Web Authorization Protocol A. Agarwal
Internet-Draft Skyfire Systems Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones
Expires: 6 May 2027 Self-Issued Consulting
2 November 2026
KYAPay Token
draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-03
Abstract
This document defines a token format for agent identity and payment
tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format. Authorization servers and
resource servers from different vendors can leverage this token
format to consume identity and payment tokens in an interoperable
manner.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://skyfire-
xyz.github.io/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token/draft-skyfire-oauth-
kyapay-token.html. Status information for this document may be found
at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-
token/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.
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Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Use Cases for the KYAPay Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1. Initiator Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2. Target Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.3. Ecosystem Infrastructure Roles . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. KYAPay Token Schemas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Common Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.1. Identifying the Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Issuer Key Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Token Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. KYA Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4.1. hid - Human Identity Sub-Claims . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4.2. Agent Platform Identity apd Sub-Claims . . . . . . . 17
3.4.3. Agent Identity aid Sub-Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.5. PAY Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5.1. Settlement Information sti Sub-Claims . . . . . . . . 20
3.5.2. Scope of Card Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5.3. PAY Token Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.6. KYA-PAY Token Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4. Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1. Validating KYA and PAY Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1. JWT Header Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.2. JWT Payload Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.3. Clock Skew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2. Validating PAY Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1. General JWT Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2. Confidentiality of Token Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3. Settlement Credential Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4. Token Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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5.5. Bearer Semantics and Proof of Possession . . . . . . . . 29
5.6. Identity Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.1. "tdm" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.2. "tsi" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.3. "ori" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.4. "env" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.5. "itg" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.6. "hid" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.7. "apd" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.8. "aid" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.9. "tpr" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1.10. "tps" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1.11. "amt" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1.12. "cur" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1.13. "val" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1.14. "mnr" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1.15. "stp" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1.16. "sti" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.2. Media Types Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.2.1. application/kya+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.2.2. application/pay+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2.3. application/kya-pay+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3. Well-Known URI Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix A. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1. Introduction
As software agents evolve from pre-orchestrated workflow automations
to truly autonomous or semi-autonomous assistants, they require the
ability to identify themselves -- and more importantly, identify
their human principals -- to external systems. Agents acting on
behalf of users to discover services, create accounts, or execute
actions currently face significant operational barriers.
The KYAPay token addresses these challenges by providing a standard
envelope to carry verified identity and payment information. By
utilizing "kya" (Agent Identity) and "pay" (Payment) tokens, agents
can identify their human principals to services, sites, bot managers,
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customer identity and access management (CIAM) systems, and fraud
detectors. This enables agents to bypass common blocking mechanisms
and access services that were previously restricted to manual human
interaction.
KYAPay does not aim to define agentic identity in its entirety.
Rather, it specifies a standard and extensible JSON Web Token (JWT)
[RFC7519] that can be used to securely share human principal and
agent identity information with websites and APIs. KYAPay tokens
provide a strong signal of human presence behind agentic requests
that are otherwise indistinguishable from programmatic and
potentially malicious bot requests.
Note that, in the future, the payment token functionality could be
split into a separate specification, if desired by a working group
adopting the specification. It is retained here at present for ease
of reviewing.
1.1. Use Cases for the KYAPay Token
Enabling agents to access websites and APIs on behalf of the human
principals they represent is a design goal of KYAPay tokens. Today’s
internet is designed primarily for humans, meaning that automated
systems are often classified as malicious and blocked by web security
infrastructure. However, the rise of AI agents has introduced a new
paradigm where programmatic clients legitimately access websites and
APIs on behalf of human principals. Because these agents can be hard
to distinguish from traditional bots, they are often inadvertently
blocked, creating a need for the web security ecosystem to
distinguish between legitimate agentic traffic and potentially
malicious activity. KYAPay tokens are designed to address this
challenge by enabling agents to convey verified identity and payment
credentials. These tokens can provide web security systems and
merchants with a strong signal that the requests are authorized by a
human, allowing them to safely permit legitimate programmatic
transactions while aggressively blocking undesired traffic.
Enabling agents to create accounts and/or log in to accounts on
behalf of their human principals is a related design goal. To
achieve this, systems can utilize a token exchange workflow
[RFC8693]. In this process, a Security Token Service (STS), Identity
Provider (IdP), or OAuth Authorization Server verifies incoming KYA
tokens and extracts claims associated with the human principal, such
as hid.id, or an email address where it requested one. The
authorization server then performs a token exchange, swapping the KYA
token for a standard OAuth Access Token, which the agent subsequently
uses to interact with the target service. Crucially, this
architecture allows the service to know that the agent is acting on
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behalf of the user, making it possible to differentiate between
direct, human-present sessions and human-initiated, agentic sessions
for authorization, auditing, and security purposes.
Enabling agents to have ubiquity of access across the Internet just
like their human principals is a related design goal. Automation
typically scales as it achieves higher reliability and lower cost-to-
entry. Unlike the structured logic required by cron jobs or low-code
/ no-code platforms, agentic automation leverages LLMs to execute
tasks via natural language, effectively removing the software-skill
barrier. As model reasoning improves and infrastructure scales,
these agents become increasingly dependable and affordable for the
human principal. To maximize utility, agents require ubiquitous
Internet access, a feat made possible by KYAPay Token Issuers. By
providing a client-side verification framework analogous to the
server-side role of Certificate Authorities (CAs), KYAPay builds a
standardized network of acceptance across the web security ecosystem.
This allows for the seamless attestation of both the agent’s and the
human principal’s identity, ensuring secure, cross-domain task
execution without the friction of fragmented authentication silos.
Enabling the ecosystem of web security vendors to engage in finer-
grained and deliberate bad-actor mitigation is a related design goal.
KYA tokens provide a layered, verified, and extensible identity stack
specifically engineered for autonomous agents. This framework allows
the web security ecosystem to distinguish among individual agent
instances, the platforms they run on, and the human principals behind
them. By establishing this level of granular visibility, security
systems can transition from broad defensive measures to specific
mitigation; rather than being forced to block an entire platform,
administrators can now isolate and neutralize a single malicious
human user or a malfunctioning software instance without disrupting
legitimate traffic.
Note that the protocols using these tokens to achieve these goals are
not defined by this specification. The interoperable use of them for
these purposes will require further specification.
Early production deployments of KYAPay tokens are described at
https://kyapay.org.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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The claims iss, iat, exp, aud, and jti are defined by [RFC7519]. The
header parameters alg, kid, and typ are defined by [RFC7515].
The alg value ES256 is a digital signature algorithm defined in
Section 3.4 of [RFC7518].
2.1. Roles
Agent:
An application, service, or specific software process, executing
on behalf of a Principal.
Agent Identity:
A unique identifier and a set of claims describing an agent.
Grouped into the aid claim for convenience. Because an agent can
be public or confidential (as described in Section 2.1 of
[RFC6749]), the level of assurance for these claims varies
dramatically. Agents also vary in terms of longevity -- they can
have stable long-running identities (such as those of a server-
side confidential client), or they can be transient and ephemeral,
and correspond to individual API calls or compute workloads.
Agent Platform:
The service provider and runtime environment hosting the Agent,
such as a cloud compute provider or AI operator service.
Assertions about the agent platform are grouped into the apd
claim, and are primarily used to identify the Principal entity
operating the platform, allowing consumers of the token to apply
reputation-based logic or offer platform-specific services.
Principal:
A legal entity (human or organization) on whose behalf / in whose
authority an agent or service is operating.
2.1.1. Initiator Roles
Initiator Agent:
An Agent performing tasks on behalf of an Initiator Principal,
that has its own Agent Identity, grouped into the aid claim.
Initiator Agent Platform:
The Agent Platform hosting the Initiator Agent. Some use cases
require the Platform to have its own verified identity assertions,
grouped into the apd claim.
Initiator Principal:
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A legal entity (human or organization) behind the purchase /
consumption of a product or service. In buyer/seller
transactions, the Initiator is the buyer. The Principal typically
interacts with the target via an Initiator Agent. Many targets
are required to be able to determine the Initiator Identity in
order to comply with KYC/AML regulations, accounting standards,
and to maintain a direct customer relationships. The initiator
principal's identity is grouped into the hid claim.
Initiator Identity:
The aggregate verified identity assertions of the initiator
entities, typically encompassing the Initiator Principal, the
Initiator Agent Platform, and the Initiator Agent itself. This
composite identity is conveyed via the KYA token, allowing the
target to verify the entire chain of responsibility behind a
request. The initiator identity utilizes the hid, apd, and aid
claims.
2.1.2. Target Roles
Target Agent:
An Agent performing tasks on behalf of a Target Principal,
directly interacting with Initiator Agents to facilitate discovery
and purchase. Typically runs on Internet-connected
infrastructure, and discoverable via service directories. Target
agent identity claims are also grouped into the aid claim if KYA
tokens are generated for the targets.
Target Agent Platform:
The Agent Platform that hosts Target Agents. Some use cases
require the Platform to have its own verified identity assertions,
grouped into the apd claim.
Target Principal:
A human principal (individual or organization) that owns the
product, service, API, website, or content being consumed or sold,
and serves as the ultimate beneficiary of a transaction. In
buyer/seller transactions, the Target is the seller. The target
principal's identity is grouped into the hid claim.
Target Identity:
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The aggregate verified identity assertions of the target entities,
typically encompassing the Target Principal, the Target Agent
Platform, as well as the Target Agent Identity. These various
aspects of Target Identity allow Initiators and Initiator Agents
to perform reputation-based logic, to verify that they are
interacting with the authorized (and expected) counter-party, and
to fulfill KYC/AML regulation requirements. The target identity
utilizes the hid, apd, and aid claims.
2.1.3. Ecosystem Infrastructure Roles
KYA Token Issuer:
A trusted neutral entity that conducts Know Your Customer (KYC)
and Know Your Business (KYB) (for organizations) verifications.
It is responsible for issuing cryptographically signed Know Your
Agent (KYA) tokens that attest to the identity of the Principal,
Agent, and Agent Platform, for both Initiators and Targets.
Payment Token Issuer:
A trusted entity responsible for facilitating the exchange of
payments and credentials between the Initiator and Target. It
issues signed pay tokens that enable settlement via various
schemes (Cards, Banks, Cryptocurrency), without exposing raw
credentials or secrets. Like a KYA Token Issuer, it conducts Know
Your Customer (KYC) and Know Your Business (KYB) verifications of
the Initiator. KYAPay does not provide for anonymous payment, so
a Payment Token Issuer does not issue a pay token for an Initiator
it has not verified.
Verifier:
The party used by the KYA Token Issuer to verify the identity of
the human, organization, or agent or the party used by the Payment
Token Issuer to verify the payment method.
3. KYAPay Token Schemas
3.1. Common Token Claims
The following are claims in common, used within the KYA (Know Your
Agent), PAY (Payment), and KYA-PAY (combined Know Your Agent and
Payment) Tokens.
iss:
REQUIRED - URL of the token's issuer. The value MUST be an origin
as defined in Section 4 of [RFC6454]: a scheme, a host, and an
optional port, with no path, query or fragment component. Used
for locating the JWK Set for token signature verification, as
described in Section 3.2.
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sub:
REQUIRED - Subject Identifier. MUST be pairwise unique within a
given issuer: unique, and different at each Target service (tsi).
As for hid.id, the value MUST NOT be, or reveal, a directly
identifying attribute, and values at different Target services
MUST NOT be linkable to one another without the issuer's
cooperation. The subject identifies the combination of identities
the issuer has verified for the initiator: the human principal,
the agent platform and the agent. An issuer MUST use the same sub
value at a given Target service while that combination remains
unchanged, MUST use a different value at each other Target
service, MUST NOT use that value for a different combination, and
MUST assign a new sub when any of those identities changes. KYA
and KYA-PAY tokens carry the human principal and the agent as the
hid and aid claims, and carry the agent platform as the apd claim
where it is identified. PAY tokens carry none of them. The
subject identifies the same combination in either case, since an
issuer does not issue a token without having verified the
initiator. Tokens of different types issued by the same issuer
for the same initiator at the same Target service therefore carry
the same sub. A recipient MAY associate a PAY token with a KYA
token on that basis, but MUST treat them as referring to the same
initiator only when both the iss and the sub values are equal.
aud:
REQUIRED - Audience (used for audience binding and replay attack
mitigation). The audience identifies the combination of
identities the issuer holds for the Target: the human principal,
the agent platform and the agent, where "agent" is understood
broadly (Section 3.1.1). A single string value.
iat:
REQUIRED - as defined in Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7519]. Identifies
the time at which the JWT was issued. This claim must have a
value in the past and can be used to determine the age of the JWT.
jti:
REQUIRED - Unique ID of this JWT as defined in Section 4.1.7 of
[RFC7519]. This claim identifies the token, not the request. A
token may be presented on more than one request within its
lifetime, so a repeated jti is not by itself evidence of replay.
exp:
REQUIRED - as defined in Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519]. Identifies
the expiration time on or after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted
for processing.
tdm:
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REQUIRED where the Target is identified by a domain name; OPTIONAL
otherwise. A host name, optionally followed by a path,
identifying the Target the token is intended for. See
Section 3.1.1.
ori:
OPTIONAL - URL of the token's originator.
env:
OPTIONAL - Issuer environment (such as "production" or "sandbox").
Additional values may be defined and used.
tsi:
REQUIRED - Target Service ID, assigned by the Token Issuer,
identifying the service offered under the Target agent named by
aud. See Section 3.1.1.
itg:
OPTIONAL - Initiator tag - an opaque reference ID internal to the
initiator.
cnf:
OPTIONAL - Confirmation claim, as defined in [RFC7800], binding
the token to a key held by the agent identified in the aid claim.
When present, it MUST contain the jwk member: the agent's public
key represented as a JWK [RFC7517]. The JWK MUST contain only
public key material; a cnf containing private key material MUST be
rejected. Other confirmation members MAY additionally be present,
but a recipient MUST NOT be required to obtain the key by any
means other than reading cnf.jwk. A token carrying cnf is sender-
constrained rather than bearer: the presenter is required to
demonstrate possession of the confirmation key. Recipient
processing is specified in
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens].
Additional claims MAY be defined and used in these tokens. The
recipient MUST ignore any unrecognized claims.
3.1.1. Identifying the Target
Three claims identify the party a token was minted for, and they
answer different questions.
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The aud claim is the counterpart, on the Target side, of sub on the
initiating side, and it names the same three things. Where sub
identifies the combination of identities the issuer has verified for
the initiator (the human principal, the agent platform and the
agent), aud identifies that combination for the Target: the Target's
agent, the platform it runs on, and the human principal behind it.
"Agent" is used broadly on the Target side. On the initiating side
it is a program acting for a person. On the Target side it is
whatever the initiator is dealing with, which may be a website, an
API, an MCP server, or another agent. The tsi claim identifies the
particular service offered under that Target agent.
The Token Issuer assigns both, and both are present in every token it
creates, so that it can account for the tokens it has issued. Their
values are meaningful to the issuer and to a Target that has
onboarded to it; onboarding is what allows a Target to interpret
them, not what causes them to be set.
The two sides differ in what stands behind them. The identities
named in sub are verified by the issuer. Those named in aud and tsi
are verified where the Target has onboarded to the issuer; where the
issuer has no means of confirming the Target, they are its record of
the Target that the initiator asserted it was minting for, and tdm
carries the domain the initiator supplied.
A recipient reads these claims accordingly. They bind a token to one
Target and so limit where it can be presented, which holds in either
case because the binding narrows the token rather than granting
anything. A recipient MUST NOT read tdm alone as the issuer
confirming the Target's identity.
The tdm claim identifies a Target reached over a URL-based interface,
such as a website or an HTTP API: at least its domain, and optionally
its host and a path. Unlike aud and tsi it is not issuer-specific,
so any recipient can interpret it without a relationship with the
issuer. It is present in addition to aud and tsi where such a Target
is identified by a domain name.
The value of tdm is a host name in lower case, optionally followed by
a path, with no scheme, port, query or fragment; for example
example.com, shop.example.com or shop.example.com/store. The
Target's domain is the registrable domain of that host, determined
using the Public Suffix List [PSL], including its private section. A
host on a shared hosting platform that the list names is therefore a
domain of its own, and a token minted for one such host does not name
the platform's other hosts.
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tdm and tsi are alternates rather than duplicates: they name the same
Target by different means, one publicly interpretable and one not. A
recipient validates whichever it is in a position to interpret. A
Target that has onboarded to the issuer checks aud and tsi. A
recipient that has not, including a security intermediary acting for
many Targets, checks at least that tdm names the domain it is
protecting for that request. The Authenticating the Counterparty
section of [I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens] describes that
choice.
A recipient that checks more than the domain checks that tdm names
the Target it is protecting for the request: the host in tdm is that
Target's host, and where that Target is identified by a path, the
path in tdm is that path or one below it. Paths are matched as
cookie paths are (Section 5.1.4 of [RFC6265]), after both are
normalized as described in Section 6.2.2 of [RFC3986]. Ports are not
compared. For example, for a Target at shop.example.com/store, a tdm
of shop.example.com/store or shop.example.com/store/cart passes, but
shop.example.com, shop.example.com/storefront and example.com/store
do not. A recipient that checks only the domain does not enforce the
host or the path. A Target whose host serves several tenants, or
that protects only some of its paths, therefore checks the host and
path itself, or aud and tsi where it has onboarded to the issuer.
3.2. Issuer Key Discovery
The JWK Set used to verify a token signature is located at the well-
known URI [RFC8615] formed from the iss claim with the URI suffix
jwks.json. Because iss is an origin, this is the well-known URI
construction described in Section 3 of [RFC8615] applied to that
origin. For example, an iss value of https://issuer.example.com
yields https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json.
The jwks.json URI suffix is registered in Section 7.3.
JWK Sets SHOULD be cached and refreshed according to standard JWK Set
practice. Retrieval per request is neither required nor expected;
because KYAPay tokens are self-contained, signature verification is
intended to be performed locally.
A recipient retrieves this JWK Set only for an issuer it trusts
(Section 4.1).
A future revision of this specification may additionally define an
issuer metadata document, giving an issuer somewhere to advertise
capabilities beyond the location of its keys, such as the identity
verification methods it supports. Such a document would supplement
the mechanism described here rather than replace it.
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3.3. Token Size
This specification sets no maximum token size; the Token Size section
of [I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens] sets the minimum a
recipient must accept. An issuer SHOULD NOT emit a token whose
claims total more than 4096 octets of JSON, counting all claims
together, whichever specification defines them, and measuring before
encoding. Base64url encoding adds about a third, so 4096 octets of
claims, with a typical JOSE header and an ES256 signature, serializes
to about 5670 octets, within that minimum. An issuer using a larger
header or signature SHOULD check the complete serialized token
against that minimum. Where a request would carry both a KYA token
and a PAY token, an issuer SHOULD issue one KYA-PAY token instead,
because two tokens at this limit exceed a single header field at a
typical origin.
3.4. KYA Token
The following identity related claims are used within KYA and KYA-PAY
tokens:
hid:
REQUIRED - A map of human identity claims (individual or
organization).
apd:
OPTIONAL - Agent Platform identity claims.
aid:
REQUIRED - Agent identity claims.
scope
OPTIONAL - String with space-separated scope values, per [RFC8693]
The following informative example displays a decoded KYA type token.
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{
"kid": "YjFdJgFNWj9AkUmtoXILwoeb37PsBuGWVK6_QvFLwJw", // JWK Key ID
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "kya+jwt"
}.{
"iss": "https://issuer.example.com", // Issuer URL
"iat": 1742245254,
"exp": 1742245554,
"jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
"sub": "bb713104-c14e-460f-9b7c-f8140fa9bea4", // Bound identity combination: hid + apd + aid
"aud": "7434230d-0861-46f2-9c2c-a6ee33d07f17", // Target Agent Account ID
"env": "production",
"tsi": "bc3ff89f-069b-4383-82a9-8cfe53c55fc3", // Target Service ID
"itg": "4f6cbd39-215c-4516-bf33-cab22862ee60", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)
"hid": {
"id": "6d2f8a41-0c3e-4b9a-a7d5-1e8f3c6b2a90" // Human principal ID at this Target service
},
"apd": {
"id": "d3306fc0-602b-47e6-9fe2-3d55d028fbd2",
"name": "Acme Shopping Agents", // Agent platform name
"email": "platform@acme.com", // Email address for the agent platform
"phone_number": "+12345677890", // Phone number for the agent platform
"organization_name": "Acme Shopping Inc.", // Legal name of the agent platform
"verifier": "https://www.verifier.com/", // URL of the KYA verifier
"verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's KYA verification
"verification_id": "a23c1fe4-a4b7-442d-8bca-3c8fad5ec3a6" // Verifier's ID for the KYA verification performed
},
"aid": {
"id": "7d889702-7b6a-46cb-9bdd-10e83d17b18d", // Identifier of the agent instance
"name": "Acme Agent Extraordinaire",
"creation_ip": "192.0.2.10", // IP address the token was requested from
"source_ips": ["192.0.2.10-192.0.2.12", "203.0.113.0/24",
"2001:db8:abcd:12::/64", "agents.example.com"]
// IP addresses from which the initiator agent will make requests to the target
}
}
Figure 1: A KYA type token
3.4.1. hid - Human Identity Sub-Claims
The Human Identity (hid) claim contains sub-claims identifying the
human principal (individual or organization) as follows.
id:
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REQUIRED - Human principal identifier. An opaque, pseudonymous
identifier for the human principal, assigned by the issuer. It
MUST NOT be, or reveal, an email address, telephone number or
other directly identifying attribute. An issuer MUST use the same
value for the same principal acting through the same agent
platform at the same Target service (tsi), whatever the agent, and
MUST use a different value for each agent platform and for each
Target service. Values for different agent platforms or Target
services MUST NOT be linkable to one another without the issuer's
cooperation; an issuer can, for example, assign each value at
random or derive it using a key known only to itself. The value
is unique within a given issuer, so a recipient that compares
hid.id values from two tokens MUST first check that both carry the
same iss.
email:
OPTIONAL - Email address associated with the human individual or
organization.
given_name:
OPTIONAL - Given name(s) or first name(s) of the human principal
if they are an individual.
middle_name:
OPTIONAL - Middle name(s) of the human principal if they are an
individual.
family_name:
OPTIONAL - Surname(s) or last name(s) of the human principal if
they are an individual.
phone_number:
OPTIONAL - Phone number associated with the human individual or
organization.
organization_name:
OPTIONAL - Name of the organization.
verifier:
OPTIONAL - URL of the party that performed the identity
verification
verified:
OPTIONAL - Boolean verification status. When present, the value
MUST be true. An issuer does not issue a token carrying
unverified identity claims, so a token never asserts false. The
claim gives a recipient an explicit affirmative signal rather than
requiring it to infer verification from other claims. A recipient
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that receives false MUST treat the claim as not asserting
verification, and MUST NOT treat the token as carrying a verified
identity on the strength of the claim's presence.
verification_id:
OPTIONAL - Verification identifier. This is the verifier's
identifier for the identity verification performed. This could be
used during auditing and dispute resolution.
ivm:
OPTIONAL - Identity Verification Methods
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification]. A JSON array of the methods
by which the human principal's identity was verified. An issuer
SHOULD include this sub-claim when it knows the methods used.
amr:
OPTIONAL - Authentication Methods References, as defined in
Section 2 of [OpenID.Core], with values from [RFC8176] and
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values]. A JSON array of the methods by
which the human principal authenticated. An issuer SHOULD include
this sub-claim when it knows the methods used.
aml:
OPTIONAL - Anti-Money Laundering Methods
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods]. A JSON array of the anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing methods applied to the
human principal. An issuer SHOULD include this sub-claim when it
knows the methods used.
The ivm, amr, and aml sub-claims use the syntax and values of the
claims of the same names defined in the cited specifications. The
absence of any of them does not indicate that a method was not used.
The sub-claims email, given_name, middle_name, family_name,
phone_number and organization_name directly identify the human
principal, and verification_id is the same at every Target. An
issuer MUST NOT include any of them unless a Target requires it for
the action at hand and the principal has authorized its disclosure to
that Target, whether to the issuer or to the agent platform
(Section 6).
Additional sub-claims MAY be defined and used, including further
identifiers for the human principal where a Target requires them to
recognize an account. An issuer MUST NOT assert an identifier of the
human principal unless it has verified that the principal controls
it. This document does not prescribe how control is verified. The
recipient MUST ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.
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3.4.2. Agent Platform Identity apd Sub-Claims
The apd claim is REQUIRED in KYA and KYAPay tokens. It contains the
following sub-claims.
id:
REQUIRED - Agent Platform identifier.
name:
REQUIRED - Agent Platform name.
email:
OPTIONAL - Email associated with agent platform.
phone_number:
OPTIONAL - Phone number associated with agent platform.
organization_name:
OPTIONAL - Legal name associated with agent platform.
verifier:
OPTIONAL - URL of the party that verified the agent identity (KYA)
verified:
OPTIONAL - Boolean verification status. When present, the value
MUST be true. An issuer does not issue a token carrying
unverified Know Your Agent claims, so a token never asserts false.
The claim gives a recipient an explicit affirmative signal rather
than requiring it to infer verification from other claims. A
recipient that receives false MUST treat the claim as not
asserting verification, and MUST NOT treat the token as carrying a
verified identity on the strength of the claim's presence.
verification_id:
OPTIONAL - Verification identifier. This is the verifier's
identifier for the KYA verification performed. This could be used
during auditing and dispute resolution.
ivm:
OPTIONAL - Identity Verification Methods
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification]. A JSON array of the methods
by which the agent platform's identity was verified. An issuer
SHOULD include this sub-claim when it knows the methods used.
aml:
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OPTIONAL - Anti-Money Laundering Methods
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods]. A JSON array of the anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing methods applied to the
agent platform. An issuer SHOULD include this sub-claim when it
knows the methods used.
The ivm and aml sub-claims use the syntax and values of the claims of
the same names defined in the cited specifications. The absence of
either does not indicate that a method was not used.
In a KYAPay token, the ivm, amr, and aml claims appear only as sub-
claims of hid and apd, so that each describes the party whose claim
contains it: in hid, how the human principal was vetted; in apd, how
the agent platform was vetted. amr does not apply to the agent
platform and is not used in apd. Issuers MUST NOT include ivm, amr,
or aml as top-level claims in a KYAPay token, and recipients MUST
ignore them if they appear there.
Additional sub-claims MAY be defined and used. The recipient MUST
ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.
3.4.3. Agent Identity aid Sub-Claims
The aid claim is REQUIRED. It contains the following sub-claims.
id:
REQUIRED - Agent identifier. An issuer MUST use the same value
for the same agent at the same Target service (tsi), and a
different value at each Target service. The value MUST NOT be, or
reveal, a directly identifying attribute, and values at different
Target services MUST NOT be linkable to one another without the
issuer's cooperation.
name:
REQUIRED - Agent name. The name should reflect the business
purpose of the agent. The name MUST be unique among the agents of
a given agent platform at a given issuer, so that the issuer, the
agent platform and the agent name together identify the agent
unambiguously.
creation_ip:
OPTIONAL - The public IP address of the system / agent that
requested the token. Its value is a string containing the public
IPv4 or IPv6 address from where the token request originated.
When present, it MUST be captured directly from the token request.
It is a diagnostic aid, for example when investigating an
incident, and is not an access-control signal: a recipient MAY use
it as a weak corroborating signal only and MUST NOT treat it as
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sufficient on its own (Section 6.3 of
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens]). It is personal data,
subject to the privacy considerations in Section 6.
source_ips:
OPTIONAL - Valid public IP address, or range of public IP
addresses, from where the system / agent's requests to merchants /
services will originate. A JSON array of IPv4 addresses or
ranges, IPv6 addresses or ranges, or domain names resolvable to an
IP address via DNS. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses can be a single IPv4
or IPv6 address or a range of IPv4 or IPv6 addresses in CIDR
notation or start-and-end IP pairs.
Additional sub-claims MAY be defined and used. The recipient MUST
ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.
3.5. PAY Token
The following payment related claims are used within PAY and KYA-PAY
type tokens:
tpr:
OPTIONAL - JSON string representing target service price in
currency units.
tps:
OPTIONAL - Target pricing scheme, which represents a way for the
target list how it charges for its service or content. One of
pay_per_use, subscription, pay_per_mb, or custom. Additional
values may be defined and used.
amt:
REQUIRED - JSON string representing token amount in currency
units.
cur:
REQUIRED - Currency unit, represented as an ISO 4217 three letter
code, such as "EUR".
val:
REQUIRED - JSON string representing token amount in settlement
network's units.
mnr:
OPTIONAL - JSON number representing maximum number of requests
when tps is pay_per_use.
stp:
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REQUIRED - Settlement type (one of coin or card). Additional
values may be defined and used.
sti:
REQUIRED - Meta information for payment settlement, depending on
the stp value.
3.5.1. Settlement Information sti Sub-Claims
The sti claim is REQUIRED in Pay Tokens. It contains the following
sub-claims, with the requirement levels marked below.
The sti claim carries the settlement instrument, and its contents
depend on the value of stp.
When the stp value is card, the settlement instrument is an agentic
payment credential issued by a payment network under an agentic-
commerce programme -- for example Visa Intelligent Commerce
(visa_vic) or Mastercard Agent Pay, using Secure Card on File
(mastercard_scof). Such a credential is a payment token issued by
the payment network (Section 3.5.2). It is used with a single-use
token cryptogram (token_security_code), and the network restricts its
use to one initiator, one target, and one amount. It is not a
Primary Account Number (PAN), and the underlying PAN cannot feasibly
be recovered from it.
type:
REQUIRED - "type" is dependent on the "stp" value; for "coin" -
"usdc"; for "card" - "visa_vic" or "mastercard_scof". Additional
values may be defined and used.
payment_token:
REQUIRED when the stp value is card; otherwise OPTIONAL - String
containing the network-issued agentic payment credential,
formatted per ISO/IEC 7812, 12-19 characters. This value MUST be
a payment-network-issued agentic or tokenized credential. It MUST
NOT be a Primary Account Number (PAN).
token_expiration_month:
REQUIRED when payment_token is present - String containing two-
digit Expiration Month Number.
token_expiration_year:
REQUIRED when payment_token is present - String containing four-
digit Expiration Year.
token_security_code:
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REQUIRED when payment_token is present - String containing the
single-use token cryptogram accompanying the credential in
payment_token -- a Dynamic Token Verification Value (DTVV) or
Token Authentication Verification Value (TAVV), depending on the
network. 3 or 4 digits. This value is generated per transaction
and is short-lived; its validity period is determined and enforced
by the payment network. It MUST NOT be a static Card Verification
Value (CVV, CVC2 or CVV2).
verifier:
OPTIONAL - URL of the party that performed the payment method
verification
verified:
OPTIONAL - Boolean verification status. When present, the value
MUST be true. An issuer does not issue a token against an
unverified payment method, so a token never asserts false. The
claim gives a recipient an explicit affirmative signal rather than
requiring it to infer verification from other claims. A recipient
that receives false MUST treat the claim as not asserting
verification, and MUST NOT treat the token as carrying a verified
payment method on the strength of the claim's presence.
verification_id:
OPTIONAL - Verification identifier. This is the verifier's
identifier for the payment method verification performed. This
could be used during auditing and dispute resolution.
Additional sub-claims MAY be defined and used. The recipient MUST
ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.
3.5.2. Scope of Card Settlement
This specification supports card settlement only through payment-
network agentic-commerce programmes whose credentials are Payment
Tokens as defined by the EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification
[EMVCo-PT], used with a single-use token cryptogram and restricted by
the payment network to the transaction bound in the token.
A token defined in this specification, of any type, MUST NOT contain
a Primary Account Number, full magnetic-stripe or chip track data, a
static card verification value (CVV, CVC2 or CVV2), or a PIN or PIN
block.
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Settlement instruments that fall within PCI DSS scope require
mechanisms this specification does not define -- including
confidentiality protection of the token contents and a defined
cardholder-data-environment boundary. Support for such instruments
is left to future work, and implementers requiring it should not
attempt to carry them in the claims defined here.
3.5.3. PAY Token Example
The following informative example displays a decoded PAY type token.
{
"kid": "FgT4q8c5IqbBCCjcho5JdeGQvuK1keMDFc9IwCm8J7Y", // JWK Key ID
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "pay+jwt"
}.{
"iss": "https://pay-issuer.example.net", // Issuer URL
"iat": 1742245254,
"exp": 1742245554,
"jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
"sub": "8b810549-7443-494f-b4ad-5bc65871e32b", // Bound identity combination: hid + apd + aid
"aud": "37888095-2721-48d9-a2df-bfe4075f223a", // Target Agent Account ID
"env": "sandbox",
"tsi": "274efc47-024e-466f-b278-152d2ee73955", // Target Service ID
"itg": "16c135ce-a99a-453d-a7b5-4958fd91de5f", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)
"tpr": "0.01",
"tps": "pay_per_use",
"amt": "15",
"cur": "USD",
"val": "15000000",
"mnr": 1600,
"stp": "card",
"sti": {
"type": "visa_vic",
"payment_token": "0000000000000000", // Example only: a network-issued payment token, not a PAN
"token_expiration_month": "03",
"token_expiration_year": "2030",
"token_security_code": "000", // Example only: a single-use cryptogram (DTVV or TAVV), not a CVV
"verifier": "https://verifier.example.info", // URL of payment method verifier
"verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's payment method verification
"verification_id": "3a6e1b76-8f78-4c24-b1bd-dc78a8cc3711" // Verifier's ID for the payment method verification performed
}
}
Figure 2: A PAY type token
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3.6. KYA-PAY Token Example
The following informative example displays a decoded KYA-PAY type
token.
{
"kid": "YjFdJgFNWj9AkUmtoXILwoeb37PsBuGWVK6_QvFLwJw", // JWK Key ID
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "kya-pay+jwt"
}.{
"iss": "https://kya-pay.example.org", // Issuer URL
"iat": 1742245254,
"exp": 1742245554,
"jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
"sub": "f24a431d-108c-46e6-9357-b428c528210e", // Bound identity combination: hid + apd + aid
"aud": "5e00177d-ff7f-424b-8c83-2756e15efbed", // Target Agent Account ID
"env": "production",
"tsi": "3e6d33a1-438e-482e-bba5-6aa69544727d", // Target Service ID
"itg": "c52e0ef2-e27d-4e95-862e-475a904ae7b2", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)
"hid": {
"id": "a4c19e07-5b2d-4f86-9e3a-7d0b8c1f5e62", // Human principal ID at this Target service
// The following are present because the Target requires them for checkout
"email": "maryjane@initiator.example.com",
"given_name": "Mary",
"middle_name": "Jane",
"family_name": "Doe",
"phone_number": "+1-425-555-1212",
"verified": true // Outcome of the verifier's KYA verification
},
"apd": {
"id": "4b087db2-b6e5-48b8-8737-1aa8ddf4c4fe", // Agent platform ID
"name": "Acme Shopping Agents", // Agent platform name
"email": "platform@acme.com", // Email address for the agent platform
"phone_number": "+12345677890", // Phone number for the agent platform
"organization_name": "Acme Shopping Inc.", // Legal name of the agent platform
"verifier": "https://www.verifier.com/", // URL of the KYA verifier
"verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's KYA verification
"verification_id": "a23c1fe4-a4b7-442d-8bca-3c8fad5ec3a6" // Verifier's ID for the KYA verification performed
},
"aid": {
"id": "4607fa56-368d-4fde-90e9-baad4e9f4439", // Identifier of the agent instance
"name": "Agentic Excellence Я Us",
"creation_ip": "198.51.100.20", // IP address the token was requested from
"source_ips": ["192.0.2.10-192.0.2.12", "203.0.113.0/24",
"2001:db8:abcd:12::/64", "agents.example.com"]
// IP addresses from which the initiator agent will make requests to the target
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},
"tpr": "0.01",
"tps": "pay_per_use",
"amt": "15",
"cur": "USD",
"val": "15000000",
"mnr": 1600,
"stp": "card",
"sti": {
"type": "visa_vic",
"payment_token": "0000000000000000", // Example only: a network-issued payment token, not a PAN
"token_expiration_month": "03",
"token_expiration_year": "2030",
"token_security_code": "000" // Example only: a single-use cryptogram (DTVV or TAVV), not a CVV
}
}
Figure 3: A KYA-PAY type token
4. Token Validation
4.1. Validating KYA and PAY Tokens
A recipient MUST confirm that the iss claim names an issuer it trusts
before it performs any step below that retrieves key material or
otherwise depends on the issuer. A recipient MUST NOT retrieve key
material for an issuer that is not in its configured set of trusted
issuers. The set of trusted issuers is configured out of band and is
not derived from the token.
4.1.1. JWT Header Validation
1. alg - The alg header parameter MUST be present. Recipients MUST
support ES256 [RFC7518], and MUST accept it from any issuer they
trust whose JWK Set publishes an ES256 key. Issuers MUST use
ES256, or an algorithm that they know every recipient of the
token accepts.
A recipient MUST determine the set of algorithms it will accept
for a given issuer, limited to those for which the issuer's JWK
Set publishes a suitable key. The set MUST NOT be derived from
the token. A token whose alg value is absent from, or outside,
that set MUST be rejected, including the value none [RFC7515] and
any symmetric (MAC) algorithm, since an issuer's JWK Set
publishes only public keys. Verification is then performed using
the algorithm named in the token and the key obtained from the
issuer's JWK Set, or the token is rejected.
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Together, these guarantee that any conforming recipient can
verify a token whose recipients the issuer does not know in
advance, without constraining which algorithm a deployment uses.
Implementations remain free to support and use others, including
post-quantum algorithms as they are standardized; this
requirement is a floor for interoperability, not a ceiling on
agility.
Where the key retrieved from the issuer's JWK Set carries an alg
or use parameter, the recipient MUST confirm it is consistent
with the parameters of the issued token, and reject the token
otherwise.
2. kid - The kid claim MUST be present, and set to a valid Key ID
present in the issuer's JWK Set, located as described in
Section 3.2.
3. typ - The typ header parameter MUST be present, and its value
MUST be one of: kya+jwt, pay+jwt, or kya-pay+jwt. As specified
in Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515], values are compared case-
insensitively, and a value with the application/ prefix, such as
application/kya+jwt, is the same type. A token whose typ is
absent or has any other value fails validation. A recipient MUST
determine which of these types it accepts for a given request
before validating a token. A token of one of these types that
the recipient does not accept for that request is set aside: the
recipient does not use it for that request, and does not treat it
as having failed validation.
4.1.2. JWT Payload Validation
1. *Validate iss Claim* - Ensure that the token's issuer is one the
recipient trusts (Section 4.1).
2. *Verify JWT Signature* - Valid JWTs MUST be signed with a valid
key belonging to the token's issuer (iss claim).
3. *Validate the exp Claim* - The recipient MUST validate that the
token has not expired, within the clock skew tolerance described
in Section 4.1.3.
4. *Validate the iat Claim* - The recipient MUST validate that the
token was issued in the past, within the clock skew tolerance
described in Section 4.1.3.
5. *Validate the jti Claim* - Ensure that the jti claim is present,
and is a UUID.
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6. *Validate the Audience* - A recipient that has onboarded to the
issuer ensures that aud and tsi identify it as the intended
audience. A recipient that has not ensures at least that tdm
names the domain it is protecting for the request
(Section 3.1.1).
7. *Validate the env Claim* - Ensure that the Environment claim is
set to an expected and use case appropriate value (such as
production or sandbox)
4.1.3. Clock Skew
The iat and exp claims are set from the issuer's clock and evaluated
against the recipient's. These are never precisely synchronized, so
a recipient applies a tolerance when evaluating them.
A recipient MUST accept a token whose iat is up to the tolerance in
the future, and MUST accept a token up to the tolerance beyond its
exp.
A recipient MUST support a tolerance of at least 5 seconds. A
recipient SHOULD NOT apply a tolerance greater than 60 seconds; 30
seconds is RECOMMENDED. A tolerance approaching the token's own
lifetime defeats the purpose of exp: the effective window in which a
captured token is accepted is its lifetime plus twice the tolerance.
Where a party generating these timestamps can observe the Date header
field (Section 6.6.1 of [RFC9110]) of a response from the intended
recipient, it SHOULD use that value to correct subsequent timestamps
rather than relying on the recipient's tolerance. Correcting at the
sender resolves skew at the only party positioned to detect it.
4.2. Validating PAY Tokens
For tokens of type pay+jwt or kya-pay+jwt, perform the steps
described in the Validating KYA and PAY Tokens section.
In addition, perform the following steps.
1. The val claim is greater than 0.
2. The amt claim is greater than 0.
3. The cur claim is set to a currency the target supports (such as
USD)
4. The tps claim, if present, matches the pricing scheme that you
configured in the target's service
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5. The tpr claim, if present, matches the price that you configured
in the target's service
5. Security Considerations
5.1. General JWT Practices
When validating the JWTs described in this specification,
implementers MUST follow the JSON Web Token Best Current Practices,
BCP 225 [RFC8725].
5.2. Confidentiality of Token Contents
The tokens defined in this specification are signed using JWS Compact
Serialization. Signing provides integrity protection, not
confidentiality. The claims in a token are encoded, not encrypted,
and are readable by any party that obtains the token.
Tokens defined in this specification carry identity claims about a
human principal and, in the case of PAY and KYA-PAY tokens, payment
settlement information. Accordingly:
* Tokens MUST be transmitted over a channel providing
confidentiality, integrity and server authentication, such as TLS
[RFC8446].
* Tokens MUST NOT be written to logs, traces, analytics pipelines,
or other persistent stores that are not required to process the
transaction. An agent that obtains a token through a tool whose
result is returned to a language model may be unable to keep the
token out of that model's context or out of a transcript retained
from it; the Token Exposure in the Agent Runtime section of
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens] describes how such a
deployment treats the token.
* Tokens MUST NOT be forwarded to parties other than those necessary
to complete the interaction for which they were issued.
* Issuers SHOULD include only those claims necessary for the
interaction for which the token is issued. Confidentiality risk
is reduced most reliably by not carrying a claim at all.
This specification does not define encryption of the token itself.
Tokens are intended to be read by multiple independent parties along
a single request path -- bot management and fraud systems at the
edge, identity providers, and the target service -- none of which is
known to the issuer at the time the token is minted, and between
which no key-distribution relationship is assumed. Encrypting the
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token to a single recipient would both require pre-established key
exchange with that recipient and withhold the token's contents from
the intermediaries that are its intended consumers. Confidentiality
is therefore provided at the transport layer and by minimising token
contents, not at the token layer.
The settlement information carried in a PAY or KYA-PAY token is
additionally protected by its own construction rather than by
encryption: the network restricts the credential to the transaction
bound in the token, and its accompanying cryptogram is single-use, so
a captured token yields no reusable payment instrument.
5.3. Settlement Credential Handling
The sti claim of a PAY or KYA-PAY token carries a settlement
instrument. When stp is card, that instrument is a payment token
issued by a payment network and accompanied by a single-use token
cryptogram (Section 3.5.1).
For entities other than Token Service Providers, a Payment Token that
is defined and used in accordance with the EMV Payment Tokenisation
Specification and that exists outside the Token Service Provider's
token data environment is not Account Data and is not in scope for
PCI DSS [PCI-FAQ-1326]. Receiving, inspecting, or forwarding a token
defined in this specification therefore does not of itself bring a
recipient within that scope. That determination concerns the payment
token, not the recipient's wider environment: a system that also
stores, processes, or transmits Account Data, or is connected to one
that does, remains in scope.
Section 3.5.2 prohibits Account Data in any token. A token that
carried it would bring every system that processes it within PCI DSS
scope, for which this specification provides no confidentiality
mechanism.
5.4. Token Lifetime
The exp claim of a token carrying a settlement instrument SHOULD NOT
extend beyond the validity period of that instrument. The token
cryptograms that accompany agentic payment credentials are single-use
and short-lived; their validity period is determined and enforced by
the payment network. Issuing a long-lived token around a short-lived
credential provides no benefit and widens the window in which a
captured token can be replayed.
More generally, issuers SHOULD set exp to the shortest value
compatible with the intended interaction.
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5.5. Bearer Semantics and Proof of Possession
Tokens defined in this specification are bearer tokens unless they
carry a confirmation method: any party in possession of such a token
can present it. For bearer tokens, the protections above --
transport confidentiality, restricted forwarding, short lifetimes,
and audience restriction via the aud claim -- are the primary
defences against capture and replay.
A token MAY carry a cnf claim [RFC7800] binding it to a public key
held by the agent. A token carrying cnf is sender-constrained rather
than bearer: possession of the token alone is insufficient, and a
recipient requires the presenter to demonstrate possession of the
confirmation key on each request.
Recipient behaviour for tokens carrying cnf -- including the
requirement to verify an HTTP Message Signature [RFC9421] over the
confirmation key, and to reject requests where that signature is
absent or invalid -- is specified in
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens].
Issuers SHOULD include cnf where the agent holds a suitable key and
the target is expected to enforce it. Issuers MUST NOT rely on cnf
as a substitute for the bearer-token protections above, since a token
carrying cnf may still be presented to a recipient that does not
enforce it.
5.6. Identity Binding
The subject binds the human principal, the agent platform and the
agent together, and the issuer's signature covers all of them. A
recipient can therefore verify that the issuer associated the parties
named by the token (see Section 5.5). Modifying any of those claims
within a token invalidates its signature. Combining claims taken
from two separately signed tokens does not invalidate either
signature, so a recipient that correlates tokens MUST check that both
carry the same iss and sub values before treating them as referring
to the same initiator. Because the subject is stable at a Target
service while the bound identities are unchanged, a recipient at that
service MAY use sub as a stable key for that combination, for example
to rate-limit or isolate a particular agent without affecting other
agents acting for the same principal.
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6. Privacy Considerations
By default, a KYA token identifies the human principal only by
hid.id. Directly identifying sub-claims such as email, phone_number
or names are disclosed only when a Target requires them for the
action at hand, as stated in its decline response or discovery
document, and the principal has authorized the disclosure. The
issuer MAY collect the principal's authorization itself or delegate
its collection to the agent platform. Whichever of them collected it
MUST be able to demonstrate that it was given. What counts as
sufficient evidence may depend on applicable law and regulation.
Targets SHOULD NOT require directly identifying sub-claims for
actions that do not need them, such as browsing a catalog.
A token carrying only hid.id is pseudonymous, not anonymous. hid.id,
sub and aid.id are each specific to one Target service and different
at every other Target service. At a given service, hid.id is stable
for a principal returning through a given agent platform, whatever
the agent, while sub and aid.id are stable for one agent of that
principal and change with the agent. Two Targets, or a party that
sees the traffic of both, cannot link the principal from these
values. apd identifies the agent platform and is the same at every
Target. aid.name is also the same at every Target, so where an agent
acts for a single principal, its name can link that principal's
activity across Targets. Directly identifying sub-claims link
wherever they are disclosed.
KYAPay tokens are designed to convey the information that an agent is
acting on behalf of a principal - a person or organization. To do
this, they will necessarily contain information about that principal
that can be verified and utilized by participants in the system.
Participants should therefore only share these tokens with other
legitimate participants and not make their contents public or
disclose them to unknown or untrustworthy parties.
Consent of the principal represented to participate in the
interactions is vital. If I authorize an agent to shop for a widget
at given price, it's legitimate for the agent to carry enough
information about me to the merchant to be able to do this for me.
Whereas, if an agent claims to be shopping for me but does not have
my authorization to do so, my privacy and possibly also my financial
integrity are being violated.
The principle of minimal disclosure should be employed. Only the
information needed to facilitate the intended interactions should be
placed in the tokens and conveyed to participants.
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7. IANA Considerations
7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the following Claims in the IANA "JSON
Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] established by
[RFC7519].
7.1.1. "tdm" Claim
* Claim Name: tdm
* Claim Description: Target domain the token is intended for
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification
7.1.2. "tsi" Claim
* Claim Name: tsi
* Claim Description: Target Service ID that this token was created
for
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification
7.1.3. "ori" Claim
* Claim Name: ori
* Claim Description: URL of the token's originator
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification
7.1.4. "env" Claim
* Claim Name: env
* Claim Description: Issuer environment (such as "production" or
"sandbox")
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
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* Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification
7.1.5. "itg" Claim
* Claim Name: itg
* Claim Description: Initiator tag, an opaque reference ID internal
to the initiator
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification
7.1.6. "hid" Claim
* Claim Name: hid
* Claim Description: JSON structure containing human identity claims
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification
7.1.7. "apd" Claim
* Claim Name: apd
* Claim Description: JSON structure containing agent platform
identity claims
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification
7.1.8. "aid" Claim
* Claim Name: aid
* Claim Description: JSON structure containing agent identity claims
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification
7.1.9. "tpr" Claim
* Claim Name: tpr
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* Claim Description: JSON string representing target service price
in currency units
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.5 of this specification
7.1.10. "tps" Claim
* Claim Name: tps
* Claim Description: Target pricing scheme, which represents a way
for the target list how it charges for its service or content
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.5 of this specification
7.1.11. "amt" Claim
* Claim Name: amt
* Claim Description: JSON string representing token amount in
currency units
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.5 of this specification
7.1.12. "cur" Claim
* Claim Name: cur
* Claim Description: Currency unit, represented as an ISO 4217 three
letter code, such as "EUR"
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.5 of this specification
7.1.13. "val" Claim
* Claim Name: val
* Claim Description: JSON string representing token amount in
settlement network's units
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
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* Reference: Section 3.5 of this specification
7.1.14. "mnr" Claim
* Claim Name: mnr
* Claim Description: JSON number representing maximum number of
requests
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.5 of this specification
7.1.15. "stp" Claim
* Claim Name: stp
* Claim Description: Settlement type
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.5 of this specification
7.1.16. "sti" Claim
* Claim Name: sti
* Claim Description: Meta information for payment settlement,
depending on settlement
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Reference: Section 3.5 of this specification
7.2. Media Types Registration
This section registers the following media types [RFC2046] in the
IANA "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described
in [RFC6838].
7.2.1. application/kya+jwt
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: kya+jwt
* Required parameters: n/a
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* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined
in [RFC7515]
* Security considerations: See Security Considerations in [RFC7519]
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: Section 3.4 of this specification
* Applications that use this media type: Applications using Know
Your Agent tokens
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
7.2.2. application/pay+jwt
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: pay+jwt
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined
in [RFC7515]
* Security considerations: See Security Considerations in [RFC7519]
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
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* Published specification: Section 3.5 of this specification
* Applications that use this media type: Applications using Pay
tokens
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
7.2.3. application/kya-pay+jwt
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: kya-pay+jwt
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined
in [RFC7515]
* Security considerations: See Security Considerations in [RFC7519]
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: Section 3.6 of this specification
* Applications that use this media type: Applications using KYA-Pay
tokens
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
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- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
7.3. Well-Known URI Registration
This specification registers the following URI suffix in the IANA
"Well-Known URIs" registry [IANA.WellKnownURIs] established by
[RFC8615].
* URI Suffix: jwks.json
* Change Controller: Michael B. Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
* Specification Document: Section 3.2 of this specification
* Status: permanent
* Related Information: The resource is a JWK Set [RFC7517]
containing the keys with which the origin signs KYAPay tokens.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods]
Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., and N. Ali, "Anti-Money
Laundering Methods Values", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-skyfire-oauth-aml-methods-01, 1 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-
oauth-aml-methods-01>.
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[I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values]
Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., Ali, N., and Srinivasa,
"Additional Authentication Method Reference Values", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-
values-03, 2 November 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-
oauth-amr-values-03>.
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification]
Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., Ali, N., and Srinivasa,
"Identity Verification Methods Values", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification-03, 2
November 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification-03>.
[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M. B., Medeiros, B. de.,
and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 2", 15 December 2023,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6265>.
[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6454>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
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[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8176] Jones, M., Hunt, P., and A. Nadalin, "Authentication
Method Reference Values", RFC 8176, DOI 10.17487/RFC8176,
June 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8176>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615>.
[RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.
[RFC8725] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725>.
8.2. Informative References
[EMVCo-PT] EMVCo, "EMV Payment Tokenisation Specification - Technical
Framework", Version 2.4, 9 July 2026,
<https://www.emvco.com/emv-technologies/payment-
tokenisation/>.
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[I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange]
Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., Hingnikar, A., and J. Hickman,
"KYAPay Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange-02, 2 November
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange-02>.
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens]
Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., and Srinivasa, "Using KYAPay
Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-skyfire-
oauth-using-kyapay-tokens-02, 2 November 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-
oauth-using-kyapay-tokens-02>.
[IANA.JWT.Claims]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[IANA.WellKnownURIs]
IANA, "Well-Known URIs",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>.
[PCI-FAQ-1326]
PCI Security Standards Council, "How does PCI DSS apply to
EMVCo Payment Tokens?", FAQ 1326, May 2015,
<https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1326>.
[PSL] Mozilla Foundation, "Public Suffix List",
<https://publicsuffix.org/>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
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[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9421] Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.
Appendix A. Related Specifications
The following specifications are related to and designed to be used
with this specification:
* [I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens] describes how security
intermediaries -- bot managers, fraud managers, account-takeover
(ATO) protection systems, and customer identity and access
management (CIAM) systems -- consume KYAPay tokens to answer a
question that traditional bot detection cannot: "Did a verified
human authorize this agent?".
* [I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange] describes how KYAPay
tokens can be exchanged for OAuth access tokens to dynamically
grant agents access to resources they need to accomplish their
mission.
* [I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values] defines additional "amr"
(Authentication Method Reference) values to represent additional
authentication methods in use today.
* [I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification] defines the "ivm" (Identity
Verification Methods) claim and values for declaring how the
person's identity was verified.
* [I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods] defines the "aml" (Anti-Money
Laundering Methods) claim and values for declaring what AML/CFT
methods were employed.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Bhasker Allam, Jean Diaconu and Carlos
Martínez for their contributions to the specification.
Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-03
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* Added the optional ivm, amr, and aml sub-claims to the hid claim,
and the optional ivm and aml sub-claims to the apd claim.
* Stated that the subject identifies the combination of identities
the issuer has verified for the initiator, that it is stable while
those identities are unchanged, and that a change to any of them
gives a new subject. The identities are carried as claims in KYA
and KYA-PAY tokens and not in PAY tokens, but the subject
identifies the same combination in all three.
* Stated in the Privacy Considerations that hid.id, sub and aid.id
are specific to one Target service, and that directly identifying
sub-claims are disclosed only when a Target requires them and the
principal has authorized it.
* Removed the qualifier on hid, which read as though the claim were
required only for some use cases.
* Stated that a Payment Token Issuer verifies the Initiator, which
the role definition had left to the KYA Token Issuer alone.
* Stated that a verified claim is only ever true, and corrected a
KYA-PAY example that asserted false. This is a compatibility
change: the previous definition admitted false, so a token
carrying that value conformed to -02 and does not conform here.
Recipient behaviour on receiving false is specified alongside each
claim.
* Required a recipient correlating a PAY token with a KYA token to
check that both carry the same iss and sub.
* Made sub pairwise: a different value at each Target service,
stable at that service.
* Stated that an agent name is unique within an agent platform at a
given issuer.
* Added Identity Binding to the Security Considerations.
* Corrected the example comments on sub, which described the subject
as an agent account identifier.
* Added "id" as a required sub-claim within "aid".
* Made the "apd" claim REQUIRED in KYA and KYAPay tokens.
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* Added a Token Size section: no maximum token size, aggregate size
guidance for issuers that fits the minimum recipients are required
to accept, and a preference for one KYA-PAY token over separate
KYA and PAY tokens.
* Stated that jti identifies the token, not the request, so a
repeated jti is not by itself evidence of replay.
* Made creation_ip OPTIONAL and described its use.
* Replaced the example IP addresses with documentation addresses.
* Required a recipient to confirm that it trusts the issuer before
retrieving key material, and moved the issuer check ahead of
signature verification.
* Added traces to the logging prohibition, and pointed to the Using
document for tokens that reach a language model's context.
* Allowed further identifiers for the human principal in hid, only
where the issuer has verified that the principal controls them.
* Prohibited Account Data in tokens of every type, described card
credentials as EMV Payment Tokens, and cited PCI SSC FAQ 1326 for
their PCI DSS scope.
* Replaced the example payment credential values with values that
cannot be mistaken for real ones.
* Added an Identifying the Target section relating aud, tsi and tdm,
made tsi REQUIRED and tdm REQUIRED where the Target is identified
by a domain name, defined the form of tdm, and let a recipient
that has not onboarded to the issuer validate the audience using
tdm.
* Added hid.id, a pseudonymous identifier for the human principal,
specific to one agent platform and one Target service, and made
aid.id specific to one Target service.
* Made email OPTIONAL, and included email, phone_number,
organization_name, verification_id and the name sub-claims only
when a Target requires them for the action at hand and the
principal has authorized their disclosure.
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* Required recipients to support ES256 and to accept it from trusted
issuers that publish an ES256 key, and issuers to use it or an
algorithm every recipient of the token accepts; limited the
accepted algorithms to those the recipient's configuration allows
and the issuer's JWK Set has keys for; and rejected none and
symmetric algorithms.
* Required a recipient to determine the typ values it accepts before
validating a token, set aside a token of a defined type it does
not accept, and reject a token whose typ is missing or not a
defined type.
* Changed "SHOULD follow" BCP 225 to "MUST follow".
-02
* Corrected the sti sub-claim names in the PAY and KYA-PAY examples
to match the normative names in the Settlement Information section
(payment_token, token_expiration_month, token_expiration_year,
token_security_code). The examples had retained the pre-rename
camelCase forms.
* Clarified that the card settlement instrument is a network-issued
agentic payment credential and that token_security_code carries a
single-use token cryptogram, not a static CVV.
* Made the aid and sti claims REQUIRED, and marked the sti sub-claim
requirement levels individually.
* Added the cnf (confirmation) claim, binding a token to a key held
by the agent, and described the resulting sender-constrained
semantics.
* Added a Scope of Card Settlement section prohibiting Primary
Account Numbers and static card verification values.
* Expanded Security Considerations to cover confidentiality of token
contents, settlement credential handling, token lifetime, and
bearer versus sender-constrained semantics.
* Tightened JWT header validation: an alg value of none and
algorithm substitution are rejected.
* Corrected a missing comma in the KYA token example, and shortened
the example token lifetimes, which had exceeded a year.
* Added {:vspace} syntax to definition list entries.
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* Required the iss claim to be an origin, with no path, query or
fragment component, and corrected the example iss values
accordingly; one had lacked a scheme.
* Added an Issuer Key Discovery section specifying that the issuer's
JWK Set is located at the jwks.json well-known URI formed from
iss, and registered that URI suffix with IANA.
* Added a Clock Skew section bounding the tolerance applied to the
"iat" and "exp" claims, and requiring senders to correct skew they
can observe.
* Addressed review comments by Jean Diaconu.
* Clarified the meaning of Verifier and differentiated from
Recipient.
-01
* Added appendix referencing related specifications.
-00
* Renamed draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile to draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-
token.
draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-02
* Changed terms buyer and seller to initiator and target to
generalize applicability. These claim names were changed: "sdm"
to "tdm", "ssi" to "tsi", "btg" to "itg", "spr" to "tpr", and
"sps" to "tps".
* Updated Settlement Information sti Sub-Claims.
* Changed specification type from Informative to Proposed Standard.
draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-01
* Removed "srl" (Seller Resource Locator) claim.
draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-00
* Initial Internet Draft.
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Contributors
Andrew Stitt
Dmitri Zagidulin
Authors' Addresses
Ankit Agarwal
Skyfire Systems Inc.
Email: ankit_agarwal@yahoo.com
URI: https://skyfire.xyz
Michael B. Jones
Self-Issued Consulting
Email: michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/
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