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CoRE Working Group                                             M. Tiloca
Internet-Draft                                                   RISE AB
Intended status: Standards Track                         2 November 2026
Expires: 6 May 2027


   Using Quantum-Resistant Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) in the
     Pairwise Mode of Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful
                      Environments (Group OSCORE)
                 draft-tiloca-core-group-oscore-kem-01

Abstract

   Group communication for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
   can be protected end-to-end by using the security protocol Group
   Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE).
   The pairwise mode of Group OSCORE provides authenticated encryption
   of CoAP messages, by means of symmetric keys that two group members
   establish only among themselves to achieve pairwise secure
   communication.  This document defines the use of quantum-resistant
   Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) as Pairwise Key Agreement
   Algorithm of Group OSCORE, enabling post-quantum secure derivation of
   the symmetric keys used in the pairwise mode.  The Group Manager
   facilitates the exchange of KEM public keys and encapsulated KEM
   shared secrets among group members.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful
   Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is
   archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://gitlab.com/crimson84/draft-tiloca-core-group-oscore-kem.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.





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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Derivation of Pairwise Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Change of Sender ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Assistance from the Group Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Uploading a KEM Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Retrieving a KEM Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  Uploading an Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret . . . . . . .   9
     5.4.  Retrieving an Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret  . . . . . .  10
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Prospective KEMs Based on a DH/NIKE  . . . . . . . .  14
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16










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1.  Introduction

   The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] also supports
   group communication [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], e.g., over IP
   multicast.  Building on Object Security for Constrained RESTful
   Environments (OSCORE) [RFC8613], the security protocol Group Object
   Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE)
   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] provides end-to-end security of CoAP
   messages when using group communication for CoAP.

   An OSCORE group is associated with a Group Manager, i.e., an entity
   responsible for managing identifiers and keying material in the group
   and for handling the join process to add group members, among other
   tasks (see Section 12 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

   Group OSCORE provides two ways to protect a CoAP message:

   *  The group mode, which achieves group-level data confidentiality
      and provides source authentication by means of a digital
      signature.  The message sender computes the signature with its own
      private key and embeds it in the protected CoAP message.

   *  The pairwise mode, which achieves pairwise data confidentiality
      and provides source authentication by means of integrity tags.
      The message sender performs authenticated encryption of the CoAP
      message by using a symmetric pairwise key that is exclusively
      shared with another group member as the intended message
      recipient.

      Symmetric pairwise keys are derived from a pairwise shared secret,
      which in turn is computed from asymmetric keys of the message
      sender and recipient, ensuring authenticated key agreement.

   In the event that a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer
   (CRQC) is constructed, it is relatively simple to adapt the group
   mode of Group OSCORE to be quantum-resistant.  That is, it is
   sufficient to rely on a quantum-resistant signature algorithm (e.g.,
   ML-DSA [FIPS204][RFC9964]) as the Signature Algorithm used in the
   group (see Section 2.1.8 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

   However, equivalent drop-in replacements are not available for the
   Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm (see Section 2.1.10 of
   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), which is used to compute the
   shared secret from which pairwise keys are derived (see Section 2.5.1
   of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).  In particular, the currently
   available Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithms are based on a direct
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Static-Static key agreement
   [NIST-800-56A].



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   At the time of writing, there is no standardized Diffie-Hellman/Non-
   Interactive Key Exchange (DH/NIKE) that can be used for post-quantum
   secure establishment of the shared secret, which makes the pairwise
   mode of Group OSCORE vulnerable to quantum attacks.  Moreover, a
   future quantum-resistant DH/NIKE might not be (immediately) usable as
   a drop-in replacement for Group OSCORE (see Appendix A).

   This document defines the use of quantum-resistant Key Encapsulation
   Mechanisms (KEMs), such as ML-KEM [FIPS203], as Pairwise Key
   Agreement Algorithm of Group OSCORE.  Consequently, it enables the
   post-quantum secure establishment of the shared secret and thus the
   post-quantum secure derivation of the symmetric keys used in the
   pairwise mode of Group OSCORE.

   The Group Manager facilitates the exchange of KEM public keys and
   encapsulated KEM shared secrets among group members that perform the
   KEM-based Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
   related to CoAP [RFC7252], OSCORE [RFC8613], Group OSCORE
   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], and CBOR Object Signing and
   Encryption (COSE) [RFC9052].

2.  Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm

   In an OSCORE group that uses the pairwise mode and a quantum-
   resistant KEM as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, the KEM is
   identified by the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm parameter, within
   the Common Context of the Group OSCORE Security Context (see
   Section 2.1.10 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

   Like for other algorithms used in Group OSCORE, the KEM used as
   Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm MUST be one of those defined for
   COSE and registered at [COSE.Algorithms].  For example, the COSE
   algorithms ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024 are being
   registered by [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem], consistent with the three
   corresponding parameter sets of the standard ML-KEM [FIPS203].






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   For endpoints that support the pairwise mode and use a quantum-
   resistant KEM as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, the algorithm ML-
   KEM-512 defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem] is mandatory to implement.

   Conventions for using quantum-resistant KEMs within COSE are
   described in [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem].  When using a quantum-resistant
   KEM as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm in Group OSCORE, the shared
   secret is computed as the result of the KEM encapsulation function
   with a KEM public key as input, or as the result of the KEM
   decapsulation function with a KEM private key and an encapsulated KEM
   shared secret as input.  That is, the computed shared secret
   corresponds to the initial shared secret SS' in
   [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem].

3.  Derivation of Pairwise Keys

   This section defines how pairwise keys are derived when the Pairwise
   Key Agreement Algorithm used is a quantum-resistant KEM.

   Analogous to the construction used by OSCORE in Section 3.2.1 of
   [RFC8613], the derivation of pairwise keys is aligned with the one
   defined in Section 2.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], with
   the difference that two shared secrets are established through the
   Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, and they are separately used to
   derive a Pairwise Sender Key and the corresponding Pairwise Recipient
   Key.

   For a given endpoint, the derivation of the pairwise keys to use
   between itself and each other endpoint X in the group is as below:

   Pairwise Sender Key    = HKDF(Sender Key, IKM-Sender, info, L)
   Pairwise Recipient Key = HKDF(Recipient Key, IKM-Recipient, info, L)

   with

   IKM-Sender    = Sender Auth Cred | Recipient Auth Cred |
                   Sender Shared Secret
   IKM-Recipient = Recipient Auth Cred | Sender Auth Cred |
                   Recipient Shared Secret

   where:

   *  The same as defined in Section 2.5.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] applies for:

      -  The HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF) [RFC5869].

      -  The Sender Key, the Recipient Key, info, and L.



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      -  Sender Auth Cred and Recipient Auth Cred.

      -  The Pairwise Sender Key, i.e., the AEAD key for processing
         outgoing messages addressed to endpoint X.

      -  The Pairwise Recipient Key, i.e., the AEAD key for processing
         incoming messages from endpoint X.

   *  IKM-Sender is the Input Keying Material (IKM) used in the HKDF for
      the derivation of the Pairwise Sender Key. IKM-Sender is the byte
      string concatenation of Sender Auth Cred, Recipient Auth Cred, and
      the Sender Shared Secret.  The authentication credentials Sender
      Auth Cred and Recipient Auth Cred are binary encoded as defined in
      Section 2.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

   *  IKM-Recipient is the IKM used in the HKDF for the derivation of
      the Pairwise Recipient Key. IKM-Recipient is the byte string
      concatenation of Recipient Auth Cred, Sender Auth Cred, and the
      Recipient Shared Secret.  The authentication credentials Recipient
      Auth Cred and Sender Auth Cred are binary encoded as defined in
      Section 2.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

   *  The Sender Shared Secret is computed by the endpoint using the
      endpoint X's KEM public key, and it is associated with the
      encapsulated KEM shared secret computed by the endpoint and
      intended to endpoint X.  The Sender Shared Secret of the endpoint
      is equal to the Recipient Shared Secret of endpoint X.

   *  The Recipient Shared Secret is computed by the endpoint using the
      endpoint's own KEM private key and the encapsulated KEM shared
      secret from endpoint X.  The Recipient Shared Secret of the
      endpoint is equal to the Sender Shared Secret of endpoint X.

   For what concerns the derivation of Pairwise Keys, a KEM public key
   associated with the endpoint is used by any and exactly one other
   endpoint X in the group to compute exactly one Sender Shared Secret.
   The endpoint computes the same value as its Recipient Shared Secret
   using its own KEM private key and the encapsulated KEM shared secret
   from endpoint X.

   That is, in order to compute its Sender Shared Secret and derive its
   Pairwise Sender Key, the endpoint has to obtain the endpoint X's KEM
   public key.  Conversely, in order to compute its Recipient Shared
   Secret and derive its Pairwise Recipient Key, the endpoint has to
   obtain the encapsulated KEM shared secret from endpoint X.






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   However, KEM public keys and encapsulated KEM shared secrets are not
   provided within messages that group members directly send to each
   other.  Instead, group members exchange KEM public keys and
   encapsulated KEM shared secrets via the Group Manager responsible for
   the group, as defined in Section 5.

4.  Change of Sender ID

   An endpoint that is a member of an OSCORE group can obtain a new
   Sender ID from the Group Manager (see Section 2.6.3.1 of
   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).  For instance, this can happen
   when the endpoint requests a new Sender ID from the Group Manager, or
   when the endpoint requests to re-join the group.

   In an OSCORE group that uses the pairwise mode and a quantum-
   resistant KEM as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, an endpoint
   performs the following actions after it obtains a new Sender ID:

   *  The endpoint MUST delete the Pairwise Sender Keys that it stores
      in its Sender Context, within the Group OSCORE Security Context
      that it uses in the group (see Section 2 of
      [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

   *  The endpoint MUST delete the Recipient Pairwise Keys that it
      stores in its Recipient Contexts, within the Group OSCORE Security
      Context that it uses in the group (see Section 2 of
      [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

5.  Assistance from the Group Manager

   This section defines the operations that the Group Manager performs
   to facilitate the exchange of KEM public keys and encapsulated KEM
   shared secrets among group members, when the Pairwise Key Agreement
   Algorithm used in the group is a quantum-resistant KEM.

   The following is not relevant for a node that joins the group
   exclusively as a silent server (see Section 1.1 of
   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]), or that does not support or does
   not intend to use the pairwise mode in the group.

   There are different ways to perform such supportive operations,
   depending on the specific realization of Group Manager.  For example,
   when considering the realization of Group Manager specified in
   [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] and based on the Authentication
   and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework
   [RFC9200], it is possible to accordingly extend its interface as
   defined in [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscore-gm-kem].




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   Given an OSCORE group, the following applies.

5.1.  Uploading a KEM Public Key

   A group member P has to be able to upload its own KEM public keys at
   the Group Manager.  In particular, P can upload a KEM public key at
   the Group Manager already when joining the group, and then upload
   other KEM public keys later on as a group member.

   After generating a KEM public/private key pair, P uploads the KEM
   public key at the Group Manager.  Then, P stores the KEM public key,
   the corresponding KEM private key, and a SHA-256 hash [SHA-256] of
   the KEM public key as corresponding identifier.

   When the Group Manager receives a KEM public key from P, the Group
   Manager stores the KEM public key as associated with the Sender ID of
   P in the group.  The Group Manager is able to identify P and thereby
   determine its Sender ID in the group, e.g., by means of the secure
   communication association shared with P.

   The Group Manager MUST keep the association between the KEM Public
   Key and Sender ID of P up-to-date over time, in the event that P
   changes its Sender ID in the group.

   The Group Manager is expected to be able to store multiple KEM public
   keys from the same group member P at any given time, up to a local
   upper bound.  When the group member P is removed from the group, the
   Group Manager deletes from its local storage any KEM public key of P.

   A KEM public key of P is intended to be retrieved from the Group
   Manager and used by any and exactly one other group member.

5.2.  Retrieving a KEM Public Key

   Another group member Q has to be able to retrieve a KEM public key of
   P from the Group Manager.

   Q retrieves a KEM public key of P when it wants to send to P a
   message protected with the pairwise mode and does not have the
   Pairwise Sender Key required to process the message.

   In order to retrieve a KEM public key of P from the Group Manager, Q
   specifies the Sender ID of P to the Group Manager.

   After the Group Manager provides Q with the KEM public key of P, the
   Group Manager deletes the KEM public key of P from its local storage.





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   P has to be able to gain knowledge about the number of own KEM public
   keys that are currently stored at the Group Manager.  For example,
   this can rely on P accessing a dedicated resource hosted by the Group
   Manager.  If such resource is observable [RFC7641], P can use CoAP
   Observe to subscribe for updates about the resource representation,
   thereby receiving notifications from the Group Manager.

5.3.  Uploading an Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret

   After Q retrieves a KEM public key of P from the Group Manager (see
   Section 5.2), Q uses the KEM public key of P to compute the shared
   secret and produces the encapsulated KEM shared secret intended to P.

   Q uses the shared secret as the Sender Shared Secret for deriving its
   own Pairwise Sender Key to use with P (see Section 3).  After that, Q
   stores the Pairwise Sender Key to use with P in its Sender Context,
   within the Group OSCORE Security Context used in the group (see
   Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

   Q has to be able to upload the following information at the Group
   Manager:

   *  The encapsulated KEM shared secret.

   *  The Sender ID of P, identifying the intended consumer of the
      encapsulated KEM shared secret.

   *  The SHA-256 hash of the KEM public key of P that Q used to compute
      the shared secret.

   When the Group Manager receives from Q an encapsulated KEM shared
   secret intended to P, the Group Manager stores the encapsulated KEM
   shared secret as associated with the following information:

   *  The Sender ID of Q, identifying the producer of the encapsulated
      KEM shared secret.  The Group Manager is able to identify Q and
      thereby determine its Sender ID in the group, e.g., by means of
      the secure communication association shared with Q.

   *  The Sender ID of P received from Q, identifying the intended
      consumer of the encapsulated KEM shared secret.

   *  The SHA-256 hash received from Q, as the identifier of the KEM
      public key of P that Q used to compute the shared secret.

   When doing so, the Group Manager overwrites any already stored
   encapsulated KEM shared secret and SHA-256 hash identifier that are
   associated with the same consumer Sender ID and producer Sender ID.



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   The Group Manager MUST keep up-to-date the association between the
   encapsulated KEM shared secret and the three pieces of information
   above, in the event that P or Q change their Sender IDs in the group.

   When a group member is removed from the group, the Group Manager
   deletes from its local storage any encapsulated KEM shared secret of
   which that group member is the producer or the intended consumer.
   For each of such encapsulated KEM shared secrets, the Group Manager
   also deletes the associated SHA-256 hash identifying a KEM public
   key, freeing up their association with the consumer Sender ID and
   producer Sender ID.

5.4.  Retrieving an Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret

   P has to be able to retrieve the following information from the Group
   Manager:

   *  The encapsulated KEM shared secret computed for P by Q.

   *  The SHA-256 hash identifier of its own KEM public key that Q used
      to compute the shared secret.

   In order to retrieve that information, P specifies the Sender ID of Q
   to the Group Manager.  Then, the Group Manager provides the requested
   information, if it stores an encapsulated KEM shared secret
   associated with both:

   *  The specified Sender ID of Q, identifying the producer of the
      encapsulated KEM shared secret; and

   *  The Sender ID of P, identifying the intended consumer of the
      encapsulated KEM shared secret.  The Group Manager is able to
      identify P and thereby determine its Sender ID in the group, e.g.,
      by means of the secure communication association shared with P.

   After providing P with the encapsulated KEM shared secret and SHA-256
   hash identifier, the Group Manager deletes those two pieces of
   information from its local storage, freeing up their association with
   the consumer Sender ID and producer Sender ID.

   P retrieves the encapsulated KEM shared secret computed by Q when it
   receives from Q a message protected with the pairwise mode and does
   not have the Pairwise Recipient Key required to process the message.

   P uses the SHA-256 hash identifier to retrieve its own corresponding
   KEM public key and KEM private key from its local storage.





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   Then, P computes the shared secret by using its own KEM private key
   and the encapsulated KEM shared secret computed by Q.  After that, P
   deletes the encapsulated KEM shared secret, and it deletes from its
   local storage the KEM private key just used as well as the
   corresponding KEM public key and the corresponding SHA-256 hash
   identifier.

   P uses the shared secret as the Recipient Shared Secret for deriving
   its own Pairwise Recipient Key to use with Q (see Section 3).  After
   that, P stores the Pairwise Recipient Key to use with Q in its
   Recipient Context associated with Q, within the Group OSCORE Security
   Context used in the group (see Section 2 of
   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).

6.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations from [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] and
   [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem] hold for this document too.  The security
   considerations for the specific KEM used as Pairwise Key Agreement
   Algorithm in the Group OSCORE Security Context also apply.  Security
   considerations for ML-KEM are compiled in
   [I-D.sfluhrer-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations].

   Using a quantum-resistant KEM typically requires a good source of
   randomness, e.g., in order to generate KEM public/private keys and to
   compute shared secrets and encapsulated KEM shared secrets.  In turn,
   for endpoints that use the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE with a
   quantum-resistant KEM as the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm, this
   requires those endpoints to use a cryptographically secure random
   number generator.

   In the case that the Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used is not
   quantum-resistant, an adversary equipped with a CRQC is able to
   derive a shared secret computed by two group members.

   Consequently, if the adversary leaks the shared secret to a third
   group member or if the adversary is in control or such third group
   member, then the same exploitation discussed in Section 14.2 of
   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] is possible.

   That is, the third group member can derive the pairwise keys of the
   two group members and use those to impersonate either of the two
   group members to the other, or to decrypt previously stored messages
   exchanged between those two members and protected with their pairwise
   keys.  Fundamentally, this would break the following security
   properties that are expected from the pairwise mode (see Section 14.2
   of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]):




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   *  Symmetric source authentication, as it becomes possible to
      impersonate either group member when sending a message protected
      with the pairwise mode.

   *  Symmetric pairwise confidentiality, as a message protected with
      the pairwise mode becomes possible to decrypt also for other group
      members than the two intended ones.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [COSE.Algorithms]
              IANA, "COSE Algorithms",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/
              cose.xhtml#algorithms>.

   [FIPS203]  "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
              Standard", NIST FIPS 203, August 2024,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.

   [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]
              Dijk, E. and M. Tiloca, "Group Communication for the
              Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis-
              18, 10 February 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-
              groupcomm-bis-18>.

   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]
              Tiloca, M., Selander, G., Palombini, F., Mattsson, J. P.,
              and R. Höglund, "Group Object Security for Constrained
              RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE)", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-28, 23
              December 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-28>.

   [I-D.ietf-cose-pqc-kem]
              Reddy.K, T., Banerjee, A., and H. Tschofenig, "Post-
              Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for COSE",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-pqc-kem-
              00, 29 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
              pqc-kem-00>.



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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7641]  Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7641>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8613]  Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
              "Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
              (OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8613>.

   [RFC9052]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.

   [SHA-256]  NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", NIST FIPS PUB 180-4, DOI
              10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4 , August 2015,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [FIPS204]  "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard",
              NIST FIPS 204, August 2024,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]
              Tiloca, M. and F. Palombini, "Key Management for Group
              Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments



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              (Group OSCORE) Using Authentication and Authorization for
              Constrained Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21, 14
              March 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-21>.

   [I-D.sfluhrer-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations]
              Fluhrer, S., Dang, Q., Mattsson, J. P., Milner, K., and D.
              Shiu, "ML-KEM Security Considerations", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-sfluhrer-cfrg-ml-kem-security-
              considerations-05, 13 May 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sfluhrer-
              cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations-05>.

   [I-D.tiloca-ace-oscore-gm-kem]
              Tiloca, M., "Quantum-Resistant Key Encapsulation
              Mechanisms (KEMs) via the OSCORE Group Manager Using
              Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
              Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-tiloca-ace-oscore-gm-kem-00, 6 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tiloca-ace-
              oscore-gm-kem-00>.

   [NIST-800-56A]
              Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
              Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
              Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography - NIST
              Special Publication 800-56A, Revision 3", April 2018,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf>.

   [RFC9200]  Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
              H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
              Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework
              (ACE-OAuth)", RFC 9200, DOI 10.17487/RFC9200, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9200>.

   [RFC9964]  Prorock, M. and O. Steele, "ML-DSA for JSON Object Signing
              and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and
              Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9964, DOI 10.17487/RFC9964, May
              2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9964>.

Appendix A.  Prospective KEMs Based on a DH/NIKE

   The construct defined in this document makes it seamlessly possible
   to use as Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm of Group OSCORE also a KEM
   that builds on a quantum-resistant DH/NIKE, when one is available.




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   For example, assuming that a quantum-resistant equivalent of Elliptic
   Curve Diffie-Hellman exists, the following would apply:

   *  The encapsulated KEM shared secret is the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
      public key of the endpoint that computes the shared secret first.

   *  The KEM public/private key is the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public/
      private key of the endpoint that computes the shared secret last.

   The ability to build such a KEM to use as Pairwise Key Agreement
   Algorithm is expected to be useful in the future: Even when a
   standardized, quantum-resistant DH/NIKE exists and is defined for
   COSE as registered at [COSE.Algorithms], it might not be
   (immediately) possible to directly use such DH/NIKE in Group OSCORE.

   In the particular case where an OSCORE group uses only the pairwise
   mode, such a DH/NIKE can be directly used as Pairwise Key Agreement
   Algorithm.  Consequently, pairwise keys are derived like originally
   defined in Section 2.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

   Instead, in the case where an OSCORE group uses both the group mode
   and the pairwise mode, authentication credentials of group members
   correspond to public/private key pairs to use for signature
   operations, as per the Signature Algorithm used in the group.
   Therefore, consistent with the security properties of Group OSCORE,
   the direct use of such a DH/NIKE requires that all the following
   conditions are fulfilled:

   *  The public/private key pairs associated with group members'
      authentication credentials can be used for both signature
      operations and static-static key agreement operations, as per the
      Signature Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used in
      the group.

   *  The use of the same public/private key pair for both signature
      operations and key agreement operations is proven to be secure for
      Group OSCORE.

   Until such conditions are fulfilled, the Pairwise Key Agreement
   Algorithm used can be a KEM that builds on the quantum-resistant DH/
   NIKE, with pairwise keys derived as defined in this document.

Acknowledgments

   The author sincerely thanks Christian Amsüss and Göran Selander for
   their feedback and comments.





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   The work on this document has been partly supported by the Sweden's
   Innovation Agency VINNOVA and the Celtic-Next project CYPRESS.

Author's Address

   Marco Tiloca
   RISE AB
   Isafjordsgatan 22
   SE-164 40 Kista
   Sweden
   Email: marco.tiloca@ri.se








































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