IPPM Working Group G. Mirsky
Internet-Draft Ciena Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track W. Lingqiang
Expires: 28 April 2027 G. Zhui
ZTE Corporation
H. Song
Futurewei Technologies
P. Thubert
Independent
25 October 2026
Hybrid Two-Step Performance Measurement Method
draft-ietf-ippm-hybrid-two-step-07
Abstract
The adoption of network operation automation has brought new
measurement methodology requirements. Among them is the ability to
collect the instant network operational state as the packet is being
processed by the network elements along its forwarding path through a
network domain. That requirement can be addressed by using on-path
telemetry, also called hybrid performance measurement according to
RFC 7799. An on-path telemetry method allows operators to collect
key information that reflects the operational state and the network
performance a packet experiences through the forwarding path. IOAM,
defined in RFC 9197 and RFC 9326, is an example of such a hybrid
method. This document introduces a method complementary to on-path
telemetry that causes the generation of network telemetry
information. This document introduces Hybrid Two-Step (HTS), a
method complementary to both passive and hybrid measurement
approaches. HTS separates measuring or calculating the performance
metric from collecting and transporting network operational state.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Problem Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Theory of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. HTS Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. HTS Trigger Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.2. HTS Follow-up Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Operation of the HTS Ingress Node . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.1. Responsibilities of the HTS Ingress Node . . . . . . 11
4.2.2. Originating the HTS Follow-up Packet . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Operation of HTS Intermediate Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.1. Processing an HTS Trigger Packet . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.2. Processing an HTS Follow-up Packet . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.3. HTS Follow-up Timer Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.4. Operation of the HTS Egress Node . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4.1. Processing an HTS Trigger Packet . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4.2. Processing an HTS Follow-up Packet . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4.3. HTS Collection Timer Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Path Congruence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2. MTU and Packet Size Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3. Timer Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4. Telemetry Volume and Profile Selection . . . . . . . . . 21
5.5. Handling Mis-injected or Malformed Packets . . . . . . . 21
5.6. Upstream and Downstream Collection Modes . . . . . . . . 22
5.7. Deploying HTS in a Multicast Network . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.7.1. Trigger Packet Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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5.7.2. Follow-up Packet Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.7.3. Telemetry Volume Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.7.4. Timer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.7.5. Collector Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.8. Operational Monitoring and Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . 24
6. Authentication in HTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1. HMAC Sub-TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2. Authentication Mechanisms in HTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.3. Integrity of Characteristic Information . . . . . . . . . 26
6.4. Integrity of Telemetry Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.5. Authentication of HTS Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.1. IOAM Option-Type for HTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.2. HTS Registry Group and HTS Registries . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.2.1. HTS TLV Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.2.2. HTS Sub-TLV Type Sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.2.3. HMAC Type Sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.2.4. HTS Error Codes Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.1. Secuiring the Integrity of Characteristic Information . . 31
8.2. Integrity of HTS Shim and Telemetry Data . . . . . . . . 32
8.3. Confidentiality of Telemetry Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.4. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.5. Multicast Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.6. Denial-of-Service Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1. Introduction
Successful resolution of challenges of automated network operation,
as part of overall service orchestration and automated network
operation, relies on a timely collection of accurate information that
reflects the state of network elements. Because performing the
analysis and act upon the collected information requires considerable
computing and storage resources, the network operational state
information is unlikely to be processed by the network elements
themselves but will be exported to big data systems for processing
and storing. The process of generating, and collecting network
operational state information also referred to in this document as
network telemetry, and transporting it for post-processing should
work equally well with data flows or injected in the network test
packets. [RFC7799] describes a combination of elements of passive
and active measurement as a hybrid measurement.
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Several technical methods have been proposed to enable the collection
of network operational state information instantaneous to the packet
processing, among them [P4.INT] and [RFC9197]. The instantaneous,
i.e., in the data packet itself, collection of telemetry information
simplifies the process of attribution of telemetry information to the
particular monitored flow. On the other hand, this collection method
impacts the data packets, potentially changing their treatment by the
network elements. Also, the amount of information the instantaneous
method collects might be incomplete because of the limited space it
can be allotted. Other proposals defined methods to collect
telemetry information in a separate packet from each node traversed
by the monitored data flow. [RFC9326] is an example of this approach
to collecting telemetry information. These methods allow data
collection from any arbitrary path and avoid directly impacting data
packets. On the other hand, to unambiguously correlate telemetry
information with the monitored flow requires explicit characteristic
information about the monitored flow to be carried in the packet that
carries telemetry information.
This document introduces Hybrid Two-Step (HTS) as a new method of
telemetry collection that improves accuracy of a measurement by
separating the act of measuring or calculating the performance metric
from the collecting and transporting this information while
minimizing the overhead of the generated load in a network.
HTS method extends the two-step mode of Residence Time Measurement
(RTM) defined in [RFC8169] to on-path network operational state
collection and transport. HTS instruments data packets of the
monitored flow or specially constructed test packets that are already
equipped with a shim of on-path telemetry protocol to use as an HTS
Trigger packet, making the process of attribution of telemetry to the
data flow simple.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
2.1. Acronyms
RTM Residence Time Measurement [RFC8169]
ECMP Equal Cost Multipath [RFC2992]
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code [RFC2104]
HTS Hybrid Two-Step (Section 1)
MTU Maximum Transmission Unit [RFC1191]
NSH Network Service Header [RFC8300]
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RTT Round-Trip Time [RFC2681]
TLV Type-Length-Value (Figure 5)
2.2. Terminology
This document makes use of the following terms:
Characteristic information - the interpretation in this document
follows the definition of "Characteristic" in Section 3.2 in
[RFC9940].
HTS domain is an example of a "limited domain" as defined in
[RFC8799]. HTS domain may be identical to an IOAM domain (see
Section 3 of [RFC9197]) or a controlled domain where the Alternate-
Marking Method is used to measure performance metrics (see
Section 7.1 of [RFC9341]).
HTS ingress node, defined in Section 4.2, an HTS system that
generates an HTS Trigger and HTS Follow-up packets.
HTS intermediate node, defined in Section 4.3, an HTS system that
receives the HTS Trigger and HTS Follow-up packets,
HTS egress node, defined in Section 4.4, consumes HTS Trigger packet
and terminates an HTS Follow-up packet.
Telemetry is information reflecting the operational state of network
elements, including performance metrics, collected and transported
for analysis.
2.3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Problem Overview
Performance measurement and network telemetry often require
collecting operational state information - such as timestamps, queue
occupancy, buffer utilization, interface load, or other metrics - at
multiple points along a packet's forwarding path. Methods that embed
telemetry directly into data packets simplify correlation with the
monitored flow but may be limited by MTU constraints, may be
incompatible with encrypted packets, and may introduce processing
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overhead that affects measurement accuracy.
For encrypted packets, inserting telemetry information directly into
the data packet may be impossible or may degrade measurement accuracy
because the packet cannot be safely modified while in transit.
Accurate comparison of timestamps depends on the availability of time
synchronization across the HTS domain.
In some networks, it is beneficial to collect telemetry at network
elements other than the egress, depending on the performance metric
and operational objective. For example, a head-end may optimize path
selection based on upstream telemetry reflecting queue depth, buffer
occupancy, or interface utilization.
These challenges motivate the HTS method, which separates the act of
measuring or collecting telemetry from the act of transporting it.
HTS handles both performance measurements and telemetry information
using the same two-step mechanism. An HTS Trigger initiates
telemetry collection, and one or more HTS Follow-up packets carry the
collected information. These phases are described in Section 4.
4. Theory of Operation
HTS measurement operates within an HTS domain consisting of an HTS
Ingress node, zero or more HTS Intermediate nodes, and an HTS Egress
node. HTS Trigger packets originate at the HTS Ingress node and are
forwarded downstream through the HTS domain. HTS Follow-up packets
are generated by the HTS Egress node and sent upstream toward the HTS
Ingress node.
A reference HTS topology is illustrated in Figure 1.
HTS telemetry is ultimately consumed by a Collector, which is a
logical function responsible for receiving, correlating, and
analyzing HTS measurement results. The Collector may be co-located
with the HTS Egress node or may reside on a remote system such as a
controller, analytics engine, or network management system. The
Collector is not part of the HTS domain and does not process HTS
packets directly.
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HTS Domain
-----------------------------------------------------
+---------+ +-------------+ +---------+
| Ingress | ---> |Intermediate | ---> | Egress |
+---------+ +-------------+ +---------+
| | |
| HTS Trigger | HTS Trigger | HTS Trigger
| HTS Follow-up | HTS Follow-up | HTS Follow-up
| (originates) | (adds telemetry) | (terminates)
-----------------------------------------------------
|
| Telemetry Export
v
+-------------+
| Collector |
+-------------+
Figure 1: An Example of an HTS Reference Topology
The HTS Egress node terminates HTS Follow-up packets, validates the
HTS shim and Telemetry Data TLVs, and exports the resulting
measurement information to the Collector. HTS Error Codes, when
present, are generated only by the HTS Egress node and delivered to
the Collector as part of the telemetry export. Intermediate nodes do
not generate HTS Error Codes.
The HTS method consists of two phases:
* Performing a measurement and/or obtaining network operational
state information on a network element. HTS Trigger is a data or
test packet instrumented to Trigger the collection of telemetry
information on a network element. Section 4.1.1 specifies
operation of an HTS Trigger packet.
* Collecting and transporting the measurement and/or the telemetry
information. HTS Follow-up is a packet constructed to transport
telemetry information that includes operational state and
performance measurements originated on the nodes along the path
traversed by the HTS Trigger. Section 4.1.2 specifies operation
of an HTS Follow-up packet.
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4.1. HTS Packets
HTS uses two packet types: HTS Trigger packets, which initiate
telemetry collection, and HTS Follow-up packets, which carry the
collected telemetry. The HTS Trigger and HTS Follow-up packets MUST
traverse the same forwarding path within the HTS domain to ensure
correct correlation of telemetry information.
Characteristic Information, in context of HTS, refers to the set of
fields carried in an HTS Trigger and HTS Follow-up packet that
uniquely identifies the monitored flow and ensures that both packets
traverse the same forwarding path within the HTS domain.
For a given monitored flow, Characteristic Information MUST be
invariant and MUST be identical in the HTS Trigger and all HTS
Follow-up packets associated with that Trigger. HTS nodes MUST use
this invariant information to correlate HTS Follow-up packets with
the corresponding HTS Trigger packets.
Characteristic Information MUST preserve the forwarding behavior of
the HTS Trigger packet and MUST NOT be modified by HTS nodes.
Below are some examples of Characteristic Information:
* IOAM: Namespace-ID, IOAM-Trace-Type, Flow ID, Sequence Number
* Segment Routing: SID list.
* NSH: Base Header and Service Path Header
* ECMP environments: reusing the same entropy label or IPv6 Flow
Label.
* Any other fields used by the forwarding plane to select the path.
The exact composition of Characteristic Information is
transport-specific and outside the scope of this document, but all
HTS nodes MUST treat it as immutable and use it to correlate HTS
Trigger and Follow-up packets.
4.1.1. HTS Trigger Packets
An HTS Trigger is a user data packet or specially constructed test
packet instrumented to cause network elements to collect telemetry
information. The Trigger packet includes characteristic information
that allows HTS nodes to associate the Trigger with the monitored
flow. The specific format of the Trigger depends on the telemetry
framework used in the HTS domain.
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4.1.1.1. HTS Trigger in In-Situ OAM
When HTS is used in an IOAM domain, the Trigger packet carries an
IOAM Option-Type set to the "IOAM Hybrid Two-Step Option-Type" value
(TBA1) allocated by IANA (Section 7.1). The HTS Trace IOAM Header is
shown in Figure 2.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Namespace-ID | Flags |Extension-Flags|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IOAM-Trace-Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Flow ID (Optional) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number (Optional) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Hybrid Two-Step Trace IOAM Header
The HTS Trigger includes HTS IOAM Header (shown in Figure 2) consists
of:
* IOAM Namespace-ID - as defined in Section 5.3 [RFC9197];
* Flags - as defined in Section 3.2 [RFC9326];
* Extension-Flags - as defined in Section 3.2 [RFC9326];
* IOAM-Trace-Type - as defined in Section 5.4 [RFC9197];
* Flow ID (Optional) - as defined in Section 3.2 [RFC9326];
* Sequence Number (Optional) - as defined in Section 3.2 [RFC9326].
These fields provide the characteristic information needed for HTS
nodes to associate the HTS Trigger packet with the monitored flow.
4.1.1.2. HTS Trigger in the Alternate-Marking Method
In an Alternate-Marking domain ([RFC9341], [RFC9342]), any packet in
a flow that carries the marking information MAY serve as an HTS
Trigger. The exact transport encapsulation of the HTS Trigger packet
is specific to the Alternate-Marking deployment and is outside the
scope of this document. Regardless of the encapsulation, the HTS
Trigger packet MUST carry characteristic information sufficient for
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HTS nodes to associate it with the monitored flow.
4.1.2. HTS Follow-up Packets
An HTS Follow-up packet carries telemetry information collected by
HTS nodes along the path traversed by the HTS Trigger packet. The
ingress network element (Figure 1) that originates the HTS Trigger
packet also originates the corresponding HTS Follow-up packet. In
upstream collection mode, an HTS Follow-up packet MAY be generated
without a preceding Trigger, provided that the Follow-up packet
includes Characteristic Information sufficient to identify the
monitored flow.
An HTS Follow-up packet MUST carry the same Characteristic
Information as the associated HTS Trigger packet. HTS nodes MUST
treat this information as immutable and MUST use it to ensure that
the HTS Follow-up packet traverses the same forwarding path as the
HTS Trigger packet.
The Follow-up packet consists of the transport encapsulation
determined by the Characteristic Information, followed by the HTS
shim and one or more Telemetry Data TLVs. The HTS shim indicates the
maximum allowed size of the Follow-up packet and the telemetry
profile requested by the ingress node.
Only one outstanding Follow-up packet MAY exist per path at a node.
If a node receives a new HTS Trigger packet while an HTS Follow-up
packet for the same flow is still pending, the node MUST first
originate the Follow-up packet for the earlier HTS Trigger before
processing the new HTS Trigger packet.
The following sections describe the operation of HTS nodes in the
downstream mode of collecting the telemetry information. In the
upstream mode, the behavior of HTS nodes, in general, identical with
the exception that the HTS Trigger packet does not precede the HTS
Follow-up packet.
4.2. Operation of the HTS Ingress Node
The HTS ingress node is the network element that originates HTS
Trigger packets and the corresponding HTS Follow-up packets. The
ingress node is responsible for constructing the HTS Trigger packet,
initiating telemetry collection, and generating HTS Follow-up packets
that carry telemetry collected along the forwarding path.
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4.2.1. Responsibilities of the HTS Ingress Node
Upon originating an HTS Trigger, the ingress node MUST:
1. Construct the HTS Trigger packet with the appropriate transport
encapsulation and Characteristic Information (Section 4.1).
2. Ensure that the HTS Trigger packet traverses the intended
forwarding path, consistent with the monitored flow.
3. Record the Characteristic Information so that the HTS Follow-up
packet can be constructed with identical values.
4. Transmit the Trigger packet into the HTS domain.
4.2.2. Originating the HTS Follow-up Packet
For each HTS Trigger packet, the HTS ingress node MUST originate a
corresponding HTS Follow-up packet unless operating in upstream
collection mode. The ingress node constructs the HTS Follow-up
packet using the format shown in Figure 3. The Follow-up packet
consists of the transport encapsulation determined by the
Characteristic Information, followed by the HTS shim and one or more
Telemetry Data TLVs. The ingress node MUST populate the HTS shim
fields as described below and MUST ensure that the Follow-up packet
carries the same Characteristic Information as the associated HTS
Trigger.
The HTS ingress node MUST:
1. Reuse the same Characteristic Information as the Trigger packet.
* This ensures that the Follow-up packet traverses the same
forwarding path.
* The ingress node MUST NOT modify Characteristic Information
once selected.
3. Construct the HTS shim (Figure 3) including:
* Version
* HTS Shim Length
* Flags
* Sequence Number
* HTS Max Length
* Telemetry Data Profile
5. Initialize the Sequence Number to zero for the first Follow-up
packet associated with a Trigger.
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6. Include one or more Telemetry Data TLVs, if local telemetry is
collected at the ingress node.
7. Transmit the HTS Follow-up packet after sending the corresponding
HTS Trigger packet.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Transport Network ~
| Encapsulation |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---
|Ver|HTS Shim L | Flags |Sequence Number| Error Code |HTS
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ S
| HTS Max Length | h
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ i
~ Telemetry Data Profile ~ m
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---
| |
~ Telemetry Data TLVs ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Follow-up Packet Format
Fields of the HTS shim are as follows:
Version (Ver) is the two-bits long field. It specifies the
version of the HTS shim format. This document defines the format
for the 0b00 value of the field.
HTS Shim Length is the six bits-long field. It defines the length
of the HTS shim in octets. The minimal value of the field is
eight octets.
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|F| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Flags Field Format
Flags is eight-bits long. The format of the Flags field displayed
in Figure 4.
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- Full (F) flag MUST be set to zero by the node originating the
HTS Follow-up packet and MUST be set to one by the node that
does not add its telemetry data to avoid exceeding MTU size.
- The node originating the Follow-up packet MUST zero the
Reserved field and ignore it on the receipt.
Sequence Number is one octet-long field. The zero-based value of
the field reflects the place of the HTS Follow-up packet in the
sequence of the HTS Follow-up packets that originated in response
to the same HTS Trigger. The ingress node MUST set the value of
the field to zero.
Error Code is one octet-long field. It MUST be zeroed on
transmission and ignored on receipt. An HTS Egress node sets the
value of the Error Code based on processing an HTS Follow-up
packet before delivering telemetry information to a Collector.
IANA is requested to assign values according to Section 7.2.4.
HTS Max Length is four octet-long field. The value of the HTS Max
Length field indicates the maximum length of the HTS Follow-up
packet in octets. An operator MUST be able to configure the HTS
Max Length field's value. The value SHOULD be set equal to the
path MTU.
Telemetry Data Profile is the optional variable-length field of
bit-size flags. Each flag indicates the requested type of
telemetry data to be collected at each HTS node. The increment of
the field is four bytes with a minimum length of zero. For
example, IOAM-Trace-Type information defined in [RFC9197],
Sequence Number and/or Flow ID (Figure 2) can be used in the
Telemetry Data Profile field.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Reserved | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Value ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Telemetry Data TLV Format
Telemetry Data TLV is a variable-length field. Multiple TLVs MAY
be placed in an HTS packet. Additional TLVs may be enclosed
within a given TLV, subject to the semantics of the (outer) TLV in
question. Figure 5 presents the format of a Telemetry Data TLV,
where fields are defined as the following:
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- Type - a one-octet-long field that characterizes the
interpretation of the Value field.
- Reserved - one-octet-long field.
- Length - two-octet-long field equal to the length of the Value
field in octets.
- Value - a variable-length field. The value of the Type field
determines its interpretation and encoding. IOAM data fields,
defined in [RFC9197], MAY be carried in the Value field.
All multibyte fields defined in this specification are in network
byte order.
4.3. Operation of HTS Intermediate Nodes
An HTS intermediate node is a network element that receives and
forwards HTS Trigger packets and HTS Follow-up packets. Intermediate
nodes collect telemetry data and contribute it to the Follow-up
packet while ensuring that the packet remains within the MTU
constraints of the path.
Intermediate nodes MUST NOT modify Characteristic Information and
MUST use it to correlate Trigger and Follow-up packets.
4.3.1. Processing an HTS Trigger Packet
Upon receiving an HTS Trigger packet, an intermediate node MUST:
1. Verify Characteristic Information
The node MUST verify that the Trigger contains valid
Characteristic Information. If validation fails, the node
MUST forward the packet unchanged.
3. Copy transport encapsulation
The node MUST record the transport encapsulation and
Characteristic Information for use when constructing a Follow-
up packet.
5. Start the HTS Follow-up Timer
The node MUST start a timer associated with the monitored
flow. The timer ensures that a Follow-up packet will be
originated even if no Follow-up packet is received from
downstream nodes.
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7. Forward the Trigger packet
The node MUST forward the Trigger packet according to the
forwarding behavior determined by the Characteristic
Information.
4.3.2. Processing an HTS Follow-up Packet
Upon receiving an HTS Follow-up packet, an intermediate node MUST:
1. Validate the Follow-up packet
* Verify that Characteristic Information matches a known
Trigger.
* Verify that the Full flag is not set. If validation fails,
the node MUST forward the packet unchanged and MUST NOT add
telemetry.
3. Stop the HTS Follow-up Timer
The node MUST stop the timer associated with the flow.
The node MUST collect telemetry data as requested by the
Telemetry Data Profile or by local HTS policy.
6. Determine whether telemetry fits within HTS Max Length
If adding telemetry does not exceed HTS Max Length:
- Append telemetry as a new Telemetry Data TLV
- Forward the Follow-up packet
If adding telemetry would exceed HTS Max Length:
- Set the Full flag in the received Follow-up packet
- Forward the received Follow-up packet unchanged
- Originate a new Follow-up packet using the stored transport
encapsulation and Characteristic Information
- Increment the Sequence Number
- Insert collected telemetry into the first Telemetry Data
TLV
- Transmit the new Follow-up packet
4.3.3. HTS Follow-up Timer Expiration
If the HTS Follow-up Timer expires before a Follow-up packet is
received, the intermediate node MUST:
1. Originate a new Follow-up packet
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Using the stored transport encapsulation and Characteristic
Information.
3. Initialize the HTS shim
* Version = 0b00
* Sequence Number = 0
* HTS Shim Length and Telemetry Data Profile MAY be set
according to local policy.
5. Insert telemetry data
* The node MUST insert locally collected telemetry into the
first Telemetry Data TLV.
7. Transmit the Follow-up packet
4.4. Operation of the HTS Egress Node
The HTS Egress node terminates synthetic HTS Trigger packets and
forwards data packets used as HTS Trigger packets according to normal
forwarding behavior. The Egress node is responsible for correlating
synthetic HTS Trigger packets with the corresponding HTS Follow-up
packets, validating the HTS shim and Telemetry Data TLVs contained in
HTS Follow-up packets, generating HTS Error Codes when processing
errors are detected, and exporting the resulting telemetry to the
Collector. The Collector is a logical function that receives,
correlates, and analyzes HTS measurement results. The Collector may
be co-located with the Egress node or may reside on a remote system
such as a controller, analytics engine, or network management system.
The Collector is not part of the HTS domain and does not process HTS
packets directly.
HTS Error Codes are generated only by the HTS Egress node and are
delivered to the Collector as part of the telemetry export. HTS
Trigger packets do not carry HTS shim or Telemetry Data TLVs and
cannot be malformed in an HTS-specific sense.
4.4.1. Processing an HTS Trigger Packet
When an HTS Trigger packet (synthetic or data-packet) arrives at the
Egress node, the node performs the following steps:
1. Record Trigger context.
The Egress node extracts the Sequence Number and
Characteristic Information and records this measurement
context. No correlation between Trigger and Follow-up packets
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is required; the Sequence Number in the HTS Follow-up packet
identifies the relative location of the HTS Follow-up packet
in the sequence of the Follow-up packets generated due to the
same HTS Trigger packet.
3. Start the HTS Collection Timer.
The Egress node starts the HTS Collection Timer associated
with the Trigger. The timer is used to detect loss or
excessive delay of the corresponding HTS Follow-up packet.
5. Apply Trigger termination behavior.
If the Trigger packet is synthetic, the Egress node MUST
terminate the packet.
If the Trigger packet is a data packet used as an HTS Trigger,
the Egress node MUST forward the packet according to normal
forwarding behavior.
Synthetic Trigger packets and data-packet Triggers do not carry HTS
shim or Telemetry Data TLVs and cannot be malformed in an
HTS-specific sense.
4.4.2. Processing an HTS Follow-up Packet
HTS Follow-up packets may arrive at the Egress node as a sequence of
packets generated in response to a single HTS Trigger packet. Each
Follow-up packet contains the HTS shim, Telemetry Data TLVs, and
optionally the HTS HMAC TLV. HTS Error Codes generated during HTS
Follow-up packet validation are defined in Section 7.2.4. The
conditions under which each Error Code is generated are specified in
this section. The Egress node processes each Follow-up packet in the
sequence as follows:
1. Clear the HTS Collection Timer.
* Upon receiving any valid Follow-up packet, the Egress node
MUST clear the HTS Collection Timer associated with the
monitored flow. Set Error Code to "No Error" value.
3. Validate the HTS HMAC TLV (if present).
The Egress node performs HMAC verification before processing
any telemetry data. If validation fails, set Error Code to
"HMAC Failure" value. Go to step 13.
5. Validate the HTS shim.
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* The Egress node verifies the Sequence Number and Full flag in
each Follow-up packet. Set Error Code to "Invalid HTS Shim"
value. Go to step 13.
7. Validate Telemetry Data TLVs.
The Egress node verifies the structure, length, and
consistency of all Telemetry Data TLVs in each packet. If
validation fails, set Error Code to "Invalid TLV" value. Go
to step 13.
9. Restart the HTS Collection Timer.
If the Full flag is set, indicating that additional Follow-up
packets are expected, the Egress node MUST restart the HTS
Collection Timer.
11. Accumulate telemetry fragments.
The Egress node stores the telemetry information from each
Follow-up packet in the sequence. If the Full flag is not
set, the packet is the final Follow-up packet for the
Trigger.
13. Export telemetry to the Collector.
When the final Follow-up packet in the sequence is received
(Full flag = 0), the Egress node aggregates all telemetry
fragments collected and exports the complete telemetry
record, including any HTS Error Codes, to the Collector using
an out-of-band mechanism. The specific telemetry export
protocol is outside the scope of this document.
4.4.3. HTS Collection Timer Expiration
The HTS Collection Timer is started when the Egress node receives an
HTS Trigger packet (synthetic or data-packet). The timer is used to
detect loss or excessive delay of HTS Follow-up packets generated in
response to that Trigger. Because multiple HTS Follow-up packets may
be generated for a single Trigger, the Egress node maintains the
timer across the entire sequence of Follow-up packets.
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When an HTS Follow-up packet is received, the Egress node MUST clear
the HTS Collection Timer associated with the monitored flow
identified by a locally unique Characteristic Information. If the
Full flag in the Follow-up packet is set, indicating that additional
Follow-up packets are expected, he Egress node MUST restart the HTS
Collection Timer. If the Full flag is not set, the Follow-up packet
is the final packet in the sequence, and the Egress node MUST NOT
restart the timer.
If the HTS Collection Timer expires before the final HTS Follow-up
packet in the sequence is received, the Egress node performs the
following steps:
1. Generate a synthetic HTS Follow-up packet.
* The Egress node originates a synthetic HTS Follow-up packet
for Sequence Number associated with the expired timer. This
packet represents the Egress node’s best available telemetry
for the Trigger's Characteristic Information.
3. Populate the HTS shim.
* The synthetic Follow-up packet includes the Sequence Number
and sets the Full flag to zero, indicating that no additional
Follow-up packets will be sent.
5. Insert an HTS Error Code.
* The Egress node MUST set Error Code value to "Follow-up Not
Received" (Section 7.2.4), indicating that one or more
expected HTS Follow-up packets were not received before the
timer expired.
7. Export telemetry to the Collector.
* The Egress node aggregates all telemetry fragments collected
for the Trigger’s Sequence Number, including any fragments
received before timer expiration, and exports the resulting
telemetry record to the Collector using an out-of-band
mechanism. The specific telemetry export protocol is outside
the scope of this document.
5. Operational Considerations
This section describes operational aspects of deploying HTS in a
network. These considerations are informational and do not impose
additional protocol requirements beyond those specified in Section 4.
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5.1. Path Congruence
HTS relies on the Trigger and Follow-up packets traversing the same
forwarding path. Operators MUST ensure that the Characteristic
Information used in the Trigger and Follow-up packets is sufficient
to preserve forwarding behavior across the HTS domain.
Examples of fields that influence forwarding include:
* Segment Routing SID lists
* NSH Service Path Headers
* IPv6 Flow Labels
* Entropy Labels
* IOAM Namespace-ID and IOAM-Trace-Type
Operators SHOULD verify that these fields are stable and predictable
across the HTS domain. If forwarding behavior changes due to ECMP
rebalancing, policy routing, or service-function steering, HTS
telemetry may be incomplete or inconsistent.
5.2. MTU and Packet Size Considerations
HTS Follow-up packets grow as telemetry is added by intermediate
nodes. Operators SHOULD ensure that:
* the HTS Max Length value is configured to avoid fragmentation,
* the underlying transport encapsulation supports the expected
packet size, and
* intermediate nodes have sufficient headroom to append telemetry.
If an intermediate node cannot append telemetry without exceeding HTS
Max Length, it will set the Full flag and originate a new Follow-up
packet. Operators SHOULD monitor this condition, as frequent
Full-flag events may indicate insufficient MTU headroom or excessive
telemetry volume.
5.3. Timer Configuration
HTS uses two types of timers:
* HTS Follow-up Timer (intermediate nodes)
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* HTS Collection Timer (egress nodes)
Operators SHOULD configure timer values based on:
* expected path latency,
* jitter characteristics,
* telemetry volume, and
* the number of intermediate nodes.
Timers that are too short may cause premature origination of
Follow-up packets. Timers that are too long may delay telemetry
delivery.
5.4. Telemetry Volume and Profile Selection
The Telemetry Data Profile determines which telemetry elements are
collected by HTS nodes. Operators SHOULD select a profile that
balances:
* operational visibility,
* packet size constraints,
* processing overhead, and
* the number of nodes in the HTS domain.
Profiles that request high-volume telemetry (e.g., queue depth,
buffer occupancy, interface load) may require larger HTS Max Length
values or more frequent Full-flag events.
5.5. Handling Mis-injected or Malformed Packets
HTS nodes MUST validate Trigger and Follow-up packets as described in
Section 4. Mis-injected or malformed packets may occur due to:
* incorrect configuration,
* software defects,
* malicious injection, or
* inconsistent forwarding behavior.
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Operators SHOULD monitor for validation failures and investigate
persistent anomalies. Egress nodes MUST discard invalid Follow-up
packets and SHOULD log such events for operational visibility.
5.6. Upstream and Downstream Collection Modes
HTS supports both upstream and downstream collection modes:
* Downstream mode: The ingress node originates the Follow-up packet.
* Upstream mode: The egress node originates the Follow-up packet if
no Follow-up is received before the HTS Collection Timer expires.
Operators SHOULD select the mode based on:
* operational goals,
* telemetry volume,
* path length, and
* processing capabilities of ingress and egress nodes.
Upstream mode may reduce packet size on long paths, while downstream
mode provides earlier visibility into telemetry collected by
intermediate nodes.
5.7. Deploying HTS in a Multicast Network
HTS can be deployed in multicast networks, but operators should be
aware that Trigger and Follow-up packets behave differently in
multicast forwarding trees.
5.7.1. Trigger Packet Behavior
An HTS Trigger packet follows the multicast distribution tree
determined by the transport encapsulation and Characteristic
Information. As a result:
* The Trigger fans out to all downstream branches.
* Each downstream branch may traverse a different number of
intermediate nodes.
* Each leaf node (multicast receiver or egress HTS node) receives a
copy of the Trigger.
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HTS does not modify multicast forwarding behavior; the Trigger is
replicated exactly as a normal multicast packet would be.
5.7.2. Follow-up Packet Behavior
HTS Follow-up packets do not follow multicast replication semantics.
A Follow-up packet is always unicast toward the HTS collector or
toward the node that originated the Trigger, depending on the
deployment mode.
As a result:
* Each branch of the multicast tree produces its own Follow-up
packet.
* Follow-up packets from different branches may arrive at the
collector at different times.
* The collector MUST correlate Follow-up packets using
Characteristic Information and Sequence Number.
Network analytics should expect one train of Follow-up packets per
multicast branch, not one per Trigger.
5.7.3. Telemetry Volume Considerations
Because each multicast branch produces a separate train of Follow-up
packets:
* Telemetry volume increases with the number of multicast receivers.
* HTS Max Length should be configured with awareness of the smallest
MTU of all branches.
* Frequent Full-flag events on long branches may indicate
insufficient MTU headroom.
5.7.4. Timer Considerations
Each egress node in the multicast tree maintains its own HTS
Collection Timer. Timer expirations may occur independently on
different branches, especially when:
* branch lengths differ,
* congestion affects only part of the tree, or
* Follow-up packets are lost on specific branches.
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Operators should expect asynchronous Follow-up arrivals from
different multicast receivers.
5.7.5. Collector Considerations
The HTS collector MUST be prepared to receive:
* multiple Follow-up packets per Trigger,
* each corresponding to a different multicast branch,
* each containing telemetry from a distinct path.
Collectors SHOULD:
* correlate Follow-up packets using both the Characteristic
Information and the HTS shim.
* treat each Follow-up as representing a unique multicast path,
* aggregate results per Trigger if required by operational policy.
5.8. Operational Monitoring and Diagnostics
Operators SHOULD monitor:
* ratio of HTS Trigger to Follow-up
* timer expirations
* validation failures.
Persistent issues may indicate:
* misattributed Characteristic Information,
* misconfiguration or overloading of telemetry profiles,
* software defects.
6. Authentication in HTS
Telemetry information may be used to drive network operation, closing
the control loop for self-driving, self-healing networks. Thus, it
is critical to provide a mechanism to protect the telemetry
information collected using the HTS method.
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6.1. HMAC Sub-TLV
This document defines an optional HTS HMAC TLV that provides
integrity protection for HTS shim fields and Telemetry Data TLVs.
The format of the HMAC sub-TLV is displayed in Figure 6.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Authentic. Type| HMAC Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Digest |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: HMAC Sub-TLV
where fields are defined as follows:
* Authentication Type - is a one-octet-long field, value 1 is
allocated by IANA Section 7.2.1.
* Length - two-octet-long field, set equal to the length of the
Digest field in octets.
* HMAC Type - is a one-octet-long field that identifies the type of
the HMAC and the length of the digest and the length of the digest
according to the HTS HMAC Type sub-registry (see Section 7.2.3).
* Digest - is a variable-length field that carries HMAC digest of
the text that includes the encompassing TLV.
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This specification defines the use of HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 128
bits ([RFC4868]) in HTS. Future specifications may define the use in
HTS of more advanced cryptographic algorithms or the use of digest of
a different length. HMAC is calculated as defined in [RFC2104] over
text as the concatenation of the Sequence Number field of the Follow-
up packet (see Figure 3) and the preceding data collected in the
Telemetry Data TLV. The digest then MUST be truncated to 128 bits
and written into the Digest field. Distribution and management of
shared keys are outside the scope of this document. In the HTS
authenticated mode, the Authentication sub-TLV MUST be present in
each Telemetry Data TLV. HMAC MUST be verified before using any data
in the included Telemetry Data TLV. If HMAC verification fails, the
system MUST stop processing corresponding Telemetry Data TLV and
notify an operator. Specification of the notification mechanism is
outside the scope of this document.
6.2. Authentication Mechanisms in HTS
To authenticate the Follow-up packets, operators MAY use
authentication mechanisms available in the transport encapsulation
used to carry HTS. Examples include:
* IPsec AH ([RFC4303])/ESP ([RFC4302]) for IPv4 and IPv6
* MACsec for Ethernet ([IEEE-802.1AE])
* DTLS for UDP-based encapsulations ([RFC9147])
* SRv6 HMAC TLV ([RFC8754])
* NSH MD Type-1 authentication metadata ([RFC8300])
Operators SHOULD enable authentication when HTS packets traverse
untrusted or multi-tenant environments.
6.3. Integrity of Characteristic Information
Characteristic Information determines the forwarding behavior of HTS
Trigger and Follow-up packets.
To prevent mis-routing or mis-injection, operators should use
integrity mechanisms provided by the underlying transport
encapsulation (e.g., IPsec AH/ESP, MACsec, NSH MD-Type 1
authentication metadata). These mechanisms help ensure that
Characteristic Information is not modified in transit.
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HTS nodes perform validation of Characteristic Information as part of
normal HTS packet processing (Section 4). Integrity protection at
the transport layer complements this validation by preventing
unauthorized modification of fields that influence forwarding
behavior.
6.4. Integrity of Telemetry Data
HTS does not define new integrity mechanisms for telemetry data.
Telemetry Data TLVs MAY be protected by existing OAM integrity
mechanisms, such as:
* IPsec AH ([RFC4303])/ESP ([RFC4302]) for IPv4 and IPv6
* MACsec for Ethernet ([IEEE-802.1AE])
* DTLS for UDP-based encapsulations ([RFC9147])
* SRv6 HMAC TLV ([RFC8754])
* NSH metadata integrity ([RFC9145])
6.5. Authentication of HTS Nodes
HTS nodes SHOULD be authenticated using mechanisms appropriate to the
deployment environment, such as:
* control-plane authentication (e.g., TLS, SSH, NETCONF/RESTCONF
security)
* routing-protocol authentication (e.g., OSPFv3 authentication, BGP
TTL security)
* domain-level trust models (e.g., SR domain trust, NSH SFC domain
trust)
Authentication of HTS nodes ensures that Trigger and Follow-up
packets originate only from authorized devices.
7. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to make several allocations and create
registries associated with HTS. HTS also defines a new IOAM Option-
Type, which must be allocated from the existing IOAM Option Types
registry established by [RFC9197]. HTS does not modify any other
IOAM registries.
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7.1. IOAM Option-Type for HTS
This document defines a new IOAM HTS Option-Type, which instructs
IOAM-capable nodes to perform HTS processing when operating within an
IOAM domain. The IOAM HTS Option-Type is an alternative IOAM
behavior, similar in nature to IOAM-Trace, IOAM-DEX, and IOAM
Proof-of-Transit.
IANA is requested to allocate a new value from the “IOAM Option
Types” registry established by [RFC9197]. IANA is requested to
allocate a new code point as listed in Table 1.
+=======+================+=========================+===============+
| Value | Name | Description | Reference |
+=======+================+=========================+===============+
| TBA1 | IOAM Hybrid | Instructs IOAM nodes to | This document |
| | Two-Step (HTS) | apply HTS processing to | |
| | Option-Type | the packet within the | |
| | | IOAM domain | |
+-------+----------------+-------------------------+---------------+
Table 1: IOAM Option-Type for HTS
7.2. HTS Registry Group and HTS Registries
IANA is requested to create "Hybrid Two-Step" registry group.
7.2.1. HTS TLV Registry
IANA is requested to create the HTS TLV Type registry in the "Hybrid
Two-Step" registry group. All code points in the range 1 through 175
in this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF Review"
procedure specified in [RFC8126]. Code points in the range 176
through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according to the
"First Come First Served" procedure specified in [RFC8126]. The
remaining code points are allocated according to Table 2:
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+===========+==============+===============+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+===========+==============+===============+
| 0 | Reserved | This document |
+-----------+--------------+---------------+
| 1 - 175 | Unassigned | This document |
+-----------+--------------+---------------+
| 176 - 239 | Unassigned | This document |
+-----------+--------------+---------------+
| 240 - 251 | Experimental | This document |
+-----------+--------------+---------------+
| 252 - 254 | Private Use | This document |
+-----------+--------------+---------------+
| 255 | Reserved | This document |
+-----------+--------------+---------------+
Table 2: HTS TLV Type Registry
7.2.2. HTS Sub-TLV Type Sub-registry
IANA is requested to create the HTS sub-TLV Type sub-registry as part
of the HTS TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1 through
175 in this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF
Review" procedure specified in [RFC8126]. Code points in the range
176 through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according to the
"First Come First Served" procedure specified in [RFC8126]. The
remaining code points are allocated according to Table 3:
+===========+==============+==========+===============+
| Value | Description | TLV Used | Reference |
+===========+==============+==========+===============+
| 0 | Reserved | None | This document |
+-----------+--------------+----------+---------------+
| 1 | HMAC | Any | This document |
+-----------+--------------+----------+---------------+
| 2 - 175 | Unassigned | | This document |
+-----------+--------------+----------+---------------+
| 176 - 239 | Unassigned | | This document |
+-----------+--------------+----------+---------------+
| 240 - 251 | Experimental | | This document |
+-----------+--------------+----------+---------------+
| 252 - 254 | Private Use | | This document |
+-----------+--------------+----------+---------------+
| 255 | Reserved | None | This document |
+-----------+--------------+----------+---------------+
Table 3: HTS Sub-TLV Type Sub-registry
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7.2.3. HMAC Type Sub-registry
IANA is requested to create the HMAC Type sub-registry as part of the
HTS TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1 through 127 in
this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF Review"
procedure specified in [RFC8126]. Code points in the range 128
through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according to the
"First Come First Served" procedure specified in [RFC8126]. The
remaining code points are allocated according to Table 4:
+===========+=============================+===============+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+===========+=============================+===============+
| 0 | Reserved | This document |
+-----------+-----------------------------+---------------+
| 1 | HMAC-SHA-256 16 octets long | This document |
+-----------+-----------------------------+---------------+
| 2 - 127 | Unassigned | This document |
+-----------+-----------------------------+---------------+
| 128 - 239 | Unassigned | This document |
+-----------+-----------------------------+---------------+
| 240 - 249 | Experimental | This document |
+-----------+-----------------------------+---------------+
| 250 - 254 | Private Use | This document |
+-----------+-----------------------------+---------------+
| 255 | Reserved | This document |
+-----------+-----------------------------+---------------+
Table 4: HMAC Type Sub-registry
7.2.4. HTS Error Codes Registry
IANA is requested to create in the HTS registry group the new Error
Codes registry as follows:
Registry Name: Error Codes
Assignment Policy:
0 - 247 - IETF Review
248 - 251 - Experimental Use (Reserved, not to be assigned)
252 - 255 - Private Use (Reserved, not to be assigned)
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+=========+===================+======================+===========+
| Value | Name | Description | Reference |
+=========+===================+======================+===========+
| 0 | No Error | No error detected | This |
| | | | document |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
| 1 | Invalid HTS Shim | HTS shim validation | This |
| | | failed | document |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
| 2 | Invalid Telemetry | TLV malformed, | This |
| | Data TLV | inconsistent, or | document |
| | | unsupported | |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
| 3 | HMAC Verification | HMAC TLV present but | This |
| | Failure | authentication | document |
| | | failed | |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
| 4 | Follow-up Not | HTS Collection Timer | This |
| | Received | expired before final | document |
| | | Follow-up packet | |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
| 5 | Local Processing | Internal Egress | This |
| | Error | processing error | document |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
| 6 - 247 | | Unassigned | This |
| | | | document |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
| 248-251 | | Reserved for | This |
| | | Experimental Use | document |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
| 252-255 | | Reserved for Private | This |
| | | Use | document |
+---------+-------------------+----------------------+-----------+
Table 5: Error Codes
8. Security Considerations
HTS introduces new packet types (Trigger and Follow-up) and new
metadata (HTS shim, Telemetry Data TLVs, and optional HTS HMAC TLV).
This section describes the security considerations associated with
processing these packets and metadata. HTS does not modify the
security properties of the underlying transport encapsulation.
8.1. Secuiring the Integrity of Characteristic Information
Characteristic Information determines the forwarding behavior of HTS
Trigger and Follow-up packets.
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If Characteristic Information is modified, mis-routed, or
mis-injected, HTS packets may:
* traverse unintended paths,
* fail to correlate at the collector,
* produce incomplete or misleading telemetry.
HTS nodes MUST validate Characteristic Information as described in
Section 4. Packets whose Characteristic Information fails validation
MUST be discarded. Operators SHOULD protect Characteristic
Information using authentication or integrity mechanisms provided by
the underlying transport encapsulation (e.g., IPsec AH/ESP, MACsec,
NSH MD-Type 1 authentication metadata).
8.2. Integrity of HTS Shim and Telemetry Data
HTS Follow-up packets carry telemetry data contributed by
intermediate nodes.
An attacker who modifies telemetry data or HTS shim fields could:
* falsify performance measurements,
* hide congestion or failures,
* inject misleading operational information,
* disrupt correlation at the collector.
Operators SHOULD enable integrity protection when telemetry is used
for security-sensitive applications.
HTS defines an optional HTS HMAC TLV (Section 6.1) that provides
integrity protection for HTS shim fields and Telemetry Data TLVs.
When present, HTS nodes MUST validate the HMAC TLV before processing
the packet.
Packets whose HMAC validation fails MUST be discarded.
8.3. Confidentiality of Telemetry Data
HTS telemetry may include information about:
* node performance,
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* queue depth,
* buffer occupancy,
* interface load,
* processing delays.
This information may be sensitive in multi-tenant or shared
environments.
Operators SHOULD protect telemetry export channels (e.g., IPFIX,
gRPC, NETCONF/RESTCONF) using authentication and encryption
mechanisms appropriate to the deployment environment.
HTS does not define confidentiality mechanisms for telemetry data
carried in Follow-up packets.
Operators SHOULD rely on transport-layer confidentiality mechanisms
(e.g., IPsec ESP, MACsec, DTLS) when confidentiality is required.
8.4. Replay Protection
Replay of HTS Follow-up packets could cause:
* duplicate telemetry records,
* misleading performance measurements,
* incorrect correlation at collectors.
HTS shim Sequence Numbers provide basic replay detection.
Egress HTS nodes and Collectors SHOULD discard Follow-up packets
whose Sequence Numbers are stale or inconsistent with previously
received packets.
When the HTS HMAC TLV is used, replayed packets will fail HMAC
validation if the HMAC includes a nonce or timestamp.
8.5. Multicast Security Considerations
In multicast deployments:
* Trigger packets fan out across multiple branches,
* Follow-up packets are unicast back to the collector,
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* each branch produces its own Follow-up packet.
Attackers could attempt to inject false Follow-up packets from
unauthorized multicast receivers.
Egress HTS nodes MUST validate Characteristic Information and HTS
shim fields and MUST validate the HTS HMAC TLV when present before
processing the Follow-up packets.
Operators SHOULD ensure that multicast receivers are authenticated
and authorized to participate in HTS measurement.
8.6. Denial-of-Service Considerations
HTS introduces additional packet processing at ingress, intermediate,
and egress nodes.
An attacker could attempt to overload HTS nodes by:
* sending excessive Trigger packets,
* injecting malformed Follow-up packets,
* forcing repeated timer expirations,
* causing excessive Full-flag events.
HTS ingress nodes MUST provide a mechanism to rate-limit HTS Trigger
packets and SHOULD apply local policies to prevent excessive resource
consumption.
Collectors SHOULD detect abnormal HTS packet rates and alert
operators.
9. Acknowledgments
Authors express their gratitude and appreciation to Joel Halpern for
the most helpful and insightful discussion on the applicability of
HTS in a Service Function Chaining domain. Also, the authors thank
Bjørn Ivar Teigen for the discussion about ensuring proper
correlation between generated telemetry information and an HTS
Follow-up packet. And a special thank you to Xiao Min for thorough
review and thoughtful suggestions that helped in improving the
document.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
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[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9197] Brockners, F., Ed., Bhandari, S., Ed., and T. Mizrahi,
Ed., "Data Fields for In Situ Operations, Administration,
and Maintenance (IOAM)", RFC 9197, DOI 10.17487/RFC9197,
May 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9197>.
[RFC9326] Song, H., Gafni, B., Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., and T.
Mizrahi, "In Situ Operations, Administration, and
Maintenance (IOAM) Direct Exporting", RFC 9326,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9326, November 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9326>.
10.2. Informative References
[IEEE-802.1AE]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks-Media Access Control (MAC) Security", IEEE Std
802.1AE-2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8447385, August
2018, <https://ieee.org>.
[P4.INT] "In-band Network Telemetry (INT)", P4.org Specification,
November 2020.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC2681] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S., and M. Zekauskas, "A Round-trip
Delay Metric for IPPM", RFC 2681, DOI 10.17487/RFC2681,
September 1999, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2681>.
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[RFC2992] Hopps, C., "Analysis of an Equal-Cost Multi-Path
Algorithm", RFC 2992, DOI 10.17487/RFC2992, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2992>.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
[RFC7799] Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.
[RFC8169] Mirsky, G., Ruffini, S., Gray, E., Drake, J., Bryant, S.,
and A. Vainshtein, "Residence Time Measurement in MPLS
Networks", RFC 8169, DOI 10.17487/RFC8169, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8169>.
[RFC8300] Quinn, P., Ed., Elzur, U., Ed., and C. Pignataro, Ed.,
"Network Service Header (NSH)", RFC 8300,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8300, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8300>.
[RFC8754] Filsfils, C., Ed., Dukes, D., Ed., Previdi, S., Leddy, J.,
Matsushima, S., and D. Voyer, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header
(SRH)", RFC 8754, DOI 10.17487/RFC8754, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8754>.
[RFC8799] Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet
Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, July 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8799>.
[RFC9145] Boucadair, M., Reddy.K, T., and D. Wing, "Integrity
Protection for the Network Service Header (NSH) and
Encryption of Sensitive Context Headers", RFC 9145,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9145, December 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9145>.
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[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
[RFC9341] Fioccola, G., Ed., Cociglio, M., Mirsky, G., Mizrahi, T.,
and T. Zhou, "Alternate-Marking Method", RFC 9341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9341, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9341>.
[RFC9342] Fioccola, G., Ed., Cociglio, M., Sapio, A., Sisto, R., and
T. Zhou, "Clustered Alternate-Marking Method", RFC 9342,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9342, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9342>.
[RFC9940] Davis, N., Ed., Farrel, A., Ed., Graf, T., Wu, Q., and C.
Yu, "Some Key Terms for Network Fault and Problem
Management", RFC 9940, DOI 10.17487/RFC9940, April 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9940>.
Authors' Addresses
Greg Mirsky
Ciena Corporation
Email: gregimirsky@gmail.com, gmirsky@ciena.com
Wang Lingqiang
ZTE Corporation
No 19, East Huayuan Road
Beijing
100191
China
Phone: +86 10 82963945
Email: wang.lingqiang@zte.com.cn
Guo Zhui
ZTE Corporation
No 19 ,East Huayuan Road
Beijing
100191
China
Phone: +86 10 82963945
Email: guo.zhui@zte.com.cn
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Haoyu Song
Futurewei Technologies
2330 Central Expressway
Santa Clara,
United States of America
Email: hsong@futurewei.com
Pascal Thubert
Independent
06330 Roquefort-les-Pins
France
Email: pascal.thubert@gmail.com
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