CoRE Working Group M. Tiloca
Internet-Draft RISE AB
Intended status: Standards Track 2 November 2026
Expires: 6 May 2027
Using Quantum-Resistant Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) in the
Pairwise Mode of Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful
Environments (Group OSCORE)
draft-tiloca-core-group-oscore-kem-01
Abstract
Group communication for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
can be protected end-to-end by using the security protocol Group
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE).
The pairwise mode of Group OSCORE provides authenticated encryption
of CoAP messages, by means of symmetric keys that two group members
establish only among themselves to achieve pairwise secure
communication. This document defines the use of quantum-resistant
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) as Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm of Group OSCORE, enabling post-quantum secure derivation of
the symmetric keys used in the pairwise mode. The Group Manager
facilitates the exchange of KEM public keys and encapsulated KEM
shared secrets among group members.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful
Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://gitlab.com/crimson84/draft-tiloca-core-group-oscore-kem.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Derivation of Pairwise Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Change of Sender ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Assistance from the Group Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Uploading a KEM Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Retrieving a KEM Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Uploading an Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret . . . . . . . 9
5.4. Retrieving an Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Prospective KEMs Based on a DH/NIKE . . . . . . . . 14
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] also supports
group communication [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], e.g., over IP
multicast. Building on Object Security for Constrained RESTful
Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613], the security protocol Group Object
Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE)
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] provides end-to-end security of CoAP
messages when using group communication for CoAP.
An OSCORE group is associated with a Group Manager, i.e., an entity
responsible for managing identifiers and keying material in the group
and for handling the join process to add group members, among other
tasks (see Section 12 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
Group OSCORE provides two ways to protect a CoAP message:
* The group mode, which achieves group-level data confidentiality
and provides source authentication by means of a digital
signature. The message sender computes the signature with its own
private key and embeds it in the protected CoAP message.
* The pairwise mode, which achieves pairwise data confidentiality
and provides source authentication by means of integrity tags.
The message sender performs authenticated encryption of the CoAP
message by using a symmetric pairwise key that is exclusively
shared with another group member as the intended message
recipient.
Symmetric pairwise keys are derived from a pairwise shared secret,
which in turn is computed from asymmetric keys of the message
sender and recipient, ensuring authenticated key agreement.
In the event that a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer
(CRQC) is constructed, it is relatively simple to adapt the group
mode of Group OSCORE to be quantum-resistant. That is, it is
sufficient to rely on a quantum-resistant signature algorithm (e.g.,
ML-DSA [FIPS204][RFC9964]) as the Signature Algorithm used in the
group (see Section 2.1.8 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
However, equivalent drop-in replacements are not available for the
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm (see Section 2.1.10 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), which is used to compute the
shared secret from which pairwise keys are derived (see Section 2.5.1
of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). In particular, the currently
available Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithms are based on a direct
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Static-Static key agreement
[NIST-800-56A].
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At the time of writing, there is no standardized Diffie-Hellman/Non-
Interactive Key Exchange (DH/NIKE) that can be used for post-quantum
secure establishment of the shared secret, which makes the pairwise
mode of Group OSCORE vulnerable to quantum attacks. Moreover, a
future quantum-resistant DH/NIKE might not be (immediately) usable as
a drop-in replacement for Group OSCORE (see Appendix A).
This document defines the use of quantum-resistant Key Encapsulation
Mechanisms (KEMs), such as ML-KEM [FIPS203], as Pairwise Key
Agreement Algorithm of Group OSCORE. Consequently, it enables the
post-quantum secure establishment of the shared secret and thus the
post-quantum secure derivation of the symmetric keys used in the
pairwise mode of Group OSCORE.
The Group Manager facilitates the exchange of KEM public keys and
encapsulated KEM shared secrets among group members that perform the
KEM-based Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
related to CoAP [RFC7252], OSCORE [RFC8613], Group OSCORE
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], and CBOR Object Signing and
Encryption (COSE) [RFC9052].
2. Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm
In an OSCORE group that uses the pairwise mode and a quantum-
resistant KEM as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, the KEM is
identified by the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm parameter, within
the Common Context of the Group OSCORE Security Context (see
Section 2.1.10 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
Like for other algorithms used in Group OSCORE, the KEM used as
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm MUST be one of those defined for
COSE and registered at [COSE.Algorithms]. For example, the COSE
algorithms ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024 are being
registered by [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem], consistent with the three
corresponding parameter sets of the standard ML-KEM [FIPS203].
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For endpoints that support the pairwise mode and use a quantum-
resistant KEM as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, the algorithm ML-
KEM-512 defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem] is mandatory to implement.
Conventions for using quantum-resistant KEMs within COSE are
described in [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem]. When using a quantum-resistant
KEM as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm in Group OSCORE, the shared
secret is computed as the result of the KEM encapsulation function
with a KEM public key as input, or as the result of the KEM
decapsulation function with a KEM private key and an encapsulated KEM
shared secret as input. That is, the computed shared secret
corresponds to the initial shared secret SS' in
[I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem].
3. Derivation of Pairwise Keys
This section defines how pairwise keys are derived when the Pairwise
Key Agreement Algorithm used is a quantum-resistant KEM.
Analogous to the construction used by OSCORE in Section 3.2.1 of
[RFC8613], the derivation of pairwise keys is aligned with the one
defined in Section 2.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], with
the difference that two shared secrets are established through the
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, and they are separately used to
derive a Pairwise Sender Key and the corresponding Pairwise Recipient
Key.
For a given endpoint, the derivation of the pairwise keys to use
between itself and each other endpoint X in the group is as below:
Pairwise Sender Key = HKDF(Sender Key, IKM-Sender, info, L)
Pairwise Recipient Key = HKDF(Recipient Key, IKM-Recipient, info, L)
with
IKM-Sender = Sender Auth Cred | Recipient Auth Cred |
Sender Shared Secret
IKM-Recipient = Recipient Auth Cred | Sender Auth Cred |
Recipient Shared Secret
where:
* The same as defined in Section 2.5.1 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] applies for:
- The HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF) [RFC5869].
- The Sender Key, the Recipient Key, info, and L.
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- Sender Auth Cred and Recipient Auth Cred.
- The Pairwise Sender Key, i.e., the AEAD key for processing
outgoing messages addressed to endpoint X.
- The Pairwise Recipient Key, i.e., the AEAD key for processing
incoming messages from endpoint X.
* IKM-Sender is the Input Keying Material (IKM) used in the HKDF for
the derivation of the Pairwise Sender Key. IKM-Sender is the byte
string concatenation of Sender Auth Cred, Recipient Auth Cred, and
the Sender Shared Secret. The authentication credentials Sender
Auth Cred and Recipient Auth Cred are binary encoded as defined in
Section 2.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].
* IKM-Recipient is the IKM used in the HKDF for the derivation of
the Pairwise Recipient Key. IKM-Recipient is the byte string
concatenation of Recipient Auth Cred, Sender Auth Cred, and the
Recipient Shared Secret. The authentication credentials Recipient
Auth Cred and Sender Auth Cred are binary encoded as defined in
Section 2.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].
* The Sender Shared Secret is computed by the endpoint using the
endpoint X's KEM public key, and it is associated with the
encapsulated KEM shared secret computed by the endpoint and
intended to endpoint X. The Sender Shared Secret of the endpoint
is equal to the Recipient Shared Secret of endpoint X.
* The Recipient Shared Secret is computed by the endpoint using the
endpoint's own KEM private key and the encapsulated KEM shared
secret from endpoint X. The Recipient Shared Secret of the
endpoint is equal to the Sender Shared Secret of endpoint X.
For what concerns the derivation of Pairwise Keys, a KEM public key
associated with the endpoint is used by any and exactly one other
endpoint X in the group to compute exactly one Sender Shared Secret.
The endpoint computes the same value as its Recipient Shared Secret
using its own KEM private key and the encapsulated KEM shared secret
from endpoint X.
That is, in order to compute its Sender Shared Secret and derive its
Pairwise Sender Key, the endpoint has to obtain the endpoint X's KEM
public key. Conversely, in order to compute its Recipient Shared
Secret and derive its Pairwise Recipient Key, the endpoint has to
obtain the encapsulated KEM shared secret from endpoint X.
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However, KEM public keys and encapsulated KEM shared secrets are not
provided within messages that group members directly send to each
other. Instead, group members exchange KEM public keys and
encapsulated KEM shared secrets via the Group Manager responsible for
the group, as defined in Section 5.
4. Change of Sender ID
An endpoint that is a member of an OSCORE group can obtain a new
Sender ID from the Group Manager (see Section 2.6.3.1 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]). For instance, this can happen
when the endpoint requests a new Sender ID from the Group Manager, or
when the endpoint requests to re-join the group.
In an OSCORE group that uses the pairwise mode and a quantum-
resistant KEM as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, an endpoint
performs the following actions after it obtains a new Sender ID:
* The endpoint MUST delete the Pairwise Sender Keys that it stores
in its Sender Context, within the Group OSCORE Security Context
that it uses in the group (see Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
* The endpoint MUST delete the Recipient Pairwise Keys that it
stores in its Recipient Contexts, within the Group OSCORE Security
Context that it uses in the group (see Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
5. Assistance from the Group Manager
This section defines the operations that the Group Manager performs
to facilitate the exchange of KEM public keys and encapsulated KEM
shared secrets among group members, when the Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm used in the group is a quantum-resistant KEM.
The following is not relevant for a node that joins the group
exclusively as a silent server (see Section 1.1 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), or that does not support or does
not intend to use the pairwise mode in the group.
There are different ways to perform such supportive operations,
depending on the specific realization of Group Manager. For example,
when considering the realization of Group Manager specified in
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] and based on the Authentication
and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework
[RFC9200], it is possible to accordingly extend its interface as
defined in [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscore-gm-kem].
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Given an OSCORE group, the following applies.
5.1. Uploading a KEM Public Key
A group member P has to be able to upload its own KEM public keys at
the Group Manager. In particular, P can upload a KEM public key at
the Group Manager already when joining the group, and then upload
other KEM public keys later on as a group member.
After generating a KEM public/private key pair, P uploads the KEM
public key at the Group Manager. Then, P stores the KEM public key,
the corresponding KEM private key, and a SHA-256 hash [SHA-256] of
the KEM public key as corresponding identifier.
When the Group Manager receives a KEM public key from P, the Group
Manager stores the KEM public key as associated with the Sender ID of
P in the group. The Group Manager is able to identify P and thereby
determine its Sender ID in the group, e.g., by means of the secure
communication association shared with P.
The Group Manager MUST keep the association between the KEM Public
Key and Sender ID of P up-to-date over time, in the event that P
changes its Sender ID in the group.
The Group Manager is expected to be able to store multiple KEM public
keys from the same group member P at any given time, up to a local
upper bound. When the group member P is removed from the group, the
Group Manager deletes from its local storage any KEM public key of P.
A KEM public key of P is intended to be retrieved from the Group
Manager and used by any and exactly one other group member.
5.2. Retrieving a KEM Public Key
Another group member Q has to be able to retrieve a KEM public key of
P from the Group Manager.
Q retrieves a KEM public key of P when it wants to send to P a
message protected with the pairwise mode and does not have the
Pairwise Sender Key required to process the message.
In order to retrieve a KEM public key of P from the Group Manager, Q
specifies the Sender ID of P to the Group Manager.
After the Group Manager provides Q with the KEM public key of P, the
Group Manager deletes the KEM public key of P from its local storage.
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P has to be able to gain knowledge about the number of own KEM public
keys that are currently stored at the Group Manager. For example,
this can rely on P accessing a dedicated resource hosted by the Group
Manager. If such resource is observable [RFC7641], P can use CoAP
Observe to subscribe for updates about the resource representation,
thereby receiving notifications from the Group Manager.
5.3. Uploading an Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret
After Q retrieves a KEM public key of P from the Group Manager (see
Section 5.2), Q uses the KEM public key of P to compute the shared
secret and produces the encapsulated KEM shared secret intended to P.
Q uses the shared secret as the Sender Shared Secret for deriving its
own Pairwise Sender Key to use with P (see Section 3). After that, Q
stores the Pairwise Sender Key to use with P in its Sender Context,
within the Group OSCORE Security Context used in the group (see
Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
Q has to be able to upload the following information at the Group
Manager:
* The encapsulated KEM shared secret.
* The Sender ID of P, identifying the intended consumer of the
encapsulated KEM shared secret.
* The SHA-256 hash of the KEM public key of P that Q used to compute
the shared secret.
When the Group Manager receives from Q an encapsulated KEM shared
secret intended to P, the Group Manager stores the encapsulated KEM
shared secret as associated with the following information:
* The Sender ID of Q, identifying the producer of the encapsulated
KEM shared secret. The Group Manager is able to identify Q and
thereby determine its Sender ID in the group, e.g., by means of
the secure communication association shared with Q.
* The Sender ID of P received from Q, identifying the intended
consumer of the encapsulated KEM shared secret.
* The SHA-256 hash received from Q, as the identifier of the KEM
public key of P that Q used to compute the shared secret.
When doing so, the Group Manager overwrites any already stored
encapsulated KEM shared secret and SHA-256 hash identifier that are
associated with the same consumer Sender ID and producer Sender ID.
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The Group Manager MUST keep up-to-date the association between the
encapsulated KEM shared secret and the three pieces of information
above, in the event that P or Q change their Sender IDs in the group.
When a group member is removed from the group, the Group Manager
deletes from its local storage any encapsulated KEM shared secret of
which that group member is the producer or the intended consumer.
For each of such encapsulated KEM shared secrets, the Group Manager
also deletes the associated SHA-256 hash identifying a KEM public
key, freeing up their association with the consumer Sender ID and
producer Sender ID.
5.4. Retrieving an Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret
P has to be able to retrieve the following information from the Group
Manager:
* The encapsulated KEM shared secret computed for P by Q.
* The SHA-256 hash identifier of its own KEM public key that Q used
to compute the shared secret.
In order to retrieve that information, P specifies the Sender ID of Q
to the Group Manager. Then, the Group Manager provides the requested
information, if it stores an encapsulated KEM shared secret
associated with both:
* The specified Sender ID of Q, identifying the producer of the
encapsulated KEM shared secret; and
* The Sender ID of P, identifying the intended consumer of the
encapsulated KEM shared secret. The Group Manager is able to
identify P and thereby determine its Sender ID in the group, e.g.,
by means of the secure communication association shared with P.
After providing P with the encapsulated KEM shared secret and SHA-256
hash identifier, the Group Manager deletes those two pieces of
information from its local storage, freeing up their association with
the consumer Sender ID and producer Sender ID.
P retrieves the encapsulated KEM shared secret computed by Q when it
receives from Q a message protected with the pairwise mode and does
not have the Pairwise Recipient Key required to process the message.
P uses the SHA-256 hash identifier to retrieve its own corresponding
KEM public key and KEM private key from its local storage.
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Then, P computes the shared secret by using its own KEM private key
and the encapsulated KEM shared secret computed by Q. After that, P
deletes the encapsulated KEM shared secret, and it deletes from its
local storage the KEM private key just used as well as the
corresponding KEM public key and the corresponding SHA-256 hash
identifier.
P uses the shared secret as the Recipient Shared Secret for deriving
its own Pairwise Recipient Key to use with Q (see Section 3). After
that, P stores the Pairwise Recipient Key to use with Q in its
Recipient Context associated with Q, within the Group OSCORE Security
Context used in the group (see Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations from [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] and
[I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem] hold for this document too. The security
considerations for the specific KEM used as Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm in the Group OSCORE Security Context also apply. Security
considerations for ML-KEM are compiled in
[I-D.sfluhrer-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations].
Using a quantum-resistant KEM typically requires a good source of
randomness, e.g., in order to generate KEM public/private keys and to
compute shared secrets and encapsulated KEM shared secrets. In turn,
for endpoints that use the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE with a
quantum-resistant KEM as the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, this
requires those endpoints to use a cryptographically secure random
number generator.
In the case that the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used is not
quantum-resistant, an adversary equipped with a CRQC is able to
derive a shared secret computed by two group members.
Consequently, if the adversary leaks the shared secret to a third
group member or if the adversary is in control or such third group
member, then the same exploitation discussed in Section 14.2 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] is possible.
That is, the third group member can derive the pairwise keys of the
two group members and use those to impersonate either of the two
group members to the other, or to decrypt previously stored messages
exchanged between those two members and protected with their pairwise
keys. Fundamentally, this would break the following security
properties that are expected from the pairwise mode (see Section 14.2
of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]):
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* Symmetric source authentication, as it becomes possible to
impersonate either group member when sending a message protected
with the pairwise mode.
* Symmetric pairwise confidentiality, as a message protected with
the pairwise mode becomes possible to decrypt also for other group
members than the two intended ones.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[COSE.Algorithms]
IANA, "COSE Algorithms",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/
cose.xhtml#algorithms>.
[FIPS203] "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
Standard", NIST FIPS 203, August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.
[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]
Dijk, E. and M. Tiloca, "Group Communication for the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis-
18, 10 February 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
groupcomm-bis-18>.
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]
Tiloca, M., Selander, G., Palombini, F., Mattsson, J. P.,
and R. Höglund, "Group Object Security for Constrained
RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-28, 23
December 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-28>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem]
Reddy.K, T., Banerjee, A., and H. Tschofenig, "Post-
Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for COSE",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-pqc-kem-
00, 29 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
pqc-kem-00>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.
[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7641>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8613>.
[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.
[SHA-256] NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", NIST FIPS PUB 180-4, DOI
10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4 , August 2015,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
8.2. Informative References
[FIPS204] "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard",
NIST FIPS 204, August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]
Tiloca, M. and F. Palombini, "Key Management for Group
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
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(Group OSCORE) Using Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21, 14
March 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21>.
[I-D.sfluhrer-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations]
Fluhrer, S., Dang, Q., Mattsson, J. P., Milner, K., and D.
Shiu, "ML-KEM Security Considerations", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-sfluhrer-cfrg-ml-kem-security-
considerations-05, 13 May 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sfluhrer-
cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations-05>.
[I-D.tiloca-ace-oscore-gm-kem]
Tiloca, M., "Quantum-Resistant Key Encapsulation
Mechanisms (KEMs) via the OSCORE Group Manager Using
Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-tiloca-ace-oscore-gm-kem-00, 6 July 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tiloca-ace-
oscore-gm-kem-00>.
[NIST-800-56A]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography - NIST
Special Publication 800-56A, Revision 3", April 2018,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf>.
[RFC9200] Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework
(ACE-OAuth)", RFC 9200, DOI 10.17487/RFC9200, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9200>.
[RFC9964] Prorock, M. and O. Steele, "ML-DSA for JSON Object Signing
and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and
Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9964, DOI 10.17487/RFC9964, May
2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9964>.
Appendix A. Prospective KEMs Based on a DH/NIKE
The construct defined in this document makes it seamlessly possible
to use as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm of Group OSCORE also a KEM
that builds on a quantum-resistant DH/NIKE, when one is available.
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For example, assuming that a quantum-resistant equivalent of Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman exists, the following would apply:
* The encapsulated KEM shared secret is the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
public key of the endpoint that computes the shared secret first.
* The KEM public/private key is the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public/
private key of the endpoint that computes the shared secret last.
The ability to build such a KEM to use as Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm is expected to be useful in the future: Even when a
standardized, quantum-resistant DH/NIKE exists and is defined for
COSE as registered at [COSE.Algorithms], it might not be
(immediately) possible to directly use such DH/NIKE in Group OSCORE.
In the particular case where an OSCORE group uses only the pairwise
mode, such a DH/NIKE can be directly used as Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm. Consequently, pairwise keys are derived like originally
defined in Section 2.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].
Instead, in the case where an OSCORE group uses both the group mode
and the pairwise mode, authentication credentials of group members
correspond to public/private key pairs to use for signature
operations, as per the Signature Algorithm used in the group.
Therefore, consistent with the security properties of Group OSCORE,
the direct use of such a DH/NIKE requires that all the following
conditions are fulfilled:
* The public/private key pairs associated with group members'
authentication credentials can be used for both signature
operations and static-static key agreement operations, as per the
Signature Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used in
the group.
* The use of the same public/private key pair for both signature
operations and key agreement operations is proven to be secure for
Group OSCORE.
Until such conditions are fulfilled, the Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm used can be a KEM that builds on the quantum-resistant DH/
NIKE, with pairwise keys derived as defined in this document.
Acknowledgments
The author sincerely thanks Christian Amsüss and Göran Selander for
their feedback and comments.
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The work on this document has been partly supported by the Sweden's
Innovation Agency VINNOVA and the Celtic-Next project CYPRESS.
Author's Address
Marco Tiloca
RISE AB
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-164 40 Kista
Sweden
Email: marco.tiloca@ri.se
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