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Network Working Group                                          R. Raskar
Internet-Draft                                             MIT Media Lab
Intended status: Informational                                 S. Sharaf
Expires: 1 May 2027                                         ProjectNanda
                                                                P. Chari
                                                                     MIT
                                                         28 October 2026


 Registry-Assisted Resolution for Known Subjects Without DNS Discovery
                                Anchors
            draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution-02

Abstract

   Discovery mechanisms for AI resources increasingly use DNS and mDNS
   as interoperable publication and lookup substrates.  These mechanisms
   work well when the publisher controls a usable DNS discovery anchor.
   They do not cover every deployment.  An individual may control an
   email or platform account without controlling the provider's DNS
   namespace.  A small organization may use managed infrastructure
   without operating an agent-specific DNS publication point.  A
   workload may have a stable identity that is not itself DNS anchored.

   This document describes Registry-Assisted Resolution for the narrower
   case in which a discovering entity already knows the Subject Identity
   it wants to resolve, but no usable DNS Discovery Anchor is available
   or selected by local policy.  A configured registry returns the
   minimum information needed to continue discovery, together with
   provenance, authority evidence, freshness, and revocation
   information.

   This mechanism is complementary to DNS-based discovery.  A validated
   direct DNS-anchored discovery path remains direct and is normally
   preferred for a domain-controlled subject.  This document does not
   define open-ended search, semantic matchmaking, ranking, capability
   search, a global registry, registry discovery, directory-to-directory
   routing, identity management, or trust evaluation.

   Multiple independently operated registries may implement the same
   resolution profile.  Registry selection is a client or deployment
   policy decision; no universal NandaIndex or global root is assumed.
   NandaIndex is described as one reference implementation of this
   model.







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Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Alignment with the DAWN Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.4.  Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.5.  Relationship to DNS-Based Discovery . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.6.  Changes from -01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Direct DNS-Anchored Path  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Registry-Assisted Path  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Mixed Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Resolver Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  Multiple Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Resolution Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11



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     4.1.  Resolution Input  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Resolution Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  Minimum Discovery Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.  Terminal Target Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.5.  Precedence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.6.  Failure Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Data Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  Resolution Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.2.  Resolution Target Object  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.3.  Subject Identity Normalization  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.4.  Authority Evidence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.5.  Freshness and Renewable Bindings  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.6.  Provenance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  Experimental HTTPS Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.1.  Endpoint and Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.2.  Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     6.3.  Successful Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     6.4.  Error Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.5.  No Public Enumeration Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.6.  No Inter-Registry Forwarding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  Resolver Procedure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.1.  Domain-Controlled Subjects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.2.  Email and Provider-Managed Accounts . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.3.  DIDs, Platform Identities, and Workload Identities  . . .  21
   8.  Deployment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.1.  Enterprise with Direct DNS Discovery  . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.2.  SMB Without a Usable DNS Discovery Anchor . . . . . . . .  22
     8.3.  Individual Personal Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     8.4.  Multiple Independent Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     9.1.  Registration Is Out of Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     9.2.  Anti-Squatting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     9.3.  Migration and Recovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     9.4.  Registry Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     10.1.  Authority Confusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     10.2.  Registry Poisoning and Squatting . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.3.  Target Substitution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.4.  Downgrade Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.5.  Replay and Stale Bindings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.6.  Resource Exhaustion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.7.  Registry Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   11. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     11.1.  Exact Lookup and Enumeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     11.2.  Query Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     11.3.  Data Minimization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     11.4.  Personal Agents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27



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   13. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   14. NandaIndex as a Reference Implementation  . . . . . . . . . .  27
   15. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   16. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   17. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   Appendix A.  Example Resolution Response  . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   Appendix B.  DAWN Requirements Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   Appendix C.  Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33

1.  Introduction

   The Discovery of Agents With Names (DAWN) Working Group is chartered
   to specify interoperable mechanisms for the initial discovery of
   public properties of AI resources.  The DAWN charter explicitly
   excludes open-ended search, semantic matchmaking, ranking, selection
   based on capability or user intent, broad identity management, and
   trust evaluation beyond secure discovery exchange [DAWN-CHARTER] .

   DNS and mDNS are important candidate mechanisms for DAWN.  They are
   especially effective when a publisher controls an appropriate DNS
   namespace and can publish discovery data there.  However, not every
   Named Entity or AI Resource that a client needs to resolve has a
   usable DNS Discovery Anchor.

   This document addresses one bounded case: the discovering entity
   already knows a stable Subject Identity, and it wants to obtain the
   minimum public information needed to continue discovery for that
   subject.  If a usable direct DNS-anchored path exists, the client
   uses that path.  If it does not, a configured registry may provide an
   authority-bound resolution target.

   The model is deliberately narrower than earlier "global switchboard"
   proposals.  It does not ask a registry to discover the best agent for
   a task.  It does not define a global search engine.  It does not
   require all clients to use the same registry.  It does not define
   registry-to-registry routing.

1.1.  Problem Statement

   The problem addressed by this document is:

   Given a Subject Identity already known to the discovering entity, and
   no usable DNS Discovery Anchor for that subject, how can the
   discovering entity obtain current, integrity-protected, authority-
   bound information that allows the initial discovery process to
   continue?



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   Examples include:

   *  a person identified by a provider-managed email or account
      identifier who does not control the provider's DNS namespace;

   *  a small organization that has a stable identity but delegates its
      agent descriptor hosting and does not operate the relevant DNS
      discovery records;

   *  a workload identified by a stable non-DNS identifier;

   *  a community or project identity whose descriptor is hosted by a
      separate service.

   This document does not address how the discovering entity initially
   learns which subject it wants.  Search, recommendation, semantic
   matchmaking, capability ranking, and intent-to-agent selection are
   separate functions.

1.2.  Alignment with the DAWN Charter

   This document is intended to fit within the initial-discovery
   boundary described by the DAWN charter and emerging DAWN requirements
   [DAWN-CHARTER] [DAWN-REQS] .

   In particular:

   *  Resolution starts from a name or Subject Identity already known to
      the discovering entity.

   *  The response contains only the minimum information needed to
      continue discovery, plus integrity, authority, provenance, and
      freshness information needed to evaluate that response.

   *  The protocol does not carry free-form user intent and does not
      perform semantic matchmaking, capability search, ranking, or
      selection.

   *  The protocol does not define the lifecycle, governance, or
      registration process of an identity system.

   *  The protocol does not define how a subject proves identity during
      enrollment.  It only defines how the resulting Authority Evidence
      is represented to and evaluated by a resolver.

   *  The protocol does not require a central registry.  Multiple
      independent registries may exist, and an organization may continue
      to publish discovery information independently.



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   *  Existing DNS or mDNS discovery mechanisms remain direct where they
      are available.

   *  The registry is a discovery service that can further the initial
      discovery process.  It is not a general Internet-wide index.

   This document does not claim Working Group adoption or consensus.  It
   is an individual contribution describing one possible deployment
   mechanism.

1.3.  Goals

   The goals of this revision are to:

   *  define a narrow resolution function for known subjects without a
      usable DNS Discovery Anchor;

   *  preserve direct DNS-based discovery where it works;

   *  define how a client selects one or more registries without
      assuming a global root;

   *  separate registry provenance from subject-specific authority;

   *  define freshness, expiry, revocation, and anti-replay behavior;

   *  reduce enumeration risk, especially for personal and provider-
      managed identities;

   *  support coexistence among independently operated registries
      without registry-to-registry recursive routing;

   *  return only the information needed to continue initial discovery.

1.4.  Non-Goals

   This document does not define:

   *  open-ended Internet search;

   *  semantic matchmaking or natural-language intent matching;

   *  capability ranking or selection;

   *  a mandatory global registry or global NandaIndex root;

   *  a registry discovery protocol;




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   *  registry-to-registry recursive forwarding or routing;

   *  a new naming system;

   *  identity enrollment or identity governance;

   *  trust or reputation scoring;

   *  agent invocation, task delegation, settlement, or execution;

   *  a public browse interface or capability marketplace.

1.5.  Relationship to DNS-Based Discovery

   The DAWN charter states that DNS and mDNS are mechanisms to consider
   when building a discovery protocol [DAWN-CHARTER] . DAWN work also
   proposes common parameters for DNS-based agent discovery
   [DAWN-DNS-PARAMS] .

   Registry-Assisted Resolution is complementary to those mechanisms.

   A client that has a validated direct DNS-anchored discovery path
   SHOULD use it directly.  A registry MUST NOT be inserted into that
   path merely because a registry also contains a record for the same
   subject.

   A temporary DNS challenge used to prove control of a domain during an
   out-of-scope enrollment process is not, by itself, a DNS Discovery
   Anchor.  The distinction is between:

   *  DNS used as the operational discovery publication path; and

   *  DNS used only as one form of authority evidence.

1.6.  Changes from -01

   This revision makes the following major changes:

   *  Renames the mechanism from "Registry-Assisted Discovery" to
      "Registry-Assisted Resolution for Known Subjects" to make the
      search-versus-resolution boundary explicit.

   *  Aligns the scope directly with the approved DAWN charter and
      draft-king-dawn-requirements.

   *  Generalizes the normative protocol from "NandaIndex" to a generic
      registry-assisted resolution profile.  NandaIndex is now a
      reference implementation rather than a required registry.



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   *  Defines explicit resolver-selection rules and states that no
      universal registry or global root is assumed.

   *  Strengthens Authority Evidence by separating registry provenance
      from subject-to-target authority.

   *  Defines renewable bindings using sequence numbers, validity
      bounds, expiry, and revocation information.

   *  Requires support for exact-lookup operation without a public
      browse or enumeration interface.

   *  Makes personal and provider-managed identities non-enumerable by
      default within this profile.

   *  Defines coexistence of multiple registries without recursive
      registry-to-registry forwarding.

   *  Removes language implying permissionless global publication or
      global-switchboard behavior.

   *  Clarifies that registration and proof acquisition are outside the
      protocol scope, while verification of discovery information is in
      scope.

2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals.

   This document uses DAWN terminology where applicable
   [DAWN-TERMINOLOGY] .

   Subject Identity  A stable identifier for the Named Entity or AI
      Resource that the discovering entity already intends to resolve.
      Examples include a domain name, an agent name, an email or
      provider-managed account, URI, URN, DID, platform identifier, or
      workload identifier.

   Known Subject  A subject whose Subject Identity is already known to
      the discovering entity before this resolution procedure begins.
      "Known" does not imply trusted, authenticated, or authorized.

   DNS Discovery Anchor  A usable discovery publication path under a




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      controlled DNS namespace, such as a DNS-based agent discovery
      record, a well-known discovery resource under an authoritative
      domain, or an organization-controlled gateway discoverable from
      that domain.

   Registry-Assisted Resolution  Resolution of a Known Subject through a
      registry selected by client or deployment policy when no usable
      DNS Discovery Anchor is available or selected.

   Resolution Registry  A service implementing the registry-assisted
      resolution profile defined by this document.

   Resolution Target  A terminal discovery object or subject-authorized
      gateway returned by a Resolution Registry.

   Authority Evidence  Evidence allowing a resolver to determine that an
      issuer was authorized to bind a Subject Identity to a Resolution
      Target.

   Registry Provenance  Information establishing which registry supplied
      a response and the integrity of the response.  Registry Provenance
      is not, by itself, proof that the subject authorized the target.

   Renewable Binding  A time-bounded subject-to-target binding with a
      sequence number, validity interval, and revocation information.

3.  Architecture

   Registry-Assisted Resolution is one possible mechanism within a
   larger discovery architecture.  It is not intended to replace direct
   publication.

3.1.  Direct DNS-Anchored Path

   For a subject with a validated DNS Discovery Anchor:

      Known Subject
           |
           v
      DNS / mDNS / well-known discovery
           |
           v
      Minimum Discovery Information or descriptor
           |
           v
      Subsequent protocol-specific interaction

   A Resolution Registry is not required in this path.



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3.2.  Registry-Assisted Path

   For a Known Subject without a usable DNS Discovery Anchor:

      Known Subject
           |
           v
      Client-selected Resolution Registry
           |
           v
      Authority-bound Resolution Target
           |
           v
      Minimum Discovery Information or descriptor
           |
           v
      Subsequent protocol-specific interaction

   Registry selection is not performed by the registry itself.

3.3.  Mixed Deployments

   A deployment MAY combine direct DNS-based discovery and Registry-
   Assisted Resolution.  For example, an enterprise policy may use DNS
   for organization-controlled subjects and a configured registry for
   provider-managed account identities.

   A registry MAY be reached through ordinary service configuration or
   through a deployment-specific bootstrap mechanism.  This document
   does not standardize a registry-discovery protocol.

   A registry response MUST NOT recursively refer the client to another
   generic Resolution Registry.

3.4.  Resolver Selection

   A client MUST select a Resolution Registry using local configuration,
   enterprise policy, application profile, identifier-method policy, or
   another explicitly configured mechanism.

   This document defines no universal default registry.

   A client configuration for a registry SHOULD include:

   *  the registry base URI;

   *  the registry's expected identity or trust anchor;




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   *  the Subject Identity types for which it may be queried;

   *  local policy governing acceptable Authority Evidence;

   *  privacy policy, including whether query fan-out is permitted.

   A client MAY be configured with an ordered set of registries.  A
   client MAY query more than one configured registry if local policy
   permits, but it MUST NOT perform unbounded registry fan-out.

   Registry selection is a local policy decision and MUST NOT be
   inferred solely from a display name.

3.5.  Multiple Registries

   Multiple independently operated registries MAY contain bindings for
   the same Subject Identity.

   No registry is authoritative merely because it is first in a global
   list, because it uses a particular brand name, or because it contains
   a record.

   A registry MUST identify itself in its response.  A resolver MUST
   evaluate each returned binding using subject-specific Authority
   Evidence and freshness information.

   A registry MUST NOT claim exclusive control of a Subject Identity
   unless the underlying identity system provides such exclusivity and
   the claim is verifiable.

   This document does not define communication, synchronization, or
   routing among registries.

4.  Resolution Model

4.1.  Resolution Input

   A resolution request contains exactly one Subject Identity and its
   type.

   A request MAY include:

   *  accepted target types;

   *  maximum result count;

   *  a required freshness bound;




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   *  an audience or deployment scope;

   *  policy hints that do not disclose sensitive information.

   A request MUST NOT include free-form user intent for the purpose of
   semantic matching.

   A display name MUST NOT be the sole lookup key for an authority-
   sensitive resolution operation.

4.2.  Resolution Output

   A successful response returns zero or more Resolution Target Objects.

   Each target MUST carry:

   *  the Subject Identity;

   *  the target type and target URI;

   *  Authority Evidence or a verifiable reference to it;

   *  Registry Provenance;

   *  a sequence number;

   *  an issuance time;

   *  an expiry time.

   A response MAY include a revocation URI and a target digest.

   The response MUST NOT include another generic registry as the
   terminal resolution target.

4.3.  Minimum Discovery Information

   The response is intended to carry only the minimum information needed
   to continue the DAWN initial-discovery process.

   This document does not define a capability taxonomy.

   A registry SHOULD return a reference to a terminal discovery object
   rather than duplicating rich capability metadata.

   Rich business metadata, reputation, user profiles, private
   capabilities, transaction history, credentials, and task-specific
   context are outside this profile.



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   As DAWN converges on a common Minimum Discoverable Information (MDI)
   model, this profile SHOULD reuse that model rather than define a
   competing set of capability fields.

4.4.  Terminal Target Classes

   A target is one of:

   artifact  A terminal discovery representation reachable by URI, such
      as an Agent Card, MCP server descriptor, workload descriptor, or a
      subject-owned discovery catalog.

   gateway  A subject-authorized gateway that returns minimum discovery
      information or a subject-specific descriptor under its own access
      policy.

   A target MUST NOT be another generic Resolution Registry.

4.5.  Precedence

   A validated direct DNS-anchored path SHOULD normally be preferred for
   a domain-controlled subject.

   That preference does not apply mechanically to provider-managed
   account identities.  Control of the DNS zone for example.net does not
   prove control of alice@example.net.

   A resolver MUST evaluate authority according to the Subject Identity
   type.

   A resolver MUST NOT silently replace a currently valid, stronger
   direct binding with a weaker registry result.

   If multiple registry results are valid, local policy MAY select one
   or retain several.  The resolver SHOULD expose the provenance and
   selection reason.

4.6.  Failure Handling

   Implementations SHOULD distinguish:

   *  no-binding;

   *  unverifiable;

   *  stale;

   *  revoked;



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   *  unsupported-target;

   *  policy-rejected;

   *  malformed-response.

   Public exact-lookup endpoints SHOULD avoid creating unnecessarily
   different externally observable responses for "unknown identity" and
   "not publicly resolvable" when doing so would increase enumeration
   risk.

   Requests and responses MUST be bounded by timeouts, response-size
   limits, and resource policy.

5.  Data Model

5.1.  Resolution Response

   The experimental JSON response contains:

   {
     "registry": { ... Registry Provenance ... },
     "subject": "alice@example.net",
     "subjectType": "email",
     "targets": [ ... Resolution Target Objects ... ]
   }

   An empty targets array indicates that the registry returns no public
   acceptable binding for the requested subject.

5.2.  Resolution Target Object

   A Resolution Target Object has the following members:

   subject REQUIRED.  The normalized Subject Identity.

   subjectType REQUIRED.  A documented Subject Identity type.

   method REQUIRED.  One of "artifact" or "gateway".

   targetType REQUIRED.  A media type or documented protocol identifier.

   targetUrl REQUIRED.  An absolute HTTPS URI.

   targetDigest OPTIONAL.  An integrity digest for the referenced
   target.

   authority REQUIRED.  Authority Evidence as described in Section 5.4.



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   sequence REQUIRED.  A non-negative integer monotonically increasing
   within the subject-authority scope for updates to the binding.

   issuedAt REQUIRED.  An [RFC3339] timestamp.

   expiresAt REQUIRED.  An [RFC3339] timestamp after which the binding
   MUST be treated as stale unless refreshed.

   revocationUrl OPTIONAL.  A URI at which revocation status may be
   checked.

   scope OPTIONAL.  A bounded audience, role, service, or deployment
   scope.

   fallback OPTIONAL boolean.  True if the target is intended only as a
   fallback under local policy.

5.3.  Subject Identity Normalization

   Domain names MUST be processed using applicable DNS and IDNA rules.

   For email identities, the domain part follows DNS canonicalization.
   The local-part MUST NOT be case-folded unless an applicable identity-
   provider profile defines that behavior.

   URIs MUST be normalized only as permitted by [RFC3986] .

   URNs MUST follow [RFC8141] and namespace-specific rules.

   DID, platform, and workload identifiers MUST follow their governing
   specifications.

   Normalization MUST NOT change the identified subject.

5.4.  Authority Evidence

   The Authority Evidence object separates subject authority from
   registry provenance.

   The object SHOULD contain:

   type REQUIRED.  The authority mechanism or credential type.

   issuer REQUIRED.  The issuer or validating authority.

   evidenceUrl or evidence RECOMMENDED.  A verifiable reference or
   embedded evidence.




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   subject RECOMMENDED.  The subject covered by the evidence when not
   implicit.

   targetUrl or targetDigest RECOMMENDED.  A binding to the target or
   publisher when supported by the evidence format.

   validFrom OPTIONAL.

   expiresAt REQUIRED for time-bounded evidence unless the underlying
   evidence format has an equivalent validity rule.

   revocationUrl OPTIONAL.

   A registry signature proves Registry Provenance.  It does not by
   itself establish that the subject authorized the target.

   Examples of subject-specific evidence include:

   *  DNS or WebPKI-backed domain control for domain identities;

   *  an account-provider assertion, mailbox challenge, or other
      account-specific proof for an email identity;

   *  a DID or wallet signature for a cryptographic identity;

   *  a platform-issued assertion for a platform account;

   *  an applicable workload identity credential.

   The mechanism by which the publisher originally obtains the proof is
   outside the scope of this document.  The resolution protocol is
   concerned with carrying enough information for the discovering entity
   to validate the discovery binding.

5.5.  Freshness and Renewable Bindings

   A registry binding is a renewable lease, not a permanent claim.

   Every returned target MUST contain sequence, issuedAt, and expiresAt.

   A registry MUST NOT return a binding as current after expiresAt.

   A registry SHOULD require renewed Authority Evidence before extending
   a binding beyond the validity of that evidence.

   When a target, ownership state, authority evidence, or publisher
   changes, the sequence number MUST increase.




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   A resolver that has multiple bindings from the same authority scope
   MUST reject an older sequence when it has already observed a newer
   valid sequence.

   A revoked binding MUST NOT remain usable solely because an HTTP cache
   lifetime has not expired.

   Negative caching SHOULD be short and policy bounded.

   Implementations SHOULD preserve sufficient audit information to
   diagnose replacement, recovery, and revocation events without
   exposing sensitive history through the public resolution API.

5.6.  Provenance

   Registry Provenance SHOULD include:

   *  registry identifier;

   *  registry base URI;

   *  response issuance time;

   *  response signature or authenticated-transport identity;

   *  profile version.

   Provenance allows a client to identify which configured registry
   supplied the result.  It MUST NOT be interpreted as subject authority
   unless the authority model explicitly says so.

6.  Experimental HTTPS Binding

6.1.  Endpoint and Transport

   A Resolution Registry implementing this experimental binding exposes:

      POST /resolve

   relative to its configured base URI.

   HTTPS is REQUIRED for public deployments.

   Requests and responses use application/json.  Errors use application/
   problem+json [RFC9457] .






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6.2.  Request

   Example:

   POST /resolve HTTP/1.1
   Host: registry.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   Accept: application/json

   {
     "identity": "alice@example.net",
     "identityType": "email",
     "maxResults": 3,
     "acceptedMethods": ["artifact", "gateway"]
   }

   identity and identityType are REQUIRED.

   maxResults defaults to 3 and MUST be between 1 and 100.

   acceptedMethods MAY constrain the target classes.

   The request MUST NOT contain an "intent", "capabilityQuery",
   "nextRegistry", or recursive forwarding field in this profile.

6.3.  Successful Response

   A registry returns HTTP 200 for a syntactically valid lookup,
   including a lookup for which no public binding is returned.

   Example:

   {
     "registry": {
       "id": "https://registry.example",
       "profile": "known-subject-resolution-02",
       "issuedAt": "2026-10-28T20:00:00Z"
     },
     "subject": "alice@example.net",
     "subjectType": "email",
     "targets": []
   }

   Using the same status code for an empty public result and a populated
   result does not eliminate enumeration attacks, but it avoids one
   unnecessary distinction.





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6.4.  Error Response

   Protocol errors use [RFC9457] .

   Example:

   HTTP/1.1 422 Unprocessable Content
   Content-Type: application/problem+json

   {
     "type": "https://registry.example/problems/unverifiable",
     "title": "Resolution binding is unverifiable",
     "status": 422,
     "code": "unverifiable"
   }

   Error responses MUST NOT expose secret credentials, private identity
   attributes, or internal policy details.

6.5.  No Public Enumeration Requirement

   Conformance to this profile MUST NOT require a registry to expose:

   *  a list-all endpoint;

   *  keyword search;

   *  natural-language search;

   *  browse-by-category;

   *  prefix enumeration;

   *  downloadable identity catalogs.

   A registry MUST support exact lookup without requiring any of those
   interfaces.

   Provider-managed personal identities SHOULD NOT be included in public
   browse or search interfaces by default.

   If a deployment separately offers public search or browsing, that
   function is outside this profile and MUST be clearly separable from
   the resolution endpoint.







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6.6.  No Inter-Registry Forwarding

   A Resolution Registry MUST NOT recursively query another Resolution
   Registry on behalf of the client under this profile.

   A response MUST NOT return another generic Resolution Registry as its
   Resolution Target.

   A client MAY independently query another registry from its configured
   registry set, subject to local privacy policy.

   This rule prevents a client-selected registry model from silently
   becoming a global registry-routing system.

7.  Resolver Procedure

   A resolver performs the following procedure:

   1.   Accept one Known Subject and local policy.

   2.   Normalize the Subject Identity without changing its semantics.

   3.   Determine whether local policy has a validated, direct DNS-
        anchored discovery procedure for this Subject Identity type.

   4.   If such a direct path exists and is selected, use it directly.

   5.   Otherwise select a Resolution Registry from local configuration
        or policy.

   6.   Send an exact resolution request.

   7.   Validate Registry Provenance.

   8.   Validate each candidate's Subject Identity, Authority Evidence,
        target binding, sequence, expiry, revocation status, and local
        policy.

   9.   Reject unknown target methods and expired or revoked bindings.

   10.  Retrieve the terminal discovery object over an authenticated
        transport.

   11.  Continue any subsequent authentication, authorization,
        capability exchange, or invocation under the specification
        governing that target.  Those actions are outside this profile.





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7.1.  Domain-Controlled Subjects

   For a domain-controlled subject, a currently valid direct DNS-based
   discovery record is normally stronger than a registry binding because
   it is published under the subject's authoritative namespace.

   A registry binding MAY be useful when the subject does not publish
   the relevant discovery data in DNS or delegates descriptor hosting.

   If a direct path later becomes available, policy SHOULD normally
   prefer it.

7.2.  Email and Provider-Managed Accounts

   The operator of a provider domain does not automatically speak for
   every individual account in that namespace.

   For example, DNS control of example.net does not alone prove that a
   particular agent is authorized for alice@example.net.

   Authority Evidence for a provider-managed identity MUST be account-
   specific or be issued under an identity-provider delegation model
   that explicitly covers the account.

   Such evidence SHOULD be time bounded and revocable.

7.3.  DIDs, Platform Identities, and Workload Identities

   For a DID, wallet, platform account, SPIFFE identity, or other
   workload identity, the resolver follows the verification and
   lifecycle rules of the governing identity system.

   The registry MUST NOT redefine the identity system's authority model.

8.  Deployment Examples

8.1.  Enterprise with Direct DNS Discovery

   Example Corp controls example.com and publishes a DAWN-compatible DNS
   discovery record.

      example.com
          |
          v
      authoritative DNS discovery
          |
          v
      descriptor / MDI



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   The registry-assisted mechanism is not used.

8.2.  SMB Without a Usable DNS Discovery Anchor

   Moon Bakery uses moon-bakery.example as its public identity but
   relies on managed hosting and does not operate the relevant discovery
   records.  Its Agent Card is hosted by agenthost.example.

   A configured registry returns:

   {
     "subject": "orders@moon-bakery.example",
     "subjectType": "agent-name",
     "method": "artifact",
     "targetType": "application/a2a-agent-card+json",
     "targetUrl":
       "https://cards.agenthost.example/moon-bakery/orders.json",
     "sequence": 8,
     "issuedAt": "2026-10-28T19:00:00Z",
     "expiresAt": "2026-10-29T19:00:00Z",
     "authority": {
       "type": "domain-control",
       "issuer": "https://registry.example",
       "evidenceUrl":
         "https://moon-bakery.example/.well-known/example-proof"
     }
   }

   The registry proves the binding; it does not become the runtime.

8.3.  Individual Personal Agent

   Alice controls alice@example.net but does not control example.net
   DNS.  A provider-specific or mailbox-specific proof authorizes her
   personal agent descriptor.
















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      alice@example.net
          |
          v
      configured registry
          |
          v
      account-specific Authority Evidence
          |
          v
      Agent Card
          |
          v
      local or cloud runtime

   Alice's identity is resolved by exact lookup.  It need not appear in
   a public browse interface.

8.4.  Multiple Independent Registries

   A client is configured with Registry A and Registry B.

   Both contain a binding for the same Subject Identity.

   The client verifies both independently.  It does not assume that one
   registry is a global root, and neither registry forwards the request
   to the other.

   Local policy may select the result with acceptable Authority Evidence
   and freshness, retain both for resilience, or reject both.

9.  Operational Considerations

9.1.  Registration Is Out of Scope

   DAWN's initial scope excludes entity registration and identity
   management [DAWN-CHARTER] [DAWN-REQS] .

   Accordingly, this document does not standardize account creation,
   challenge issuance, proof acquisition, registrant recovery, or
   governance of an identity namespace.

   A registry implementation necessarily performs enrollment and
   lifecycle operations, but those operations are outside the resolution
   protocol defined here.

   What is in scope is that the resolution response carry enough
   integrity, provenance, authority, and freshness information for the
   discovering entity to evaluate the discovery result.



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9.2.  Anti-Squatting

   A registry MUST NOT treat first registration as sufficient authority.

   A pending or unverified registration MUST NOT block a later
   registrant that presents valid authority evidence under the
   registry's policy.

   Resolver clients MUST NOT treat registry presence alone as proof of
   ownership.

9.3.  Migration and Recovery

   A subject may migrate its descriptor or runtime without changing its
   Subject Identity.

   The binding sequence MUST increase when the resolution target
   changes.

   Recovery of a subject binding SHOULD require evidence at least as
   strong as the evidence used for the previous valid binding, subject
   to the governing identity system.

   A registry MAY retain non-public audit history or tombstones to
   prevent immediate reassignment after withdrawal, subject to privacy
   and retention policy.

9.4.  Registry Independence

   Registries are independently operated.

   A registry MAY apply its own enrollment, evidence, jurisdiction,
   retention, and abuse policies.

   Interoperability depends on the common resolution representation and
   resolver behavior, not on shared registry governance.

10.  Security Considerations

10.1.  Authority Confusion

   The most important security property is distinguishing:

   *  the identity of the registry;

   *  the Subject Identity;

   *  the authority that validates the subject;



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   *  the host of the descriptor;

   *  the runtime operator.

   These may all be different parties.

   Implementations MUST NOT infer subject authority from descriptor
   hosting or registry hosting alone.

10.2.  Registry Poisoning and Squatting

   A malicious registrant may attempt to bind another subject to an
   attacker-controlled descriptor.

   Registries MUST validate authority before publishing a current
   binding.  Resolvers MUST evaluate the Authority Evidence rather than
   trusting registry presence alone.

10.3.  Target Substitution

   An attacker may replace a target after authority was verified.

   Authority Evidence SHOULD bind the subject to the target URI, target
   digest, authorized publisher, or another object from which the target
   is securely derived.

10.4.  Downgrade Attacks

   An attacker may try to suppress a stronger direct DNS path and force
   a client onto a weaker registry result.

   A resolver MUST NOT silently downgrade from a validated direct path
   to a weaker registry result.

10.5.  Replay and Stale Bindings

   An attacker may replay a previously valid binding.

   Sequence numbers, validity bounds, expiry, and revocation checks are
   therefore required.

   HTTP cache freshness MUST NOT override subject-level revocation or
   expiry.

10.6.  Resource Exhaustion

   Exact lookup endpoints are attractive denial-of-service and scraping
   targets.



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   Registries SHOULD use rate limiting, request-size limits, deadlines,
   abuse detection, and bounded result sets.

   Clients MUST NOT perform unbounded registry fan-out.

10.7.  Registry Trust

   A configured registry is trusted to operate the protocol correctly
   and to preserve response integrity.  It is not automatically trusted
   to make arbitrary claims about a subject.

   Subject-specific Authority Evidence remains necessary.

11.  Privacy Considerations

11.1.  Exact Lookup and Enumeration

   A major difference between resolution and search is that resolution
   can operate without exposing the entire set of registered subjects.

   This profile therefore requires support for exact lookup and does not
   require listing or browsing.

   Personal and provider-managed account identities SHOULD be hidden
   from public enumeration by default.

   Public search or browsing, if provided by the same implementation, is
   a separate function outside this profile.

   Rate limiting and uniform response behavior can reduce simple
   enumeration but do not eliminate it.  Privacy-preserving exact-lookup
   mechanisms are an area for future work.

11.2.  Query Privacy

   Resolution queries can reveal relationships, planned interactions, or
   sensitive identities.

   Clients SHOULD avoid unnecessary query fan-out.

   Registries SHOULD minimize logs, document retention policy, protect
   transport confidentiality, and avoid logging secrets.

11.3.  Data Minimization

   A resolution record SHOULD contain only the information needed to
   find and validate the terminal discovery target.




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   Rich profiles, personal attributes, transaction history, private
   capability descriptions, and credentials SHOULD NOT be included.

11.4.  Personal Agents

   Verification that a person controls an account does not imply consent
   for all actions by or toward the person's agent.

   Resolution identifies a discovery target.  It does not authorize
   invocation, disclosure of private capabilities, or transactions.

12.  IANA Considerations

   This revision requests no new DNS label, well-known URI, registry
   root, or URN namespace.

   The media type application/agent-resolution-target+json proposed in
   -01 remains experimental in this revision.  A future Standards Track
   version may request formal registration if the DAWN architecture
   adopts a dedicated representation rather than a common MDI object.

13.  Interoperability Considerations

   The registry-assisted path SHOULD converge on the same DAWN minimum
   discovery semantics as direct DNS-based mechanisms.

   This document deliberately avoids defining a parallel capability
   model.

   As common DAWN discovery parameters and MDI definitions stabilize,
   implementations SHOULD map registry outputs to those common fields.

   Terminal Agent Card, MCP, workload, or other descriptors remain
   governed by their own specifications.

   This document does not define interoperability among registries
   beyond the fact that multiple registries may expose the same
   resolution profile to clients.

14.  NandaIndex as a Reference Implementation

   Project NANDA operates NandaIndex as an experimental implementation
   of agent resolution and discovery concepts [NANDAINDEX]
   [NANDA-GITHUB] .

   For the model in this revision, NandaIndex is best understood as one
   possible Resolution Registry, not as a mandatory global root.




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   To implement this profile, a NandaIndex deployment should:

   *  expose exact resolution independently of public search or browse;

   *  keep direct DNS-anchored discovery outside the NandaIndex critical
      path where possible;

   *  require subject-specific authority evidence;

   *  publish expiry, sequence, provenance, and revocation information;

   *  make personal records non-enumerable by default;

   *  avoid recursive registry-to-registry forwarding;

   *  permit clients to choose other compatible registries.

   Natural-language discovery, public browsing, capability search, and
   marketplace functions may exist as separate Project NANDA
   experimentation, but they are not part of the registry-assisted
   resolution profile described here.

15.  Conclusion

   DNS and mDNS are strong foundations for AI-resource discovery when
   the subject controls a usable discovery publication point.

   A narrower gap remains for a Known Subject whose identity is stable
   but whose discovery information cannot be published through a usable
   DNS Discovery Anchor.

   Registry-Assisted Resolution fills that gap without requiring a
   global index.  The client starts with a Known Subject, selects a
   registry by local policy, validates subject-specific authority and
   freshness, and receives only the minimum information needed to
   continue discovery.

   The design preserves four important boundaries:

   *  DNS remains direct where it works;

   *  resolution is distinct from open-ended search;

   *  registry provenance is distinct from subject authority;

   *  multiple registries coexist without registry-to-registry routing.





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   This makes registry-assisted resolution a complementary discovery
   mechanism rather than an alternative global naming or search system.

16.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC8141]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Klensin, "Uniform Resource Names
              (URNs)", RFC 8141, April 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8141>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9457]  Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details
              for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, July 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9457>.

17.  Informative References

   [DAWN-CHARTER]
              Force, I. E. T., "Discovery of Agents With Names (DAWN)
              Charter", Charter charter-ietf-dawn-01, October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-dawn/>.

   [DAWN-REQS]
              King, D. and A. Farrel, "Requirements for the Discovery of
              Agents With Names (DAWN)", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-king-dawn-requirements-02, October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-dawn-
              requirements/>.

   [DAWN-TERMINOLOGY]
              Farrel, A., Yao, K., Schott, R., and N. Williams,
              "Terminology for the Discovery of Agents With Names
              (DAWN)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-farrel-



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              dawn-terminology-06, October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farrel-dawn-
              terminology/>.

   [DAWN-DNS-PARAMS]
              Brockners, F., Jakab, L., Williams, N., and J. Mozley,
              "Common Agent DNS Discovery Parameters", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-blwm-dawn-common-discovery-
              parameters-00, October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-blwm-dawn-common-
              discovery-parameters/>.

   [NANDAINDEX]
              NANDA, P., "NandaIndex", 2026, <https://nandaindex.org/>.

   [NANDA-GITHUB]
              NANDA, P., "NandaIndex Version 2 Source Code", 2026,
              <https://github.com/projnanda/nanda-index-v2>.

Appendix A.  Example Resolution Response

   POST /resolve

   {
     "identity": "alice@example.net",
     "identityType": "email",
     "maxResults": 2,
     "acceptedMethods": ["artifact"]
   }

   200 OK




















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   {
     "registry": {
       "id": "https://registry.example",
       "profile": "known-subject-resolution-02",
       "issuedAt": "2026-10-28T20:00:00Z"
     },
     "subject": "alice@example.net",
     "subjectType": "email",
     "targets": [
       {
         "subject": "alice@example.net",
         "subjectType": "email",
         "method": "artifact",
         "targetType": "application/a2a-agent-card+json",
         "targetUrl":
           "https://cards.agenthost.example/alice/card.json",
         "targetDigest": "sha256:BASE64URLVALUE",
         "sequence": 14,
         "issuedAt": "2026-10-28T19:00:00Z",
         "expiresAt": "2026-10-29T19:00:00Z",
         "authority": {
           "type": "account-provider-assertion",
           "issuer": "https://identity.example.net",
           "evidenceUrl":
             "https://identity.example.net/evidence/EXAMPLE",
           "expiresAt": "2026-10-29T19:00:00Z"
         },
         "revocationUrl":
           "https://registry.example/revocations/alice-14"
       }
     ]
   }

Appendix B.  DAWN Requirements Mapping

   The following non-normative mapping explains how this mechanism is
   intended to relate to current DAWN requirements.

   Known starting point: The Subject Identity is already known before
   resolution.

   Referral / directory: The configured registry is a bounded discovery
   service that furthers discovery for the known subject.

   Minimum information: The response carries a target pointer and the
   security/lifecycle information needed to validate it, rather than a
   capability catalog.




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   Decentralization: No single registry is required.  Clients select
   registries by configuration or policy.

   Independent publication: Subjects with direct DNS publication remain
   independent of registries and are resolved directly.

   Existing protocols: DNS/mDNS are reused where applicable.  HTTPS is
   used for the registry-assisted gap.

   Integrity: Registry Provenance protects the response, while Authority
   Evidence binds the subject to the target.

   Privacy: Exact lookup is supported without public enumeration.

   Scope boundary: Search, ranking, semantic matchmaking, identity
   management, and trust evaluation are not part of this profile.

Appendix C.  Open Questions

   *  Whether the generic registry-assisted mechanism belongs in a DAWN
      Architecture document, a use-case document, or a separate protocol
      specification.

   *  Whether DAWN MDI can directly represent all fields needed for the
      Resolution Target Object, eliminating a dedicated target media
      type.

   *  Which authority-evidence formats should be standardized or
      profiled for email, platform, DID, and workload identities.

   *  Whether privacy-preserving exact lookup techniques such as OPRF-
      or PIR-based designs are warranted for personal-agent deployments.

   *  How registry selection should be profiled for specific identity
      methods without creating a universal registry-discovery system.

   *  Whether a transparency mechanism is useful for detecting
      conflicting or malicious bindings without creating a public
      enumeration surface.

   *  How conformance tests should verify non-enumerability, freshness,
      and no-forwarding behavior.









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Acknowledgements

   This document draws on work by the Project NANDA community and on
   discussions in the IETF DAWN community concerning discovery scope,
   DNS-based discovery, referrals, identity boundaries, authority,
   freshness, privacy, and enumeration.

   Earlier Project NANDA work explored a broader global-switchboard
   model.  This revision intentionally narrows the protocol contribution
   to resolution of Known Subjects without usable DNS Discovery Anchors.

Authors' Addresses

   Ramesh Raskar
   MIT Media Lab
   75 Amherst Street
   Cambridge, MA 02142
   United States of America
   Email: raskar@mit.edu


   Samuel Sharaf
   ProjectNanda
   Email: samuel.sharaf@gmail.com


   Pradyumna Chari
   MIT
   Email: pradyumna.chari4@gmail.com






















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