Web Authorization Protocol A. Agarwal
Internet-Draft Skyfire Systems Inc.
Updates: 8176 (if approved) M. Jones
Intended status: Standards Track Self-Issued Consulting
Expires: 6 May 2027 N. Ali
Experian
S. Thumma
Akamai
2 November 2026
Additional Authentication Method Reference Values
draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values-03
Abstract
The JWT "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim contains
values conveying authentication methods used in the authentication.
This specification defines additional Authentication Method Reference
values beyond those already registered to represent additional
authentication methods in use today.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://skyfire-
xyz.github.io/draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values/draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-
values.html. Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-values.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Authentication Method Reference Values . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. "app" (Authenticator App) Method . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. "bg" (Background Authentication) Method . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. "sna" (Silent Network Authentication) Method . . . . . . 4
3.4. "email" (E-mail Channel) Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.5. "code" (Code provided to and entered by user) Method . . 4
3.6. "url" (URL provided to and clicked on by user) Method . . 5
3.7. "push" (Push notification to mobile phone) Method . . . . 5
3.8. "facliv" (Facial Liveness Check) Method . . . . . . . . . 5
3.9. "passkey" (Passkey) Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.10. "mdc" (Multi-Device Credential) Method . . . . . . . . . 5
3.11. "uv" (User Verification) Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Updated Authentication Method Reference Value . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. "tel" (Telephone Call) Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Composing Authentication Method Reference Values . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Authentication Method References Registry . . . . . . . . 8
8.1.1. "app" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1.2. "bg" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1.3. "sna" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1.4. "email" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1.5. "code" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1.6. "url" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1.7. "push" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1.8. "facliv" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1.9. "passkey" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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8.1.10. "mdc" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1.11. "uv" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1.12. "tel" Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix B. Common Compositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
The JWT [RFC7519] "amr" (Authentication Methods References) claim
[OpenID.Core] contains values conveying authentication methods used
in the authentication. They are registered in the IANA
"Authentication Method Reference Values" registry [IANA.AMR].
Since the Authentication Method Reference Values [RFC8176]
specification was published, several new authentication methods have
been developed and/or come into widespread use. This specification
defines additional Authentication Method Reference values to
represent these additional authentication methods in use today.
While these Authentication Method Reference values are general
purpose and can be used in any JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519], one
use case for them is use in KYAPay tokens
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token].
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Authentication Method Reference Values
The following Authentication Method Reference values are defined by
this specification:
3.1. "app" (Authenticator App) Method
app:
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Use of an authenticator application on a device held by the user.
An issuer includes this value where it knows that an authenticator
application was used. Where a code is produced from a shared
secret and the issuer cannot determine what produced it, this
value is omitted.
An authenticator application commonly acts as an OTP authenticator
or as an out-of-band authenticator, as described in Sections 3.1.3
to 3.1.5 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4].
3.2. "bg" (Background Authentication) Method
bg:
Background Authentication (Silent network authentication of phone
number, device recognition, geo-location, etc.)
The "sna" value (Section 3.3) identifies one specific background
method and is a subset of this value. Geo-location is separately
registered as "geo" and device recognition is within the scope of
"rba", both in [RFC8176].
3.3. "sna" (Silent Network Authentication) Method
sna:
Silent Network Authentication. Confirmation by the mobile network
operator that the device making the request holds the subscriber
identity associated with a given telephone number, performed
without any interaction with the user. An example is the Number
Verification API [CAMARA.NumberVerification].
3.4. "email" (E-mail Channel) Method
email:
Use of e-mail as the channel by which an authentication
interaction reached the user. What was delivered over the channel
is described by an accompanying value such as "code" or "url".
See Section 5.
E-mail is not an acceptable channel for out-of-band authentication
under Section 3.1.3.1 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4]. See Section 6.
3.5. "code" (Code provided to and entered by user) Method
code:
Code provided to and entered by user
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For example, a secret received on an out-of-band device and
entered into the authentication session, as described in
Section 3.1.3 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4].
3.6. "url" (URL provided to and clicked on by user) Method
url:
URL provided to and clicked on by user
3.7. "push" (Push notification to mobile phone) Method
push:
Push notification to mobile phone
An out-of-band authentication interaction in which the verifier
reaches an application on the user's device over a secondary
channel, as described in Section 3.1.3 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4].
3.8. "facliv" (Facial Liveness Check) Method
facliv:
Determination that a facial image or video presented for
authentication is of a live person rather than an artifact such as
a photograph, mask, or synthetic rendering. This is a
presentation attack detection measure [ISO30107-1].
The "facliv" and "face" [RFC8176] values describe different
determinations and are not alternatives: "face" is a comparison of
a presented face against a reference, and "facliv" is a
determination that the presented face is live. Where both were
performed, both values are included.
3.9. "passkey" (Passkey) Method
passkey:
A passkey, that is, a client-side discoverable credential as
defined by [WebAuthn].
3.10. "mdc" (Multi-Device Credential) Method
mdc:
Use of a multi-device credential as defined by [WebAuthn], that
is, a backup-eligible credential, which may be backed up and
synchronized to other devices. Multi-device credentials are
commonly referred to as synced passkeys. A WebAuthn Relying Party
learns whether a credential is backup eligible from the flags in
the authenticator data.
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This value describes whether a credential may be replicated. It
is independent of how the key is protected on any one device,
which "hwk" and "swk" [RFC8176] describe. Where both are known,
both are included.
The absence of this value does not indicate that a credential is a
single-device credential.
3.11. "uv" (User Verification) Method
uv:
User verification. Local authorization of the authenticator by an
authorization gesture capable of distinguishing individual users,
such as a PIN, a password, or biometric recognition [WebAuthn].
This is distinct from "user" [RFC8176], which is a test of user
presence. As [WebAuthn] states, a user presence test "is not
capable of biometric recognition, nor does it involve the
presentation of a shared secret such as a password or PIN".
This value does not identify which modality the authenticator
used.
4. Updated Authentication Method Reference Value
The following Authentication Method Reference value is updated by
this specification:
4.1. "tel" (Telephone Call) Method
tel:
Telephone call to the user at a registered number. The call may
be used to provide information to the user, such as a code, that
is then used in another channel. The call may be used for the
user to provide information that the caller uses in the
authentication.
This definition replaces the one in [RFC8176], which is "Confirmation
by telephone call to the user at a registered number. This
authentication technique is sometimes also referred to as 'call back'
[RFC4949]."
5. Composing Authentication Method Reference Values
The "amr" claim value is an array, and as described in [RFC8176], all
the applicable values may be returned. A single authentication event
is frequently described by more than one value, because the
registered values describe different aspects of it.
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The "email" and "push" values registered by this specification
describe the channel by which an authentication interaction reached
the person. [RFC8176] registers "sms" and "tel" in the same sense,
and uses the term "channel" in this sense in its definition of "mca".
The "code" and "url" values describe challenges delivered over such a
channel, which the person must return to the verifier to complete
authentication. The person may return it directly, as when a code is
read and typed in, or indirectly, as when following a link causes the
value to be sent. The "otp" value [RFC8176] is related but narrower:
it identifies a one-time password produced by an algorithm such as
HOTP [RFC4226] or TOTP [RFC6238], typically generated by an
authenticator rather than delivered over a channel. A code not
produced by such an algorithm is described by "code".
A channel value alone does not say what the person did. A challenge
value alone does not say how it reached them. An issuer that knows
both will typically return both. Appendix A gives examples, and
Appendix B maps terms in common industry use onto the corresponding
sets of values.
The "sms" value registered by [RFC8176] predates this distinction.
Its definition describes both a channel and the interaction carried
over it, and is unchanged by this specification. An issuer wishing
to be explicit about what was delivered over the SMS channel may
return a challenge value alongside it.
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations defined in Authentication Method
Reference Values [RFC8176] apply to this specification.
E-mail is not an acceptable channel for out-of-band authentication
under Section 3.1.3.1 of [NIST.SP.800-63B-4], because an e-mail
account may be accessible with only a password and messages may be
intercepted or rerouted. A relying party evaluating an "amr" claim
that includes "email" may wish to take this into account.
[NIST.SP.800-63B-4] also no longer accepts out-of-band authentication
in which the user approves a request on the secondary channel without
transferring a secret between the channels, because of authentication
fatigue attacks. The "push" value alone does not indicate whether a
secret was transferred. An issuer that knows a code was transferred
returns "code" alongside it.
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7. Privacy Considerations
The privacy considerations defined in Authentication Method Reference
Values [RFC8176] apply to this specification.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Authentication Method References Registry
This specification registers the following Authentication Method
Reference values in the IANA "Authentication Method Reference Values"
registry [IANA.AMR] established by [RFC8176].
8.1.1. "app" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: app
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Authenticator App
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of this specification
8.1.2. "bg" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: bg
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Background
Authentication
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of this specification
8.1.3. "sna" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: sna
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Silent Network
Authentication
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of this specification
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8.1.4. "email" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: email
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Use of e-mail as the
channel for an authentication interaction
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of this specification
8.1.5. "code" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: code
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Code provided to and
entered by user
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.5 of this specification
8.1.6. "url" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: url
* Authentication Method Reference Description: URL provided to and
clicked on by user
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.6 of this specification
8.1.7. "push" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: push
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Push notification to
mobile phone
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.7 of this specification
8.1.8. "facliv" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: facliv
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* Authentication Method Reference Description: Facial Liveness Check
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.8 of this specification
8.1.9. "passkey" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: passkey
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Passkey
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.9 of this specification
8.1.10. "mdc" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: mdc
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Multi-Device
Credential
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.10 of this specification
8.1.11. "uv" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: uv
* Authentication Method Reference Description: User Verification
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 3.11 of this specification
8.1.12. "tel" Method
* Authentication Method Reference Name: tel
* Authentication Method Reference Description: Telephone call to the
user at a registered number
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of this specification
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8176] Jones, M., Hunt, P., and A. Nadalin, "Authentication
Method Reference Values", RFC 8176, DOI 10.17487/RFC8176,
June 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8176>.
9.2. Informative References
[CAMARA.NumberVerification]
CAMARA Project, "Number Verification API, version 2.1.0",
2025,
<https://github.com/camaraproject/NumberVerification/blob/r3.2/
code/API_definitions/number-verification.yaml>.
[I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token]
Agarwal, A. and M. B. Jones, "KYAPay Token", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-
token-02, 1 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-
oauth-kyapay-token-02>.
[IANA.AMR] IANA, "Authentication Method Reference Values",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/authentication-method-
reference-values>.
[ISO30107-1]
International Organization for Standardization,
"Information technology - Biometric presentation attack
detection - Part 1: Framework", ISO/IEC 30107-1:2023,
2023, <https://www.iso.org/standard/83828.html>.
[NIST.SP.800-63B-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator
Management", NIST Special Publication 800-63B-4, August
2025, <https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html>.
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[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M. B., Medeiros, B. de.,
and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 2", 15 December 2023,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC4226] M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password
Algorithm", RFC 4226, DOI 10.17487/RFC4226, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4226>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949>.
[RFC6238] M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:
Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6238>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[WebAuthn] Cappalli, T., Kumar, A., Lundberg, E., Miller, M., Pascoe,
and N. Satragno, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing
Public Key Credentials - Level 3", W3C Recommendation, 25
August 2026,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/2026/REC-webauthn-3-20260825/>.
Appendix A. Examples
The following "amr" claim value indicates that a code was sent to the
user over the e-mail channel and entered by the user:
"amr": ["email", "code"]
The following "amr" claim value indicates that a link was sent to the
user over the e-mail channel and followed by the user:
"amr": ["email", "url"]
The following "amr" claim value indicates that a one-time password
was generated by an authenticator application and entered by the
user:
"amr": ["app", "otp"]
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The following "amr" claim value indicates that a password was used
together with a code sent over the e-mail channel, and that the
issuer considers the combination to be multiple-factor
authentication:
"amr": ["pwd", "email", "code", "mfa"]
Appendix B. Common Compositions
The terms below are names in common industry use for authentication
arrangements that this specification describes using more than one
value. This mapping is non-normative. It is provided so that
implementers of the same arrangement emit the same set of values.
Email one-time code, also called email OTP:
["email", "code"]
Magic link, also called e-mail link sign-in:
["email", "url"]
SMS one-time code:
["sms", "code"]. As noted in Section 5, "sms" predates the
channel and challenge distinction, and ["sms"] remains correct.
Voice one-time code, where a call conveys a code that the user
then enters:
["tel", "code"]
Call-back confirmation, where the user confirms during the call
itself:
["tel"]
Authenticator application one-time password:
["app", "otp"]
Push approval:
["push"]
Push approval with number matching:
["push", "code"]
Silent network authentication:
["sna"]
Facial recognition with a liveness check:
["face", "facliv"]
Device-bound passkey held in hardware, such as on a security key:
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["passkey", "hwk"]
Synced passkey:
["passkey", "mdc"]. "hwk" or "swk" is added where the issuer knows
how the key is protected.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jean Diaconu, Max Gerber, and Rob Zagarella
for their contributions to the specification.
Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-03
* Added "sna" for silent network authentication, a specific case of
the background authentication described by "bg".
* Added "mdc" for multi-device credentials, commonly called synced
passkeys, which composes with "hwk" and "swk" [RFC8176].
* Added "uv" for user verification, distinct from the user presence
test described by "user" [RFC8176].
* Redefined "app" by the property it describes rather than by
product examples, and stated when an issuer can assert it.
* Narrowed "email" to the channel, with what was delivered over it
described by an accompanying value.
* Stated that "facliv" and "face" [RFC8176] describe different
determinations and are included together where both were
performed, and added a reference to [ISO30107-1].
* Added a reference for "passkey" to [WebAuthn].
* Added references to [NIST.SP.800-63B-4] for "app", "code", "push",
and "email", and to [CAMARA.NumberVerification] for "sna".
* Added Security Considerations on e-mail as an authentication
channel and on push approval without a transferred secret.
* Added a section on composing values, and appendices giving
examples and common compositions.
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* Removed "sqa". Current NIST guidance treats knowledge-based
authentication and security questions as the same family, and
"kba" [RFC8176] already covers it.
* Removed the Security Considerations note on security questions,
which applied to "sqa".
* Added Max Gerber to the acknowledgments.
-02
* Updated the definition of "tel" to incorporate calls to provide
information such as codes and removed "call".
* Renamed "psk" to "passkey" because of the potential confusion with
pre-shared key.
* Added warning in Security Considerations that security questions
are not acceptable authentication secrets under current NIST
guidance.
* Added {:vspace} syntax to definition list entries.
-01
* Moved "inp" and "vid" methods to the ID Verification spec.
* Added "call", "code", "url", "facliv", "sqa", and "psk" methods.
* Added Nash Ali and Srinivasa Thumma as authors.
-00
* Initial draft.
Authors' Addresses
Ankit Agarwal
Skyfire Systems Inc.
Email: ankit_agarwal@yahoo.com
URI: https://skyfire.xyz
Michael B. Jones
Self-Issued Consulting
Email: michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/
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Nash Ali
Experian
Email: nash.ali@experian.com
Srinivasa Thumma
Akamai
Email: sthumma@akamai.com
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