Network Working Group T. Meunier
Internet-Draft Cloudflare
Intended status: Informational K. Kelly
Expires: 2 May 2027 Anthropic
29 October 2026
Principles for Web Traffic Management by Intermediaries
draft-meunier-bcp-civil-00
Abstract
This document describes principles for web intermediaries that
balance security needs with open web accessibility.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://thibmeu.github.io/draft-bcp-civil/draft-meunier-bcp-
civil.html. Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-meunier-bcp-civil/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/thibmeu/draft-bcp-civil.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Meunier & Kelly Expires 2 May 2027 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Web Traffic Management Principles October 2026
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Behavior-based classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Graduated enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Protocol neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. Active signals over passive fingerprints . . . . . . . . 5
3.5. Implementation transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
Web intermediaries such as content delivery networks, security
services, and edge platforms increasingly implement traffic
management systems to protect against abuse. As these systems become
more sophisticated, there is growing concern about their impact on
legitimate users and the open nature of the web.
This document establishes principles for responsible traffic
management that preserve web accessibility while maintaining
necessary protections.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The following terms are used throughout this document:
Meunier & Kelly Expires 2 May 2027 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Web Traffic Management Principles October 2026
Active signal: Client property asserted by the client or its
operator, verifiable by the intermediary, and not assertable by an
unrelated party
Passive signal: Inferred/heuristic client property
Graduated response: Configurable action spectrum
Intermediary: As defined in Section 3.7 of [RFC9110], an HTTP
intermediary is a proxy, gateway, or tunnel that acts on behalf of
either the client or server. This document also covers traffic
management services integrated into proxies or applications.
3. Principles
The following principles should be followed by web intermediaries to
balance\ security requirements with web openness:
1. Intermediaries must classify traffic by specific behaviors, not
by client identity
2. Intermediaries must offer options other than block or allow
3. Intermediaries must favor open protocols for traffic management
decisions
4. Intermediaries must prefer active signals over passive signals
5. Intermediaries must document where their services diverge from
published standards.
3.1. Behavior-based classification
Intermediaries must classify traffic by specific behaviors, not by
client identity.
Classifications based on inferred client types (such as "bot" or
"automated") are unreliable as the distinction between human and
automated web browsing continues to blur. Modern web applications
routinely use automation, and browsers themselves perform automated
requests for prefetching, security scanning, and other legitimate
purposes. Human users can be represented by software, including
automated clients (Section 2 of [RFC8890]). Representing a user
implies neither unconditional access nor an override of site policy.
Behavior-based classification focuses on observable actions that may
indicate abuse, such as excessive request rates, unusual access
patterns, or failure to respect machine-readable signals such as
Meunier & Kelly Expires 2 May 2027 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Web Traffic Management Principles October 2026
caching directives [RFC9111] and, for crawlers, the Robots Exclusion
Protocol [RFC9309]. This approach enables more precise enforcement
while avoiding false positives based on client characteristics.
Policies applied to every client must be general, such as not causing
adverse impact on the site. More specific expectations apply
according to the purpose a client declares, such as [CBCP] for
crawlers.
3.2. Graduated enforcement
Intermediaries must allow traffic unless restrictions are required by
the policy of the operator they act for (client or server), or
necessary to protect availability (Section 4). They must make the
policies they apply and their effects clear to that operator, and
offer options other than block or allow.
Binary blocking decisions create unnecessary friction for legitimate
users while failing to address the spectrum of potentially unwanted
behavior. Graduated responses allow intermediaries to apply
appropriate restrictions based on confidence levels and threat
severity. Intermediaries should narrowly target restrictions to the
relevant behavior, minimizing effects on unrelated users sharing
infrastructure, applying the scope and granularity considerations in
Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7754] and Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7754].
Effective responses include rate limiting (HTTP 429 status code),
requests to retry after temporary overload (HTTP 503 with Retry-
After), content modification per site policy (for instance, a summary
or lower-quality variant), and verification challenges. Rate
limiting implementations SHOULD follow emerging standards such as
[draft-ietf-httpapi-ratelimit-headers] for consistent client
communication. These responses can be applied progressively based on
behavior patterns rather than defaulting to complete blocking for
ambiguous cases.
Challenges and content modification can prevent legitimate clients
from processing a response. Where site policy otherwise permits
access, intermediaries should offer a documented recovery or
alternative access path that does not depend on human interaction or
a particular browser's capabilities. Such a path does not guarantee
access and remains subject to the availability protections in
Section 4.
3.3. Protocol neutrality
Intermediaries must favor open protocols for traffic management
decisions and communicate responses using standard HTTP semantics.
Meunier & Kelly Expires 2 May 2027 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Web Traffic Management Principles October 2026
Traffic management decisions should be based on standardized
mechanisms that any client can implement, rather than proprietary
systems or curated lists. This allows legitimate automated clients
to identify themselves appropriately and follow established
conventions for access control.
When responding to blocked or restricted requests, intermediaries
MUST use appropriate HTTP status codes: 403 Forbidden for policy
violations and 503 Service Unavailable for temporary overload or
maintenance, as defined in [RFC9110], and 429 Too Many Requests for
rate limiting, as defined in [RFC6585]. Response headers SHOULD
provide actionable information about restrictions and recovery paths.
For 429 and 503 responses, intermediaries SHOULD include Retry-After
(Section 10.2.3 of [RFC9110]) when they can estimate when the client
should retry.
Open protocols enable website owners to express their preferences
consistently across different intermediaries, rather than managing
separate configurations for each vendor's proprietary system.
3.4. Active signals over passive fingerprints
Intermediaries must prefer active signals over passive signals.
Passive fingerprinting techniques identify users without their
participation, and create false positives for users sharing IP
addresses, using privacy tools, or connecting from networks with
unusual characteristics. These techniques also degrade over time as
clients change behavior or implement countermeasures.
Active signals provide assurance about the asserted property, because
the client or its operator positively asserts a property that the
intermediary can verify. Examples include HTTP Message Signatures
[RFC9421] profiles such as [draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol],
Privacy Pass tokens [RFC9577], published IP ranges as recommended by
[CBCP], and forward-confirmed reverse DNS.
Note that what differs is not necessarily the data itself. An
observed IP address is a passive signal, while the same address
published by its operator is an active signal.
Authentication and privacy-preserving tokens can improve traffic
management, but do not by themselves resolve how legitimate clients
without recognized credentials or supported challenge capabilities
are treated. Absence of an active signal does not itself establish
abuse.
Meunier & Kelly Expires 2 May 2027 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Web Traffic Management Principles October 2026
3.5. Implementation transparency
Intermediaries must document where their services diverge from
published standards.
Intermediaries that develop or promote standards operate multiple
services that may implement those standards differently. An
intermediary that promotes a standard should disclose where its
services do not follow it.
While documenting every deviation may not be practical,
intermediaries should prioritize disclosure in areas where they have
established published guidance.
Where safe and feasible, intermediaries should distinguish explicit
site-policy denial from suspected abuse or temporary overload, and
provide operators enough information to investigate unintended
blocking. This need not disclose detection rules or sensitive
signals.
4. Security Considerations
Authentication does not by itself establish authorization or harmless
behavior. Authenticated clients remain subject to site access policy
and behavior-based limits. The preference for active signals does
not require clients to identify themselves to access public
resources.
Client assertions can be spoofed. Intermediaries should verify
active signals using the relevant mechanism, including the
authenticity and integrity of published identity data, before using
them in access decisions.
Protecting availability can require immediate blocking or dropping
connections. Graduated enforcement does not require trying every
response first (Section 7.2 of [RFC6585]). Intermediaries should
also limit the resources spent on signal verification and challenges.
Active identifiers and passive fingerprints can enable tracking.
Intermediaries should minimize the collection and retention of
identifying data and prefer mechanisms that disclose only the
property needed for a decision.
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
6. References
Meunier & Kelly Expires 2 May 2027 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Web Traffic Management Principles October 2026
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
Codes", RFC 6585, DOI 10.17487/RFC6585, April 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6585>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
6.2. Informative References
[CBCP] Illyes, G., Kühlewind, M., and K. Aj, "Crawler best
practices", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
illyes-webbotauth-cbcp-01, 22 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-illyes-
webbotauth-cbcp-01>.
[draft-ietf-httpapi-ratelimit-headers]
Polli, R., Ruiz, A. M., and D. Miller, "RateLimit header
fields for HTTP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-httpapi-ratelimit-headers-11, 23 May 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpapi-
ratelimit-headers-11>.
[draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol]
Meunier, T. and S. Major, "HTTP Message Signatures for
automated traffic", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-00, 1 September
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
webbotauth-httpsig-protocol-00>.
[RFC7754] Barnes, R., Cooper, A., Kolkman, O., Thaler, D., and E.
Nordmark, "Technical Considerations for Internet Service
Blocking and Filtering", RFC 7754, DOI 10.17487/RFC7754,
March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7754>.
Meunier & Kelly Expires 2 May 2027 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Web Traffic Management Principles October 2026
[RFC8890] Nottingham, M., "The Internet is for End Users", RFC 8890,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8890, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8890>.
[RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9111>.
[RFC9309] Koster, M., Illyes, G., Zeller, H., and L. Sassman,
"Robots Exclusion Protocol", RFC 9309,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9309, September 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9309>.
[RFC9421] Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.
[RFC9577] Pauly, T., Valdez, S., and C. A. Wood, "The Privacy Pass
HTTP Authentication Scheme", RFC 9577,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9577, June 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9577>.
Acknowledgments
TODO acknowledge.
Authors' Addresses
Thibault Meunier
Cloudflare
Email: ot-ietf@thibault.uk
Kevin Kelly
Anthropic
Email: kelleyk-ietf@kelleyk.net
Meunier & Kelly Expires 2 May 2027 [Page 8]