iotops A. Mishra
Internet-Draft Inria
Intended status: Best Current Practice A. Losty
Expires: 6 May 2027 A. M. Mandalari
UCL
J. Mozley
Infoblox
M. Cunche
INSA-Lyon & Inria
2 November 2026
IoT DNS Security and Privacy Guidelines
draft-ietf-iotops-iot-dns-guidelines-06
Abstract
This document outlines guidance for Internet of Things (IoT)
manufacturers regarding the implementation of DNS stub resolver
software on devices, and for the management zones used for purposes
such as device configuration and software upgrades. It aims to
mitigate security threats, enhance privacy, and to address
operational security challenges.
DNS resolution between devices and management zone servers depends
upon DNS services within operator networks, and these services and
operator networks can be impacted by device behavior. Hence, this
document also provides guidance to network operators that deploy IoT
devices to mitigate the specific risks identified in this document
and take advantage of improved DNS security mechanisms provided by
manufacturers.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://miishra.github.io/IoT-DNS-Guidelines/draft-mishra-iotops-iot-
dns-guidelines-latest.html. Status information for this document may
be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-iot-
dns-guidelines/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/miishra/IoT-DNS-Guidelines.
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Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Threat Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Guidance for IoT Device Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Configuration of DNS servers used by IoT Stub
Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Source Port and Transaction ID Randomization . . . . . . 7
4.3. Handling of TTL Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Support of EDNS(0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5. Improve Device Behavior in Response to Resolution
Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.6. Compliance with Encrypted DNS Standards . . . . . . . . . 10
4.7. Use of DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.7.1. Stub-resolver Checking for Validation . . . . . . . . 12
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4.7.2. Stub-resolver Performing Full Validation . . . . . . 12
4.8. DNS over CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.9. Publication of Device Domain Dependencies . . . . . . . . 13
5. Guidance for Manufacturer Authoritative DNS Zones . . . . . . 14
5.1. Zone Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. TTL Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Guidance for Network Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Resolvers Supporting DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Blocking of Unmanaged or Malicious DNS Traffic . . . . . 15
6.3. Minimizing DNS Response Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.4. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
Research into the DNS behavior of IoT devices [UCLandInriaPaper]
shows widespread non-compliance with protocol standards, gaps in
protocol support, and security vulnerabilities. This leads to
unpredictable operational behavior and exposes devices to
fingerprinting and denial-of-service attacks. This document provides
DNS guidance across the IoT resolution path (device, resolver, and
authoritative infrastructure), with primary emphasis on device
behavior aimed at IoT manufacturers.
The recommendations in this document are organized according to three
roles: (1) IoT device manufacturers, concerning DNS functionality
implemented on devices; (2) operators of authoritative DNS zones used
for device management and related services; and (3) network operators
providing recursive DNS resolution or DNS-based security controls to
IoT devices. Sections Section 4, Section 5, and Section 6 address
these roles, respectively. The guidance is neutral on the type of
organization deploying DNS for IoT and leaves it up to each network
operator to consider what is appropriate for their network
considering the function that they want to achieve.
While the guidance in this document may apply to any device using
DNS, this document considers IoT devices as a specific case where
targeted recommendations are useful for the following reasons:
* The recommendations address specific IoT-related security concerns
not seen in the DNS behavior of general-purpose operating systems
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* IoT devices have different resource characteristics from general-
purpose devices, such as constrained power consumption, meaning
incorrect software implementations can have an increased
operational impact on device functionality
* IoT devices do not typically have endpoint security agents
installed on them that are widely used on general-purpose
operating systems
* There are many DNS RFCs, and this document can be used to identify
those related to specific security issues observed through
research into IoT devices, with the aim of making it easier to
address these vulnerabilities
* IoT devices may be deployed at scale on dedicated networks where
device behavior cannot be changed post-deployment, making these
recommendations particularly useful to network security teams in
mitigating vulnerabilities
* Manufacturers may use standard software distributions aimed at IoT
devices without considering DNS behavior, and the guidelines here
can be used as part of the criteria to evaluate these
distributions
* IoT devices typically perform the same set of DNS queries on
start-up, which makes them both more vulnerable because of this
predictable behavior and also more prone to network fingerprinting
[IoTDeviceIdentificationUsingPassiveNetworkTrafficAnalysis]
This document is primarily concerned with device-to-cloud
communication [RFC7452], but DNS may be used in other IoT device
communication patterns. Hence recommendations apply to any
deployment type where DNS is used, but decisions on implementation
will be proportionate to the associated security risks and
operational considerations. For example, the implementation of
Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 would be appropriate to any
implementation, whereas Section 4.6 may not be proportionate in
industrial automation environments where devices do not encrypt other
types of traffic [RFC9150]. Multicast DNS (mDNS) [RFC6762] is a
distinct protocol from unicast DNS and is out of scope in these
recommendations.
1.1. Threat Summary
Threats and associated mitigations are summarized in the table below,
along with a link to the relevant sections.
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+================+===================================+=========+
| Threat | Mitigation Summary | Section |
+================+===================================+=========+
| Hard-coded or | Use configurable resolvers; do | Section |
| ignored DNS | not fall back to hard-coded | 4.1 |
| resolver | resolvers | |
| configuration | | |
+----------------+-----------------------------------+---------+
| Predictable | Use unpredictable transaction IDs | Section |
| source ports | across the full 16-bit range and | 4.2 |
| or transaction | ensure source ports are random | |
| IDs | and span a large a range as | |
| | practical, using different source | |
| | ports for concurrent queries | |
+----------------+-----------------------------------+---------+
| Excessive or | Honor TTLs; cache responses where | Section |
| fixed-interval | resources permit; avoid | 4.3 |
| queries that | deterministic revalidation | |
| ignore TTLs | intervals | |
+----------------+-----------------------------------+---------+
| Poor EDNS(0) | Support EDNS(0); advertise safe | Section |
| support or | UDP payload sizes to avoid | 4.4 |
| oversized DNS/ | fragmentation; retry over TCP | |
| UDP messages | when the TC bit is set | |
+----------------+-----------------------------------+---------+
| Retry storms | Bound query retries; cache | Section |
| following | resolution failures; use serve- | 4.5 |
| resolution | stale where applicable | |
| failures | | |
+----------------+-----------------------------------+---------+
| Unencrypted | Support an appropriate protected | Section |
| DNS traffic | DNS transport, such as DoT, DoQ, | 4.6 |
| | DoH, or protected DoC, where | |
| | feasible | |
+----------------+-----------------------------------+---------+
| Spoofed DNS | DNSSEC-sign manufacturer-operated | Section |
| responses or | management zones; rely on | 4.7, |
| AiTM | validation by a trusted resolver | Section |
| redirection | or perform local DNSSEC | 5.1 |
| | validation | |
+----------------+-----------------------------------+---------+
| Compromised | Implement ingress filtering; use | Section |
| devices used | DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL) | 6.4 |
| for DoS with | where appropriate | |
| forged source | | |
| addresses | | |
+----------------+-----------------------------------+---------+
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Table 1
2. Terminology
DNS terminology in this document conforms to [BCP219].
+=============+====================================================+
| Terminology | Description |
+=============+====================================================+
| AiTM | adversary-in-the-middle attacks |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| DoS | Denial of Service |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Stub | DNS resolver functionality on an IoT device that |
| Resolver | relies on an upstream recursive resolver. IoT |
| | devices addressed by this document are assumed to |
| | operate as stub resolvers, or local resolver |
| | components that rely on an upstream recursive |
| | resolver. IoT devices operating as full recursive |
| | resolvers are out of scope for this document. |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Resolver | The recursive DNS resolver used by the IoT device |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Management | A DNS zone operated by an entity, hosting its |
| zone | devices' and management servers' records |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------------+
Table 2
3. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
4. Guidance for IoT Device Manufacturers
An IoT device may implement DNS resolution using a stub resolver, a
validating stub resolver, or another suitable local resolver
component. This document does not require IoT devices to use a
particular resolver architecture. Unless otherwise stated, the
recommendations in this section apply to DNS stub resolver
functionality implemented on the device. The following guidance
specifies expected behavior for IoT device stub resolvers to ensure
secure, privacy-preserving, and operationally efficient DNS
resolution.
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4.1. Configuration of DNS servers used by IoT Stub Resolvers
IoT devices have been observed to fall back to hard-coded IP
addresses for DNS resolvers [UCLandInriaPaper], such as well-known
open resolvers [CharacterizingSmartHomeIoTTraffic], or ignore
addresses assigned to them via automated configuration methods such
as DHCP Option 6 [RFC2132].
Such behavior can bypass network DNS policies and can prevent devices
from functioning correctly when the hard-coded resolver is
unreachable or blocked by the network.
The DNS resolver configuration used by an IoT device MUST be
configurable through applicable network configuration protocols or
authorized device-management mechanisms. Devices MUST NOT fall back
to hard-coded public resolvers.
Devices SHOULD use the following priority order for selecting a
resolver. The first one that results in a valid DNS response SHOULD
be selected.
1. Manual user configuration.
2. Device management software authorized for configuration purposes.
3. IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) [RFC8106], DHCPv6 [RFC9915] using
DNS configuration options such as those defined in [RFC3646], and
IPv4 DHCP [RFC2132]. When encrypted resolver options are present
in DHCP or IPv6 Router Advertisements [RFC9463], they SHOULD be
used unless the device has insufficient resources for this
(see{#encrypted-standards}).
If the selected resolver is identified only by an IP address and
encrypted resolver information was not otherwise provided, Discovery
of Designated Resolvers (DDR) [RFC9462] can be performed to discover
an encrypted resolver, where available.
4.2. Source Port and Transaction ID Randomization
Some IoT devices have been observed to have insufficient or no
randomization in the source ports of DNS queries or DNS transaction
IDs, making them vulnerable to spoofed responses. A combination of
Source Port and Transaction ID is used, amongst other criteria, by
the stub resolver when accepting a DNS response.
Device behavior MUST be consistent with Sections 4.5 and 9.2 of
[RFC5452]. Stub resolvers sending DNS queries over UDP MUST use
unpredictable DNS transaction IDs across the full 16-bit range and
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unpredictable source ports selected from as large a range of
available ports as is practical. They MUST use multiple source ports
when multiple DNS queries are outstanding.
4.3. Handling of TTL Values
IoT devices have been observed making unexpectedly high numbers of
DNS queries even when DNS record Time-To-Live values (TTLs) would
mean this should be unnecessary. Devices have also been observed
issuing DNS queries at fixed, highly predictable intervals for the
same domain names, regardless of operational changes or TTL values.
Unnecessary queries may lead to a drain of power in resource-
constrained IoT devices. Conversely, very high TTLs may impact
device operations such as communicating with management servers,
receiving software updates, or other changes, which may lead to
security issues. Deterministic query behavior that ignores TTL
values increases the risk of device fingerprinting by adversaries who
can profile query timing to identify specific device models or
firmware versions.
Manufacturers MUST configure the records in authoritative zones with
TTL values appropriate to the use of the records by devices, ensuring
the TTL is not too low to cause unnecessary queries for frequently
used names, but not high enough to cause operational issues, such as
when the IP address of an A record in a management zone changes.
IoT device resolver implementations SHOULD cache DNS responses when
sufficient memory and other device resources are available.
Implementations that cache DNS resource records MUST expire, or
otherwise process cached records in accordance with their TTLs,
unless the device has minimum or maximum cache values configured.
Where minimum or maximum cache TTL values are supported, these values
SHOULD be configurable through an appropriate device-management
mechanism rather than fixed by the implementation. When device stub
resolvers cannot be configured with minimum and maximum TTL values,
this MAY be mitigated by setting these on the network resolver.
If certain device operational requirements necessitate periodic
revalidation of critical domains (e.g., management servers), these
repeated queries SHOULD use non-deterministic inter-query timing to
avoid predictable timing patterns that could enable traffic
fingerprinting.
In the event of resolution failure (e.g., no response from the
resolver), devices SHOULD implement back-off strategies to limit
unnecessary query traffic; also see Section 4.5.
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4.4. Support of EDNS(0)
Devices have been observed having limited support for EDNS(0),
causing them to revert to TCP for queries over 512 bytes, affecting
the device's efficiency. Other research findings include increased
processing overhead and devices failing to maintain their network
connectivity when responses to DNS requests exceed 512 bytes.
IoT devices MUST support EDNS(0) and send a supported UDP packet size
via OPT 41 [RFC6891]. To avoid fragmentation of UDP packets, which
may be dropped by intervening networks, manufacturers SHOULD evaluate
guidance in [RFC9715]. Although the networks to which IoT devices
connect may support larger packet sizes, the nature of these devices
in being deployed on many network types, and DNS queries traversing
networks controlled by different operators, means it is operationally
more effective to use a smaller size that avoids fragmentation. In
addition, IoT devices MUST support using both TCP and UDP for
queries, and support switching to TCP when a TC bit is returned from
the resolver [RFC1035].
For constrained networks where DNS messages may exceed the available
link-layer frame size, implementors should evaluate DNS over CoAP as
described in Section 4.8.
4.5. Improve Device Behavior in Response to Resolution Problems
When resolving domain names, IoT devices may not receive a response
from a resolver. This can result in surges in DNS queries and
retries, or increased use of an alternative protocol (e.g., querying
over IPv6 more frequently than over IPv4).
Device resolver implementations MUST comply with the retry and
resolution-failure caching requirements in Section 3.2 of [RFC9520].
In particular, a resolver MUST NOT retry a given query to the same
server address over the same DNS transport more than twice before
considering that server address unresponsive for the query, and MUST
cache resolution failures for at least one second. Implementations
SHOULD limit the memory and processing resources allocated to the
resolution-failure cache to avoid performance problems.
If supported by the stub-resolver implementation on device operating
systems, the use of serve-stale [RFC8767] on the IoT device may
mitigate the impact of failed resolution, such as when authoritative
servers are unavailable. This will reduce the impact of surges in
DNS traffic if the network resolver is unreachable, and it may allow
the device to maintain ongoing communication with endpoints for which
previously valid DNS data remain usable.
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4.6. Compliance with Encrypted DNS Standards
The majority of IoT devices use unencrypted DNS over port 53, which
means this traffic can be captured and is open to interception and
manipulation. Encrypted DNS protocols are not mandated for
compliance with DNS standards, but the use of encrypted DNS may be
mandated by some regulators and advised by competent authorities
[ENISAGuidanceForNIS2] in deployment guidelines. Encrypted DNS
support is widely deployed, and it is possible for IoT devices to
discover DNS resolver support for this as described in Section 4.1.
IoT devices SHOULD support at least one encrypted DNS transport, such
as DNS over TLS (DoT) [RFC7858], DNS over QUIC (DoQ) [RFC9250], or
DNS over HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484], when doing so is feasible and does
not impair device operation because of power, memory, computational,
or other deployment constraints. This enhances privacy by preventing
passive observation of DNS queries, improves security by mitigating
adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks, and enables compatibility
with resolvers that require encrypted transport. When encrypted DNS
is used, devices SHOULD use EDNS(0) padding as described in [RFC7830]
and [RFC8467] to reduce size-based traffic fingerprinting, where
doing so does not cause excessive fragmentation, energy consumption,
or other operational costs. Padding policies suitable for
conventional networks may be inappropriate on constrained links with
small frame sizes.
4.7. Use of DNSSEC
IoT devices can be induced to connect to an adversary's server or
make large volumes of DNS queries via spoofed responses to queries.
It would be difficult for manufacturers to mitigate this by
implementing checks of data received via DNS queries, such as
validating IP addresses in the A/AAAA record RDATA, as this does not
reliably prevent malicious redirection. In addition, any validation
of this type does not address the problem of AiTM attacks targeting
DNS query responses.
DNSSEC can be implemented by manufacturers to mitigate AiTM attacks
on DNS query responses. Note that manufacturers MUST have signed
public zones used for device management and services so that
validation can take place. This improves security when devices do
not perform local validation, as many network operators deploy
validating resolvers.
Manufacturers MAY improve device security by utilizing DNSSEC
validation [RFC9364] on the stub resolver. When supported, devices
typically follow one of two models for validation (see Table 3) by
setting a combination of the DO and CD bits in DNS queries:
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* Stub-resolver checking for validation - the stub resolver checks
for the Authenticated Data (AD) bit in the response, which is
suitable for constrained devices but requires explicit trust in
the upstream resolver performing correct DNSSEC validation
* Stub-resolver performing full validation - local cryptographic
checks of DNSSEC-related records, providing stronger assurance
Both models improve security over unvalidated queries, but
manufacturers should weigh the security considerations, such as trust
assumptions, against the operational feasibility when determining
which approach to adopt. Manufacturers should consider the type of
network the device is likely to be deployed on, such as a home
network vs. other environments, in determining the likelihood of
DNSSEC validation being available on the network and thus deciding if
the device should rely on a validating resolver or be independently
capable of performing DNSSEC validation.
The deployment options are summarised below, with two constituting
the typical deployment scenarios:
+=====+=====+============+===========+=============================+
| DO | CD | Resolver | DNSSEC | Notes |
| Bit | Bit | Validated? | RRs | |
| | | | Returned? | |
+=====+=====+============+===========+=============================+
| Y | Y | N | Y | Resolver does not validate. |
| | | | | DNSSEC data returned. |
| | | | | Stub-resolver performing |
| | | | | full validation deployment. |
+-----+-----+------------+-----------+-----------------------------+
| Y | N | Y | Y | Resolver validates. DNSSEC |
| | | | | data returned. Stub- |
| | | | | resolver can use AD bit to |
| | | | | check validation. |
+-----+-----+------------+-----------+-----------------------------+
| N | Y | N | N | Resolver does not validate. |
| | | | | No DNSSEC data returned. |
| | | | | Do not use. |
+-----+-----+------------+-----------+-----------------------------+
| N | N | Y | N | Resolver validates. No |
| | | | | DNSSEC data. Stub-resolver |
| | | | | checking for validation |
| | | | | deployment. |
+-----+-----+------------+-----------+-----------------------------+
Table 3: Stub-resolver deployment options
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4.7.1. Stub-resolver Checking for Validation
Where a manufacturer implements DNSSEC validation on the device, the
minimum implementation will be a stub resolver checking the AD bit to
see if the answer has been validated. Relying solely on the AD bit
assumes that the upstream resolver is trustworthy and uncompromised.
Manufacturers may implement a testing mechanism to determine if the
network resolver supports DNSSEC, enabling the device to utilize
validation when available in a network that supports it, or falls
back to unvalidated answers. Any such test of the resolver will only
validate that it supports DNSSEC; given that the resolver is
performing the validation, it must be explicitly trusted.
To determine whether a DNS response has been validated, a stub
resolver MUST check the Authenticated Data (AD) bit [RFC4035] in
responses to determine whether data was validated by the resolver it
is using. When checking for the AD bit, stub resolvers MUST treat
DNSSEC validation failures as fatal. Responses that fail validation
MUST NOT be used for name resolution.
4.7.2. Stub-resolver Performing Full Validation
A device stub resolver MAY perform DNSSEC validation locally when the
network resolver does not perform validation or when the device does
not trust the network resolver to do so. Local validation introduces
additional implementation, processing, memory, and trust-anchor-
management requirements that manufacturers need to consider for
constrained devices.
Considerations for device manufacturers in implementing full
validation include:
* Devices performing local validation gain end-to-end trust but at a
higher computational cost
* Devices should cache results, including validation outcomes, to
reduce repeated computation
* Devices need to be shipped with a root trust anchor and have a
mechanism to update this securely
IoT devices that perform local DNSSEC validation MUST conform to the
applicable DNSSEC validation requirements in [RFC4035].
Manufacturers may implement this functionality in a validating stub
resolver, a local validating resolver, or another suitable local
resolver component.
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Devices performing local DNSSEC validation MUST maintain
authenticated DNS trust anchors and MUST provide a secure mechanism
to provision and update them. Manufacturers SHOULD support automated
trust-anchor updates as described in [RFC5011] or provide these
through an alternative mechanism such as device updates, and MUST
support changes to DNSSEC cryptographic algorithms through device
updates. Device software updates MAY include changes to the CA root
store to support the TLS used in Encrypted DNS protocols.
4.8. DNS over CoAP
DNS over CoAP (DoC) [RFC9953] provides a DNS transport for
constrained IoT environments using CoAP [RFC7252], with
confidentiality and integrity provided by (D)TLS or OSCORE [RFC8613].
DoC is appropriate where the resource or transport characteristics of
constrained devices make DoT, DoH, or DoQ unsuitable. The choice of
DNS transport should consider device resources, available protocol
stacks, network characteristics, and operational requirements.
Implementations MUST conform to all requirements specified in
[RFC9953], these include resolver configuration, request/response
matching, caching, retransmission, and security. Implementations
MUST additionally follow [RFC7252] and [RFC7959] where requirements
interact with the underlying CoAP transport.
Implementations where traffic analysis is a concern should consider
message size, timing, and packet-count characteristics when selecting
DoC block sizes, padding, and header-compression mechanisms.
Mitigations including block-size selection and final-block padding
are discussed in [RFC9953] and [LendersDoCPrivacy]; SCHC [RFC8724]
MAY additionally be used to reduce observable header information.
4.9. Publication of Device Domain Dependencies
To allow network operators to distinguish legitimate device traffic
from anomalous or malicious traffic, manufacturers SHOULD provide
network operators with accurate and current information about the
domain names, domain-name patterns, and external services required
for device operation. When providing details of the domains used by
a device for network security, manufacturers SHOULD include all such
domains, including those outside their direct control, such as
content delivery networks or cloud services.
Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUDs) [RFC8520] can provide machine-
readable information that defines the network communications required
for device operation and can support the deployment of network
security controls. Manufacturers SHOULD publish device communication
requirements, including relevant management domain names, in a
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publicly retrievable MUD file [RFC8520], or in comparable
manufacturer documentation if MUD files are not supported for the
device.
Manufacturers SHOULD update this information when device dependencies
change so that device operations are not impacted.
5. Guidance for Manufacturer Authoritative DNS Zones
Manufacturers use public authoritative DNS zones for purposes such as
device configuration, control, and upgrades. This section covers
guidance for manufacturers in operating these zones.
5.1. Zone Signing
Zones supporting the management and data collection of devices MUST
be DNSSEC signed in order to support the behavior described in
Section 4.7 and Section 6.1. The zones used for these purposes
should be publicly listed for network operators to use in securing
their networks as described in Section 6.2.
5.2. TTL Values
As stated in Section 4.3, manufacturers MUST configure TTL values for
management zone records that are appropriate for device operations,
considering a balance between avoiding excessive query traffic,
maintaining continuous operation in the event the resolver is
unreachable, and accommodating potential changes in RDATA such as
management IP addresses.
6. Guidance for Network Operators
This section provides guidance to operators that have IoT devices on
their networks. Manufacturers should be aware of the network
operator guidance in this section as devices will use these
resolvers, even though this infrastructure is not under the
manufacturer's control.
Most IoT devices do not have dedicated security software agents, as
are commonly available for general-purpose operating systems. In
addition, supply chain vulnerabilities may result in devices being
compromised before they reach the consumer. Network operators can
use DNS resolvers to mitigate these risks, although this will vary
depending on policy. These networks may be public, without
restrictions on DNS usage, or may be private networks that could be
dedicated to IoT devices where operators implement more security
controls to mitigate these risks.
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Some aspects of DNS security rely on the resolution process between
stub resolver, resolver, and authoritative servers, as well as DNS
record types (notably DNSSEC). It is therefore necessary for network
operators to implement DNS in such a way as to support some of the
recommendations in Section 4.
6.1. Resolvers Supporting DNSSEC
In order to support improving device DNS security as described in
Section 4.7, resolvers SHOULD be configured to validate DNS responses
using DNSSEC.
6.2. Blocking of Unmanaged or Malicious DNS Traffic
Private network operators may block DNS traffic to resolvers not
managed by the operator to prevent bypass of DNS security controls,
such as Response Policy Zones (RPZs) and DNS traffic logging. This
practice is more common on enterprise and other private networks than
on service-provider networks, where operators may avoid restricting
customers' use of alternative resolvers.
Where operators maintain networks dedicated to IoT devices, they MAY
restrict DNS resolution to domain names that are necessary for normal
device operation in order to reduce the impact of a device
compromise.
Network operators MAY use manufacturer-provided domain dependency
information, including MUDs [RFC8520], to distinguish legitimate
device traffic from anomalous or malicious traffic.
6.3. Minimizing DNS Response Size
Recursive resolvers serving constrained IoT networks SHOULD minimize
unnecessary DNS response data where supported by the resolver
implementation, unless it impacts the operation of other types of
devices on the network. In particular, operators SHOULD use minimal-
response configurations that avoid unnecessary Additional-section
records while retaining records required for correct DNS resolution
and the semantics of the queried RR type [RFC9715].
Reducing unnecessary response data can reduce bandwidth usage,
processing overhead, energy consumption, and the likelihood of
fragmentation on constrained links.
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6.4. Availability
Providers should optimize resolver configurations to mitigate the
security and operational risks identified in this document, provided
that such optimizations do not adversely affect the operation of
other DNS clients.
Network operators SHOULD optimize DNS resolver configurations through
the use of serve-stale mechanisms, as specified in [RFC8767]. In
particularly this is RECOMMENDED in environments dedicated to
supporting IoT devices, in order to minimize operational disruption
during DNS resolution failures. Recursive DNS resolvers provided to
IoT devices SHOULD be able to perform dual-stack DNS resolution,
consistent with [RFC10001], to support both IPv4 and IPv6 networks.
DNS queries are most commonly transported over UDP, and compromised
devices have been used to launch DoS attacks by sending queries with
forged source addresses. Therefore, network operators MUST implement
[RFC2827] network ingress filtering. Network operators SHOULD
implement DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL) on resolvers to mitigate
high query volumes from devices causing DoS attacks against DNS
infrastructure.
7. Security Considerations
IoT devices are often deployed at scale, operate under resource
constraints, and typically lack host-based security controls.
Consequently, weaknesses in DNS behavior can increase exposure to
spoofing, on-path attacks, amplification, and fingerprinting. The
guidance in this document improves the security properties of DNS
resolution by promoting correct protocol behavior, reducing
unnecessary or anomalous query traffic, and supporting the use of
authenticated and integrity-protected data (e.g., DNSSEC) and
encrypted transport. The effectiveness of these measures depends on
coordinated deployment across stub resolvers, recursive resolvers,
and authoritative servers. Partial deployment may reduce the
benefits of some mechanisms.
Residual risks remain, including device compromise outside the DNS
layer, misconfiguration, and reliance on untrusted upstream
resolvers. In addition, the use of encrypted DNS may limit network-
based inspection and policy enforcement. This document does not
introduce new protocols or mechanisms; it reduces the attack surface
and improves the predictability and resilience of DNS interactions in
IoT environments.
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8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2827>.
[RFC5452] Hubert, A. and R. van Mook, "Measures for Making DNS More
Resilient against Forged Answers", RFC 5452,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5452, January 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5452>.
[RFC6891] Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6891>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.
[RFC7959] Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7959>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
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[RFC9520] Wessels, D., Carroll, W., and M. Thomas, "Negative Caching
of DNS Resolution Failures", RFC 9520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9520, December 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9520>.
[RFC9715] Fujiwara, K. and P. Vixie, "IP Fragmentation Avoidance in
DNS over UDP", RFC 9715, DOI 10.17487/RFC9715, January
2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9715>.
[RFC9953] Lenders, M. S., Amsüss, C., Gündoğan, C., Schmidt, T. C.,
and M. Wählisch, "DNS over CoAP (DoC)", RFC 9953,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9953, March 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9953>.
9.2. Informative References
[BCP219] Best Current Practice 219,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp219>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Hoffman, P. and K. Fujiwara, "DNS Terminology", BCP 219,
RFC 9499, DOI 10.17487/RFC9499, March 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9499>.
[CharacterizingSmartHomeIoTTraffic]
"Characterizing smart home IoT traffic in the wild", n.d.,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9097598>.
[ENISAGuidanceForNIS2]
"NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance", n.d.,
<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/nis2-technical-
implementation-guidance>.
[IoTDeviceIdentificationUsingPassiveNetworkTrafficAnalysis]
"Early-Stage IoT Device Identification Using Passive
Network Traffic Analysis", n.d.,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/11579207>.
[LendersDoCPrivacy]
"Secrets Best Not Shared - DNS Privacy Enhancements for
the Constrained IoT", n.d.,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP68448.2026.00094>.
[RFC2132] Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
Extensions", RFC 2132, DOI 10.17487/RFC2132, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2132>.
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[RFC3646] Droms, R., Ed., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3646, December 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3646>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4035>.
[RFC5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
Trust Anchors", STD 74, RFC 5011, DOI 10.17487/RFC5011,
September 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5011>.
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6762>.
[RFC7452] Tschofenig, H., Arkko, J., Thaler, D., and D. McPherson,
"Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking",
RFC 7452, DOI 10.17487/RFC7452, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7452>.
[RFC7830] Mayrhofer, A., "The EDNS(0) Padding Option", RFC 7830,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7830, May 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7830>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7858>.
[RFC8106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8106>.
[RFC8467] Mayrhofer, A., "Padding Policies for Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0))", RFC 8467, DOI 10.17487/RFC8467,
October 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8467>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8484>.
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[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8520>.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8613>.
[RFC8724] Minaburo, A., Toutain, L., Gomez, C., Barthel, D., and JC.
Zuniga, "SCHC: Generic Framework for Static Context Header
Compression and Fragmentation", RFC 8724,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8724, April 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8724>.
[RFC8767] Lawrence, D., Kumari, W., and P. Sood, "Serving Stale Data
to Improve DNS Resiliency", RFC 8767,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8767, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8767>.
[RFC9150] Cam-Winget, N. and J. Visoky, "TLS 1.3 Authentication and
Integrity-Only Cipher Suites", RFC 9150,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9150, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9150>.
[RFC9250] Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
Dedicated QUIC Connections", RFC 9250,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9250, May 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9250>.
[RFC9364] Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237,
RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9364>.
[RFC9462] Pauly, T., Kinnear, E., Wood, C. A., McManus, P., and T.
Jensen, "Discovery of Designated Resolvers", RFC 9462,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9462, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9462>.
[RFC9463] Boucadair, M., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Wing, D., Cook, N.,
and T. Jensen, "DHCP and Router Advertisement Options for
the Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR)",
RFC 9463, DOI 10.17487/RFC9463, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9463>.
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[RFC9915] Mrugalski, T., Volz, B., Richardson, M., Jiang, S., and T.
Winters, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
(DHCPv6)", STD 102, RFC 9915, DOI 10.17487/RFC9915,
January 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9915>.
[RFC10001] Momoka and T. Fiebig, "Operational Guidelines for DNS
Transport in Mixed IPv4/IPv6 Environments", BCP 91,
RFC 10001, DOI 10.17487/RFC10001, August 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10001>.
[UCLandInriaPaper]
"From Lookup to Lockdown DNS Guidelines for Securing IoT
Ecosystems", n.d.,
<https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10223583/>.
Acknowledgments
We thank the researchers, reviewers, and engineers who contributed to
the analysis and testing process.
The authors thank Lou Berger, Henk Birkholz, Mohamed Boucadair, Chris
Box, Stephen Farrell, Ross Gibson, Eliot Lear, Martine Lenders,
Alexey Melnikov, Patrick Mevzek, Jim Reid, Michael Richardson and
Hannes Tschofenig for their contributions, questions and comments.
Authors' Addresses
Abhishek Mishra
Inria
Email: abhishek.mishra@inria.fr
Andrew Losty
UCL
Email: andrew.losty.23@ucl.ac.uk
Anna Maria Mandalari
UCL
Email: a.mandalari@ucl.ac.uk
Jim Mozley
Infoblox
Email: jmozley@infoblox.com
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Mathieu Cunche
INSA-Lyon & Inria
Email: mathieu.cunche@inria.fr
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