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Web Authorization Protocol                                    A. Agarwal
Internet-Draft                                      Skyfire Systems Inc.
Updates: 8176 (if approved)                                     M. Jones
Intended status: Standards Track                  Self-Issued Consulting
Expires: 6 May 2027                                               N. Ali
                                                                Experian
                                                               S. Thumma
                                                                  Akamai
                                                         2 November 2026


           Additional Authentication Method Reference Values
                   draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values-03

Abstract

   The JWT "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim contains
   values conveying authentication methods used in the authentication.
   This specification defines additional Authentication Method Reference
   values beyond those already registered to represent additional
   authentication methods in use today.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://skyfire-
   xyz.github.io/draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values/draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-
   values.html.  Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."



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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Authentication Method Reference Values  . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  "app" (Authenticator App) Method  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  "bg" (Background Authentication) Method . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  "sna" (Silent Network Authentication) Method  . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  "email" (E-mail Channel) Method . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.5.  "code" (Code provided to and entered by user) Method  . .   4
     3.6.  "url" (URL provided to and clicked on by user) Method . .   5
     3.7.  "push" (Push notification to mobile phone) Method . . . .   5
     3.8.  "facliv" (Facial Liveness Check) Method . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.9.  "passkey" (Passkey) Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.10. "mdc" (Multi-Device Credential) Method  . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.11. "uv" (User Verification) Method . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Updated Authentication Method Reference Value . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  "tel" (Telephone Call) Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Composing Authentication Method Reference Values  . . . . . .   6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Authentication Method References Registry . . . . . . . .   8
       8.1.1.  "app" Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       8.1.2.  "bg" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       8.1.3.  "sna" Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       8.1.4.  "email" Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       8.1.5.  "code" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       8.1.6.  "url" Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       8.1.7.  "push" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       8.1.8.  "facliv" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       8.1.9.  "passkey" Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10



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       8.1.10. "mdc" Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       8.1.11. "uv" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       8.1.12. "tel" Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix B.  Common Compositions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Document History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   The JWT [RFC7519] "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim
   [OpenID.Core] contains values conveying authentication methods used
   in the authentication.  They are registered in the IANA
   "Authentication Method Reference Values" registry [IANA.AMR].

   Since the Authentication Method Reference Values [RFC8176]
   specification was published, several new authentication methods have
   been developed and/or come into widespread use.  This specification
   defines additional Authentication Method Reference values to
   represent these additional authentication methods in use today.

   While these Authentication Method Reference values are general
   purpose and can be used in any JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519], one
   use case for them is use in KYAPay tokens
   [I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token].

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Authentication Method Reference Values

   The following Authentication Method Reference values are defined by
   this specification:

3.1.  "app" (Authenticator App) Method

   app:





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      Use of an authenticator application on a device held by the user.
      An issuer includes this value where it knows that an authenticator
      application was used.  Where a code is produced from a shared
      secret and the issuer cannot determine what produced it, this
      value is omitted.

      An authenticator application commonly acts as an OTP authenticator
      or as an out-of-band authenticator, as described in Sections 3.1.3
      to 3.1.5 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4].

3.2.  "bg" (Background Authentication) Method

   bg:
      Background Authentication (Silent network authentication of phone
      number, device recognition, geo-location, etc.)

      The "sna" value (Section 3.3) identifies one specific background
      method and is a subset of this value.  Geo-location is separately
      registered as "geo" and device recognition is within the scope of
      "rba", both in [RFC8176].

3.3.  "sna" (Silent Network Authentication) Method

   sna:
      Silent Network Authentication.  Confirmation by the mobile network
      operator that the device making the request holds the subscriber
      identity associated with a given telephone number, performed
      without any interaction with the user.  An example is the Number
      Verification API [CAMARA.NumberVerification].

3.4.  "email" (E-mail Channel) Method

   email:
      Use of e-mail as the channel by which an authentication
      interaction reached the user.  What was delivered over the channel
      is described by an accompanying value such as "code" or "url".
      See Section 5.

      E-mail is not an acceptable channel for out-of-band authentication
      under Section 3.1.3.1 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4].  See Section 6.

3.5.  "code" (Code provided to and entered by user) Method

   code:
      Code provided to and entered by user






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      For example, a secret received on an out-of-band device and
      entered into the authentication session, as described in
      Section 3.1.3 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4].

3.6.  "url" (URL provided to and clicked on by user) Method

   url:
      URL provided to and clicked on by user

3.7.  "push" (Push notification to mobile phone) Method

   push:
      Push notification to mobile phone

      An out-of-band authentication interaction in which the verifier
      reaches an application on the user's device over a secondary
      channel, as described in Section 3.1.3 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4].

3.8.  "facliv" (Facial Liveness Check) Method

   facliv:
      Determination that a facial image or video presented for
      authentication is of a live person rather than an artifact such as
      a photograph, mask, or synthetic rendering.  This is a
      presentation attack detection measure [ISO30107-1].

      The "facliv" and "face" [RFC8176] values describe different
      determinations and are not alternatives: "face" is a comparison of
      a presented face against a reference, and "facliv" is a
      determination that the presented face is live.  Where both were
      performed, both values are included.

3.9.  "passkey" (Passkey) Method

   passkey:
      A passkey, that is, a client-side discoverable credential as
      defined by [WebAuthn].

3.10.  "mdc" (Multi-Device Credential) Method

   mdc:
      Use of a multi-device credential as defined by [WebAuthn], that
      is, a backup-eligible credential, which may be backed up and
      synchronized to other devices.  Multi-device credentials are
      commonly referred to as synced passkeys.  A WebAuthn Relying Party
      learns whether a credential is backup eligible from the flags in
      the authenticator data.




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      This value describes whether a credential may be replicated.  It
      is independent of how the key is protected on any one device,
      which "hwk" and "swk" [RFC8176] describe.  Where both are known,
      both are included.

      The absence of this value does not indicate that a credential is a
      single-device credential.

3.11.  "uv" (User Verification) Method

   uv:
      User verification.  Local authorization of the authenticator by an
      authorization gesture capable of distinguishing individual users,
      such as a PIN, a password, or biometric recognition [WebAuthn].

      This is distinct from "user" [RFC8176], which is a test of user
      presence.  As [WebAuthn] states, a user presence test "is not
      capable of biometric recognition, nor does it involve the
      presentation of a shared secret such as a password or PIN".

      This value does not identify which modality the authenticator
      used.

4.  Updated Authentication Method Reference Value

   The following Authentication Method Reference value is updated by
   this specification:

4.1.  "tel" (Telephone Call) Method

   tel:
      Telephone call to the user at a registered number.  The call may
      be used to provide information to the user, such as a code, that
      is then used in another channel.  The call may be used for the
      user to provide information that the caller uses in the
      authentication.

   This definition replaces the one in [RFC8176], which is "Confirmation
   by telephone call to the user at a registered number.  This
   authentication technique is sometimes also referred to as 'call back'
   [RFC4949]."

5.  Composing Authentication Method Reference Values

   The "amr" claim value is an array, and as described in [RFC8176], all
   the applicable values may be returned.  A single authentication event
   is frequently described by more than one value, because the
   registered values describe different aspects of it.



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   The "email" and "push" values registered by this specification
   describe the channel by which an authentication interaction reached
   the person.  [RFC8176] registers "sms" and "tel" in the same sense,
   and uses the term "channel" in this sense in its definition of "mca".

   The "code" and "url" values describe challenges delivered over such a
   channel, which the person must return to the verifier to complete
   authentication.  The person may return it directly, as when a code is
   read and typed in, or indirectly, as when following a link causes the
   value to be sent.  The "otp" value [RFC8176] is related but narrower:
   it identifies a one-time password produced by an algorithm such as
   HOTP [RFC4226] or TOTP [RFC6238], typically generated by an
   authenticator rather than delivered over a channel.  A code not
   produced by such an algorithm is described by "code".

   A channel value alone does not say what the person did.  A challenge
   value alone does not say how it reached them.  An issuer that knows
   both will typically return both.  Appendix A gives examples, and
   Appendix B maps terms in common industry use onto the corresponding
   sets of values.

   The "sms" value registered by [RFC8176] predates this distinction.
   Its definition describes both a channel and the interaction carried
   over it, and is unchanged by this specification.  An issuer wishing
   to be explicit about what was delivered over the SMS channel may
   return a challenge value alongside it.

6.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations defined in Authentication Method
   Reference Values [RFC8176] apply to this specification.

   E-mail is not an acceptable channel for out-of-band authentication
   under Section 3.1.3.1 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4], because an e-mail
   account may be accessible with only a password and messages may be
   intercepted or rerouted.  A relying party evaluating an "amr" claim
   that includes "email" may wish to take this into account.

   [NIST.SP.800-63B-4] also no longer accepts out-of-band authentication
   in which the user approves a request on the secondary channel without
   transferring a secret between the channels, because of authentication
   fatigue attacks.  The "push" value alone does not indicate whether a
   secret was transferred.  An issuer that knows a code was transferred
   returns "code" alongside it.







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7.  Privacy Considerations

   The privacy considerations defined in Authentication Method Reference
   Values [RFC8176] apply to this specification.

8.  IANA Considerations

8.1.  Authentication Method References Registry

   This specification registers the following Authentication Method
   Reference values in the IANA "Authentication Method Reference Values"
   registry [IANA.AMR] established by [RFC8176].

8.1.1.  "app" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: app

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Authenticator App

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of this specification

8.1.2.  "bg" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: bg

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Background
      Authentication

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of this specification

8.1.3.  "sna" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: sna

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Silent Network
      Authentication

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of this specification







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8.1.4.  "email" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: email

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Use of e-mail as the
      channel for an authentication interaction

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of this specification

8.1.5.  "code" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: code

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Code provided to and
      entered by user

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.5 of this specification

8.1.6.  "url" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: url

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: URL provided to and
      clicked on by user

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.6 of this specification

8.1.7.  "push" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: push

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Push notification to
      mobile phone

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.7 of this specification

8.1.8.  "facliv" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: facliv




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   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Facial Liveness Check

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.8 of this specification

8.1.9.  "passkey" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: passkey

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Passkey

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.9 of this specification

8.1.10.  "mdc" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: mdc

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Multi-Device
      Credential

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.10 of this specification

8.1.11.  "uv" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: uv

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: User Verification

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 3.11 of this specification

8.1.12.  "tel" Method

   *  Authentication Method Reference Name: tel

   *  Authentication Method Reference Description: Telephone call to the
      user at a registered number

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of this specification




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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8176]  Jones, M., Hunt, P., and A. Nadalin, "Authentication
              Method Reference Values", RFC 8176, DOI 10.17487/RFC8176,
              June 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8176>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [CAMARA.NumberVerification]
              CAMARA Project, "Number Verification API, version 2.1.0",
              2025,
              <https://github.com/camaraproject/NumberVerification/blob/r3.2/
              code/API_definitions/number-verification.yaml>.

   [I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token]
              Agarwal, A. and M. B. Jones, "KYAPay Token", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-
              token-02, 1 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-
              oauth-kyapay-token-02>.

   [IANA.AMR] IANA, "Authentication Method Reference Values",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/authentication-method-
              reference-values>.

   [ISO30107-1]
              International Organization for Standardization,
              "Information technology - Biometric presentation attack
              detection - Part 1: Framework", ISO/IEC 30107-1:2023,
              2023, <https://www.iso.org/standard/83828.html>.

   [NIST.SP.800-63B-4]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
              Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator
              Management", NIST Special Publication 800-63B-4, August
              2025, <https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html>.




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   [OpenID.Core]
              Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M. B., Medeiros, B. de.,
              and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
              errata set 2", 15 December 2023,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

   [RFC4226]  M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
              O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password
              Algorithm", RFC 4226, DOI 10.17487/RFC4226, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4226>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949>.

   [RFC6238]  M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:
              Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6238>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

   [WebAuthn] Cappalli, T., Kumar, A., Lundberg, E., Miller, M., Pascoe,
              and N. Satragno, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing
              Public Key Credentials - Level 3", W3C Recommendation, 25
              August 2026,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/2026/REC-webauthn-3-20260825/>.

Appendix A.  Examples

   The following "amr" claim value indicates that a code was sent to the
   user over the e-mail channel and entered by the user:

   "amr": ["email", "code"]

   The following "amr" claim value indicates that a link was sent to the
   user over the e-mail channel and followed by the user:

   "amr": ["email", "url"]

   The following "amr" claim value indicates that a one-time password
   was generated by an authenticator application and entered by the
   user:

   "amr": ["app", "otp"]




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   The following "amr" claim value indicates that a password was used
   together with a code sent over the e-mail channel, and that the
   issuer considers the combination to be multiple-factor
   authentication:

   "amr": ["pwd", "email", "code", "mfa"]

Appendix B.  Common Compositions

   The terms below are names in common industry use for authentication
   arrangements that this specification describes using more than one
   value.  This mapping is non-normative.  It is provided so that
   implementers of the same arrangement emit the same set of values.

   Email one-time code, also called email OTP:
      ["email", "code"]

   Magic link, also called e-mail link sign-in:
      ["email", "url"]

   SMS one-time code:
      ["sms", "code"].  As noted in Section 5, "sms" predates the
      channel and challenge distinction, and ["sms"] remains correct.

   Voice one-time code, where a call conveys a code that the user
   then enters:
      ["tel", "code"]

   Call-back confirmation, where the user confirms during the call
   itself:
      ["tel"]

   Authenticator application one-time password:
      ["app", "otp"]

   Push approval:
      ["push"]

   Push approval with number matching:
      ["push", "code"]

   Silent network authentication:
      ["sna"]

   Facial recognition with a liveness check:
      ["face", "facliv"]

   Device-bound passkey held in hardware, such as on a security key:



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      ["passkey", "hwk"]

   Synced passkey:
      ["passkey", "mdc"]. "hwk" or "swk" is added where the issuer knows
      how the key is protected.

Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Jean Diaconu, Max Gerber, and Rob Zagarella
   for their contributions to the specification.

Document History

   [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]

   -03

   *  Added "sna" for silent network authentication, a specific case of
      the background authentication described by "bg".

   *  Added "mdc" for multi-device credentials, commonly called synced
      passkeys, which composes with "hwk" and "swk" [RFC8176].

   *  Added "uv" for user verification, distinct from the user presence
      test described by "user" [RFC8176].

   *  Redefined "app" by the property it describes rather than by
      product examples, and stated when an issuer can assert it.

   *  Narrowed "email" to the channel, with what was delivered over it
      described by an accompanying value.

   *  Stated that "facliv" and "face" [RFC8176] describe different
      determinations and are included together where both were
      performed, and added a reference to [ISO30107-1].

   *  Added a reference for "passkey" to [WebAuthn].

   *  Added references to [NIST.SP.800-63B-4] for "app", "code", "push",
      and "email", and to [CAMARA.NumberVerification] for "sna".

   *  Added Security Considerations on e-mail as an authentication
      channel and on push approval without a transferred secret.

   *  Added a section on composing values, and appendices giving
      examples and common compositions.





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   *  Removed "sqa".  Current NIST guidance treats knowledge-based
      authentication and security questions as the same family, and
      "kba" [RFC8176] already covers it.

   *  Removed the Security Considerations note on security questions,
      which applied to "sqa".

   *  Added Max Gerber to the acknowledgments.

   -02

   *  Updated the definition of "tel" to incorporate calls to provide
      information such as codes and removed "call".

   *  Renamed "psk" to "passkey" because of the potential confusion with
      pre-shared key.

   *  Added warning in Security Considerations that security questions
      are not acceptable authentication secrets under current NIST
      guidance.

   *  Added {:vspace} syntax to definition list entries.

   -01

   *  Moved "inp" and "vid" methods to the ID Verification spec.

   *  Added "call", "code", "url", "facliv", "sqa", and "psk" methods.

   *  Added Nash Ali and Srinivasa Thumma as authors.

   -00

   *  Initial draft.

Authors' Addresses

   Ankit Agarwal
   Skyfire Systems Inc.
   Email: ankit_agarwal@yahoo.com
   URI:   https://skyfire.xyz


   Michael B. Jones
   Self-Issued Consulting
   Email: michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
   URI:   https://self-issued.info/




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   Nash Ali
   Experian
   Email: nash.ali@experian.com


   Srinivasa Thumma
   Akamai
   Email: sthumma@akamai.com











































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