Internet Engineering Task Force N. Elkins
Internet-Draft Inside Products, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track M. Ackermann
Expires: 17 February 2027 BCBS Michigan
A. Deshpande
NITK Surathkal/Google
T. Pecorella
University of Florence
A. Rashid
Politecnico di Bari
L. Fedi
University of Florence
16 August 2026
IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics Version 2 (PDMv2) Destination
Option
draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-16
Abstract
RFC 8250 defines an IPv6 Destination Option that carries Performance
and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) such as sequence numbers and timing
information. While useful for measurement and troubleshooting,
clear-text PDM data may expose operational characteristics of
endpoints and networks.
This document defines PDMv2, a revised version of PDM that introduces
a registration-based security model. Instead of specifying
cryptographic algorithms or inline key negotiation, PDMv2 relies on a
prior registration process to authenticate entities, authorize
participation, and establish shared secrets. These secrets are then
used by endpoints and authorized analyzers to protect and interpret
PDMv2 data according to local policy.
This document specifies the PDMv2 semantics, header structure, and
operational model. The selection of specific cryptographic
algorithms and key derivation functions, and the definition of any
cipher-negotiation mechanism, are outside the scope of this document.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://ameyand.github.io/PDMv2/draft-elkins-ippm-encrypted-
pdmv2.html. Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2/.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
Discussion of this document takes place on the IP Performance
Measurement Working Group mailing list (mailto:ippm@ietf.org), which
is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ippm/.
Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ippm/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ameyand/PDMv2.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 February 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. PDMv2 Foundational Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Registration Framework Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Registration Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Registration Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
5.3. Registration Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.4. Registration Output and SessionTemporaryKey . . . . . . . 6
6. PDMv2 Destination Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Use of IPv6 Destination Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. Global Pointer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. PDMv2 Destination Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Unprotected PDMv2 Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. Protected PDMv2 Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.3. Option Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.4. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.5. Epoch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.6. PDMv2 Flow Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.7. Packet Sequence Number This Packet . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.8. Packet Sequence Number Last Received . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.9. Global Pointer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.10. Scale Fields and Delta Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.11. Reserved Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.12. Segmentation and Aggregation Offload . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.13. Protected Options and Repeated PSNTP Values . . . . . . . 17
7.14. Receiver Validation and Exception Handling . . . . . . . 17
8. Operational Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Registration Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Measurement Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.3. Analysis Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.4. PDMv2 Option Size and Path Treatment . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10.1. Global Pointer Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.1. PDMv2 Destination Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix A. Example: RADIUS / EAP-Based Registration . . . . . . 23
A.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.2. Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.3. Registration Flow (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.4. Registration Flow (Illustrative ASCII Diagram) . . . . . 24
A.5. Use with PDMv2 Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.6. Key Lifecycle Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.7. Example Deployment: Federated Environments
(eduroam-Style) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.8. Why TLS Session Keys Are Not Reused (Informative) . . . . 26
A.9. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix C. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
1. Introduction
The Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination Option
defined in [RFC8250] provides packet sequence numbers and timing
information to support performance measurement and diagnostics.
While effective, transmitting such information in clear text can
reveal details about endpoint behavior, processing capability, and
network characteristics.
PDMv2 enhances PDM by enabling secure operation through a
registration-first architecture. Security-sensitive material is
established out of band, prior to data transmission, and is not
negotiated inline with PDMv2 traffic. This approach preserves the
lightweight nature of PDM while avoiding tight coupling to transport-
layer security protocols.
PDMv2 operates entirely at the IPv6 layer and applies uniformly to
TCP, UDP, ICMP, QUIC, and other upper-layer protocols. Intermediate
devices are not required to decrypt or interpret PDMv2 contents.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Design Goals
PDMv2 is designed with the following goals:
* Maintain compatibility with the operational model of [RFC8250]
* Avoid inline cryptographic handshakes at the IP layer
* Support heterogeneous transport protocols and non-transport flows
* Enable offline analysis by authorized entities
* Integrate cleanly with existing authentication and authorization
infrastructures
4. PDMv2 Foundational Principles
PDMv2 adheres to the following foundational principles:
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
* Registration-First Security: All security context used by PDMv2 is
established during a prior registration phase. No cryptographic
negotiation occurs during PDMv2 packet exchange.
* IP-Layer Independence: PDMv2 security does not depend on TCP, TLS,
QUIC, or any specific transport protocol.
* Minimal On-Path Impact: Routers and intermediate nodes forward
PDMv2 packets without decryption or inspection.
* Offline Decryption and Analysis: PDMv2 data MAY be collected and
analyzed after transmission. Real-time interpretation is optional
and deployment-specific.
* Separation of Specification Scope: This document defines protocol
behavior and data formats, not cryptographic algorithms.
* Explicit Authorization: Only registered and authorized entities
may emit, receive, or analyze protected PDMv2 data.
5. Registration Framework Overview
PDMv2 relies on an external registration system to establish trust
and shared context between participating entities.
5.1. Registration Objectives
A PDMv2 registration mechanism establishes the context required for
authorized endpoints and measurement systems to generate, receive,
interpret, and, when applicable, decrypt PDMv2 information.
A registration mechanism is expected to provide:
* identification and authorization of participating endpoints or
measurement domains;
* authorization to generate, receive, or analyze PDMv2 data;
* selection of the PDMv2 protection suite;
* establishment or provisioning of the keying material required by
that suite;
* assignment of an Epoch value;
* definition of the scope and lifetime of the resulting security
context;
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
* delivery of the context required to construct nonces and
associated data; and
* procedures for expiration, replacement, and revocation of the
security context.
This document does not require a particular registration protocol.
Appendix A describes one possible mechanism.
5.2. Registration Participants
The following logical roles are assumed:
* Client : An endpoint that initiates communication and emits PDMv2
data
* Server : An endpoint that receives communication and emits PDMv2
data
* Authentication Server (AS) : A trusted entity that performs
authentication and authorization
* Analyzer : An authorized entity that interprets collected PDMv2
data
An implementation MAY combine roles within a single system.
5.3. Registration Transport
The registration exchange MUST be protected by a secure channel. The
choice of transport and security protocol is out of scope for this
document.
5.4. Registration Output and SessionTemporaryKey
A successful registration produces a PDMv2 security context
containing, at minimum:
* the identities or measurement domains to which the context
applies;
* the authorization granted to each participant;
* the selected PDMv2 protection suite;
* an Epoch value;
* keying material or a directly provisioned SessionTemporaryKey;
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
* the scope and lifetime of the keying material; and
* the information required to construct nonces and associated data.
A SessionTemporaryKey is cryptographic keying material used to
protect PDMv2 metric blocks during a bounded key epoch. It is
derived or provisioned from keying material established by the
applicable registration mechanism.
The registration mechanism or protection-suite specification MUST
define:
* how the SessionTemporaryKey is derived or provisioned;
* the cryptographic algorithm and key length;
* the endpoints, flows, or measurement domain to which the key
applies;
* the Epoch value associated with the key;
* the lifetime of the key;
* the rekey procedure;
* how authorized measurement systems obtain the required security
context; and
* how expiration and revocation are handled.
When a SessionTemporaryKey is derived from a master secret, the
derivation MUST use a cryptographically secure key-derivation
function and a PDMv2-specific purpose label. The derivation MUST
provide cryptographic separation between PDMv2 keys and keys used by
other protocols or for other purposes.
A PDMv2 SessionTemporaryKey MUST NOT be a TLS, QUIC, IPsec, or other
application or transport traffic key.
The specific registration protocol and key-derivation function are
outside the scope of this document.
This document specifies the PDMv2 on-wire formats and the processing
and exception-handling requirements for those formats. A
registration mechanism supplies the security context described in
this section but does not redefine receiver behavior for malformed,
unauthenticated, or unauthorized PDMv2 options.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
6. PDMv2 Destination Options
6.1. Use of IPv6 Destination Options
PDMv2 is carried as an IPv6 Destination Option within the Destination
Options Header as defined in [RFC8200]. Processing rules from
[RFC8250] continue to apply unless explicitly updated by this
document.
PDMv2 does not define any new IPv6 extension-header ordering
requirements. The PDMv2 option is carried in an IPv6 Destination
Options header and follows the placement and processing rules for
that header defined by [RFC8200]. An implementation MUST NOT infer
additional PDMv2 semantics from the position of the Destination
Options header relative to other IPv6 extension headers.
When IPv6 fragmentation is present, PDMv2 processing follows the IPv6
fragmentation and Destination Options processing rules defined by
[RFC8200]. PDMv2 does not require a sender or receiver to perform
fragmentation or reassembly differently from other IPv6 packets
carrying a Destination Options header. A reconstruction system MAY
use information derived from IPv6 fragmentation and reassembly, when
available, together with other transport and PDMv2 observations as
described in Section 7.12.
6.2. Metrics
PDMv2 supports the following metrics:
* Packet Sequence Number (This Packet)
* Packet Sequence Number (Last Received)
* Delta Time Last Received
* Delta Time Last Sent
* Global Pointer
These metrics have the same semantics as in [RFC8250], with the
addition of the Global Pointer.
6.3. Global Pointer
The Global Pointer provides a coarse indicator of packet transmission
activity by an endpoint. Separate counters are maintained for link-
local and global unicast source addresses.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
7. PDMv2 Destination Option
PDMv2 defines an unprotected wire format and a protected wire format.
Both formats use the PDMv2 Option Type assigned by IANA.
PDMv2 does not reuse the PDM Option Type 0x0F assigned by [RFC8250].
References in this document to fields adopted from [RFC8250] describe
their semantics and do not indicate reuse of the RFC 8250 Option
Type.
The Option Length distinguishes the unprotected and protected
formats. A receiver can therefore determine from the PDMv2 option
itself whether the metric block is protected. Registration context
is required to decrypt and interpret a protected metric block, but it
is not required merely to identify the format.
An implementation MUST NOT determine whether a received PDMv2 option
is protected solely from local policy or registration context.
7.1. Unprotected PDMv2 Format
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Len=22 | Version | Epoch |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Sequence Number This Packet |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Sequence Number Last Received |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Global Pointer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ScaleDTLR | ScaleDTLS | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Delta Time Last Received | Delta Time Last Sent |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Option Length is 22 decimal (0x16). As specified for IPv6
options, the Option Length excludes the Option Type and Option Length
octets. The complete unprotected PDMv2 option occupies 24 octets.
The fields following the Option Length are:
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
+========+==========+==========================+
| Offset | Length | Field |
+========+==========+==========================+
| 2 | 4 bits | Version |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 2 | 12 bits | Epoch |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 4 | 4 octets | PSNTP |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 8 | 4 octets | PSNLR |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 12 | 4 octets | Global Pointer |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 16 | 1 octet | ScaleDTLR |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 17 | 1 octet | ScaleDTLS |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 18 | 2 octets | Reserved |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 20 | 2 octets | Delta Time Last Received |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
| 22 | 2 octets | Delta Time Last Sent |
+--------+----------+--------------------------+
Table 1
7.2. Protected PDMv2 Format
The protected format uses an authenticated-encryption protection
suite that produces a 16-octet authentication tag.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Len=38 | Version | Epoch |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Sequence Number This Packet |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Protected Metric Block +
| (16 octets) |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Authentication Tag +
| (16 octets) |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Option Length is 38 decimal (0x26). It excludes the Option Type
and Option Length octets. The complete protected PDMv2 option
occupies 40 octets.
The plaintext protected metric block is:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Sequence Number Last Received |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Global Pointer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ScaleDTLR | ScaleDTLS | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Delta Time Last Received | Delta Time Last Sent |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The protected format has the following organization:
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
+========+===========+================+=========================+
| Offset | Length | Field | Protection |
+========+===========+================+=========================+
| 0 | 1 octet | Option Type | Clear and authenticated |
+--------+-----------+----------------+-------------------------+
| 1 | 1 octet | Option Length | Clear and authenticated |
+--------+-----------+----------------+-------------------------+
| 2 | 4 bits | Version | Clear and authenticated |
+--------+-----------+----------------+-------------------------+
| 2 | 12 bits | Epoch | Clear and authenticated |
+--------+-----------+----------------+-------------------------+
| 4 | 4 octets | PSNTP | Clear and authenticated |
+--------+-----------+----------------+-------------------------+
| 8 | 16 octets | Protected | Encrypted and |
| | | Metric Block | authenticated |
+--------+-----------+----------------+-------------------------+
| 24 | 16 octets | Authentication | AEAD output |
| | | Tag | |
+--------+-----------+----------------+-------------------------+
Table 2
The Option Type, Option Length, Version, Epoch, and PSNTP fields MUST
be cryptographically bound to the protected metric block as
associated data.
This specification requires a 16-octet authentication tag. A future
protection suite using a different tag length must define an
unambiguous on-wire indication of its format and length.
7.3. Option Type
The Option Type is the 8-bit value assigned by IANA for PDMv2: TBD1
TBD1 is distinct from the PDM Option Type 0x0F assigned by [RFC8250].
The required IPv6 option action and change-en-route bits are
reflected in the value assigned by IANA. The hexadecimal value
remains TBD1 until the allocation is made.
7.4. Version
The Version field is a 4-bit unsigned integer. This document defines
Version 2.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
A receiver that does not support the indicated version MUST process
the option according to the action bits in the PDMv2 Option Type.
The receiver MUST NOT interpret the remaining fields using the
Version 2 format.
7.5. Epoch
The Epoch field is a 12-bit unsigned integer identifying the PDMv2
security context and SessionTemporaryKey applicable to the protected
option.
The Epoch value is a key selector. It is not secret keying material.
The registration mechanism or protection-suite specification MUST
define how an Epoch is assigned, how long it remains valid, and how a
receiver maps the Epoch to the applicable security context.
A sender MUST NOT independently protect different PDMv2 plaintext
values using the same SessionTemporaryKey and nonce.
Before PSNTP reuse could cause nonce reuse with the same
SessionTemporaryKey, the sender MUST establish a new key epoch or
otherwise follow a nonce construction defined by the selected
protection suite that prevents nonce reuse.
7.6. PDMv2 Flow Identification
The term "PDMv2 flow" identifies the packet sequence and associated
PDMv2 state. It is not limited to protocols that provide transport-
layer port numbers.
For TCP and UDP, a PDMv2 flow is identified by:
* IPv6 source address;
* IPv6 destination address;
* upper-layer protocol number;
* source port; and
* destination port.
For ICMPv6, where transport-layer ports do not exist, a PDMv2 flow is
identified by:
* IPv6 source address;
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
* IPv6 destination address;
* ICMPv6 Next Header value;
* ICMPv6 Type; and
* ICMPv6 Code.
For ICMPv6 message types containing an Identifier field, such as Echo
Request and Echo Reply, an implementation SHOULD also use that
Identifier to distinguish concurrent exchanges.
An ICMPv6 error message is classified using its outer IPv6 and ICMPv6
headers. The quoted packet carried inside the ICMPv6 error message
does not identify the flow carrying the PDMv2 option.
For another upper-layer protocol without port numbers, the protocol
specification or registration context SHOULD define an equivalent
stable flow identifier. If no protocol-specific discriminator is
available, packets having the same IPv6 source address, IPv6
destination address, and upper-layer protocol number are treated as
one PDMv2 flow.
For TCP and UDP, the corresponding reverse-direction flow is
identified by exchanging the source and destination IPv6 addresses
and exchanging the source and destination ports.
For ICMPv6 request-and-reply message pairs, the corresponding
reverse-direction flow exchanges the source and destination IPv6
addresses and associates the applicable request Type with its
corresponding reply Type. When an Identifier field is present, the
same Identifier is used for the association. A registration or
protocol specification defining another request-and-reply
relationship MUST define its reverse-direction mapping.
If no corresponding reverse-direction flow can be identified, PSNLR
is initialized as specified by this document.
7.7. Packet Sequence Number This Packet
The Packet Sequence Number This Packet field, abbreviated PSNTP, is a
32-bit unsigned integer.
PSNTP is initialized to a pseudorandom value when PDMv2 state is
created for a flow. It is incremented modulo (2^{32}) for each
packet processed as a new transmission at the PDMv2 sender's
processing point.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
PSNTP counts packet-processing events visible to the PDMv2 module.
It does not count application data units, TCP sequence space, or
unique transport payloads.
A TCP retransmission presented to the PDMv2 module as a new packet is
a new transmission and receives a new PSNTP value.
Packets produced below the PDMv2 processing point by segmentation
offload can retain the PSNTP value of the packet from which they were
produced, as described in Section 7.12.
7.8. Packet Sequence Number Last Received
The Packet Sequence Number Last Received field, abbreviated PSNLR,
contains the PSNTP value from the most recently received PDMv2
observation associated with the corresponding reverse-direction flow.
Because segmentation, aggregation, packet duplication, reordering, or
differences in processing location can affect the observations
available to an implementation, PSNLR describes the most recent PDMv2
observation at the implementation's processing point. It does not
necessarily identify the last physical packet received by an
interface.
Before a PDMv2 option has been received for the corresponding
reverse-direction flow, PSNLR is initialized to zero.
7.9. Global Pointer
The Global Pointer identifies the applicable registration or
measurement context. Its interpretation and allocation are defined
by the registration mechanism.
The Global Pointer is not secret. A protected PDMv2 implementation
MUST NOT treat possession of a Global Pointer as proof of
authorization.
Because reuse of a Global Pointer can provide a means of correlating
PDMv2 observations across IPv6 address changes, implementations and
registration policies need to consider the privacy implications of
Global Pointer reuse; see Section 10.
7.10. Scale Fields and Delta Times
ScaleDTLR specifies the scale applied to Delta Time Last Received.
ScaleDTLS specifies the scale applied to Delta Time Last Sent.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
Delta Time Last Received and Delta Time Last Sent are 16-bit unsigned
values interpreted using their respective scale fields.
The existing scale and delta-time calculations inherited from the PDM
model remain unchanged unless otherwise specified by this document.
7.11. Reserved Field
The Reserved field is 16 bits.
A sender MUST set the Reserved field to zero. A receiver MUST ignore
a nonzero Reserved value for protocol processing but MAY record the
condition as an anomaly.
In the protected format, the Reserved field is part of the protected
metric block.
7.12. Segmentation and Aggregation Offload
PDMv2 can be implemented at a processing point preceding transmit
segmentation or following receive aggregation. Consequently, the
packets observed by a PDMv2 implementation do not necessarily have a
one-to-one relationship with the IPv6 packets transmitted or received
by a physical interface.
When a packet carrying PDMv2 is divided into multiple packets by TCP
Segmentation Offload, Generic Segmentation Offload, or an equivalent
mechanism below the PDMv2 processing point, the resulting packets MAY
carry identical PDMv2 field values, including the same PSNTP.
Repeated PSNTP values resulting from such processing do not, by
themselves, indicate packet loss, retransmission, malformed PDMv2
data, or nonconforming sender behavior.
Similarly, Generic Receive Offload, Large Receive Offload, or another
receive-side aggregation mechanism can combine multiple received
packets before they become visible to a PDMv2 implementation.
PDMv2 does not require an implementation to:
* disable segmentation or aggregation offload;
* inspect an outgoing interface's Maximum Transmission Unit solely
for PDMv2 processing;
* update a PDMv2 option separately in each packet produced below the
PDMv2 processing point; or
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
* reconstruct an exact one-to-one correspondence between PDMv2
observations and packets appearing on a physical interface.
A measurement or reconstruction system observing repeated PSNTP
values SHOULD use other available information, including TCP
sequence-number ranges, payload lengths, timestamps, IPv6
fragmentation information, and surrounding PDMv2 observations, to
distinguish likely segmentation, duplication, retransmission, and
reordering.
If the available information is insufficient to distinguish among
these conditions, the system SHOULD report the result as ambiguous.
It MUST NOT classify a repeated PSNTP as a protocol error solely
because the value was repeated.
PDMv2 alone cannot always determine the exact number of IPv6 packets
transmitted or received at a physical interface when segmentation or
aggregation occurs outside the PDMv2 processing point.
7.13. Protected Options and Repeated PSNTP Values
Multiple packets can contain the same protected PDMv2 value because
of packet duplication or segmentation below the PDMv2 processing
point.
Replication of an already protected PDMv2 option is not a new
invocation of the authenticated-encryption algorithm. Repetition of
an identical ciphertext and authentication tag therefore does not, by
itself, constitute cryptographic nonce reuse.
A sender MUST NOT independently encrypt different PDMv2 plaintext
values using the same SessionTemporaryKey and nonce.
A receiver or analyzer MAY recognize identical protected values as
repeated observations. It MUST authenticate a protected value before
using its contents, regardless of whether an identical value was
previously observed.
7.14. Receiver Validation and Exception Handling
A receiver MUST validate the PDMv2 Option Type, Option Length,
Version, and identified format before interpreting dependent PDMv2
fields.
A receiver MUST treat a protected PDMv2 option as invalid for PDMv2
processing if:
* authentication fails;
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
* the indicated Epoch is unknown or expired;
* the indicated Epoch cannot be mapped to an applicable security
context;
* the required security context is unavailable;
* the sender is not authorized by that security context; or
* the option is malformed or inconsistent with its declared format.
An invalid, unauthenticated, or unauthorized PDMv2 option MUST NOT be
used for measurement, reconstruction, or updating PDMv2 state.
Failure of a registration service or inability to obtain an
applicable security context MUST fail closed with respect to
protected PDMv2 content. The protected content MUST NOT be
decrypted, interpreted, or used to update measurement state.
Failure to process PDMv2 information does not, by itself, require
discarding the enclosing IPv6 packet. Unless local security policy
requires otherwise, failure to process PDMv2 information SHOULD NOT
cause the receiver to discard the enclosing packet's upper-layer
payload. The receiver MAY ignore the PDMv2 information and continue
normal IPv6 processing, subject to the processing behavior encoded in
the IPv6 Option Type action bits.
A deployment MAY discard or block packets carrying invalid or
unauthorized PDMv2 options when required by local security policy.
Because such behavior can affect connectivity and can be exploited
for denial of service, implementations SHOULD default to ignoring
invalid PDMv2 measurement information rather than discarding the
enclosing packet when the IPv6 Option Type action bits permit that
behavior.
An unsupported Version MUST be processed according to the action bits
in the PDMv2 Option Type. The receiver MUST NOT interpret the
remaining fields using the Version 2 format.
Implementations SHOULD count, log, or alert on authentication
failures, unknown or expired Epoch values, unavailable security
contexts, unauthorized senders, malformed options, unsupported
versions, and other anomalous PDMv2 conditions. Such reporting
SHOULD be aggregated or rate-limited to prevent logging-based denial
of service.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
Implementations SHOULD provide configurable policies for ignoring
invalid PDMv2 data, generating an alert, discarding an enclosing
packet, or blocking a source. The selected policy and its
operational consequences are deployment-specific.
8. Operational Model
8.1. Registration Phase
Prior to sending PDMv2 data:
* The endpoint authenticates to an Authentication Server
* Authorization for PDMv2 usage is evaluated
* Shared secret(s) or credentials are provisioned
8.2. Measurement Phase
* Endpoints send PDMv2 headers according to local policy
* No cryptographic negotiation occurs on the wire
* Intermediate devices forward packets unchanged
8.3. Analysis Phase
* Authorized analyzers access collected data
* Interpretation uses registration-derived context
8.4. PDMv2 Option Size and Path Treatment
PDMv2 options are larger than the PDM option defined by [RFC8250].
The unprotected PDMv2 option occupies 24 octets and the protected
PDMv2 option occupies 40 octets, including the Option Type and Option
Length fields. This additional overhead reduces the space available
for upper-layer payload within a given IPv6 packet size and can
affect packets near the applicable path MTU.
In addition, some networks may filter, discard, or otherwise provide
different treatment to packets containing IPv6 extension headers or
Destination Options. PDMv2 does not assume that the option will
traverse every possible path. Deployments SHOULD therefore consider
the behavior of the intended network path when enabling PDMv2. This
is particularly relevant when PDMv2 is used outside a controlled or
managed measurement environment.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
9. Security Considerations
This section follows the security-considerations guidance in
[RFC3552].
PDMv2 carries measurement information that can expose operational
characteristics of endpoints and networks. The protected format is
intended to limit interpretation and modification of that information
to entities possessing an applicable authorized security context.
Section 7.14 defines the authoritative receiver behavior for
malformed, unauthenticated, unauthorized, or otherwise unusable PDMv2
options. Such information MUST NOT be used for measurement,
reconstruction, or updating PDMv2 state. This prevents forged or
malformed PDMv2 data from contaminating measurement results.
Authentication failure, an unknown or expired Epoch, inability to map
an Epoch to a security context, an unavailable security context, or a
sender that is not authorized by that context causes the protected
PDMv2 information to be rejected for PDMv2 processing. Failure to
obtain registration information therefore fails closed with respect
to protected PDMv2 content.
The Epoch and Global Pointer fields are selectors used to locate
applicable context. Neither field is secret material, and possession
or knowledge of either value is not proof of authorization.
The selected protection suite and registration mechanism MUST prevent
reuse of the same key and nonce for independently protected different
plaintext values, as specified in Section 7.5. Segmentation,
duplication, or other processing below the PDMv2 processing point can
copy an already protected PDMv2 option into more than one packet. As
described in Section 7.13, repetition of identical ciphertext and
authentication tag is not a new authenticated-encryption invocation
and is distinct from independently encrypting different plaintexts
using the same key and nonce.
Packet-disposition policy requires care. Discarding an enclosing
IPv6 packet solely because its PDMv2 information cannot be used can
affect connectivity and can create a denial-of-service opportunity.
Section 7.14 therefore recommends ignoring invalid PDMv2 measurement
information when the IPv6 Option Type action bits and local security
policy permit that behavior. Deployments can impose stricter policy
when required.
Diagnostics can themselves be abused. Authentication failures,
malformed options, unknown or expired Epoch values, unavailable
security contexts, unauthorized senders, and unsupported versions can
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
be counted, logged, or alerted on, but reporting SHOULD be aggregated
or rate-limited as specified in Section 7.14 to avoid a logging-based
denial-of-service vector.
The security of protected PDMv2 depends on the registration system,
selected protection suite, authentication and authorization methods,
key derivation or provisioning, key lifetime, rekey procedures, and
revocation practices. Section 5.4 requires cryptographic separation
of PDMv2 SessionTemporaryKey material from TLS, QUIC, IPsec, and
other traffic keys.
10. Privacy Considerations
PDMv2 metrics may reveal traffic patterns or operational
characteristics. Registration-based authorization limits access to
such data to approved entities. Deployments SHOULD consider enabling
PDMv2 on multiple flows to reduce metadata distinguishability.
10.1. Global Pointer Correlation
The Global Pointer is visible on the wire and can provide a means of
correlating PDMv2 observations. If the same Global Pointer is used
after an endpoint changes an IPv6 privacy address, an observer may be
able to associate traffic using the old and new addresses. However,
changing the Global Pointer does not by itself prevent such
correlation. Information available to an authorized after-the-fact
analyzer can provide other means of associating observations,
including information associated with the Layer 2 interface, the IPv6
prefix, timing, and observed patterns in privacy-address changes.
Access to PDMv2 registration and analysis information is subject to
the applicable registration and authorization policy.
An implementation or registration policy that wishes to reduce
correlation based specifically on the Global Pointer MAY define a
lifetime for a Global Pointer and assign a new value when that
lifetime expires. Such a lifetime MAY be selected with consideration
for address-rotation or other privacy policies. Rotation of the
Global Pointer reduces the value of that field as a persistent
correlation identifier, but does not guarantee that observations
cannot be correlated using other information.
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. PDMv2 Destination Option
IANA is requested to assign a new IPv6 Destination Option Type for
PDMv2 from the "Destination Options and Hop-by-Hop Options" registry.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
+=======+==============================================+===========+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+=======+==============================================+===========+
| TBD1 | Performance and Diagnostic Metrics Version 2 | This |
| | | document |
+-------+----------------------------------------------+-----------+
Table 3
The PDMv2 allocation is independent of the PDM Option Type 0x0F
assigned to [RFC8250]. This document does not modify or redefine the
[RFC8250] allocation.
The requested allocation must provide the option-processing behavior
specified by this document. The final hexadecimal representation,
including the action and change-en-route bits, will be inserted when
IANA assigns the value.
12. Contributors
The authors wish to thank NITK Surathkal for their support and
assistance in coding and review. In particular Dr. Mohit Tahiliani
and Abhishek Kumar (now with Google). Thanks also to Priyanka Sinha
for her comments. Thanks to the India Internet Engineering Society
(iiesoc.in), in particular Dhruv Dhody, for his comments and for
providing the funding for servers needed for protocol development.
Thanks to Balajinaidu V, Amogh Umesh, and Chinmaya Sharma of NITK for
developing the PDMv2 implementation for testing.
13. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3552>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8200>.
[RFC8250] Elkins, N., Hamilton, R., and M. Ackermann, "IPv6
Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) Destination
Option", RFC 8250, DOI 10.17487/RFC8250, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8250>.
Appendix A. Example: RADIUS / EAP-Based Registration
This appendix illustrates one possible registration mechanism that
can meet the registration objectives listed in Section 5.1 and
provide the security context described in Section 5.4. The example
is informative. Conformance with this document depends on satisfying
the applicable normative requirements in the main body and does not
depend on using RADIUS or EAP.
A.1. Overview
This appendix describes an example registration system for PDMv2
based on RADIUS with Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). This
approach has been implemented and validated in a prototype
environment and demonstrates that a shared master secret can be
established prior to PDMv2 operation without introducing inline
cryptographic negotiation at the IP layer.
RADIUS and EAP are widely deployed for Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting (AAA) in enterprise, service provider, and federated
environments (e.g., eduroam). Their use here is illustrative and
leverages existing infrastructure and operational experience.
A.2. Participants
The following entities participate in this example:
* PDMv2 Endpoint
A Client or Server that will emit or receive PDMv2 data.
* Authentication Server (AS)
A RADIUS server that performs authentication and authorization
using EAP.
* Analyzer
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
An authorized entity that may interpret or decrypt collected PDMv2
data using registration-derived context.
An implementation MAY combine multiple roles within a single system.
A.3. Registration Flow (Example)
A typical registration flow proceeds as follows:
* Secure Channel Establishment The PDMv2 endpoint establishes a
secure exchange with the Authentication Server. In many
deployments this occurs implicitly as part of an EAP method
protected by TLS (e.g., EAP-TLS or PEAP).
* Endpoint Authentication The endpoint authenticates using
credentials appropriate to the deployment, such as certificates,
credentials, tokens, or federated identity.
* Authorization Decision The Authentication Server determines
whether the endpoint is authorized to:
- Send PDMv2 data
- Receive PDMv2 data
- Participate in specific measurement domains
* Master Secret Establishment Upon successful authentication, EAP
produces keying material (e.g., a Master Session Key). This
keying material is made available to the endpoint and retained by
the Authentication Server according to local policy.
* Provisioning of Context The endpoint associates the received
master secret with local PDMv2 policy, such as permitted peers,
scope, and lifetime.
* Analyzer Enablement (Optional) If offline analysis is required,
the Authentication Server provisions appropriate authorization or
keying context to approved analyzers.
A.4. Registration Flow (Illustrative ASCII Diagram)
The following diagram illustrates the example flow. It is provided
for clarity only and does not define protocol behavior.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
PDMv2 Endpoint Authentication Server Analyzer
| | |
|--- EAP Authentication -----> | |
|<-- EAP Success / Keys ------ | |
| | |
| (Registration Complete) | |
| | |
|====== PDMv2 Data Flow =====> | (out of path) |
| | |
| |------- Authorized Access ---->|
| |<------ Analysis Results ------|
A.5. Use with PDMv2 Traffic
After registration:
* PDMv2 packets are sent without any inline authentication or
negotiation.
* Endpoints locally derive any session-specific context needed to
protect or interpret PDMv2 metrics.
* Intermediate routers forward packets without modification or
inspection.
* Analyzers use registration-derived context to interpret collected
data.
The registration system is not involved in the PDMv2 data path.
A.6. Key Lifecycle Considerations
In this example, the RADIUS/EAP infrastructure can support:
* Periodic re-registration to refresh secrets
* Revocation of authorization by disabling credentials
* Federation across administrative domains
* Separation of endpoint and analyzer privileges
The specific key derivation, transformation, and protection
mechanisms used by this illustrative RADIUS/EAP example are outside
the scope of this appendix. Such mechanisms are subject to the
applicable normative requirements in Section 5.4 and to the selected
registration mechanism or protection-suite specification.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
A.7. Example Deployment: Federated Environments (eduroam-Style)
In federated environments such as global research and education
networks, RADIUS is commonly deployed in a hierarchical or proxy-
based architecture. An endpoint authenticates using credentials
issued by its home organization, while authorization decisions may be
enforced by visited or intermediate domains.
This model maps naturally to PDMv2 registration:
* Endpoints authenticate using existing institutional credentials
* Authorization for PDMv2 usage can be scoped by domain, role, or
policy
* Registration secrets are derived without requiring bilateral
agreements between all participating domains
This example demonstrates that PDMv2 registration can scale across
organizational and administrative boundaries.
A.8. Why TLS Session Keys Are Not Reused (Informative)
It may appear attractive to reuse TLS session keys for protecting
PDMv2 metrics. However, this approach is not suitable for PDMv2 for
several reasons:
* Layering : PDMv2 operates at the IPv6 layer, while TLS is bound to
transport-layer protocols such as TCP or QUIC.
* Protocol Coverage : PDMv2 applies equally to UDP, ICMP, and other
non-TLS-capable protocols.
* Multiplicity of Flows : A single endpoint may emit PDMv2 data for
multiple concurrent flows that do not share a common TLS session.
* Analyzer Access : Offline analyzers may require access to PDMv2
data without participating in live TLS sessions.
* Operational Simplicity : Registration decouples security
establishment from traffic patterns and avoids inline negotiation
complexity.
For these reasons, PDMv2 adopts a registration-based security model
rather than reusing transport-layer session keys.
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
A.9. Summary
This appendix demonstrates that a RADIUS/EAP-based registration
system can satisfy the registration objectives and applicable
normative requirements defined in this document. The example shows
that secure, scalable, and federated registration can be achieved
using existing AAA infrastructure, without constraining PDMv2 to a
specific authentication or cryptographic technology.
Appendix B. Change Log
Note to RFC Editor: if this document does not obsolete an existing
RFC, please remove this appendix before publication as an RFC.
Appendix C. Open Issues
Note to RFC Editor: please remove this appendix before publication as
an RFC.
Authors' Addresses
Nalini Elkins
Inside Products, Inc.
United States
Email: nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com
Michael Ackermann
BCBS Michigan
United States
Email: mackermann@bcbsm.com
Ameya Deshpande
NITK Surathkal/Google
India
Email: ameyanrd@gmail.com
Tommaso Pecorella
University of Florence
Italy
Email: tommaso.pecorella@unifi.it
Adnan Rashid
Politecnico di Bari
Italy
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2 August 2026
Email: adnan.rashid@poliba.it
Lorenzo Fedi
University of Florence
Italy
Email: lorenzo.fedi3@edu.unifi.it
Elkins, et al. Expires 17 February 2027 [Page 28]