token (WIT) is a JWT that represents the
identity of a workload and binds a public key to that identity.
* The Workload Identity Certificate (WIC) is an X.509 certificate
that represents the identity of a workload and binds a public key
to that identity.
The Workload Identity Token is targeted for application-layer
protocols. The Workload Identity Certificate is targeted for
transport-layer protocols, primarily mutual TLS. Presenting a WIT
over a TLS-protected channel, or binding an application-layer proof
of possession to TLS session properties (see Section 9.3), does not
make the WIT a transport-layer credential: mutual TLS authentication
uses the Workload Identity Certificate, not the WIT. This does not
preclude the use of the WIC in application-layer protocols or the WIT
in transport-layer protocols, but these are the primary intended
uses.
The various protocol bindings that use these credentials to
authenticate workloads to each other are specified in separate
documents and are out of scope for this document. Each such binding
defines how a workload proves possession of the key material bound to
its credential in order to authenticate to another workload. At the
time of writing, three such protocol bindings are defined:
* Transport-layer authentication using mutual TLS with the Workload
Identity Certificate, specified in [I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls].
* Application-layer authentication using the Workload Identity Token
in conjunction with a JWT-based proof of possession, the Workload
Proof Token (WPT), specified in [I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt].
* Application-layer authentication using the Workload Identity Token
in conjunction with HTTP Message Signatures, specified in
[I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature].
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1.1. Deployment Architecture and Message Flow
This architecture and message flow is part of the broader flow as
described in Section 3.3 of the WIMSE architecture
[I-D.ietf-wimse-arch].
Independent of the transport between the workloads, we assume that
workloads hold credentials from the same trust domain and that
following architecture applies:
+------------+ +------------+
| | (1) | |
| |<=============>| |
| | | |
| Workload A | (2) | Workload B |
| |==============>| |
| | | |--+
| | | | | (3)
| | | |<-+
| | (4) | |
| |<==============| |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 1: Sequence of Operations
The high-level message flow is as follows:
1. A transport connection is established using TLS server
authentication for Workload B, optionally incorporating mutual
TLS (mTLS) with Workload A's Workload Identity Certificate for
client authentication.
2. Workload A prepares to call Workload B. This may include adding
application-layer authentication information, such as the
Workload Identity Token and proof of possession. Workload B
authenticates Workload A.
3. Workload B authorizes Workload A and the call.
4. Workload B returns a response to Workload A, which may be either
a success or an error response.
Depending on the protocol, the workload authentication may happen
during step (1) at the transport-layer or at step (2) at the
application-layer, or both.
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1.2. Workload Identifiers and Authentication Granularity
The Workload Identifier is a URI and its baseline syntax and
processing requirements are defined in [WIMSE-ID]. While deployments
define how they assign identifiers and what the path portion means,
implementations are expected to conform to the URI requirements
outlined in Section 4.1 of [WIMSE-ID].
To enable granular authentication between workloads, i.e.,
authenticate a peer as a specific workload, the following must be in
place:
* Each workload must know its own identifier.
* A callee must be able to verify that a request is intended for it.
* A caller that authenticates the callee must know the identifier it
expects the callee to present.
Once these conditions are met, the methods described in this document
can be used for the caller and callee to authenticate one another.
At the transport layer, the client validates the server certificate
against that expected identifier as described in "Verifying Service
Identity" of [RFC9525]. At the application layer, the callee
verifies the audience of the proof of possession (Section 5.2).
2. Conventions and Definitions
All terminology in this document follows [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Establishing Trust Anchors
Trust anchors used to validate Workload Identity Certificates and
Workload Identity Tokens are associated with a trust domain, as
discussed in Section 3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch]. They are
provisioned to consumers together with trust domain metadata for that
domain. Trust anchors can be represented in different ways depending
on the deployment; for example, as a set of public keys (such as a
JWKS), as an X.509 certification authority used to validate
certificate chains, or as other deployment-specific material.
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This document does not define a mechanism for discovering trust
anchor information. Consumers MUST associate each trust domain with
a known, preconfigured issuer (or set of issuers) and with the
corresponding trust anchors. That mapping MUST be distributed via a
secure out-of-band mechanism. A credential MUST be validated only
against the anchors bound to the trust domain named in its Workload
Identifier.
To validate a WIT, the receiving workload verifies the JWS signature
using key material from the trust anchors configured for the trust
domain in the sub claim. Trust anchor material for WIT validation
MAY include more than one public key so that operators can rotate
signing keys. In practice, the alg header parameter would identify
an algorithm that the validator accepts for that trust domain, and
the signature would be checked under a key drawn from the configured
trust anchors. If the JWS header contains a kid parameter, the
validator would use the key in the trust anchor material with the
same kid value. If kid is absent, deployment policy would need to
provide unambiguous key selection (for example, when only a single
key is configured for that trust domain). Recipient processing of a
presented WIT is specified in Section 5.1.3.
For Workload Identity Certificates, validators use the trust anchors
for the peer's trust domain to validate the X.509 chain and the
Workload Identifier in the certificate, as described in Section 6.1
and in companion specifications such as [I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls].
4. One Workload Identity per Credential
Each WIMSE credential carries exactly one Workload Identifier
([WIMSE-ID]) that is used for authentication and authorization.
Requiring a single identifier per credential keeps authorization and
auditing unambiguous and aligns with common practice for workload
X.509 certificates (for example, a single URI in an X.509-SVID).
For a Workload Identity Token, that identifier is the value of the
sub claim. For a Workload Identity Certificate, that identifier is
carried in the single URI SubjectAltName described in Section 6.1.
Multiple credentials of the same Workload Identifier may be
differentiated using other fields such as the optional jti claim.
5. Application-Layer Credentials
In many deployments communication between workloads cannot use end-
to-end transport security such as TLS. For these deployment styles,
this document proposes a credential that can be used at the
application-layer.
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5.1. The Workload Identity Token
The Workload Identity Token (WIT) is a JWS [RFC7515] signed JWT
[RFC7519] that represents the identity of a workload. It is issued
by the Identity Server and binds a public key to the workload
identity. See Section 9.5 for security considerations.
A WIT MUST contain the following content, except where noted:
* in the JOSE header:
- alg: An identifier for a JWS asymmetric digital signature
algorithm (registered algorithm identifiers are listed in the
IANA JOSE Algorithms registry [IANA.JOSE.ALGS]). The value
none MUST NOT be used.
- typ: the WIT is explicitly typed, as recommended in
Section 3.11 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-rfc8725bis], using the wit+jwt
media type.
* in the JWT claims:
- iss: The issuer of the token, which is the Identity Server,
represented by a URI. The iss claim is RECOMMENDED but
optional; See Section 5.1.2 for details.
- sub: The subject is the Workload Identifier as defined in
[WIMSE-ID], constrained to exactly one per credential
(Section 4).
- exp: The expiration time of the token (as defined in
Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519]). WITs should be refreshed
regularly, e.g., on the order of hours.
- jti: A unique identifier for the token (as defined in
Section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519]). This claim is OPTIONAL. The jti
claim is useful for auditing the issuance of individual WITs,
and it is needed to identify individual tokens in deployments
that operate an optional token status or deny-list mechanism
(Section 9.3.1). Some token generation environments do not
support it.
- cnf: A confirmation claim referencing the public key of the
workload.
o jwk: Within the cnf claim, a jwk key MUST be present that
contains the public key of the workload as defined in
Section 3.2 of [RFC7800]. The workload MUST prove
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possession of the corresponding private key when presenting
the WIT to another party. As such, it MUST NOT be used as a
bearer token and is not intended for use in the
Authorization header.
+ alg: Within the jwk object, an alg field MUST be present.
Allowed values are listed in the IANA "JSON Web Signature
and Encryption Algorithms" registry established by
[RFC7518]. The presented proof MUST be produced with the
algorithm specified in this field. The value none MUST
NOT be used. Algorithms used in combination with
symmetric keys MUST NOT be used. Also encryption
algorithms MUST NOT be used as this would require
additional key distribution outside of the WIT. To
promote interoperability, the ES256 signing algorithm
MUST be supported by general purpose implementations of
this document.
As noted in [WIMSE-ID], a Workload Identifier is a URI that includes
a trust domain in the authority component. The runtime environment
often determines which URI scheme is used, e.g., if SPIFFE is used to
authenticate workloads, it mandates spiffe URIs. For deployments
that do not use an environment-specific scheme, the wimse URI scheme
can be used; it is defined in [WIMSE-ID].
An example WIT might look like this:
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ikp1bmUgNSIsInR5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjb\
mYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTkiLCJjcnYiOiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia3R5IjoiT\
0tQIiwieCI6IjFDWFh2ZmxOX0xWVnNJc1lYc1V2QjAzSm1sR1dlQ0hxUVZ1b3VDRjkyY\
mcifX0sImV4cCI6MTc0NTUxMjUxMCwiaWF0IjoxNzQ1NTA4OTEwLCJqdGkiOiJ4LV8xQ\
1RMMmNjYTNDU0U0Y3diX2wiLCJzdWIiOiJ3aW1zZTovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3NwZWNpZ\
mljLXdvcmtsb2FkIn0.4kNF4FP1dshxHrFub2kRusiV9qK_xrGi0pbLG5hpOS3fR0izY\
Zu5lPHei94TTvOvORJPT9jSVT-C6IIBattDbg
Figure 2: An example Workload Identity Token (WIT)
The decoded JOSE header of the WIT from the example above is shown
here:
{
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "June 5",
"typ": "wit+jwt"
}
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Figure 3: Example WIT JOSE Header
The decoded JWT claims of the WIT from the example above are shown
here:
{
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"alg": "Ed25519",
"crv": "Ed25519",
"kty": "OKP",
"x": "1CXXvflN_LVVsIsYXsUvB03JmlGWeCHqQVuouCF92bg"
}
},
"exp": 1745512510,
"iat": 1745508910,
"jti": "x-_1CTL2cca3CSE4cwb_l",
"sub": "wimse://example.com/specific-workload"
}
Figure 4: Example WIT claims, including an `iat` claim,
demonstrating WIT's extensibility
The example omits the recommended iss claim; see Section 5.1 and
Section 5.1.2.
The claims indicate that the example WIT:
* is valid until Thu Apr 24 2025 16:35:10 GMT (represented as
NumericDate Section 2 of [RFC7519] value 1745512510).
* identifies the workload to which the token was issued as
wimse://example.com/specific-workload.
* has a unique identifier of x-_1CTL2cca3CSE4cwb_l.
* binds the public key represented by the jwk confirmation method to
the workload wimse://example.com/specific-workload.
* requires the proof to be produced with the Ed25519 signature
algorithm.
For elucidative purposes only, the workload's key, including the
private part, is shown below in JWK [RFC7517] format:
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{
"kty": "OKP",
"crv": "Ed25519",
"x": "1CXXvflN_LVVsIsYXsUvB03JmlGWeCHqQVuouCF92bg",
"d": "sdLX8yCYKqo_XvGBLn-ZWeKT7llYeeQpgeCaXVxb5kY"
}
Figure 5: Example Workload's Key
The example WIT is signed with one of the Identity Server's signing
keys; the JOSE header kid identifies which key was used. Validators
use the Identity Server's public keys from the trust anchors
configured for that trust domain to verify the signature (see
Section 3). The Identity Server's public key from this example is
shown below in JWK [RFC7517] format:
{
"kty": "EC",
"kid": "June 5",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "kXqnA2Op7hgd4zRMbw0iFcc_hDxUxhojxOFVGjE2gks",
"y": "n__VndPMR021-59UAs0b9qDTFT-EZtT6xSNs_xFskLo"
}
Figure 6: Example Identity Server Key
5.1.1. The WIT HTTP Header
A WIT is conveyed in an HTTP header field named Workload-Identity-
Token.
ABNF [RFC5234] for the value of Workload-Identity-Token header field
is provided in Figure 7:
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z
DIGIT = %x30-39 ; 0-9
base64url = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_")
JWT = base64url "." base64url "." base64url
WIT = JWT
Figure 7: Workload-Identity-Token Header Field ABNF
The following shows the WIT from Figure 2 in an example of a
Workload-Identity-Token header field:
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=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
Workload-Identity-Token: eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ikp1bmUgNSIsInR\
5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkMjU1MTkiLCJjcnYi\
OiJFZDI1NTE5Iiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwieCI6IjFDWFh2ZmxOX0xWVnNJc1lYc1V2QjAz\
Sm1sR1dlQ0hxUVZ1b3VDRjkyYmcifX0sImV4cCI6MTc0NTUxMjUxMCwiaWF0IjoxNzQ1\
NTA4OTEwLCJqdGkiOiJ4LV8xQ1RMMmNjYTNDU0U0Y3diX2wiLCJzdWIiOiJ3aW1zZTov\
L2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3NwZWNpZmljLXdvcmtsb2FkIn0.4kNF4FP1dshxHrFub2kRusiV\
9qK_xrGi0pbLG5hpOS3fR0izYZu5lPHei94TTvOvORJPT9jSVT-C6IIBattDbg
Figure 8: An example Workload Identity Token HTTP Header Field
Note that per [RFC9110], header field names are case insensitive;
thus, Workload-Identity-Token, workload-identity-token, WORKLOAD-
IDENTITY-TOKEN, etc., are all valid and equivalent header field
names. However, case is significant in the header field value.
5.1.2. Including Additional Claims
The WIT contains JSON structures and therefore can be trivially
extended by adding more claims beyond those defined in the current
document. This, however, could result in interoperability issues,
which the following rules are addressing.
* To ensure interoperability in WIMSE environments, the use of
Private claim names (Section 4.3 of [RFC7519]) is NOT RECOMMENDED.
* In closed environments, deployers MAY freely add claims to the
WIT. Such claims SHOULD be collision-resistant, such as
example.com/myclaim.
* A recipient that does not understand such claims MUST ignore them,
as per Section 4 of [RFC7519].
* Outside of closed environments, new claims MUST be registered with
IANA [IANA.JWT.CLAIMS] before they can be used.
It is RECOMMENDED that the WIT carries an iss claim for the auditing
and operational uses described above. Validators are not required to
use iss when validating the WIT or establishing the workload
identity: the trust domain and workload identity are carried in the
mandatory sub claim ([WIMSE-ID]).
5.1.3. Validating the WIT
Verification of a WIT follows [RFC7515] and the JWT best practices in
[I-D.ietf-oauth-rfc8725bis], with the WIMSE-specific requirements
below. To validate a WIT, the recipient MUST ensure the following:
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* The token is a single well-formed JWT using JWS compact
serialization ([RFC7515], [RFC7519]).
* The sub claim is present and is a single Workload Identifier
([WIMSE-ID], Section 4). The recipient uses the trust domain of
that identifier to select the configured trust anchors
(Section 3).
* The typ JOSE header parameter conveys a media type of wit+jwt.
* The JWS signature is valid under those trust anchors, as described
in Section 3.
* The cnf claim is present and contains a jwk object with an alg
member as specified in Section 5.1.
* Additional claims that are not understood are ignored, as
specified in Section 5.1.2.
See Section 9.3.1 for WIT lifetime considerations.
5.2. Audience of Application-Layer Proofs
The Workload Identifier in a WIT identifies the sender. The audience
of the proof of possession that accompanies the WIT identifies the
intended recipient. A recipient MUST verify that the audience refers
to it, using trusted configuration rather than request fields such as
Host, because intermediaries may rewrite the request URI. Each
proof-of-possession mechanism defines how the audience is set and
validated; see "Audience validation" in [I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt] and "The
wimse-aud Signature Parameter" in [I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature].
5.3. Error Conditions
Errors may occur during the processing of the WIT. If the WIT
validation fails for any reason, such as an invalid signature, an
expired validity time window, or a malformed data structure, an error
is returned. Typically, this will be in response to an API call, so
an HTTP status code such as 400 (Bad Request) is appropriate. This
response could include more details as per [RFC9457], such as an
indicator that the wrong key material or algorithm was used. Using
the HTTP status code 401 is only recommended for this purpose when an
acceptable HTTP authentication mechanism exists that can be returned
with the WWW-Authenticate HTTP header.
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5.4. Coexistence with JWT Bearer Tokens
The WIT defines new HTTP headers. It can therefore be presented
along with existing headers used for JWT bearer tokens. This
property allows for transition from mechanisms using identity tokens
based on bearer JWTs to proof-of-possession-based WITs. A workload
may implement a policy that accepts both bearer tokens and WITs
during a transition period. This policy may be configurable per-
caller to allow the workload to reject bearer tokens from callers
that support WITs. Once a deployment fully supports WITs, then the
use of bearer tokens for identity can be disabled through policy.
Implementations should be careful when implementing such a transition
strategy, since the decision which token to prefer is made when the
caller's identity has still not been authenticated, and needs to be
revalidated following the authentication step.
The WIT can also coexist with tokens used to establish security
context, such as transaction tokens
[I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens]. In this case a workload's
authorization policy may take into account both the sending
workload's identity and the information in the context token. For
example, the identity in the WIT may be used to establish which API
calls can be made and information in the context token may be used to
determine which specific resources can be accessed.
6. Transport-Layer Credentials
As noted in the introduction, for many deployments, transport-layer
protection of application traffic is ideal.
6.1. The Workload Identity Certificate
The Workload Identity Certificate is an X.509 certificate. The
Workload Identifier used for WIMSE authentication and authorization
MUST appear in exactly one SubjectAltName extension of type URI, as
required by Section 4. The certificate MUST NOT contain more than
one URI SAN that carries a Workload Identifier.
When the certificate is also used for TLS server authentication, it
is RECOMMENDED to include SubjectAltName extensions of type DNSName
with the appropriate DNS names for clients that validate the server
by host name rather than by workload identity. The certificate MAY
contain SubjectAltName extensions of other types for PKIX or local
policy, but only the URI SAN above is the WIMSE workload identity.
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7. Client Authorization Using the Workload Identity
The receiving application uses the authenticated peer's Workload
Identifier in authorization, accounting, and auditing. For example,
the full Workload Identifier may be matched against ACLs to authorize
actions requested by the peer and the identifier may be included in
log messages to associate actions to the client workload for audit
purposes. A deployment may specify other authorization policies
based on the specific details of how the Workload Identifier is
constructed. The path portion of the Workload Identifier MUST always
be considered in the scope of the trust domain. See Section 1.2 on
additional security implications of Workload Identifiers.
How the receiving application obtains the Workload Identifier depends
on the credential used to authenticate the peer:
* Application-layer: After successfully validating the WIT, the
receiving application retrieves the Workload Identifier from the
sub claim.
* Transport-layer: When the client is authenticated with a Workload
Identity Certificate, the receiving application retrieves the
Workload Identifier from the client certificate's SubjectAltName
extension of type URI.
A workload MAY use other standard and deployment specific fields in
the workload credential for accounting or authorization purposes.
8. Implementation Status
// Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section, as well as the
// reference to RFC 7942, before publication.
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this document at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
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According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
SPIFFE (Standard)
* Organization: CNCF
* Maturity:
- Workload Identity Certificate: fully compatible with the
X509-SVID and widely used.
- Workload Identity Token: beta
* Coverage: Workload Identity Certificate, WIT
* Contact: SPIFFE sig-spec community
(https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/tree/main/community/sig-spec)
Defakto Security
* Organization: Defakto Security (prior SPIRL)
* Maturity:
- Workload Identity Certificate: production
- Workload Identity Token: alpha
* Coverage: Workload Identity Certificate, WIT
* Contact: arndt@defakto.security
Teleport - Machine & Workload Identity
* Organization: Teleport
* Maturity:
- Workload Identity Certificate: production
- Workload Identity Token: research
* Coverage: Workload Identity Certificate
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* Contact: noah@goteleport.com
wimsey
* Organization: independent
* Implementation: https://github.com/kanywst/wimsey
(https://github.com/kanywst/wimsey)
* Maturity:
- Workload Identity Token: alpha
- Workload Identity Certificate: alpha
* Coverage: WIT, Workload Identity Certificate
* Contact: kanywst on GitHub (https://github.com/kanywst)
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Workload Identity
Workload Identifiers ([WIMSE-ID]) are scoped to a trust domain (the
URI authority component) and MUST be interpreted in that trust domain
context. Using a Workload Identifier without taking into account the
trust domain could allow one domain to issue tokens to spoof
identities in another domain. Similarly, a validator that obtains
key material from the credential itself, for example by resolving the
iss claim of a WIT to a key set, would accept credentials from any
entity able to operate an issuer. The pre-configured binding of
trust domains to authorized issuers and trust anchors described in
Section 3 prevents both attacks.
9.2. Trust Domain Membership and Peer Authentication
Validating a peer's credential against the trust anchors for a trust
domain establishes that the peer belongs to that trust domain, but
does not by itself establish which workload the peer represents. The
additional identity comparison described in Section 1.2 is required
to make that distinction. This affects both sides of a call,
workloads acting as clients and workloads acting as servers.
Proof of possession does not mitigate this vulnerability. It shows
that the peer holds the private key for the credential it presented
(Section 9.3), but it does not prove the identity itself. The same
consideration applies when a Workload Identity Certificate is used at
the transport layer.
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Deprovisioning a workload instance or stopping credential issuance
does not invalidate its existing WITs or WICs. If the corresponding
private key remains usable, these credentials can still support
authentication until expiry, including any permitted clock skew,
unless relying parties reject them earlier, for example through
revocation. Credential lifetimes therefore affect the residual
exposure after deprovisioning or detection of compromise. If
multiple instances use the same Workload Identifier, the identifier
alone cannot distinguish them for authorization or auditing.
9.3. Workload Identity Token and Proof of Possession
The Workload Identity Token (WIT) is bound to a secret cryptographic
key and is always presented with a proof of possession (PoP) as
described in Section 5.1. The WIT is a general purpose token that
can be presented in multiple contexts. The WIT and its PoP are used
for application-layer authentication; they are not used as the client
or server credential for mutual TLS, which uses the Workload Identity
Certificate (Section 6.1). The WIT MUST NOT be used as a bearer
token. While this helps reduce the sensitivity of the token it is
still possible that a token and its PoP may be captured and replayed
within the PoP's lifetime. The following are some mitigations for
the capture and reuse of the WIT and its PoP:
9.3.1. Limiting Workload Identity Token Lifespan
The WIT MUST have a limited lifetime expressed through the exp claim.
If both a WIT and its corresponding private key are compromised, an
attacker can impersonate the workload until the WIT expires. Because
JWT-based credentials such as the WIT are not revocable on demand, a
short expiration is the primary mitigation against continued use of a
compromised WIT and key. WITs SHOULD therefore be short-lived,
typically on the order of hours, with the chosen lifetime balancing
the operational cost of frequent refresh against the window of
exposure if a credential is compromised.
This document does not define a revocation mechanism for WITs and
does not rely on one; validators are not required to consult any
token status service. Deployments MAY nevertheless operate such a
mechanism as a defense in depth measure, for example a Token Status
List [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list] or a deny-list of jti values. A
deployment that does so MUST include the jti claim (Section 5.1) in
every WIT, because a WIT without a jti cannot be identified
individually. Such mechanisms are subject to a propagation delay
during which a revoked WIT may still be accepted, and their use does
not relax the requirement for short WIT lifetimes.
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9.3.2. Limiting Proof of Possession Lifespan
The PoP MUST be time limited. A PoP should only be valid over the
time necessary for it to be successfully used for the purpose it is
needed. This will typically be on the order of minutes. PoPs
received outside their validity time MUST be rejected.
9.3.3. Limiting Proof of Possession Scope
In order to reduce the risk of theft and replay the PoP should have a
limited scope. For example, a PoP may be targeted for use with a
specific workload and even a specific transaction to reduce the
impact of a stolen PoP. In some cases a workload may wish to reuse a
PoP for a period of time or have it accepted by multiple target
workloads. A careful analysis is warranted to understand the impacts
to the system if a PoP is disclosed allowing it to be presented by an
attacker along with a captured WIT.
9.3.4. Replay Protection
PoP mechanisms should include replay protection to prevent reuse of a
captured PoP. Without it an attacker can replay a captured PoP
within its validity period.
9.3.5. Binding to TLS Endpoint
The PoP MAY be bound to a transport layer sender such as the client
identity of a TLS session or TLS channel binding parameters. The
mechanisms for binding are outside the scope of this document.
9.4. Workload Identity Certificate
The Workload Identity Certificate carries the Workload Identifier in
a single URI SubjectAltName (Section 6.1). As with the WIT, the
identifier is meaningful only within its trust domain. A relying
party MUST validate the certificate against the trust anchors
configured for the peer's trust domain (Section 3) and MUST reject
the certificate if the Workload Identifier is not within that trust
domain and the trust anchor used. Evaluating the path or other
components of the identifier without also considering the trust
domain and the trust anchor can allow one trust domain to impersonate
workloads in another. Protocol-specific certificate validation
requirements are defined in [I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls].
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9.4.1. Limiting Workload Identity Certificate Lifespan
Workload Identity Certificates are frequently issued to dynamic and/
or short-lived workloads. Deployments SHOULD use certificate
lifetimes appropriate to the workload environment, typically on a
similar scale to WITs (Section 9.3). Long-lived certificates
increase the impact of private-key compromise. As with WITs, short
certificate lifetimes are the primary mitigation against continued
use of a compromised key; this document does not rely on certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
[RFC6960] for WICs, although deployments MAY use them as a defense in
depth measure.
The lifetime of Workload Identity Certificates is bounded by the
lifetime and rotation cadence of the trust anchors of the trust
domain (Section 3). Compromise of a trust anchor permits issuance of
certificates for the trust domain for as long as that anchor remains
trusted. Deployments should therefore consider leaf and trust-anchor
lifetimes together rather than the leaf lifetime in isolation.
9.5. Workload Identity Key Management
Both the Workload Identity Token and the Workload Identity
Certificate carry a public key. The corresponding private key:
* MUST be kept private
* MUST be bound to a single Workload Identifier ([WIMSE-ID])
* MUST NOT be used once the credential is expired
* SHOULD be regenerated for each new Workload Identity Token or
Certificate, unless the key is sufficiently protected, e.g., non-
exportable and hardware-bound.
For purposes of this section, keeping the private key private means
that the private key is not intentionally disclosed outside the
workload instance or an authorized signing component, is not placed
in credentials, logs, images, configuration artifacts, or bearer
tokens, and is not made available to intermediaries except as part of
an explicitly trusted signing service. Compromise or disclosure of
the private key invalidates the security assumptions of the
associated WIT or WIC. This document does not require a particular
key-protection mechanism; deployments that require stronger
properties such as non-exportability, hardware-backed protection, or
binding to a measured runtime need additional deployment-specific
evidence or profile requirements. Verifiers must not infer such
stronger properties from the WIT or WIC alone.
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9.6. Transport Security
An attacker observing or intercepting the communication channel can
view the Workload Identity Token and its PoP and attempt to replay
them to gain an advantage. To prevent this, the WIT and its PoP MUST
be sent over a secure, server-authenticated TLS connection unless a
secure channel is provided by some other mechanism.
In some deployments the Workload Identity Token and PoP may pass
through multiple systems. Communication between systems is over TLS,
but the token and PoP are available in the clear at each
intermediary. While an intermediary cannot modify the token or the
information within the PoP, it can attempt to capture and replay the
token or modify data not protected by the PoP. Mitigations listed in
Section 9.3 can reduce this risk. Deployments should analyze their
situation to determine whether it is appropriate to trust and allow
traffic to pass through a middlebox.
10. Privacy Considerations
WITs and PoPs may contain private information such as user names or
other identities. Care should be taken to prevent the disclosure of
this information. The use of TLS helps protect the privacy of WITs
and PoPs in transit. Workload Identity Certificates likewise expose
the Workload Identifier, and any attributes carried in the
certificate, to the peer, to any TLS-terminating intermediary, and to
logs; in particular, client-certificate authentication discloses the
client's workload identity to the server during the TLS handshake.
WITs and certificates with Workload Identifiers are typically
associated with a workload and not a specific user, however in some
deployments the workload may be associated directly to a user. While
these are exceptional cases a deployment should evaluate if the
disclosure of WITs or certificates can be used to track a user.
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. Media Type Registration
IANA is requested to register the following entries to the "Media
Types" registry [IANA.MEDIA.TYPES]:
* application/wit+jwt, per Section 11.1.1.
11.1.1. application/wit+jwt
Type name: application
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Subtype name: wit+jwt
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: Encoding considerations are identical to
those specified for the application/jwt media type. See [RFC7519].
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of
RFC XXX.
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: RFC XXX, Section 5.1.
Applications that use this media type: Identity Servers that issue
Workload Identity Tokens, and workloads that use these tokens to
authenticate to each other.
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): None
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:
See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC XXX.
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC XXX.
Change controller: Internet Engineering Task Force (iesg@ietf.org).
11.2. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registration
IANA is requested to register the following entries to the "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" [IANA.HTTP.FIELDS]:
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* Workload-Identity-Token, per Section 11.2.1.
11.2.1. Workload-Identity-Token
* Field Name: Workload-Identity-Token
* Status: permanent
* Structured Type: N/A
* Specification Document: RFC XXX, Section 5.1.1
* Comments: see reference above for an ABNF syntax of this field
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-rfc8725bis]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. B. Jones, "JSON Web Token
Best Current Practices", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-oauth-rfc8725bis-10, 21 August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
rfc8725bis-10>.
[I-D.ietf-wimse-mutual-tls]
Salowey, J. A. and Y. Rosomakho, "Workload Authentication
Using Mutual TLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-wimse-mutual-tls-03, 24 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
mutual-tls-03>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
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[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9525] Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS",
RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.
[WIMSE-ID] Rosomakho, Y. and J. A. Salowey, "Workload Identifier",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-
identifier-04, 23 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
identifier-04>.
12.2. Informative References
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[I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list]
Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-status-list-21, 21 June 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
status-list-21>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens]
Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman,
"Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11, 30 July 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
transaction-tokens-11>.
[I-D.ietf-wimse-arch]
Salowey, J. A., Rosomakho, Y., and H. Tschofenig,
"Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-wimse-arch-08, 6 July 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
arch-08>.
[I-D.ietf-wimse-http-signature]
Salowey, J. A. and Y. Sheffer, "WIMSE Workload-to-Workload
Authentication with HTTP Signatures", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08, 20
October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08>.
[I-D.ietf-wimse-wpt]
Campbell, B. and A. Schwenkschuster, "WIMSE Workload Proof
Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
wimse-wpt-02, 27 August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
wpt-02>.
[IANA.HTTP.FIELDS]
IANA, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name
Registry", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields>.
[IANA.JOSE.ALGS]
IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose>.
[IANA.JWT.CLAIMS]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
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[IANA.MEDIA.TYPES]
IANA, "Media Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.
[RFC9457] Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details
for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, DOI 10.17487/RFC9457, July 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457>.
[RFC9864] Jones, M.B. and O. Steele, "Fully-Specified Algorithms for
JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object
Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9864,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9864, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9864>.
Appendix A. Document History
// RFC Editor: please remove before publication.
A.1. draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03
* Replace the access-path-to-identifier mapping API with conditions
for caller and callee, and add a short subsection on the audience
of application-layer proofs (#173, #175).
* Added a section to describe the security considerations of
granular authentication.
* Use the fully-specified Ed25519 algorithm identifier in the
examples instead of the deprecated EdDSA ([RFC9864]).
* Add a WIT validation procedure for recipients (#290, #294).
* Clarify that WIT/PoP are application-layer credentials and are not
used for mutual TLS; TLS binding does not change that (#256).
* Simplify the one-Workload-Identifier-per-credential section
(#395).
* State the WIC revocation stance: short lifetimes like WITs; no CRL
reliance (#270).
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* State the WIT revocation stance and resolve the conflicting jti
description: the document does not rely on revocation, but
deployments may operate a token status list or jti deny-list, in
which case jti is required in every WIT (#269).
* Editorial: consistent use of "proof of possession"/"PoP", with the
abbreviation expanded on first use, and consistent capitalization
of the defined term "Workload Identifier".
* Remove superfluous 'Use In Other Protocols' subsection that
basically just said what amounts to "other specs can reference
this"
* Retitle Application-Layer and Transport-Layer Workload-to-Workload
Authentication to Application-Layer and Transport-Layer
Credentials to clarify that these are credentials, not
authentication protocols.
* say what it means to keep the private key private and that reuse
of a key is probably okay when it's non-exportable and hardware-
protected
* Reduce some normative and definitional duplication
* Point to draft-ietf-wimse-arch's "Trust Domain" from "Establishing
Trust Anchors"
* Define sub a little more cleanly
* fix various editorial nits
* Try to clarify always server and sometimes client authentication
in the transport bullet of the Message Flow breakdown
* Attempt some clarification of the Authentication Granularity
section and reference RFC9525 for server certificate name
validation
* Allow HTTP 401 for WIT errors when a WWW-Authenticate mechanism
exists (#402).
* Validate credentials only against their trust domain's anchors
(#370).
* Simplify iss text; remove iss-based key distribution (#411).
* Add exposure window after deprovisioning or compromise (#393).
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* Remove Identity Server, PEP and PDP from the architecture diagram
(#303).
A.2. draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-02
* Add a section requiring exactly one Workload Identifier per
credential (the sub claim for a WIT, a single URI SubjectAltName
for a WIC).
* Add a Trust Anchors section and clarify WIT validation, key
selection, and key rotation.
* Rework the Security Considerations, including WIT lifetime, WIC
validation and lifetime, and privacy of the workload identifier.
* Generalize client authorization to cover both the WIT and the WIC.
* Reference the protocol binding documents (mutual TLS, WPT, and
HTTP Message Signatures).
* Rename "level" to "layer" throughout.
A.3. draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-01
* Clarify that the iss claim is RECOMMENDED in part for auditing and
operations, and that validation of workload identity uses sub, not
iss.
* Remove the wimse URI scheme definition and IANA registration from
this document; both are specified in [WIMSE-ID].
A.4. draft-ietf-wimse-workload-creds-00
* Remove WPT, HTTP-Sig and mutual TLS sections, which are going to
be covered by individual documents. This includes re-phrasing of
various sections to focus on the credentials only.
A.5. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07
* Rework the WPT's oth claim.
* update the media types.
* Discuss extensibility of WIT and WPT.
* Clarify error handling, specifically why not HTTP 401.
* Correct the code examples.
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* Add registration request content for a wimse URI scheme.
* New section on key management.
* Use of the Accept-Signature header.
A.6. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-06
* Explicit definition of the Workload Identity Certificate.
* Definition of the validation of workload identifiers as part of
workload authentication. Still work in progress.
A.7. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-05
* Removed the entire Workload Identity section which is now covered
in the Architecture document.
* Content-Digest is mandatory with HTTP-Sig.
* Some wording on extending the protocol beyond HTTP.
* IANA considerations.
A.8. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-04
* Require cnf.jwk.alg in WIT which restricts signature algorithm of
WPT or HTTP-Sig.
* Replay protection as a SHOULD for both WPT and HTTP-Sig.
* Consolidate terminology with the Architecture draft.
A.9. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-03
* Consistently use "workload".
* Implement comments from the SPIFFE community.
* Make iss claim in WIT optional and add wording about its relation
to key distribution.
* Remove iss claim from WPT.
* Make jti claim in WIT optional.
* Error handling for the application-level methods.
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A.10. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-02
* Coexistence with bearer tokens.
* Improve the architecture diagram.
* Some more ABNF.
* Clarified identifiers and URIs.
* Moved an author to acknowledgments.
A.11. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-01
* Addressed multiple comments from Pieter.
* Clarified WIMSE identity concepts, specifically "trust domain" and
"workload identifier".
* Much more detail around mTLS, including some normative language.
* WIT (the identity token) is now included in the WPT proof of
possession.
* Added a section comparing the DPoP-inspired app-level security
option to the Message Signature-based alternative.
A.12. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-00
* Initial WG draft, an exact copy of draft-sheffer-wimse-s2s-
protocol-00
* Added this document history section
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Pieter Kasselman for his detailed
comments.
We thank Daniel Feldman for his contributions to earlier versions of
this document.
Additional thanks to the WIMSE working group for the feedback and
discussions that helped shape this specification, including, but not
limited to, Andrii Deinega, Flemming Andreasen, Jean-François "Jeff"
Lombardo, Karthik Rampalli, and Songbo Bu.
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Authors' Addresses
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity
Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com
Joe Salowey
Palo Alto Networks
Email: joe@salowey.net
Arndt Schwenkschuster
Defakto Security
Email: arndts.ietf@gmail.com
Yaron Sheffer
Independent
Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
Yaroslav Rosomakho
Zscaler
Email: yrosomakho@zscaler.com
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