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Workload Identity in Multi System Environments               B. Campbell
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track                      A. Schwenkschuster
Expires: 28 February 2027                               Defakto Security
                                                          27 August 2026


                       WIMSE Workload Proof Token
                        draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02

Abstract

   The WIMSE architecture defines authentication and authorization for
   software workloads in a variety of runtime environments, from basic
   deployments to complex multi-service, multi-cloud, multi-tenant
   systems.  This document specifies the Workload Proof Token (WPT), a
   mechanism for workloads to prove possession of the private key
   associated with a Workload Identity Token (WIT).  The WPT is a signed
   JWT that binds the workload's authentication to a specific HTTP
   request, providing application-layer proof of possession for
   workload-to-workload communication.  This specification is designed
   to work alongside the WIT credential format defined in draft-ietf-
   wimse-workload-creds and can be combined with other WIMSE protocols
   in multi-hop call chains.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-wg-
   wimse.github.io/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol/draft-ietf-wimse-
   wpt.html.  Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-wpt/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Workload Identity in
   Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list
   (mailto:wimse@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ietf-wg-wimse/draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.




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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Workload Proof Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Error Conditions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.2.  Coexistence with Bearer Tokens  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.3.  Including Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Workload Identity Token and Proof of Possession . . . . .  10
       3.1.1.  Preventing Eavesdropping and Interception with TLS  .  11
       3.1.2.  Limiting Proof of Possession Lifespan . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.3.  Limiting Proof of Possession Scope  . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.4.  Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.5.  Avoid Logging Raw WPT Values  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.6.  Binding to TLS Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.1.7.  Audience validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.2.  Workload Identity Key Management  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.3.  Middle Boxes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.4.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13



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       4.2.1.  application/wpt+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.3.  Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme
           Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     A.1.  draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     A.2.  draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.3.  draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.4.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07  . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.5.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-06  . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.6.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-05  . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.7.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-04  . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     A.8.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-03  . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     A.9.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-02  . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     A.10. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-01  . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     A.11. draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-00  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   This document defines the Workload Proof Token (WPT), a simple,
   protocol-independent mechanism for proving possession of the private
   key associated with a Workload Identity Token (WIT).  The WIT,
   defined in [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds], is a credential that
   binds a public key to a workload identity and is designed to require
   proof of possession - it must not be used as a bearer token.  The WPT
   provides that proof of possession.  The WPT's primary design goal is
   simplicity: it is a signed JWT that demonstrates control of the
   private key corresponding to the public key in the WIT.  By requiring
   this cryptographic proof, the WPT significantly reduces the risk of
   credential theft and replay attacks compared to bearer token
   approaches.  The WPT is protocol-agnostic by design.  While this
   specification provides detailed guidance for HTTP-based usage
   (including the WPT HTTP authentication scheme), the core WPT format
   is fundamentally a signed JWT that can be adapted to other protocols
   including asynchronous messaging systems, event-driven architectures,
   and future transport mechanisms.  The JWT-based structure allows for
   protocol-specific extensions through additional claims while
   maintaining core interoperability.

   Key characteristics of the WPT include:

   Proof of Possession: Demonstrates control of the WIT's associated
   private key through a digital signature.  Context Binding: Binds the
   proof to specific message context through claims such as audience



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   (aud) and WIT hash (wth).  Other tokens in the message can also be
   bound (e.g., transaction tokens) to provide unified proof across
   different authorization contexts.  Short-Lived: Typically valid for
   minutes or seconds, limiting replay attack windows.  Protocol
   Independent: Core format is not tied to any specific transport
   protocol.

   This specification is part of the WIMSE protocol suite, which
   includes credential formats defined in
   [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds] and follows the architectural
   principles in [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch].  The WPT provides application-
   layer proof of possession particularly suited for environments where
   transport-layer solutions are insufficient or where communication
   patterns span multiple protocols.  This document defines the WPT JWT
   format, its HTTP usage, validation requirements, and security
   considerations.  Out of scope are the WIT credential format itself
   (covered in [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds]), policy enforcement and
   authorization, credential issuance and lifecycle management, detailed
   bindings for non-HTTP protocols (to be addressed in future
   specifications), and alternative proof-of-possession mechanisms such
   as HTTP Message Signatures.

2.  Workload Proof Token

   The Workload Proof Token (WPT) is a JWT that provides proof of
   possession of the private key associated with a Workload Identity
   Token (WIT).  The Workload Identity Token is sent in the request as
   described in [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds].  The WPT is sent in the
   Authorization header field (Section 11.6.2 of [RFC9110]) of the
   request, using the WPT authentication scheme defined by this
   document.  The syntax of the credentials of the WPT authentication
   scheme uses the token68 syntax defined in Section 11.2 of [RFC9110],
   whose ABNF [RFC5234] is repeated in Figure 1 below for ease of
   reference.  As with any HTTP authentication scheme, the scheme name
   is case-insensitive (Section 11.1 of [RFC9110]), while case is
   significant in the credentials.

   token68     = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /
                     "-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" ) *"="

   credentials = "WPT" 1*SP token68

                  Figure 1: WPT Authentication Scheme ABNF

   The credentials are a JWT [RFC7519], whose serialization is a valid
   token68, so requests can be parsed by generic HTTP authentication
   implementations.




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   A WPT MUST contain the following:

   *  in the JOSE header:

      -  alg: An identifier for an appropriate JWS asymmetric digital
         signature algorithm corresponding to the confirmation key in
         the associated WIT.  The value MUST match the alg value of the
         jwk in the cnf claim of the WIT.  See
         [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds] for valid values and
         restrictions.

      -  typ: the WPT is explicitly typed, as recommended in
         Section 3.11 of [RFC8725], using the application/wpt+jwt media
         type.

   *  in the JWT claims:

      -  aud: The audience SHOULD contain the HTTP target URI
         (Section 7.1 of [RFC9110]) of the request to which the WPT is
         attached, without query or fragment parts.  However, there may
         be some normalization, rewriting or other process that requires
         the audience to be set to a deployment-specific value.

      -  exp: The expiration time of the WPT (as defined in
         Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519]).  WPT lifetimes MUST be short,
         e.g., on the order of minutes or seconds.

      -  jti: A unique identifier for the WPT.  The value MUST be
         assigned such that there is a negligible probability that the
         same value will be assigned to any other WPT.  Such uniqueness
         can be accomplished by encoding (base64url or any other
         suitable encoding) 128 bits of pseudorandom data.

      -  wth: Hash of the Workload Identity Token, defined in
         [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds].  The value is the base64url
         encoding (as defined in Section 2 of [RFC7515]) of the SHA-256
         hash of the bytes of the ASCII representation of the WIT's
         value.

      -  tth: Hash of the Txn-Token [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens],
         if present in the request, which might convey end-user identity
         and/or authorization context of the request.  The value MUST be
         the result of base64url encoding (as defined in Section 2 of
         [RFC7515]) the SHA-256 hash of the bytes of the ASCII
         representation of the associated token's value.






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      -  oth: Hash(es) of other token(s) in the request that convey end-
         user identity and/or authorization context of the request.  The
         value is a JSON object with a key-value pair for each such
         token.  For each, in the absence of an application profile
         specifying details, the key corresponds to the header field
         name containing the token, and the value is the base64url
         encoding (as defined in Section 2 of [RFC7515]) of the SHA-256
         hash of the bytes of the ASCII representation of the header
         field value with any leading or trailing spaces removed.  The
         header field name MUST be normalized by converting it to all
         lower case.  Header fields occurring multiple times in the
         request are not supported by default.  An application profile
         may specify different behavior for a key, such as using a
         different hash algorithm or means of locating the token in the
         request.

   To clarify: the tth and oth claims are each mandatory if the
   respective tokens are included in the request.

   The rules for using non-standard claims in WPTs are documented in
   Section 2.3.

   An example WPT might look like the following:

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsInR5cCI6IndwdCtqd3QifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3dvc\
   mtsb2FkLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL3BhdGgiLCJleHAiOjE3NDU1MTAwMTYsImp0aSI6Il9fY\
   ndjNEVTQzNhY2MyTFRDMS1feCIsInd0aCI6Ilg5d2lQZ3EzamxTR3pBZWdIQ0doTk8xb\
   EpnVWJEb0kxTWprYXQ1UUhKQjAifQ.sa5ZYHTeCx4AsurafaBJ2rrMnE7TBHBB47ZUT7\
   yoiyz2lcGY5XAnpGPjPnzeRroJJiR7Nr_C5J7mexxrsHM3CQ

                Figure 2: Example Workload Proof Token (WPT)

   The decoded JOSE header of the WPT from the example above is shown
   here:

   {
     "alg": "EdDSA",
     "typ": "wpt+jwt"
   }

                     Figure 3: Example WPT JOSE Header

   The decoded JWT claims of the WPT from the example above are shown
   here:





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   {
     "aud": "https://workload.example.com/path",
     "exp": 1745510016,
     "jti": "__bwc4ESC3acc2LTC1-_x",
     "wth": "X9wiPgq3jlSGzAegHCGhNO1lJgUbDoI1Mjkat5QHJB0"
   }

                        Figure 4: Example WPT Claims

   An example of an HTTP request with both the WIT and WPT from prior
   examples is shown below:

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   POST /path HTTP/1.1
   Host: workload.example.com
   Content-Type: application/json
   Workload-Identity-Token: eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ikp1bmUgNSIsInR\
   5cCI6IndpdCtqd3QifQ.eyJjbmYiOnsiandrIjp7ImFsZyI6IkVkRFNBIiwiY3J2Ijoi\
   RWQyNTUxOSIsImt0eSI6Ik9LUCIsIngiOiIxQ1hYdmZsTl9MVlZzSXNZWHNVdkIwM0pt\
   bEdXZUNIcVFWdW91Q0Y5MmJnIn19LCJleHAiOjE3NDU1MTI1MTAsImlhdCI6MTc0NTUw\
   ODkxMCwianRpIjoieC1fMUNUTDJjY2EzQ1NFNGN3Yl9sIiwic3ViIjoid2ltc2U6Ly9l\
   eGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zcGVjaWZpYy13b3JrbG9hZCJ9.ohKJ50QaW8ydALJwaA0Sz4ys3hc\
   N_1S-aTZBytMGc3u8QWUmn5uxUDSonoZFAfZk1Ro1kR4vE_xa7mvoE37R-Q
   Authorization: WPT eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsInR5cCI6IndwdCtqd3QifQ.eyJhdW\
   QiOiJodHRwczovL3dvcmtsb2FkLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL3BhdGgiLCJleHAiOjE3NDU1MT\
   AwMTYsImp0aSI6Il9fYndjNEVTQzNhY2MyTFRDMS1feCIsInd0aCI6Ilg5d2lQZ3Ezam\
   xTR3pBZWdIQ0doTk8xbEpnVWJEb0kxTWprYXQ1UUhKQjAifQ.sa5ZYHTeCx4AsurafaB\
   J2rrMnE7TBHBB47ZUT7yoiyz2lcGY5XAnpGPjPnzeRroJJiR7Nr_C5J7mexxrsHM3CQ

   {"do stuff":"please"}

              Figure 5: Example HTTP Request with WIT and WPT

   To validate the WPT in the request, the recipient MUST first validate
   the WIT as specified in Section 5.1.4 of
   [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds], then ensure the following:

   *  There is exactly one Authorization header field in the request and
      it uses the WPT authentication scheme.

   *  The credentials of the WPT authentication scheme are a single and
      well-formed JWT.

   *  The signature algorithm in the alg JOSE header string-equal
      matches the alg attribute of the jwk in the cnf claim of the WIT.





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   *  The WPT signature is valid using the public key from the
      confirmation claim of the WIT.

   *  The typ JOSE header parameter of the WPT conveys a media type of
      wpt+jwt.

   *  The aud claim of the WPT matches the target URI, or an acceptable
      alias or normalization thereof, of the HTTP request in which the
      WPT was received, ignoring any query and fragment parts.

   *  The exp claim is present and conveys a time that has not passed.
      WPTs with an expiration time unreasonably far in the future SHOULD
      be rejected.

   *  The wth claim is present and matches the hash of the token value
      conveyed in the Workload-Identity-Token header.

   *  It is RECOMMENDED to check that the value of the jti claim has not
      been used before in the time window in which the respective WPT
      would be considered valid.

   *  If presented in conjunction with a Txn-Token, the value of the tth
      claim matches the hash of that token's value.

   *  If presented in conjunction with a token conveying end-user
      identity or authorization context, the value of the oth claim
      matches the hash of that token's value.

   *  If the oth claim is present, verify the hashes of all tokens
      listed in the oth claim per the default behavior defined in
      Section 2 or as specified by an application specific profile.  If
      the oth claim contains entries that are not understood by the
      recipient, the WPT MUST be rejected.  Conversely, additional
      tokens not covered by the oth claim MUST NOT be used by the
      recipient to make authorization decisions.

2.1.  Error Conditions

   Errors may occur during the processing of the WPT.  If the validation
   fails for any reason, such as an invalid signature, an expired
   validity time window, or a malformed data structure, an error is
   returned.  Because the WPT is conveyed with an HTTP authentication
   scheme, a recipient that rejects the request for a reason related to
   the WPT SHOULD use the HTTP status code 401 (Unauthorized).  Such a
   response carries a WWW-Authenticate header field with at least one
   challenge, as required by Section 11.6.1 of [RFC9110], and a
   recipient that accepts WPTs includes a challenge with the WPT scheme.
   This specification defines no authentication parameters for the WPT



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   challenge.  An example of such a response header field is shown
   below.

   WWW-Authenticate: WPT

                      Figure 6: Example WPT Challenge

   An HTTP status code such as 400 (Bad Request) remains appropriate for
   errors that are not related to the presented credentials.  Either
   response could include more details as per [RFC9457], such as an
   indicator that the wrong key material or algorithm was used.

2.2.  Coexistence with Bearer Tokens

   The WPT occupies the Authorization header field of the request.  That
   field is defined as Authorization = credentials (Section 11.6.2 of
   [RFC9110]); its value is a single set of credentials rather than a
   comma-separated list, and a sender therefore MUST NOT generate more
   than one Authorization header field (Section 5.3 of [RFC9110]).  A
   request that presents a WPT consequently cannot present a token with
   any other authentication scheme, including the Bearer scheme
   (Section 2.1 of [RFC6750]) or the Basic scheme ([RFC7617]).

   This exclusivity is intended.  A workload that authenticates with a
   WIT and a WPT MUST NOT rely on a bearer token presented in the same
   request to authenticate the calling workload, and a recipient MUST
   NOT use such a token to make authorization decisions about the
   caller.  A bearer token can be used by anyone who obtains it, so
   honoring one alongside a WPT would reduce the strength of the request
   to that of its weakest credential and defeat the proof of possession
   that the WIT and WPT provide.

   Tokens that convey end-user identity or authorization context rather
   than the identity of the calling workload are not affected, provided
   that they are conveyed in their own header fields.  Transaction
   tokens [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens] are an example: they are
   carried in the Txn-Token header field and are explicitly not
   permitted in the Authorization header field, precisely so that the
   field remains available for authenticating the call itself.  Such
   tokens are bound to the WPT with the tth and oth claims described in
   Section 2.  In this case a workload's authorization policy may take
   into account both the sending workload's identity and the information
   in the context token.  For example, the identity in the WIT may be
   used to establish which API calls can be made and information in the
   context token may be used to determine which specific resources can
   be accessed.





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   The Proxy-Authorization header field (Section 11.7.2 of [RFC9110]) is
   a distinct field and is unaffected by the WPT scheme, so a workload
   can still authenticate to an intermediary that challenges it.  Those
   credentials authenticate the sender to that intermediary rather than
   to the target workload, are consumed by the intermediary that issued
   the challenge, and are not covered by the proof of possession
   presented to the target workload.  The use of the WPT scheme with
   Proxy-Authenticate and Proxy-Authorization is out of scope for this
   document.

2.3.  Including Additional Claims

   The WPT contains JSON structures and therefore can be trivially
   extended by adding more claims beyond those defined in the current
   specification.  This, however, could result in interoperability
   issues, which the following rules are addressing.

   *  To ensure interoperability in WIMSE environments, the use of
      Private claim names (Sec. 4.3 of [RFC7519]) is NOT RECOMMENDED.

   *  In closed environments, deployers MAY freely add claims to the
      WPT.  Such claims SHOULD be collision-resistant, such as
      example.com/myclaim.

   *  A recipient that does not understand such claims MUST ignore them,
      as per Sec. 4 of [RFC7519].

   *  Outside of closed environments, new claims MUST be registered with
      IANA [IANA.JWT.CLAIMS] before they can be used.

3.  Security Considerations

3.1.  Workload Identity Token and Proof of Possession

   The Workload Identity Token (WIT) is bound to a secret cryptographic
   key and is always presented with a proof of possession (PoP) as
   described in [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds].  The WIT is a general
   purpose token that can be presented in multiple contexts.  The WIT
   and WPT are only used in the application-layer options, and both are
   not used in MTLS.  The WIT MUST NOT be used as a bearer token.  While
   this helps reduce the sensitivity of the token it is still possible
   that a token and its PoP may be captured and replayed within the
   PoP's lifetime.  The following are some mitigations for the capture
   and reuse of the PoP:







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3.1.1.  Preventing Eavesdropping and Interception with TLS

   An attacker observing or intercepting the communication channel can
   view the token and its PoP and attempt to replay it to gain an
   advantage.  In order to prevent this the token and PoP MUST be sent
   over a secure, server authenticated TLS connection unless a secure
   channel is provided by some other mechanisms.  Host name validation
   MUST be performed by the client.

3.1.2.  Limiting Proof of Possession Lifespan

   The PoP MUST be time limited.  A PoP should only be valid over the
   time necessary for it to be successfully used for the purpose it is
   needed.  This will typically be on the order of minutes.  PoPs
   received outside their validity time MUST be rejected.

3.1.3.  Limiting Proof of Possession Scope

   In order to reduce the risk of theft and replay the PoP should have a
   limited scope.  For example, a PoP may be targeted for use with a
   specific workload and even a specific transaction to reduce the
   impact of a stolen PoP.  In some cases a workload may wish to reuse a
   PoP for a period of time or have it accepted by multiple target
   workloads.  A careful analysis is warranted to understand the impacts
   to the system if a PoP is disclosed allowing it to be presented by an
   attacker along with a captured WIT.

3.1.4.  Replay Protection

   A PoP includes the jti claim that uniquely identifies it.  This claim
   SHOULD be used by the receiver to perform basic replay protection,
   within the scope of a particular sender, against tokens it has
   already seen.  Depending upon the design of the system it may be
   difficult to synchronize the replay cache across all token
   validators.  If an attacker can somehow influence the identity of the
   validator (e.g. which cluster member receives the message) then
   replay protection would not be effective.

3.1.5.  Avoid Logging Raw WPT Values

   Implementations MUST NOT log raw WPTs by default.  Depending on the
   aggressiveness of the replay protection mechinism, a WPT harvested
   from logs could potentially be replayed and accepted as a legitimate
   proof.  Implementations should therefore treat WPT values as
   sensitive and avoid persisting them in logs.






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3.1.6.  Binding to TLS Endpoint

   The PoP MAY be bound to a transport layer sender such as the client
   identity of a TLS session or TLS channel binding parameters.  The
   mechanisms for binding are outside the scope of this specification.

3.1.7.  Audience validation

   Validators MUST check that the audience field of the WPT is a URI or
   other value that is for their consumption.  In some cases when a URI
   is used as the audience some information, such as the authority
   portion, may be generated by an external requester who sees a
   different host name for the service than is used internally.
   Validators MUST NOT use untrusted information obtained from the
   request to determine if the hostname belongs to an authorized
   authority.  Doing so could allow attackers to trick validators into
   accepting a WPT generated for a different receiver by sending a
   fabricated request.  The validator MUST get the information about
   allowed URL authorities from a trusted source such as out-of-band
   configuration.  The Host of the request or an "X-Forwarded-Host"
   header is an example of untrusted data and cannot be trusted and MUST
   NOT be used.

3.2.  Workload Identity Key Management

   The Workload Identity Token is signed by a private key in possession
   of the workload.  This private key:

   *  MUST be kept private

   *  MUST be individual for each Workload Identifier (see
      [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch])

   *  MUST NOT be used once the Workload Identity Token is expired

   *  SHOULD be individual for each Workload Identity Token issued

   *  SHOULD not be reused for other purposes

3.3.  Middle Boxes

   In some deployments the Workload Identity Token and Workload Proof
   Token may pass through multiple systems.  The communication between
   the systems is over TLS, but the WIT and WPT are available in the
   clear at each intermediary.  While the intermediary cannot modify the
   token or the information within the PoP they can attempt to capture
   and replay the token or modify the data not protected by the PoP.




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   It is important to note that the WPT does not protect major portions
   of the request and response and therefore does not provide protection
   from an actively malicious middle box.  Deployments should perform
   analysis on their situation to determine if it is appropriate to
   trust and allow traffic to pass through a middle box.

3.4.  Privacy Considerations

   The Workload Proof Token may contain private information such as user
   names or other identities.  Care should be taken to prevent the
   disclosure of this information.  The use of TLS helps protect the
   privacy of WITs and PoPs.

   The Workload Identifier present in the WPT is typically associated
   with a workload and not a specific user, however in some deployments
   the workload or the HTTP Target URI may be associated directly to a
   user.  While these are exceptional cases a deployment should evaluate
   if the disclosure of a WPT can be used to track a user.

4.  IANA Considerations

4.1.  JSON Web Token Claims

   IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "JSON Web Token
   Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.CLAIMS]:

    +============+===================+===================+===========+
    | Claim Name | Claim Description | Change Controller | Reference |
    +============+===================+===================+===========+
    | tth        | Transaction Token | IETF              | RFC XXX,  |
    |            | hash              |                   | Section 2 |
    +------------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------+
    | wth        | Workload Identity | IETF              | RFC XXX,  |
    |            | Token hash        |                   | Section 2 |
    +------------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------+
    | oth        | Other Tokens      | IETF              | RFC XXX,  |
    |            | hashes            |                   | Section 2 |
    +------------+-------------------+-------------------+-----------+

                                 Table 1

4.2.  Media Type Registration

   IANA is requested to register the following entries to the "Media
   Types" registry [IANA.MEDIA.TYPES]:

   *  application/wpt+jwt, per Section 4.2.1.




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4.2.1.  application/wpt+jwt

   Type name: application

   Subtype name: wpt+jwt

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: Encoding considerations are identical to
   those specified for the "application/jwt" media type.  See [RFC7519].

   Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of
   RFC XXX.

   Interoperability considerations: N/A

   Published specification: RFC XXX, Section 2.

   Applications that use this media type: Workloads that use these
   tokens to integrity-protect messages in the WIMSE workload-to-
   workload protocol.

   Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   Additional information:

   Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

   Magic number(s): N/A

   File extension(s): None

   Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   Person & email address to contact for further information:

   See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC XXX.

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: See the Authors' Addresses section of RFC XXX.

   Change controller: Internet Engineering Task Force (iesg@ietf.org).




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4.3.  Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme
      Registration

   IANA is requested to register the following entry to the "Hypertext
   Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry"
   [IANA.HTTP.AUTHSCHEMES]:

   *  Authentication Scheme Name: WPT

   *  Reference: RFC XXX, Section 2

   *  Notes: see reference above for an ABNF syntax of the credentials
      of this scheme

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-arch]
              Salowey, J. A., Rosomakho, Y., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE)
              Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-wimse-arch-08, 6 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              arch-08>.

   [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds]
              Campbell, B., Salowey, J. A., Schwenkschuster, A.,
              Sheffer, Y., and Y. Rosomakho, "WIMSE Workload
              Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-wimse-workload-creds-02, 2 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              workload-creds-02>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.





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   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.

   [RFC8725]  Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
              Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

5.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens]
              Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman,
              "Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11, 30 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              transaction-tokens-11>.

   [IANA.HTTP.AUTHSCHEMES]
              IANA, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication
              Scheme Registry",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>.

   [IANA.JOSE.ALGS]
              IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose>.

   [IANA.JWT.CLAIMS]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.

   [IANA.MEDIA.TYPES]
              IANA, "Media Types",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.



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   [IANA.URI.SCHEMES]
              IANA, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes>.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750>.

   [RFC7617]  Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
              RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7617>.

   [RFC9457]  Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details
              for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, DOI 10.17487/RFC9457, July 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457>.

Appendix A.  Document History


   // RFC Editor: please remove before publication.

A.1.  draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-02

   *  Convey the WPT in the Authorization header field with a new WPT
      HTTP authentication scheme, replacing the Workload-Proof-Token
      header field.  Along with this, recommend HTTP status code 401
      with a WWW-Authenticate: WPT challenge, remove the ath claim,
      rework Section 2.2 since a request has at most one Authorization
      header field, move the DPoP specification to the informative
      references, and update the examples.

   *  Editorial: consistent use of "proof of possession"/"PoP", with the
      abbreviation expanded on first use, and consistent capitalization
      of the defined term "Workload Identifier".

   *  Advise against logging proof-of-possession values (#271).

   *  Security Considerations formatting fixup (#217).

   *  Try to be more clear on how the various token hash claims are done

   *  Reference the WIT validation procedure in
      [I-D.ietf-wimse-workload-creds] (#290).







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A.2.  draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-01

   *  Clairify treatment of "jti" claim

   *  Fix Example WPT Claims to match the example WPT

   *  Inline the ABNF for the Workload-Proof-Token Header Field

   *  Add audience security considerations

A.3.  draft-ietf-wimse-wpt-00

   *  Focus on Workload Proof Token (WPT) only.

      -  Remove credential formats (WIT and WIC)

      -  Remove HTTP-Message-Signature profile

A.4.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-07

   *  Rework the WPT's oth claim.

   *  update the media types.

   *  Discuss extensibility of WIT and WPT.

   *  Clarify error handling, specifically why not HTTP 401.

   *  Correct the code examples.

   *  Add registration request content for a wimse URI scheme.

   *  New section on key management.

   *  Use of the Accept-Signature header.

A.5.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-06

   *  Explicit definition of the Workload Identity Certificate.

   *  Definition of the validation of workload identifiers as part of
      workload authentication.  Still work in progress.

A.6.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-05

   *  Removed the entire Workload Identity section which is now covered
      in the Architecture document.




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   *  Content-Digest is mandatory with HTTP-Sig.

   *  Some wording on extending the protocol beyond HTTP.

   *  IANA considerations.

A.7.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-04

   *  Require cnf.jwk.alg in WIT which restricts signature algorithm of
      WPT or HTTP-Sig.

   *  Replay protection as a SHOULD for both WPT and HTTP-Sig.

   *  Consolidate terminology with the Architecture draft.

A.8.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-03

   *  Consistently use "workload".

   *  Implement comments from the SPIFFE community.

   *  Make iss claim in WIT optional and add wording about its relation
      to key distribution.

   *  Remove iss claim from WPT.

   *  Make jti claim in WIT optional.

   *  Error handling for the application-level methods.

A.9.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-02

   *  Coexistence with bearer tokens.

   *  Improve the architecture diagram.

   *  Some more ABNF.

   *  Clarified identifiers and URIs.

   *  Moved an author to acknowledgments.

A.10.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-01

   *  Addressed multiple comments from Pieter.

   *  Clarified WIMSE identity concepts, specifically "trust domain" and
      "workload identifier".



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   *  Much more detail around mTLS, including some normative language.

   *  WIT (the identity token) is now included in the WPT proof of
      possession.

   *  Added a section comparing the DPoP-inspired app-level security
      option to the Message Signature-based alternative.

A.11.  draft-ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol-00

   *  Initial WG draft, an exact copy of draft-sheffer-wimse-s2s-
      protocol-00

   *  Added this document history section

Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Pieter Kasselman for his detailed
   comments.

   We thank Daniel Feldman for his contributions to earlier versions of
   this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Brian Campbell
   Ping Identity
   Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com


   Arndt Schwenkschuster
   Defakto Security
   Email: arndts.ietf@gmail.com


















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