Network Working Group R. Raskar
Internet-Draft MIT Media Lab
Intended status: Informational S. Sharaf
Expires: 1 May 2027 ProjectNanda
P. Chari
MIT
28 October 2026
Registry-Assisted Resolution for Known Subjects Without DNS Discovery
Anchors
draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution-02
Abstract
Discovery mechanisms for AI resources increasingly use DNS and mDNS
as interoperable publication and lookup substrates. These mechanisms
work well when the publisher controls a usable DNS discovery anchor.
They do not cover every deployment. An individual may control an
email or platform account without controlling the provider's DNS
namespace. A small organization may use managed infrastructure
without operating an agent-specific DNS publication point. A
workload may have a stable identity that is not itself DNS anchored.
This document describes Registry-Assisted Resolution for the narrower
case in which a discovering entity already knows the Subject Identity
it wants to resolve, but no usable DNS Discovery Anchor is available
or selected by local policy. A configured registry returns the
minimum information needed to continue discovery, together with
provenance, authority evidence, freshness, and revocation
information.
This mechanism is complementary to DNS-based discovery. A validated
direct DNS-anchored discovery path remains direct and is normally
preferred for a domain-controlled subject. This document does not
define open-ended search, semantic matchmaking, ranking, capability
search, a global registry, registry discovery, directory-to-directory
routing, identity management, or trust evaluation.
Multiple independently operated registries may implement the same
resolution profile. Registry selection is a client or deployment
policy decision; no universal NandaIndex or global root is assumed.
NandaIndex is described as one reference implementation of this
model.
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Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 May 2027.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Alignment with the DAWN Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5. Relationship to DNS-Based Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6. Changes from -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Direct DNS-Anchored Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Registry-Assisted Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Mixed Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Resolver Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.5. Multiple Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Resolution Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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4.1. Resolution Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Resolution Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Minimum Discovery Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Terminal Target Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.6. Failure Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Resolution Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Resolution Target Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Subject Identity Normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.4. Authority Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.5. Freshness and Renewable Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.6. Provenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Experimental HTTPS Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. Endpoint and Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.3. Successful Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.4. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.5. No Public Enumeration Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.6. No Inter-Registry Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. Resolver Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1. Domain-Controlled Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2. Email and Provider-Managed Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.3. DIDs, Platform Identities, and Workload Identities . . . 21
8. Deployment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1. Enterprise with Direct DNS Discovery . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.2. SMB Without a Usable DNS Discovery Anchor . . . . . . . . 22
8.3. Individual Personal Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.4. Multiple Independent Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. Registration Is Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.2. Anti-Squatting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.3. Migration and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.4. Registry Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1. Authority Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.2. Registry Poisoning and Squatting . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.3. Target Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.4. Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.5. Replay and Stale Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.6. Resource Exhaustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.7. Registry Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.1. Exact Lookup and Enumeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.2. Query Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.3. Data Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11.4. Personal Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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13. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
14. NandaIndex as a Reference Implementation . . . . . . . . . . 27
15. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
16. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
17. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix A. Example Resolution Response . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix B. DAWN Requirements Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix C. Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Introduction
The Discovery of Agents With Names (DAWN) Working Group is chartered
to specify interoperable mechanisms for the initial discovery of
public properties of AI resources. The DAWN charter explicitly
excludes open-ended search, semantic matchmaking, ranking, selection
based on capability or user intent, broad identity management, and
trust evaluation beyond secure discovery exchange [DAWN-CHARTER] .
DNS and mDNS are important candidate mechanisms for DAWN. They are
especially effective when a publisher controls an appropriate DNS
namespace and can publish discovery data there. However, not every
Named Entity or AI Resource that a client needs to resolve has a
usable DNS Discovery Anchor.
This document addresses one bounded case: the discovering entity
already knows a stable Subject Identity, and it wants to obtain the
minimum public information needed to continue discovery for that
subject. If a usable direct DNS-anchored path exists, the client
uses that path. If it does not, a configured registry may provide an
authority-bound resolution target.
The model is deliberately narrower than earlier "global switchboard"
proposals. It does not ask a registry to discover the best agent for
a task. It does not define a global search engine. It does not
require all clients to use the same registry. It does not define
registry-to-registry routing.
1.1. Problem Statement
The problem addressed by this document is:
Given a Subject Identity already known to the discovering entity, and
no usable DNS Discovery Anchor for that subject, how can the
discovering entity obtain current, integrity-protected, authority-
bound information that allows the initial discovery process to
continue?
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Examples include:
* a person identified by a provider-managed email or account
identifier who does not control the provider's DNS namespace;
* a small organization that has a stable identity but delegates its
agent descriptor hosting and does not operate the relevant DNS
discovery records;
* a workload identified by a stable non-DNS identifier;
* a community or project identity whose descriptor is hosted by a
separate service.
This document does not address how the discovering entity initially
learns which subject it wants. Search, recommendation, semantic
matchmaking, capability ranking, and intent-to-agent selection are
separate functions.
1.2. Alignment with the DAWN Charter
This document is intended to fit within the initial-discovery
boundary described by the DAWN charter and emerging DAWN requirements
[DAWN-CHARTER] [DAWN-REQS] .
In particular:
* Resolution starts from a name or Subject Identity already known to
the discovering entity.
* The response contains only the minimum information needed to
continue discovery, plus integrity, authority, provenance, and
freshness information needed to evaluate that response.
* The protocol does not carry free-form user intent and does not
perform semantic matchmaking, capability search, ranking, or
selection.
* The protocol does not define the lifecycle, governance, or
registration process of an identity system.
* The protocol does not define how a subject proves identity during
enrollment. It only defines how the resulting Authority Evidence
is represented to and evaluated by a resolver.
* The protocol does not require a central registry. Multiple
independent registries may exist, and an organization may continue
to publish discovery information independently.
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* Existing DNS or mDNS discovery mechanisms remain direct where they
are available.
* The registry is a discovery service that can further the initial
discovery process. It is not a general Internet-wide index.
This document does not claim Working Group adoption or consensus. It
is an individual contribution describing one possible deployment
mechanism.
1.3. Goals
The goals of this revision are to:
* define a narrow resolution function for known subjects without a
usable DNS Discovery Anchor;
* preserve direct DNS-based discovery where it works;
* define how a client selects one or more registries without
assuming a global root;
* separate registry provenance from subject-specific authority;
* define freshness, expiry, revocation, and anti-replay behavior;
* reduce enumeration risk, especially for personal and provider-
managed identities;
* support coexistence among independently operated registries
without registry-to-registry recursive routing;
* return only the information needed to continue initial discovery.
1.4. Non-Goals
This document does not define:
* open-ended Internet search;
* semantic matchmaking or natural-language intent matching;
* capability ranking or selection;
* a mandatory global registry or global NandaIndex root;
* a registry discovery protocol;
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* registry-to-registry recursive forwarding or routing;
* a new naming system;
* identity enrollment or identity governance;
* trust or reputation scoring;
* agent invocation, task delegation, settlement, or execution;
* a public browse interface or capability marketplace.
1.5. Relationship to DNS-Based Discovery
The DAWN charter states that DNS and mDNS are mechanisms to consider
when building a discovery protocol [DAWN-CHARTER] . DAWN work also
proposes common parameters for DNS-based agent discovery
[DAWN-DNS-PARAMS] .
Registry-Assisted Resolution is complementary to those mechanisms.
A client that has a validated direct DNS-anchored discovery path
SHOULD use it directly. A registry MUST NOT be inserted into that
path merely because a registry also contains a record for the same
subject.
A temporary DNS challenge used to prove control of a domain during an
out-of-scope enrollment process is not, by itself, a DNS Discovery
Anchor. The distinction is between:
* DNS used as the operational discovery publication path; and
* DNS used only as one form of authority evidence.
1.6. Changes from -01
This revision makes the following major changes:
* Renames the mechanism from "Registry-Assisted Discovery" to
"Registry-Assisted Resolution for Known Subjects" to make the
search-versus-resolution boundary explicit.
* Aligns the scope directly with the approved DAWN charter and
draft-king-dawn-requirements.
* Generalizes the normative protocol from "NandaIndex" to a generic
registry-assisted resolution profile. NandaIndex is now a
reference implementation rather than a required registry.
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* Defines explicit resolver-selection rules and states that no
universal registry or global root is assumed.
* Strengthens Authority Evidence by separating registry provenance
from subject-to-target authority.
* Defines renewable bindings using sequence numbers, validity
bounds, expiry, and revocation information.
* Requires support for exact-lookup operation without a public
browse or enumeration interface.
* Makes personal and provider-managed identities non-enumerable by
default within this profile.
* Defines coexistence of multiple registries without recursive
registry-to-registry forwarding.
* Removes language implying permissionless global publication or
global-switchboard behavior.
* Clarifies that registration and proof acquisition are outside the
protocol scope, while verification of discovery information is in
scope.
2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals.
This document uses DAWN terminology where applicable
[DAWN-TERMINOLOGY] .
Subject Identity A stable identifier for the Named Entity or AI
Resource that the discovering entity already intends to resolve.
Examples include a domain name, an agent name, an email or
provider-managed account, URI, URN, DID, platform identifier, or
workload identifier.
Known Subject A subject whose Subject Identity is already known to
the discovering entity before this resolution procedure begins.
"Known" does not imply trusted, authenticated, or authorized.
DNS Discovery Anchor A usable discovery publication path under a
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controlled DNS namespace, such as a DNS-based agent discovery
record, a well-known discovery resource under an authoritative
domain, or an organization-controlled gateway discoverable from
that domain.
Registry-Assisted Resolution Resolution of a Known Subject through a
registry selected by client or deployment policy when no usable
DNS Discovery Anchor is available or selected.
Resolution Registry A service implementing the registry-assisted
resolution profile defined by this document.
Resolution Target A terminal discovery object or subject-authorized
gateway returned by a Resolution Registry.
Authority Evidence Evidence allowing a resolver to determine that an
issuer was authorized to bind a Subject Identity to a Resolution
Target.
Registry Provenance Information establishing which registry supplied
a response and the integrity of the response. Registry Provenance
is not, by itself, proof that the subject authorized the target.
Renewable Binding A time-bounded subject-to-target binding with a
sequence number, validity interval, and revocation information.
3. Architecture
Registry-Assisted Resolution is one possible mechanism within a
larger discovery architecture. It is not intended to replace direct
publication.
3.1. Direct DNS-Anchored Path
For a subject with a validated DNS Discovery Anchor:
Known Subject
|
v
DNS / mDNS / well-known discovery
|
v
Minimum Discovery Information or descriptor
|
v
Subsequent protocol-specific interaction
A Resolution Registry is not required in this path.
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3.2. Registry-Assisted Path
For a Known Subject without a usable DNS Discovery Anchor:
Known Subject
|
v
Client-selected Resolution Registry
|
v
Authority-bound Resolution Target
|
v
Minimum Discovery Information or descriptor
|
v
Subsequent protocol-specific interaction
Registry selection is not performed by the registry itself.
3.3. Mixed Deployments
A deployment MAY combine direct DNS-based discovery and Registry-
Assisted Resolution. For example, an enterprise policy may use DNS
for organization-controlled subjects and a configured registry for
provider-managed account identities.
A registry MAY be reached through ordinary service configuration or
through a deployment-specific bootstrap mechanism. This document
does not standardize a registry-discovery protocol.
A registry response MUST NOT recursively refer the client to another
generic Resolution Registry.
3.4. Resolver Selection
A client MUST select a Resolution Registry using local configuration,
enterprise policy, application profile, identifier-method policy, or
another explicitly configured mechanism.
This document defines no universal default registry.
A client configuration for a registry SHOULD include:
* the registry base URI;
* the registry's expected identity or trust anchor;
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* the Subject Identity types for which it may be queried;
* local policy governing acceptable Authority Evidence;
* privacy policy, including whether query fan-out is permitted.
A client MAY be configured with an ordered set of registries. A
client MAY query more than one configured registry if local policy
permits, but it MUST NOT perform unbounded registry fan-out.
Registry selection is a local policy decision and MUST NOT be
inferred solely from a display name.
3.5. Multiple Registries
Multiple independently operated registries MAY contain bindings for
the same Subject Identity.
No registry is authoritative merely because it is first in a global
list, because it uses a particular brand name, or because it contains
a record.
A registry MUST identify itself in its response. A resolver MUST
evaluate each returned binding using subject-specific Authority
Evidence and freshness information.
A registry MUST NOT claim exclusive control of a Subject Identity
unless the underlying identity system provides such exclusivity and
the claim is verifiable.
This document does not define communication, synchronization, or
routing among registries.
4. Resolution Model
4.1. Resolution Input
A resolution request contains exactly one Subject Identity and its
type.
A request MAY include:
* accepted target types;
* maximum result count;
* a required freshness bound;
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* an audience or deployment scope;
* policy hints that do not disclose sensitive information.
A request MUST NOT include free-form user intent for the purpose of
semantic matching.
A display name MUST NOT be the sole lookup key for an authority-
sensitive resolution operation.
4.2. Resolution Output
A successful response returns zero or more Resolution Target Objects.
Each target MUST carry:
* the Subject Identity;
* the target type and target URI;
* Authority Evidence or a verifiable reference to it;
* Registry Provenance;
* a sequence number;
* an issuance time;
* an expiry time.
A response MAY include a revocation URI and a target digest.
The response MUST NOT include another generic registry as the
terminal resolution target.
4.3. Minimum Discovery Information
The response is intended to carry only the minimum information needed
to continue the DAWN initial-discovery process.
This document does not define a capability taxonomy.
A registry SHOULD return a reference to a terminal discovery object
rather than duplicating rich capability metadata.
Rich business metadata, reputation, user profiles, private
capabilities, transaction history, credentials, and task-specific
context are outside this profile.
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As DAWN converges on a common Minimum Discoverable Information (MDI)
model, this profile SHOULD reuse that model rather than define a
competing set of capability fields.
4.4. Terminal Target Classes
A target is one of:
artifact A terminal discovery representation reachable by URI, such
as an Agent Card, MCP server descriptor, workload descriptor, or a
subject-owned discovery catalog.
gateway A subject-authorized gateway that returns minimum discovery
information or a subject-specific descriptor under its own access
policy.
A target MUST NOT be another generic Resolution Registry.
4.5. Precedence
A validated direct DNS-anchored path SHOULD normally be preferred for
a domain-controlled subject.
That preference does not apply mechanically to provider-managed
account identities. Control of the DNS zone for example.net does not
prove control of alice@example.net.
A resolver MUST evaluate authority according to the Subject Identity
type.
A resolver MUST NOT silently replace a currently valid, stronger
direct binding with a weaker registry result.
If multiple registry results are valid, local policy MAY select one
or retain several. The resolver SHOULD expose the provenance and
selection reason.
4.6. Failure Handling
Implementations SHOULD distinguish:
* no-binding;
* unverifiable;
* stale;
* revoked;
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* unsupported-target;
* policy-rejected;
* malformed-response.
Public exact-lookup endpoints SHOULD avoid creating unnecessarily
different externally observable responses for "unknown identity" and
"not publicly resolvable" when doing so would increase enumeration
risk.
Requests and responses MUST be bounded by timeouts, response-size
limits, and resource policy.
5. Data Model
5.1. Resolution Response
The experimental JSON response contains:
{
"registry": { ... Registry Provenance ... },
"subject": "alice@example.net",
"subjectType": "email",
"targets": [ ... Resolution Target Objects ... ]
}
An empty targets array indicates that the registry returns no public
acceptable binding for the requested subject.
5.2. Resolution Target Object
A Resolution Target Object has the following members:
subject REQUIRED. The normalized Subject Identity.
subjectType REQUIRED. A documented Subject Identity type.
method REQUIRED. One of "artifact" or "gateway".
targetType REQUIRED. A media type or documented protocol identifier.
targetUrl REQUIRED. An absolute HTTPS URI.
targetDigest OPTIONAL. An integrity digest for the referenced
target.
authority REQUIRED. Authority Evidence as described in Section 5.4.
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sequence REQUIRED. A non-negative integer monotonically increasing
within the subject-authority scope for updates to the binding.
issuedAt REQUIRED. An [RFC3339] timestamp.
expiresAt REQUIRED. An [RFC3339] timestamp after which the binding
MUST be treated as stale unless refreshed.
revocationUrl OPTIONAL. A URI at which revocation status may be
checked.
scope OPTIONAL. A bounded audience, role, service, or deployment
scope.
fallback OPTIONAL boolean. True if the target is intended only as a
fallback under local policy.
5.3. Subject Identity Normalization
Domain names MUST be processed using applicable DNS and IDNA rules.
For email identities, the domain part follows DNS canonicalization.
The local-part MUST NOT be case-folded unless an applicable identity-
provider profile defines that behavior.
URIs MUST be normalized only as permitted by [RFC3986] .
URNs MUST follow [RFC8141] and namespace-specific rules.
DID, platform, and workload identifiers MUST follow their governing
specifications.
Normalization MUST NOT change the identified subject.
5.4. Authority Evidence
The Authority Evidence object separates subject authority from
registry provenance.
The object SHOULD contain:
type REQUIRED. The authority mechanism or credential type.
issuer REQUIRED. The issuer or validating authority.
evidenceUrl or evidence RECOMMENDED. A verifiable reference or
embedded evidence.
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subject RECOMMENDED. The subject covered by the evidence when not
implicit.
targetUrl or targetDigest RECOMMENDED. A binding to the target or
publisher when supported by the evidence format.
validFrom OPTIONAL.
expiresAt REQUIRED for time-bounded evidence unless the underlying
evidence format has an equivalent validity rule.
revocationUrl OPTIONAL.
A registry signature proves Registry Provenance. It does not by
itself establish that the subject authorized the target.
Examples of subject-specific evidence include:
* DNS or WebPKI-backed domain control for domain identities;
* an account-provider assertion, mailbox challenge, or other
account-specific proof for an email identity;
* a DID or wallet signature for a cryptographic identity;
* a platform-issued assertion for a platform account;
* an applicable workload identity credential.
The mechanism by which the publisher originally obtains the proof is
outside the scope of this document. The resolution protocol is
concerned with carrying enough information for the discovering entity
to validate the discovery binding.
5.5. Freshness and Renewable Bindings
A registry binding is a renewable lease, not a permanent claim.
Every returned target MUST contain sequence, issuedAt, and expiresAt.
A registry MUST NOT return a binding as current after expiresAt.
A registry SHOULD require renewed Authority Evidence before extending
a binding beyond the validity of that evidence.
When a target, ownership state, authority evidence, or publisher
changes, the sequence number MUST increase.
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A resolver that has multiple bindings from the same authority scope
MUST reject an older sequence when it has already observed a newer
valid sequence.
A revoked binding MUST NOT remain usable solely because an HTTP cache
lifetime has not expired.
Negative caching SHOULD be short and policy bounded.
Implementations SHOULD preserve sufficient audit information to
diagnose replacement, recovery, and revocation events without
exposing sensitive history through the public resolution API.
5.6. Provenance
Registry Provenance SHOULD include:
* registry identifier;
* registry base URI;
* response issuance time;
* response signature or authenticated-transport identity;
* profile version.
Provenance allows a client to identify which configured registry
supplied the result. It MUST NOT be interpreted as subject authority
unless the authority model explicitly says so.
6. Experimental HTTPS Binding
6.1. Endpoint and Transport
A Resolution Registry implementing this experimental binding exposes:
POST /resolve
relative to its configured base URI.
HTTPS is REQUIRED for public deployments.
Requests and responses use application/json. Errors use application/
problem+json [RFC9457] .
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6.2. Request
Example:
POST /resolve HTTP/1.1
Host: registry.example
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json
{
"identity": "alice@example.net",
"identityType": "email",
"maxResults": 3,
"acceptedMethods": ["artifact", "gateway"]
}
identity and identityType are REQUIRED.
maxResults defaults to 3 and MUST be between 1 and 100.
acceptedMethods MAY constrain the target classes.
The request MUST NOT contain an "intent", "capabilityQuery",
"nextRegistry", or recursive forwarding field in this profile.
6.3. Successful Response
A registry returns HTTP 200 for a syntactically valid lookup,
including a lookup for which no public binding is returned.
Example:
{
"registry": {
"id": "https://registry.example",
"profile": "known-subject-resolution-02",
"issuedAt": "2026-10-28T20:00:00Z"
},
"subject": "alice@example.net",
"subjectType": "email",
"targets": []
}
Using the same status code for an empty public result and a populated
result does not eliminate enumeration attacks, but it avoids one
unnecessary distinction.
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6.4. Error Response
Protocol errors use [RFC9457] .
Example:
HTTP/1.1 422 Unprocessable Content
Content-Type: application/problem+json
{
"type": "https://registry.example/problems/unverifiable",
"title": "Resolution binding is unverifiable",
"status": 422,
"code": "unverifiable"
}
Error responses MUST NOT expose secret credentials, private identity
attributes, or internal policy details.
6.5. No Public Enumeration Requirement
Conformance to this profile MUST NOT require a registry to expose:
* a list-all endpoint;
* keyword search;
* natural-language search;
* browse-by-category;
* prefix enumeration;
* downloadable identity catalogs.
A registry MUST support exact lookup without requiring any of those
interfaces.
Provider-managed personal identities SHOULD NOT be included in public
browse or search interfaces by default.
If a deployment separately offers public search or browsing, that
function is outside this profile and MUST be clearly separable from
the resolution endpoint.
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6.6. No Inter-Registry Forwarding
A Resolution Registry MUST NOT recursively query another Resolution
Registry on behalf of the client under this profile.
A response MUST NOT return another generic Resolution Registry as its
Resolution Target.
A client MAY independently query another registry from its configured
registry set, subject to local privacy policy.
This rule prevents a client-selected registry model from silently
becoming a global registry-routing system.
7. Resolver Procedure
A resolver performs the following procedure:
1. Accept one Known Subject and local policy.
2. Normalize the Subject Identity without changing its semantics.
3. Determine whether local policy has a validated, direct DNS-
anchored discovery procedure for this Subject Identity type.
4. If such a direct path exists and is selected, use it directly.
5. Otherwise select a Resolution Registry from local configuration
or policy.
6. Send an exact resolution request.
7. Validate Registry Provenance.
8. Validate each candidate's Subject Identity, Authority Evidence,
target binding, sequence, expiry, revocation status, and local
policy.
9. Reject unknown target methods and expired or revoked bindings.
10. Retrieve the terminal discovery object over an authenticated
transport.
11. Continue any subsequent authentication, authorization,
capability exchange, or invocation under the specification
governing that target. Those actions are outside this profile.
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7.1. Domain-Controlled Subjects
For a domain-controlled subject, a currently valid direct DNS-based
discovery record is normally stronger than a registry binding because
it is published under the subject's authoritative namespace.
A registry binding MAY be useful when the subject does not publish
the relevant discovery data in DNS or delegates descriptor hosting.
If a direct path later becomes available, policy SHOULD normally
prefer it.
7.2. Email and Provider-Managed Accounts
The operator of a provider domain does not automatically speak for
every individual account in that namespace.
For example, DNS control of example.net does not alone prove that a
particular agent is authorized for alice@example.net.
Authority Evidence for a provider-managed identity MUST be account-
specific or be issued under an identity-provider delegation model
that explicitly covers the account.
Such evidence SHOULD be time bounded and revocable.
7.3. DIDs, Platform Identities, and Workload Identities
For a DID, wallet, platform account, SPIFFE identity, or other
workload identity, the resolver follows the verification and
lifecycle rules of the governing identity system.
The registry MUST NOT redefine the identity system's authority model.
8. Deployment Examples
8.1. Enterprise with Direct DNS Discovery
Example Corp controls example.com and publishes a DAWN-compatible DNS
discovery record.
example.com
|
v
authoritative DNS discovery
|
v
descriptor / MDI
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The registry-assisted mechanism is not used.
8.2. SMB Without a Usable DNS Discovery Anchor
Moon Bakery uses moon-bakery.example as its public identity but
relies on managed hosting and does not operate the relevant discovery
records. Its Agent Card is hosted by agenthost.example.
A configured registry returns:
{
"subject": "orders@moon-bakery.example",
"subjectType": "agent-name",
"method": "artifact",
"targetType": "application/a2a-agent-card+json",
"targetUrl":
"https://cards.agenthost.example/moon-bakery/orders.json",
"sequence": 8,
"issuedAt": "2026-10-28T19:00:00Z",
"expiresAt": "2026-10-29T19:00:00Z",
"authority": {
"type": "domain-control",
"issuer": "https://registry.example",
"evidenceUrl":
"https://moon-bakery.example/.well-known/example-proof"
}
}
The registry proves the binding; it does not become the runtime.
8.3. Individual Personal Agent
Alice controls alice@example.net but does not control example.net
DNS. A provider-specific or mailbox-specific proof authorizes her
personal agent descriptor.
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alice@example.net
|
v
configured registry
|
v
account-specific Authority Evidence
|
v
Agent Card
|
v
local or cloud runtime
Alice's identity is resolved by exact lookup. It need not appear in
a public browse interface.
8.4. Multiple Independent Registries
A client is configured with Registry A and Registry B.
Both contain a binding for the same Subject Identity.
The client verifies both independently. It does not assume that one
registry is a global root, and neither registry forwards the request
to the other.
Local policy may select the result with acceptable Authority Evidence
and freshness, retain both for resilience, or reject both.
9. Operational Considerations
9.1. Registration Is Out of Scope
DAWN's initial scope excludes entity registration and identity
management [DAWN-CHARTER] [DAWN-REQS] .
Accordingly, this document does not standardize account creation,
challenge issuance, proof acquisition, registrant recovery, or
governance of an identity namespace.
A registry implementation necessarily performs enrollment and
lifecycle operations, but those operations are outside the resolution
protocol defined here.
What is in scope is that the resolution response carry enough
integrity, provenance, authority, and freshness information for the
discovering entity to evaluate the discovery result.
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9.2. Anti-Squatting
A registry MUST NOT treat first registration as sufficient authority.
A pending or unverified registration MUST NOT block a later
registrant that presents valid authority evidence under the
registry's policy.
Resolver clients MUST NOT treat registry presence alone as proof of
ownership.
9.3. Migration and Recovery
A subject may migrate its descriptor or runtime without changing its
Subject Identity.
The binding sequence MUST increase when the resolution target
changes.
Recovery of a subject binding SHOULD require evidence at least as
strong as the evidence used for the previous valid binding, subject
to the governing identity system.
A registry MAY retain non-public audit history or tombstones to
prevent immediate reassignment after withdrawal, subject to privacy
and retention policy.
9.4. Registry Independence
Registries are independently operated.
A registry MAY apply its own enrollment, evidence, jurisdiction,
retention, and abuse policies.
Interoperability depends on the common resolution representation and
resolver behavior, not on shared registry governance.
10. Security Considerations
10.1. Authority Confusion
The most important security property is distinguishing:
* the identity of the registry;
* the Subject Identity;
* the authority that validates the subject;
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* the host of the descriptor;
* the runtime operator.
These may all be different parties.
Implementations MUST NOT infer subject authority from descriptor
hosting or registry hosting alone.
10.2. Registry Poisoning and Squatting
A malicious registrant may attempt to bind another subject to an
attacker-controlled descriptor.
Registries MUST validate authority before publishing a current
binding. Resolvers MUST evaluate the Authority Evidence rather than
trusting registry presence alone.
10.3. Target Substitution
An attacker may replace a target after authority was verified.
Authority Evidence SHOULD bind the subject to the target URI, target
digest, authorized publisher, or another object from which the target
is securely derived.
10.4. Downgrade Attacks
An attacker may try to suppress a stronger direct DNS path and force
a client onto a weaker registry result.
A resolver MUST NOT silently downgrade from a validated direct path
to a weaker registry result.
10.5. Replay and Stale Bindings
An attacker may replay a previously valid binding.
Sequence numbers, validity bounds, expiry, and revocation checks are
therefore required.
HTTP cache freshness MUST NOT override subject-level revocation or
expiry.
10.6. Resource Exhaustion
Exact lookup endpoints are attractive denial-of-service and scraping
targets.
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Registries SHOULD use rate limiting, request-size limits, deadlines,
abuse detection, and bounded result sets.
Clients MUST NOT perform unbounded registry fan-out.
10.7. Registry Trust
A configured registry is trusted to operate the protocol correctly
and to preserve response integrity. It is not automatically trusted
to make arbitrary claims about a subject.
Subject-specific Authority Evidence remains necessary.
11. Privacy Considerations
11.1. Exact Lookup and Enumeration
A major difference between resolution and search is that resolution
can operate without exposing the entire set of registered subjects.
This profile therefore requires support for exact lookup and does not
require listing or browsing.
Personal and provider-managed account identities SHOULD be hidden
from public enumeration by default.
Public search or browsing, if provided by the same implementation, is
a separate function outside this profile.
Rate limiting and uniform response behavior can reduce simple
enumeration but do not eliminate it. Privacy-preserving exact-lookup
mechanisms are an area for future work.
11.2. Query Privacy
Resolution queries can reveal relationships, planned interactions, or
sensitive identities.
Clients SHOULD avoid unnecessary query fan-out.
Registries SHOULD minimize logs, document retention policy, protect
transport confidentiality, and avoid logging secrets.
11.3. Data Minimization
A resolution record SHOULD contain only the information needed to
find and validate the terminal discovery target.
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Rich profiles, personal attributes, transaction history, private
capability descriptions, and credentials SHOULD NOT be included.
11.4. Personal Agents
Verification that a person controls an account does not imply consent
for all actions by or toward the person's agent.
Resolution identifies a discovery target. It does not authorize
invocation, disclosure of private capabilities, or transactions.
12. IANA Considerations
This revision requests no new DNS label, well-known URI, registry
root, or URN namespace.
The media type application/agent-resolution-target+json proposed in
-01 remains experimental in this revision. A future Standards Track
version may request formal registration if the DAWN architecture
adopts a dedicated representation rather than a common MDI object.
13. Interoperability Considerations
The registry-assisted path SHOULD converge on the same DAWN minimum
discovery semantics as direct DNS-based mechanisms.
This document deliberately avoids defining a parallel capability
model.
As common DAWN discovery parameters and MDI definitions stabilize,
implementations SHOULD map registry outputs to those common fields.
Terminal Agent Card, MCP, workload, or other descriptors remain
governed by their own specifications.
This document does not define interoperability among registries
beyond the fact that multiple registries may expose the same
resolution profile to clients.
14. NandaIndex as a Reference Implementation
Project NANDA operates NandaIndex as an experimental implementation
of agent resolution and discovery concepts [NANDAINDEX]
[NANDA-GITHUB] .
For the model in this revision, NandaIndex is best understood as one
possible Resolution Registry, not as a mandatory global root.
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To implement this profile, a NandaIndex deployment should:
* expose exact resolution independently of public search or browse;
* keep direct DNS-anchored discovery outside the NandaIndex critical
path where possible;
* require subject-specific authority evidence;
* publish expiry, sequence, provenance, and revocation information;
* make personal records non-enumerable by default;
* avoid recursive registry-to-registry forwarding;
* permit clients to choose other compatible registries.
Natural-language discovery, public browsing, capability search, and
marketplace functions may exist as separate Project NANDA
experimentation, but they are not part of the registry-assisted
resolution profile described here.
15. Conclusion
DNS and mDNS are strong foundations for AI-resource discovery when
the subject controls a usable discovery publication point.
A narrower gap remains for a Known Subject whose identity is stable
but whose discovery information cannot be published through a usable
DNS Discovery Anchor.
Registry-Assisted Resolution fills that gap without requiring a
global index. The client starts with a Known Subject, selects a
registry by local policy, validates subject-specific authority and
freshness, and receives only the minimum information needed to
continue discovery.
The design preserves four important boundaries:
* DNS remains direct where it works;
* resolution is distinct from open-ended search;
* registry provenance is distinct from subject authority;
* multiple registries coexist without registry-to-registry routing.
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This makes registry-assisted resolution a complementary discovery
mechanism rather than an alternative global naming or search system.
16. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC8141] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Klensin, "Uniform Resource Names
(URNs)", RFC 8141, April 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8141>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9457] Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details
for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, July 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9457>.
17. Informative References
[DAWN-CHARTER]
Force, I. E. T., "Discovery of Agents With Names (DAWN)
Charter", Charter charter-ietf-dawn-01, October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-dawn/>.
[DAWN-REQS]
King, D. and A. Farrel, "Requirements for the Discovery of
Agents With Names (DAWN)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-king-dawn-requirements-02, October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-king-dawn-
requirements/>.
[DAWN-TERMINOLOGY]
Farrel, A., Yao, K., Schott, R., and N. Williams,
"Terminology for the Discovery of Agents With Names
(DAWN)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-farrel-
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dawn-terminology-06, October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farrel-dawn-
terminology/>.
[DAWN-DNS-PARAMS]
Brockners, F., Jakab, L., Williams, N., and J. Mozley,
"Common Agent DNS Discovery Parameters", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-blwm-dawn-common-discovery-
parameters-00, October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-blwm-dawn-common-
discovery-parameters/>.
[NANDAINDEX]
NANDA, P., "NandaIndex", 2026, <https://nandaindex.org/>.
[NANDA-GITHUB]
NANDA, P., "NandaIndex Version 2 Source Code", 2026,
<https://github.com/projnanda/nanda-index-v2>.
Appendix A. Example Resolution Response
POST /resolve
{
"identity": "alice@example.net",
"identityType": "email",
"maxResults": 2,
"acceptedMethods": ["artifact"]
}
200 OK
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{
"registry": {
"id": "https://registry.example",
"profile": "known-subject-resolution-02",
"issuedAt": "2026-10-28T20:00:00Z"
},
"subject": "alice@example.net",
"subjectType": "email",
"targets": [
{
"subject": "alice@example.net",
"subjectType": "email",
"method": "artifact",
"targetType": "application/a2a-agent-card+json",
"targetUrl":
"https://cards.agenthost.example/alice/card.json",
"targetDigest": "sha256:BASE64URLVALUE",
"sequence": 14,
"issuedAt": "2026-10-28T19:00:00Z",
"expiresAt": "2026-10-29T19:00:00Z",
"authority": {
"type": "account-provider-assertion",
"issuer": "https://identity.example.net",
"evidenceUrl":
"https://identity.example.net/evidence/EXAMPLE",
"expiresAt": "2026-10-29T19:00:00Z"
},
"revocationUrl":
"https://registry.example/revocations/alice-14"
}
]
}
Appendix B. DAWN Requirements Mapping
The following non-normative mapping explains how this mechanism is
intended to relate to current DAWN requirements.
Known starting point: The Subject Identity is already known before
resolution.
Referral / directory: The configured registry is a bounded discovery
service that furthers discovery for the known subject.
Minimum information: The response carries a target pointer and the
security/lifecycle information needed to validate it, rather than a
capability catalog.
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Decentralization: No single registry is required. Clients select
registries by configuration or policy.
Independent publication: Subjects with direct DNS publication remain
independent of registries and are resolved directly.
Existing protocols: DNS/mDNS are reused where applicable. HTTPS is
used for the registry-assisted gap.
Integrity: Registry Provenance protects the response, while Authority
Evidence binds the subject to the target.
Privacy: Exact lookup is supported without public enumeration.
Scope boundary: Search, ranking, semantic matchmaking, identity
management, and trust evaluation are not part of this profile.
Appendix C. Open Questions
* Whether the generic registry-assisted mechanism belongs in a DAWN
Architecture document, a use-case document, or a separate protocol
specification.
* Whether DAWN MDI can directly represent all fields needed for the
Resolution Target Object, eliminating a dedicated target media
type.
* Which authority-evidence formats should be standardized or
profiled for email, platform, DID, and workload identities.
* Whether privacy-preserving exact lookup techniques such as OPRF-
or PIR-based designs are warranted for personal-agent deployments.
* How registry selection should be profiled for specific identity
methods without creating a universal registry-discovery system.
* Whether a transparency mechanism is useful for detecting
conflicting or malicious bindings without creating a public
enumeration surface.
* How conformance tests should verify non-enumerability, freshness,
and no-forwarding behavior.
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Acknowledgements
This document draws on work by the Project NANDA community and on
discussions in the IETF DAWN community concerning discovery scope,
DNS-based discovery, referrals, identity boundaries, authority,
freshness, privacy, and enumeration.
Earlier Project NANDA work explored a broader global-switchboard
model. This revision intentionally narrows the protocol contribution
to resolution of Known Subjects without usable DNS Discovery Anchors.
Authors' Addresses
Ramesh Raskar
MIT Media Lab
75 Amherst Street
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States of America
Email: raskar@mit.edu
Samuel Sharaf
ProjectNanda
Email: samuel.sharaf@gmail.com
Pradyumna Chari
MIT
Email: pradyumna.chari4@gmail.com
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