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BMWG                                                             L. Chen
Internet-Draft                                   Zhongguancun Laboratory
Intended status: Informational                                     D. Li
Expires: 18 March 2027                               Tsinghua University
                                                                  L. Liu
                                                                  L. Qin
                                                 Zhongguancun Laboratory
                                                       14 September 2026


   Benchmarking Methodology for Intra-domain and Inter-domain Source
                           Address Validation
               draft-ietf-bmwg-savnet-sav-benchmarking-04

Abstract

   This document defines methodologies for benchmarking the performance
   of intra-domain and inter-domain source address validation (SAV)
   mechanisms.  SAV mechanisms are utilized to generate SAV rules that
   prevent source address spoofing.  The methodology treats a SAV device
   as a black box and is therefore agnostic to the specific SAV
   mechanism and implementation used by the device.  This document
   defines test setups, performance indicators, and test cases for SAV
   accuracy, control-plane and data-plane performance, and resource
   utilization.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 18 March 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Goal and Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Test Methodology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Test Setup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Network Topology and Device Configuration . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  SAV Performance Indicators  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  False Positive Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  False Negative Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Protocol Convergence Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Protocol Message Processing Throughput  . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.5.  Data Plane SAV Table Refreshing Rate  . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.6.  Data Plane Forwarding Rate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.7.  Resource Utilization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Benchmarking Tests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Intra-domain SAV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.1.  False Positive and False Negative Rates . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.2.  Control Plane Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.1.3.  Data Plane Performance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Inter-domain SAV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.2.1.  False Positive and False Negative Rates . . . . . . .  17
       5.2.2.  Control Plane Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       5.2.3.  Data Plane Performance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     5.3.  Resource Utilization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   6.  Reporting Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   Appendix A.  Summary of Changes (to be removed by RFC Editor before
           publication)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     A.1.  Changes from Version -03 to Version -04 . . . . . . . . .  37
     A.2.  Changes from Version -02 to Version -03 . . . . . . . . .  38
     A.3.  Changes from Version -01 to Version -02 . . . . . . . . .  38
     A.4.  Changes from Version -00 to Version -01 . . . . . . . . .  39
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39



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1.  Introduction

   Source address validation (SAV) is a fundamental mechanism for
   mitigating IP source address spoofing [RFC2827] [RFC3704] [RFC8704].
   Operators may deploy SAV at different locations, including access
   networks, intra-domain interfaces, and inter-domain interfaces
   [RFC5210].  Existing intra-domain and inter-domain SAV mechanisms can
   suffer from improper blocks, improper permits, and operational
   overhead in several deployment scenarios
   [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement]
   [I-D.ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement].

   The SAVNET Working Group has analyzed the problem space for both
   intra-domain and inter-domain SAV.  Intra-domain SAV is applied at
   external interfaces on routers facing entities that are not deployed
   as neighboring ASes, such as a single host, a set of hosts, or a
   customer network with no AS.  SAV on traffic received on external
   interfaces facing a neighboring AS is considered inter-domain SAV,
   regardless of whether the neighboring AS uses a public or private
   ASN.  SAV on internal interfaces between routers in the same AS is
   outside the scope of the intra-domain SAV benchmarking scenarios in
   this document.  This document uses the same conceptual split when
   defining benchmarking test cases.

   This document provides generic methodologies for benchmarking SAV
   mechanism performance.  A SAV device may support one or more SAV
   mechanisms, and operators may enable different mechanisms depending
   on their network environments.  This document treats the Device Under
   Test (DUT) as a black box and does not assume a particular
   implementation.  The tests defined in this document can be used to
   benchmark SAV accuracy, protocol convergence performance, control-
   plane processing performance, data-plane SAV table refresh
   performance, data-plane forwarding performance, and resource
   utilization.  These tests can be performed on a hardware router,
   software router, virtual machine (VM), or container instance that
   runs as a SAV device.

1.1.  Goal and Scope

   The benchmarking methodology outlined in this document has two goals:

   *  Benchmark SAV mechanisms and implementations over a set of well-
      defined intra-domain and inter-domain scenarios.

   *  Measure the contribution of control-plane, data-plane, and
      resource-related sub-systems to the overall performance of a SAV
      device.




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   This document focuses on laboratory benchmarking of individual DUTs.
   It does not define a new SAV mechanism, protocol extension, or
   operational recommendation.  The test cases are intended to evaluate
   whether a DUT can produce correct SAV behavior and maintain
   acceptable performance under representative scenarios.

1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Terminology

   This document uses the terminology in
   [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement] and
   [I-D.ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement].  The following
   terms are used in this document.

   SAV Device: A device that applies SAV to incoming packets.  In this
   document, the SAV device is the DUT.

   SAV Control Plane: The processes used to gather, communicate,
   compute, and update information used for SAV rule or SAV table
   generation.

   SAV Data Plane: The packet-processing component that validates each
   incoming packet against the applicable SAV rules and either permits
   or blocks the packet.

   SAV Rule: A rule that indicates the validity of a specific source IP
   address or source IP prefix per router interface.  It is used by a
   router to make SAV decisions.

   SAV Table: The table of prefixes that indicates the validity of a
   specific source IP address or source IP prefix per interface.  A SAV
   table contains the information used by the DUT to make SAV decisions.
   The terms "SAV rules" and "SAV table" describe individual validation
   rules and their collective table, respectively.

   Proper Block: The validation result in which packets with spoofed
   source addresses are blocked by the DUT.

   Proper Permit: The validation result in which packets with legitimate
   source addresses are permitted by the DUT.




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   Improper Block: The validation result in which packets with
   legitimate source addresses are blocked improperly due to inaccurate
   SAV rules or an inaccurate SAV table.  The terms "improper block" and
   "false positive" are used synonymously in this document.

   Improper Permit: The validation result in which packets with spoofed
   source addresses are permitted improperly due to inaccurate SAV rules
   or an inaccurate SAV table.  The terms "improper permit" and "false
   negative" are used synonymously in this document.

   Intra-domain SAV: SAV performed by an AS to validate the source
   addresses of data traffic that the AS originates directly or
   indirectly.  Intra-domain SAV is applied at external interfaces on
   routers facing entities that are not deployed as neighboring ASes,
   such as a single host, a set of hosts, or a customer network with no
   AS.

   Inter-domain SAV: SAV performed by an AS on traffic received over an
   AS-to-AS interface that carries an eBGP session.  Such interfaces
   include customer, provider, lateral peer, and RS/RS-client
   interfaces.

   Customer Network with No AS: A customer network that manages one or
   more IP prefixes but is not deployed as a neighboring AS of the SAV-
   performing AS.

   Neighboring AS: An AS directly connected to the SAV-performing AS
   using eBGP.  The relationship can be Customer-to-Provider (C2P),
   Provider-to-Customer (P2C), lateral peering (P2P), or Route Server
   (RS) to RS-client.

   Customer Cone (CC): For a given AS, the set that includes the AS
   itself, its direct customer ASes, and all indirect customer ASes
   reachable recursively through provider-to-customer links.

   Prefixes in the Customer Cone: IP prefixes permitted by their owners
   to be originated by, or used as source addresses for data traffic
   originated from, one or more ASes within the customer cone.

   Limited Propagation of a Prefix (LPP): An inter-domain scenario in
   which a prefix is not propagated to all relevant ASes or interfaces
   due to mechanisms such as NO_EXPORT, NO_ADVERTISE, or selective
   export policies, while legitimate traffic using that prefix may still
   arrive at an interface where the prefix is not visible in BGP.

   Hidden Prefix (HP): A scenario in which an entity legitimately
   originates traffic using source addresses that are not visible to the
   routing or forwarding information used by the SAV mechanism.



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   Direct Server Return (DSR): A traffic delivery model commonly used by
   CDNs that use anycast service addresses while delivering data from
   edge locations that do not announce those addresses.  A request is
   received by an anycast server or location, but the response is sent
   directly by another server using the anycast service address as the
   source address.  This can create a legitimate hidden-prefix scenario.

   SAV-related Information: Routing information, such as RIBs and FIBs
   populated by routing protocols or local configuration information,
   and objects published in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
   (RPKI) that were originally proposed for non-SAV purposes but may
   also be used for SAV.  The RPKI objects include existing RPKI object
   types, such as ROAs and ASPAs, as well as any new types that may be
   proposed.

   SAV-specific Information: Information dedicated to SAV table
   generation.  It may be defined and exchanged between ASes using a
   SAV-specific communication protocol or an extension of an existing
   protocol.  The information may also take the form of SAV-specific
   RPKI object types or local configuration information provided by an
   operator.

   Configuration Information: Information configured locally by the
   network operator that describes the authorized use or propagation of
   source prefixes.  Such information may be used by SAV mechanisms to
   generate or update SAV table.

3.  Test Methodology

3.1.  Test Setup

   The test setup in general is compliant with [RFC2544].  The DUT is
   connected to a Tester and other network devices to construct the
   network topology introduced in Section 5.  The Tester is a traffic
   generator that generates network traffic with specified source and
   destination addresses in order to emulate spoofed or legitimate
   traffic.  The Tester may also emulate routing peers, hosts, customer
   networks with no AS, or neighboring ASes, depending on the test case.













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       +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
       | Test Network Environment |
       |     +--------------+     |
       |     |              |     |
   +-->|     |      DUT     |     |---+
   |   |     |              |     |   |
   |   |     +--------------+     |   |
   |   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+   |
   |                                  |
   |         +--------------+         |
   +---------|    Tester    |<--------+
             +--------------+

                       Figure 1: Generic Test Setup.

   Figure 1 illustrates the generic test configuration.  Within the test
   network environment, the DUT can be interconnected with other devices
   to create the specific intra-domain or inter-domain test scenarios
   described in Section 5.  The Tester may connect directly to the DUT
   or indirectly through other emulated routers or ASes.  The Tester
   generates both spoofed and legitimate traffic for SAV accuracy tests
   and may generate traffic at controlled offered loads for data-plane
   performance tests.  Accuracy tests MUST be conducted at an offered
   traffic rate below the loss-free forwarding capacity of the DUT.  The
   DUT is expected to provide logs, counters, telemetry, or other
   observable outputs sufficient to compute the performance indicators
   defined in this document.

3.2.  Network Topology and Device Configuration

   The position of the DUT within the test topology has an impact on SAV
   performance.  Therefore, each benchmark report must identify the DUT
   location and the interface on which SAV is evaluated.

   For intra-domain SAV, the report must specify whether the DUT
   interface faces a single host, a set of hosts, or a customer network
   with no AS.  For inter-domain SAV, the report must specify the
   business relationship between the SAV-performing AS and the
   neighboring AS on the tested interface.  The relationship must be
   identified as customer, provider, lateral peer, RS, or RS-client when
   applicable.

   The routing, policy, and SAV configurations used in the test must be
   documented.  Examples include IGP configuration, BGP configuration,
   business relationships, NO_EXPORT or NO_ADVERTISE communities, route-
   policy configuration, and any SAV-specific configuration.  If the DUT
   uses SAV-related information or SAV-specific information, the sources
   and update procedures of that information should be documented.



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   When evaluating data-plane forwarding performance, the traffic
   generated by the Tester must be characterized by traffic rate, packet
   size distribution, ratio of spoofed to legitimate traffic, source
   prefix distribution, destination prefix distribution, and the ingress
   interface on which the traffic is received.

4.  SAV Performance Indicators

   This section lists key performance indicators (KPIs) for SAV
   benchmarking tests.  All KPIs should be measured in the applicable
   benchmarking scenarios described in Section 5.  The standard
   deviation of repeated test results should be reported for each fixed
   test setup.  The data-plane SAV table refresh rate and data-plane
   forwarding rate should be measured using varying SAV table sizes to
   show the sensitivity of the DUT to the SAV table size.

4.1.  False Positive Rate

   The proportion of legitimate packets incorrectly classified as
   spoofed and blocked by the DUT to the total number of legitimate
   packets sent to the DUT.  This metric corresponds to the improper
   block rate.  For the purpose of this document, this metric is
   computed based on packet counts on a per-packet basis.

   Note that other computation methods, such as byte-count-based
   computation, may be used for supplementary analysis, but are outside
   the scope of the normative metric definition in this document.

4.2.  False Negative Rate

   The proportion of spoofed packets incorrectly classified as
   legitimate and permitted by the DUT to the total number of spoofed
   packets sent to the DUT.  This metric corresponds to the improper
   permit rate.  For the purpose of this document, this metric is
   computed based on packet counts on a per-packet basis.

   Note that other computation methods, such as byte-count-based
   computation, may be used for supplementary analysis, but are outside
   the scope of the normative metric definition in this document.

4.3.  Protocol Convergence Time

   The protocol convergence time represents the elapsed time from a
   relevant change in SAV-related information or SAV-specific
   information to the completion of the corresponding SAV table update
   on the DUT.  Relevant changes can include route announcement, route
   withdrawal, policy change, prefix authorization change, configuration
   change, or SAV-specific information update.  Where possible, the



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   report should distinguish the time consumed by underlying information
   convergence, SAV computation, and SAV table installation.

4.4.  Protocol Message Processing Throughput

   The protocol message processing throughput measures the rate at which
   the DUT processes control-plane messages used to communicate SAV-
   related or SAV-specific information.  It can indicate the SAV
   control-plane processing performance of the DUT.

4.5.  Data Plane SAV Table Refreshing Rate

   The data-plane SAV table refreshing rate is the rate at which the DUT
   updates the data-plane SAV table.  It reflects the ability of the DUT
   to install, update, or remove SAV entries in the data plane.

4.6.  Data Plane Forwarding Rate

   The data-plane forwarding rate measures the throughput for processing
   data-plane traffic while SAV is enabled.  The same forwarding-rate
   test should also be performed with SAV disabled, so that the relative
   performance impact of SAV can be reported.

4.7.  Resource Utilization

   Resource utilization refers to the CPU, memory, and other relevant
   resources consumed by SAV control-plane and data-plane processes on
   the DUT.  CPU and memory utilization should be recorded continuously
   during each test and should be reported separately for control-plane
   and data-plane components when possible.

5.  Benchmarking Tests

5.1.  Intra-domain SAV

5.1.1.  False Positive and False Negative Rates

   *Objective*: Evaluate the false positive rate and false negative rate
   of the DUT when performing intra-domain SAV on external interfaces
   facing a single host, a set of hosts, or a customer network with no
   AS.

   The intra-domain SAV accuracy tests consist of three classic
   scenarios: asymmetric routing and hidden prefix.  The baseline
   scenario exercises both improper-block and improper-permit behavior.
   The asymmetric-routing and hidden-prefix scenarios primarily expose
   improper blocks, while spoofed traffic can also be used to detect
   overly permissive validation behavior.  The DUT should be evaluated



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   on the external interface where SAV is applied.  The generated
   spoofed traffic should include different types of forged source
   addresses, such as source addresses not assigned to the connected
   entity, private-use or special-purpose addresses when applicable,
   internal-use-only prefixes of the AS, and external prefixes that are
   routable but not authorized for the tested ingress interface.

   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
   |                   Test Network Environment                 |
   |                         +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
   |                         | Router 1 |                       |
   | FIB on DUT              +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
   | Dest           Next_hop   /\    |                          |
   | 2001:db8::/55  Network 1   |    |                          |
   |                            |    \/                         |
   |                         +----------+                       |
   |                         |   DUT    |                       |
   |                         +----------+                       |
   |                           /\    |                          |
   |               Traffic with |    | Traffic with             |
   |        source IP addresses |    | destination IP addresses |
   |           of 2001:db8::/55 |    | of 2001:db8::/55         |
   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                                |    \/
                         +------------------------+
                         |Tester (Host or customer|
                         |   network with no AS)  |
                         |     (2001:db8::/55)    |
                         +------------------------+

      Figure 2: Intra-domain SAV facing host or customer network with
                  no AS under symmetric routing scenario.

   *Intra-domain Symmetric Routing Scenario*: Figure 2 shows an intra-
   domain symmetric routing scenario.  The Tester emulates a host, a set
   of hosts, or a customer network with no AS connected to the DUT.  The
   Tester is authorized to originate traffic using 2001:db8::/55.  The
   DUT applies intra-domain SAV on the interface facing the Tester.

   The *procedure* for this test is as follows:

   1.  Configure the DUT and other routers Figure 2 so that traffic from
       the Tester to destinations in the domain or outside the domain is
       forwarded through the DUT.

   2.  Configure or advertise the authorized source prefix 2001:db8::/55
       according to the SAV mechanism under test.




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   3.  Send legitimate traffic from the Tester using source addresses in
       2001:db8::/55.

   4.  Send spoofed traffic from the Tester using source addresses not
       authorized for the Tester, for example 2001:db8:0:200::/55.

   5.  Vary the ratio of legitimate to spoofed traffic, for example from
       1:9 to 9:1, and record the DUT counters or logs.

   6.  Measure the false positive rate and false negative rate.

   The test records whether the DUT properly permits the legitimate
   traffic and properly blocks the spoofed traffic.  Any improper blocks
   and improper permits are reflected in the measured false positive and
   false negative rates.

+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|                         Test Network Environment                       |
|                             +~~~~~~~~~~+                               |
|                             | Router 2 |                               |
| FIB on DUT                  +~~~~~~~~~~+   FIB on Router 1             |
| Dest                Next_hop  /\      \    Dest               Next_hop |
| 2001:db8::/56       Network 1 /        \ 2001:db8:0:100::/56  Network 1|
| 2001:db8:0:100::/56 Router 2 /         \/ 2001:db8::/56       Router 2 |
|                    +----------+     +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
|                    |   DUT    |     | Router 1 |                       |
|                    +----------+     +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
|                       /\               /                               |
|           Traffic with \              / Traffic with                   |
|     source IP addresses \            / destination IP addresses        |
|   of 2001:db8:0:100::/56 \          / of 2001:db8:0:100::/56           |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                             \      \/
                     +------------------------+
                     |Tester (Host or customer|
                     |   network with no AS)  |
                     |     (2001:db8::/55)    |
                     +------------------------+

   Figure 3: Intra-domain SAV facing host or customer network with
               no AS under asymmetric routing scenario.










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   *Intra-domain Asymmetric Routing Scenario*: Figure 3 shows an intra-
   domain asymmetric routing scenario.  The host or customer network
   with no AS owns 2001:db8::/55 and is connected to both the DUT and
   Router 2.  Inbound traffic for 2001:db8:0::/56 uses the DUT, while
   inbound traffic for 2001:db8:0:100::/56 uses Router 2.  The customer
   network may nevertheless send outbound traffic with source addresses
   in 2001:db8:0:100::/56 through the DUT.  This creates a legitimate
   asymmetric path.

   The *procedure* for this test is as follows:

   1.  Configure the topology shown in Figure 3.  The Tester emulates
       the host or the customer network with no AS and connects to both
       the DUT and Router 2.

   2.  Configure the routing system so that the DUT's route to
       2001:db8:0:100::/56 points away from the Tester, while the Tester
       can send traffic with source addresses in 2001:db8:0:100::/56 to
       the DUT.

   3.  Send legitimate traffic from the Tester to the DUT using source
       addresses in 2001:db8:0:100::/56.

   4.  Send spoofed traffic from the Tester to the DUT using source
       addresses not authorized for the Tester, for example
       2001:db8:0:200::/55.

   5.  Vary the ratio of legitimate to spoofed traffic, for example from
       1:9 to 9:1, and record the DUT counters or logs.

   6.  Measure the false positive rate and false negative rate.

   The test records whether the DUT permits the legitimate traffic that
   follows the asymmetric path and blocks the spoofed traffic.  Any
   improper blocks and improper permits are reflected in the measured
   false positive and false negative rates.















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   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
   |                   Test Network Environment                 |
   |                         +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
   |                         | Router 1 |                       |
   | FIB on DUT              +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
   | Dest           Next_hop   /\    |                          |
   | 2001:db8::/55  Network 1   |    |                          |
   |                            |    \/                         |
   |                         +----------+                       |
   |                         |   DUT    |                       |
   |                         +----------+                       |
   |                           /\    |                          |
   |               Traffic with |    | Traffic with             |
   |        source IP addresses |    | destination IP addresses |
   |           of 2001:db8::/55 |    | of 2001:db8::/55         |
   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                                |    \/
                         +------------------------+
                         |Tester (Host or customer|
                         |   network with no AS)  |
                         +------------------------+
   Visible/assigned prefix:  2001:db8::/56
   Hidden source prefix:     2001:db8:0:100::/56

         Figure 4: Intra-domain SAV under a hidden prefix scenario.

   *Intra-domain Hidden Prefix Scenario*: Figure 4 shows an intra-domain
   hidden prefix scenario.  The Tester emulates a host or customer
   network with no AS that legitimately originates traffic from a source
   prefix not visible to the routing or forwarding information used by
   the SAV mechanism.  Examples include DSR deployments or other cases
   where the authorized source prefix is not propagated within the
   operator's intra-domain routing system.

   The *procedure* for this test is as follows:

   1.  Configure the Tester as a host, a set of hosts, or a customer
       network with no AS connected to the DUT.

   2.  Configure the test so that 2001:db8::/56 is visible to the DUT as
       an assigned or routed prefix, while 2001:db8:0:100::/56 is a
       legitimate source prefix for the Tester but is not visible in the
       routing or forwarding information normally used by the DUT.

   3.  Send legitimate traffic from the Tester using source addresses in
       2001:db8:0:100::/56.





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   4.  Send spoofed traffic from the Tester using source addresses not
       authorized for the Tester.

   5.  Measure the false positive rate and false negative rate.

   The test records whether the DUT permits legitimate traffic from the
   hidden prefix and blocks spoofed control traffic.  This scenario
   primarily exercises improper-block behavior.  If the DUT does not
   support the information needed to authorize the hidden prefix, the
   report should record the resulting improper block behavior.

5.1.2.  Control Plane Performance

   *Objective*: Measure the SAV protocol convergence performance of the
   DUT and, when applicable, the processing performance of control-plane
   messages used to communicate SAV-related or SAV-specific information.

   *Protocol Convergence Performance*: SAV protocol convergence is
   measured from a relevant input-state change until the corresponding
   SAV table has been updated on the DUT.  The input-state change can be
   a route announcement or withdrawal, policy or configuration change,
   prefix-authorization change, or SAV-specific information update.  The
   test should distinguish SAV convergence from the convergence of an
   underlying routing protocol when the distinction is observable.

   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+      +-------------+          +-----------+
   | Emulated Topology |------|   Tester    |<-------->|    DUT    |
   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+      +-------------+          +-----------+

      Figure 5: Test setup for control-plane performance measurement.

   The *procedure* for measuring protocol convergence is as follows:

   1.  Set up the test environment as depicted in Figure 5.

   2.  Establish a stable initial routing and SAV state and record the
       initial SAV table.

   3.  Trigger a specified number or percentage of changes in the
       information used by the DUT for SAV, for example by announcing or
       withdrawing prefixes, changing configuration or authorization
       information, or updating SAV-specific information.

   4.  Record the time at which the relevant change becomes observable
       to the DUT and the time at which the corresponding SAV table
       update is complete.





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   5.  Repeat the test for different initial SAV table sizes and
       different numbers or percentages of changed entries.

   6.  Report SAV convergence time and, where observable, separately
       report the contribution of underlying routing or information
       convergence, SAV computation, and SAV table installation.

   For an IGP-driven test in which the trigger is an adjacency failure,
   the receipt time of the last hello message, or a more explicit
   shutdown indication when available, may be used as the routing-event
   timestamp as described in [RFC4061].  This timestamp represents the
   underlying routing trigger; the benchmark remains the time until the
   corresponding SAV table reaches the updated state.

   *Protocol Message Processing Performance*: This test is OPTIONAL and
   applies when the SAV mechanism receives explicit control-plane
   messages carrying information used for SAV.  The offered load SHOULD
   be expressed primarily as messages per second, updates per second, or
   changed prefixes/objects per second rather than as a percentage of
   link capacity.  Byte rate MAY be reported as a supplementary metric.

   The *procedure* for testing protocol message processing performance
   is as follows:

   1.  Set up the test environment as shown in Figure 5.

   2.  Send control-plane updates at increasing offered rates, expressed
       in messages per second and, where applicable, changed prefixes or
       SAV objects per second.

   3.  For each offered rate, record the number of messages or updates
       successfully processed, the processing interval, queueing or
       backlog when observable, and any message loss or processing
       failure.

   4.  Report the sustained processing throughput and the offered rate
       at which processing backlog or loss begins to occur.

5.1.3.  Data Plane Performance

   *Objective*: Evaluate SAV table refresh performance and packet-
   processing performance while SAV is enabled.

   *Data Plane SAV Table Refreshing Performance*: This metric measures
   how quickly the DUT installs, modifies, or removes entries in the
   data-plane SAV table after the corresponding SAV state has been
   computed.




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   The *procedure* for testing data-plane SAV table refresh performance
   is as follows:

   1.  Establish an initial SAV table of a specified size.

   2.  Trigger a batch of changes that causes a specified number or
       percentage of SAV table entries to be added, modified, or
       removed.

   3.  Record the number of changed entries and the time from the start
       of data-plane installation until the update is complete.

   4.  Repeat the test for multiple initial SAV table sizes and multiple
       update sizes, for example 1%, 10%, 50%, and 100% of the table.

   5.  Report the refresh rate in entries per second and the total
       installation latency.  Additions, modifications, and removals
       SHOULD be reported separately when their performance differs
       materially.

   *Data Plane Forwarding Performance*: The forwarding benchmark MUST
   distinguish intentional SAV filtering from unintended forwarding
   loss.  The primary forwarding-performance comparison uses legitimate
   traffic and compares SAV enabled with SAV disabled.  The Tester
   increases the offered load and determines the forwarding throughput
   at which legitimate traffic is forwarded without unintended loss
   according to the selected benchmarking procedure.

   A supplementary mixed-traffic test MAY combine legitimate and spoofed
   traffic to characterize SAV packet-processing behavior under
   different traffic compositions.  For a mixed-traffic test, the report
   MUST separately identify the offered packet rate, legitimate
   forwarding rate, spoofed blocking rate, and any unintended loss.
   Intentionally blocked spoofed packets MUST NOT be counted as
   forwarding-performance loss.

   The *procedure* for testing data-plane forwarding performance is as
   follows:

   1.  Establish a stable, fully populated SAV table and record its
       size.

   2.  Send legitimate traffic at increasing offered loads and measure
       forwarding performance with SAV enabled.

   3.  Repeat the same traffic profile with SAV disabled and report the
       relative performance impact of SAV.




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   4.  Optionally, repeat the test with mixtures of legitimate and
       spoofed traffic, varying the ratio, for example from 1:9 to 9:1.

   5.  For mixed traffic, report legitimate forwarding and spoofed
       blocking separately, together with any unintended packet loss.

5.2.  Inter-domain SAV

5.2.1.  False Positive and False Negative Rates

   *Objective*: Evaluate the false positive rate and false negative rate
   of the DUT when performing inter-domain SAV on an external interface
   connected to a neighboring AS.

   For the inter-domain SAV accuracy tests, at customer interfaces,
   these include Limited Propagation of a Prefix (LPP), Hidden Prefix
   (HP), and Source Address Spoofing within a Customer Cone (SCC).  At
   provider interfaces, the primary improper-permit scenario is source
   address spoofing from providers.  A symmetric-routing customer-
   interface test is retained as a baseline.  The generated spoofed
   traffic should include source addresses belonging to prefixes outside
   the legitimate set for the tested ingress interface, prefixes
   originated elsewhere in the customer cone, prefixes originated by the
   SAV-performing AS, special-purpose or unallocated prefixes when
   applicable, and prefixes associated with other ASes.


























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   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
   |                  Test Network Environment                |
   |                        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+                |
   |                        |    AS 3(P3)    |                |
   |                        +~+/\~~~~~~+/\+~~+                |
   |                           /         \                    |
   |                          /           \                   |
   |                         /             \                  |
   |                        / (C2P)         \                 |
   |              +------------------+       \                |
   |              |   DUT:AS 4(P4)   |        \               |
   |              +-+/\+-+/\+----+/\++         \              |
   |                 /     |       \            \             |
   |      P2[AS 2]  /      |        \            \            |
   |P6[AS 2, AS 1] /       |         \            \           |
   |P1[AS 2, AS 1]/ (C2P)  |          \ P5[AS 5]   \ P5[AS 5] |
   |+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+     |           \            \         |
   ||    AS 2(P2)    |     | P1[AS 1]   \            \        |
   |+~~~~~~~~~~+/\+~~+     | P6[AS 1]    \            \       |
   |             \         |              \            \      |
   |     P6[AS 1] \        |               \            \     |
   |      P1[AS 1] \       |                \            \    |
   |          (C2P) \      | (C2P)     (C2P) \      (C2P) \   |
   |             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ |
   |             |  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
   |             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ |
   |                  /\     |                                |
   |                  |      |                                |
   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                      |     \/
                 +----------------+
                 |     Tester     |
                 +----------------+

      Figure 6: SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain symmetric
                             routing scenario.

   *SAV at a Customer Interface under Symmetric Routing*: Figure 6
   presents a test case for SAV in customer-facing ASes under an inter-
   domain symmetric routing scenario.  In this setup, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3,
   the DUT, and AS 5 form the test network environment, with the DUT
   performing SAV at the AS level.  AS 1 is a customer of both AS 2 and
   the DUT; AS 2 is a customer of the DUT, which in turn is a customer
   of AS 3; and AS 5 is a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT.  AS 1
   advertises prefixes P1 and P6 to AS 2 and the DUT, respectively.  AS
   2 then propagates routes for P1 and P6 to the DUT, enabling the DUT
   to learn these prefixes from both AS 1 and AS 2.  In this test, the
   legitimate path for traffic with source addresses in P1 and



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   destination addresses in P4 is AS 1->AS 2->DUT.  The Tester is
   connected to AS 1 to evaluate the DUT's SAV performance for customer-
   facing ASes.

   The *procedure* for testing SAV in this scenario is as follows:

   1.  To evaluate whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for
       customer-facing ASes under symmetric inter-domain routing
       scenario, construct the test environment as shown in Figure 6.
       The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates test traffic toward
       the DUT.

   2.  Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to establish
       symmetric routing environment.

   3.  The Tester sends both legitimate traffic (with source addresses
       in P1 and destination addresses in P4) and spoofed traffic (with
       source addresses in P5 and destination addresses in P4) to the
       DUT via AS 2.  The ratio of spoofed to legitimate traffic may
       vary, for example, from 1:9 to 9:1.

   The test records whether the DUT blocks the spoofed traffic and
   permits the legitimate traffic received from the direction of AS 2.
   Any improper block or improper permit is reflected in the measured
   false positive or false negative rate.

   Note that the DUT may also be placed at AS 1 or AS 2 in Figure 6 to
   evaluate its false positive and false negative rates using the same
   procedure.






















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   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
   |                  Test Network Environment                |
   |                        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+                |
   |                        |    AS 3(P3)    |                |
   |                        +~+/\~~~~~~+/\+~~+                |
   |                           /         \                    |
   |                          /           \                   |
   |                         /             \                  |
   |                        / (C2P)         \                 |
   |              +------------------+       \                |
   |              |   DUT:AS 4(P4)   |        \               |
   |              ++/\+--+/\+----+/\++         \              |
   |                /      |       \            \             |
   |      P2[AS 2] /       |        \            \            |
   |P6[AS 2, AS 1]/        |         \            \           |
   |             / (C2P)   |          \ P5[AS 5]   \ P5[AS 5] |
   |+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+     |           \            \         |
   ||    AS 2(P2)    |     | P1[AS 1]   \            \        |
   |+~~~~~~~~~~+/\+~~+     | P6[AS 1]    \            \       |
   |    P6[AS 1] \         | NO_EXPORT    \            \      |
   |     P1[AS 1] \        |               \            \     |
   |     NO_EXPORT \       |                \            \    |
   |          (C2P) \      | (C2P)     (C2P) \      (C2P) \   |
   |             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ |
   |             |  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
   |             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ |
   |                  /\     |                                |
   |                  |      |                                |
   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                      |     \/
                 +----------------+
                 |     Tester     |
                 +----------------+

     Figure 7: SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain asymmetric
                   routing scenario caused by NO_EXPORT.

   *SAV at a Customer Interface under the Limited Propagation of a
   Prefix (LPP) Scenario*: Figure 7 presents a test case for SAV at a
   customer interface under a Limited Propagation of a Prefix (LPP)
   scenario.  In this example, limited propagation is induced by
   NO_EXPORT community configuration.  In this setup, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3,
   the DUT, and AS 5 form the test network, with the DUT performing SAV
   at the AS level.  AS 1 is a customer of both AS 2 and the DUT; AS 2
   is a customer of the DUT, which is itself a customer of AS 3; and AS
   5 is a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT.  AS 1 advertises prefix P1
   to AS 2 with the NO_EXPORT community attribute, preventing AS 2 from
   propagating the route for P1 to the DUT.  Similarly, AS 1 advertises



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   prefix P6 to the DUT with the NO_EXPORT attribute, preventing the DUT
   from propagating this route to AS 3.  As a result, the DUT learns the
   route for prefix P1 only from AS 1.  The legitimate path for traffic
   with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P4 is AS
   1->AS 2->DUT.  The Tester is connected to AS 1 to evaluate the DUT's
   SAV performance for customer-facing ASes.

   The *procedure* for testing SAV in this asymmetric routing scenario
   is as follows:

   1.  To evaluate the DUT under an LPP scenario created using
       NO_EXPORT, construct the test environment as shown in Figure 7.
       The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates test traffic toward
       the DUT.

   2.  Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to establish the
       asymmetric routing scenario.

   3.  The Tester sends both legitimate traffic (with source addresses
       in P1 and destination addresses in P4) and spoofed traffic (with
       source addresses in P5 and destination addresses in P4) to the
       DUT via AS 2.  The ratio of spoofed to legitimate traffic may
       vary—for example, from 1:9 to 9:1.

   The test records whether the DUT blocks the spoofed traffic and
   permits the legitimate traffic received from the direction of AS 2.
   Any improper block or improper permit is reflected in the measured
   false positive or false negative rate.

   Note that the DUT may also be placed at AS 1 or AS 2 in Figure 7 to
   evaluate its false positive and false negative rates using the same
   procedure.



















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   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
   |                  Test Network Environment                       |
   |                                +----------------+               |
   |                Anycast Server+-+  AS 3(P3, P7)  |               |
   |                                +-+/\----+/\+----+               |
   |                                   /       \                     |
   |                       / P3[AS 3] /         \ P3[AS 3] \         |
   |                      / P7[AS 3] /           \ P7[AS 3] \        |
   |                     \/         / (C2P)       \         \/       |
   |                       +----------------+      \                 |
   |                       |  DUT: AS 4(P4) |       \                |
   |                       ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++        \               |
   |                         /     |      \           \              |
   |       / P3[AS 4, AS 3] /      |       \           \             |
   |      / P7[AS 4, AS 3] /       |        \           \            |
   |    \/                / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5]  \ P5[AS 5]  |
   |      +----------------+       |          \           \          |
   |User+-+    AS 2(P2)    |       | P1[AS 1]  \           \         |
   |      +----------+/\+--+       | P6[AS 1]   \           \        |
   |                   \           |             \           \       |
   |           P6[AS 1] \          |              \           \      |
   |            P1[AS 1] \         |               \           \     |
   |                      \(C2P)   |(C2P)      (C2P)\      (C2P)\    |
   |                    +---------------+         +----------------+ |
   |       Edge Server+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
   |                    +----------------+        +----------------+ |
   |                         /\     |                                |
   |                          |     |                                |
   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                              |    \/
                        +----------------+
                        |     Tester     |
                        | (Edge Server)  |
                        +----------------+
   P7 is the anycast prefix and is originated only by AS 3 via BGP.
   Note that the prefix route propagations relevant to the DSR
   scenario are depicted; not all prefix propagations are depicted.

      Figure 8: SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of hidden
                prefix caused by direct server return (DSR).

   *SAV at a Customer Interface under the Hidden Prefix (HP) Scenario*:
   Figure 8 presents a test case for SAV at a customer interface under a
   Hidden Prefix (HP) scenario.  DSR is used as one representative
   realization of the HP scenario.  In this setup, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the
   DUT, and AS 5 form the test network, with the DUT performing SAV at
   the AS level.  AS 1 is a customer of both AS 2 and the DUT; AS 2 is a
   customer of the DUT, which is itself a customer of AS 3; and AS 5 is



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   a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT.  When users in AS 2 send
   requests to an anycast destination IP in P7, the forwarding path is
   AS 2->DUT->AS 3.  Anycast servers in AS 3 receive the requests and
   tunnel them to edge servers in AS 1.  The edge servers then return
   content to the users with source addresses in prefix P7.  If the
   reverse forwarding path is AS 1->DUT->AS 2, the Tester sends traffic
   with source addresses in P7 and destination addresses in P2 along the
   path AS 1->DUT->AS 2.  Alternatively, if the reverse forwarding path
   is AS 1->AS 2, the Tester sends traffic with source addresses in P7
   and destination addresses in P2 along the path AS 1->AS 2.  In this
   case, AS 2 may serve as the DUT.

   The *procedure* for testing SAV in this DSR scenario is as follows:

   1.  To evaluate whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules under
       DSR conditions, construct the test environment as shown in
       Figure 8.  The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates test
       traffic toward the DUT.

   2.  Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to establish the
       DSR scenario.

   3.  The Tester sends legitimate traffic (with source addresses in P7
       and destination addresses in P2) to AS 2 via the DUT.

   The test records whether the DUT permits legitimate traffic with
   source addresses in P7 received from the direction of AS 1.  This HP
   scenario primarily exercises improper-block behavior.  Other HP
   cases, including prefixes legitimately used only as source addresses
   without being advertised through BGP, may be tested using the same
   methodology.

   Note that the DUT may also be placed at AS 1 or AS 2 in Figure 8 to
   evaluate its false positive and false negative rates using the same
   procedure.
















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             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
             |                   Test Network Environment                 |
             |                          +----------------+                |
             |                          |    AS 3(P3)    |                |
             |                          +--+/\+--+/\+----+                |
             |                              /      \                      |
             |                             /        \                     |
             |                            /          \                    |
             |                           / (C2P)      \                   |
             |                  +----------------+     \                  |
             |                  |     DUT(P4)    |      \                 |
             |                  ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++       \                |
             |     P6[AS 1, AS 2] /     |      \          \               |
             |          P2[AS 2] /      |       \          \              |
             |                  /       |        \          \             |
             |                 / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5] \ P5[AS 5]   |
+----------+ |  +----------------+      |          \          \           |
|  Tester  |-|->|                |      |           \          \          |
|(Attacker)| |  |    AS 2(P2)    |      |            \          \         |
|  (P1')   |<|--|                |      | P1[AS 1]    \          \        |
+----------+ |  +---------+/\+---+      | P6[AS 1]     \          \       |
             |     P6[AS 1] \           | NO_EXPORT     \          \      |
             |      P1[AS 1] \          |                \          \     |
             |      NO_EXPORT \         |                 \          \    |
             |                 \ (C2P)  | (C2P)      (C2P) \    (C2P) \   |
             |             +----------------+          +----------------+ |
             |     Victim+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |  Server+-+    AS 5(P5)    | |
             |             +----------------+          +----------------+ |
             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
P1' is the spoofed source prefix P1 by the attacker which is inside of
AS 2 or connected to AS 2 through other ASes.

      Figure 9: SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of
                         reflection attacks.

   *SAV at a Customer Interface under the Source Address Spoofing within
   a Customer Cone (SCC) Scenario -- Reflection Variant*: Figure 9
   illustrates a test case for SAV in customer-facing ASes under a
   reflection attack scenario.  In this SCC scenario, source address
   spoofing occurs within the DUT's customer cone and is used to trigger
   a reflection attack.  The attacker spoofs the victim's IP address
   (P1) and sends requests to server IP addresses (P5) that are
   configured to respond to such requests.  The Tester emulates the
   attacker by performing source address spoofing.  The arrows in
   Figure 9 indicate the business relationships between ASes: AS 3
   serves as the provider for both the DUT and AS 5, while the DUT acts
   as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5.  Additionally, AS 2 is the
   provider for AS 1.



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   The *procedure* for testing SAV under reflection attack conditions is
   as follows:

   1.  To evaluate whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules in a
       reflection attack scenario, construct the test environment as
       shown in Figure 9.  The Tester is connected to AS 2 and generates
       test traffic toward the DUT.

   2.  Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to simulate the
       reflection attack scenario.

   3.  The Tester sends spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P1 and
       destination addresses in P5) toward AS 5 via the DUT.

   The test records whether the DUT blocks spoofed traffic with source
   addresses in P1 received from the direction of AS 2.  This SCC
   variant primarily exercises improper-permit behavior.

   Note that the DUT may also be placed at AS 1 or AS 2 in Figure 9 to
   evaluate its false positive and false negative rates using the same
   procedure.






























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             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
             |                   Test Network Environment                 |
             |                          +----------------+                |
             |                          |    AS 3(P3)    |                |
             |                          +--+/\+--+/\+----+                |
             |                              /      \                      |
             |                             /        \                     |
             |                            /          \                    |
             |                           / (C2P)      \                   |
             |                  +----------------+     \                  |
             |                  |     DUT(P4)    |      \                 |
             |                  ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++       \                |
             |     P6[AS 1, AS 2] /     |      \          \               |
             |          P2[AS 2] /      |       \          \              |
             |                  /       |        \          \             |
             |                 / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5] \ P5[AS 5]   |
+----------+ |  +----------------+      |          \          \           |
|  Tester  |-|->|                |      |           \          \          |
|(Attacker)| |  |    AS 2(P2)    |      |            \          \         |
|  (P5')   |<|--|                |      | P1[AS 1]    \          \        |
+----------+ |  +---------+/\+---+      | P6[AS 1]     \          \       |
             |     P6[AS 1] \           | NO_EXPORT     \          \      |
             |      P1[AS 1] \          |                \          \     |
             |      NO_EXPORT \         |                 \          \    |
             |                 \ (C2P)  | (C2P)      (C2P) \    (C2P) \   |
             |             +----------------+          +----------------+ |
             |     Victim+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |          |    AS 5(P5)    | |
             |             +----------------+          +----------------+ |
             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
P5' is the spoofed source prefix P5 by the attacker which is inside of
AS 2 or connected to AS 2 through other ASes.

  Figure 10: SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct
                               attacks.

   *SAV at a Customer Interface under the Source Address Spoofing within
   a Customer Cone (SCC) Scenario -- Direct Variant*: Figure 10 presents
   a test case for SAV in customer-facing ASes under a direct attack
   scenario.  In this SCC scenario, source address spoofing occurs
   within the DUT's customer cone and the spoofed traffic is sent
   directly toward the victim.  The attacker spoofs a source address
   (P5) and directly targets the victim's IP address (P1), aiming to
   overwhelm its network resources.  The Tester emulates the attacker by
   performing source address spoofing.  The arrows in Figure 10 indicate
   the business relationships between ASes: AS 3 serves as the provider
   for both the DUT and AS 5, while the DUT acts as the provider for AS
   1, AS 2, and AS 5.  Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1.




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   The *procedure* for testing SAV under direct attack conditions is as
   follows:

   1.  To evaluate whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules in a
       direct attack scenario, construct the test environment as shown
       in Figure 10.  The Tester is connected to AS 2 and generates test
       traffic toward the DUT.

   2.  Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to simulate the
       direct attack scenario.

   3.  The Tester sends spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P5 and
       destination addresses in P1) toward AS 1 via the DUT.

   The test records whether the DUT blocks spoofed traffic with source
   addresses in P5 received from the direction of AS 2.  This SCC
   variant primarily exercises improper-permit behavior.

   Note that DUT may also be placed at AS 1 or AS 2 in Figure 10 to
   evaluate its false positive and false negative rates using the same
   procedure.






























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                                     +----------------+
                                     |     Tester     |
                                     |   (Attacker)   |
                                     |      (P1')     |
                                     +----------------+
                                          |     /\
                                          |      |
  +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
  | Test Network Environment              \/     |                    |
  |                                  +----------------+               |
  |                                  |                |               |
  |                                  |    AS 3(P3)    |               |
  |                                  |                |               |
  |                                  +-+/\----+/\+----+               |
  |                                     /       \                     |
  |                                    /         \                    |
  |                                   /           \                   |
  |                                  / (C2P/P2P)   \                  |
  |                         +----------------+      \                 |
  |                         |     DUT(P4)    |       \                |
  |                         ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++        \               |
  |            P6[AS 1, AS 2] /     |      \           \              |
  |                 P2[AS 2] /      |       \           \             |
  |                         /       |        \           \            |
  |                        / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5]  \ P5[AS 5]  |
  |        +----------------+       |          \           \          |
  |Server+-+    AS 2(P2)    |       | P1[AS 1]  \           \         |
  |        +----------+/\+--+       | P6[AS 1]   \           \        |
  |            P6[AS 1] \           | NO_EXPORT   \           \       |
  |             P1[AS 1] \          |              \           \      |
  |             NO_EXPORT \         |               \           \     |
  |                        \ (C2P)  | (C2P)    (C2P) \     (C2P) \    |
  |                      +----------------+        +----------------+ |
  |              Victim+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
  |                      +----------------+        +----------------+ |
  +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
  P1' is the spoofed source prefix P1 by the attacker which is inside of
  AS 3 or connected to AS 3 through other ASes.

        Figure 11: SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of
                           reflection attacks.

   *SAV at a Provider Interface under the Spoofing-from-Providers
   Scenario -- Reflection Variant*: Figure 11 illustrates a test case
   for SAV in provider/peer-facing ASes under a reflection attack
   scenario.  In this scenario, the attacker spoofs the victim's IP
   address (P1) and sends requests to server IP addresses (P2) that are
   configured to respond.  The Tester emulates the attacker by



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   performing source address spoofing.  The servers then send
   overwhelming responses to the victim, exhausting its network
   resources.  The arrows in Figure 11 represent the business
   relationships between ASes: AS 3 acts as either a provider or a
   lateral peer of the DUT and is the provider for AS 5, while the DUT
   serves as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5.  Additionally, AS 2
   is the provider for AS 1.

   The *procedure* for testing SAV under reflection attack conditions is
   as follows:

   1.  To evaluate the DUT under a spoofing-from-providers scenario
       using reflection traffic, construct the test environment as shown
       in Figure 11.  The Tester is connected to AS 3 and generates test
       traffic toward the DUT.

   2.  Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to simulate the
       reflection attack scenario.

   3.  The Tester sends spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P1 and
       destination addresses in P2) toward AS 2 via AS 3 and the DUT.

   The test records whether the DUT blocks spoofed traffic with source
   addresses in P1 received from the direction of AS 3.  This spoofing-
   from-providers variant primarily exercises improper-permit behavior.

   Note that the DUT may also be placed at AS 1 or AS 2 in Figure 11 to
   evaluate its false positive and false negative rates using the same
   procedure.






















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                             +----------------+
                             |     Tester     |
                             |   (Attacker)   |
                             |      (P2')     |
                             +----------------+
                                  |     /\
                                  |      |
  +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
  | Test Network Environment      \/     |                    |
  |                          +----------------+               |
  |                          |    AS 3(P3)    |               |
  |                          +-+/\----+/\+----+               |
  |                             /       \                     |
  |                            /         \                    |
  |                           /           \                   |
  |                          / (C2P/P2P)   \                  |
  |                 +----------------+      \                 |
  |                 |     DUT(P4)    |       \                |
  |                 ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++        \               |
  |    P6[AS 1, AS 2] /     |      \           \              |
  |         P2[AS 2] /      |       \           \             |
  |                 /       |        \           \            |
  |                / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5]  \ P5[AS 5]  |
  |+----------------+       |          \           \          |
  ||    AS 2(P2)    |       | P1[AS 1]  \           \         |
  |+----------+/\+--+       | P6[AS 1]   \           \        |
  |    P6[AS 1] \           | NO_EXPORT   \           \       |
  |     P1[AS 1] \          |              \           \      |
  |     NO_EXPORT \         |               \           \     |
  |                \ (C2P)  | (C2P)    (C2P) \     (C2P) \    |
  |              +----------------+        +----------------+ |
  |      Victim+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
  |              +----------------+        +----------------+ |
  +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
  P2' is the spoofed source prefix P2 by the attacker which is inside of
  AS 3 or connected to AS 3 through other ASes.

    Figure 12: SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of direct
                                 attacks.












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   *SAV at a Provider Interface under the Spoofing-from-Providers
   Scenario -- Direct Variant*: Figure 12 presents a test case for SAV
   in provider-facing ASes under a direct attack scenario.  In this
   scenario, the attacker spoofs a source address (P2) and directly
   targets the victim's IP address (P1), overwhelming its network
   resources.  The arrows in Figure 12 represent the business
   relationships between ASes: AS 3 acts as either a provider or a
   lateral peer of the DUT and is the provider for AS 5, while the DUT
   serves as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5.  Additionally, AS 2
   is the provider for AS 1.

   The procedure for testing SAV under direct attack conditions is as
   follows:

   1.  To evaluate the DUT under a spoofing-from-providers scenario
       using direct traffic, construct the test environment as shown in
       Figure 12.  The Tester is connected to AS 3 and generates test
       traffic toward the DUT.

   2.  Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to simulate the
       direct attack scenario.

   3.  The Tester sends spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P2 and
       destination addresses in P1) toward AS 1 via AS 3 and the DUT.

   The test records whether the DUT blocks spoofed traffic with source
   addresses in P2 received from the direction of AS 3.  This spoofing-
   from-providers variant primarily exercises improper-permit behavior.

   Note that the DUT may also be placed at AS 1 or AS 2 in Figure 12 to
   evaluate its false positive and false negative rates using the same
   procedure.

   *Applicability to Peer and Route-Server Interfaces*: For a lateral
   peer interface, the applicable accuracy test depends on the
   validation model used by the DUT.  If the interface is validated
   using customer-interface-like directionality, the customer-interface
   test cases apply.  If it is validated using provider-interface-like
   relaxed filtering, the provider-interface test cases apply.  For an
   RS-to-RS-client interface, the customer-interface tests can be
   applied.  For an RS-client-to-RS interface, the provider-interface
   tests may be applied as a simplified model, or the interface may be
   treated as the union of the lateral peers selected by the RS client.

   *Additional Operational Dynamics*: The following FRR and routing-
   policy-change tests are supplementary operational scenarios.  They
   evaluate whether SAV behavior remains stable while routing or
   forwarding state changes.



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   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
   |                   Test Network Environment           |
   |          +-----------+            +-----------+      |
   |          |   AS3     |------------|   AS2     |      |
   |          +-----------+            +-----------+      |
   |               /\                       /\            |
   |               |                        |             |
   | primary link  |            backup link |             |
   |               | (C2P)                  | (C2P)       |
   |        +-----------------------------------------+   |
   |        |                   DUT                   |   |
   |        +-----------------------------------------+   |
   |                           /\                         |
   |                           |                          |
   |                           | Legitimate and           |
   |                           | Spoofed Traffic          |
   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                               | (C2P)
                        +-------------+
                        |    Tester   |
                        +-------------+

              Figure 13: Inter-domain SAV under FRR scenario.

   *SAV for Customer-facing ASes under FRR Scenario*: Inter-domain Fast
   Reroute (FRR) mechanisms, such as BGP Prefix Independent Convergence
   (PIC) or MPLS-based FRR, allow rapid failover between ASes after a
   link or node failure.  These events may temporarily desynchronize
   routing information and SAV rules.

   The *procedure* for testing SAV under FRR scenario is as follows:

   1.  Configure FRR or BGP PIC on the DUT for inter-AS links to AS3
       (primary) and AS2 (backup).

   2.  Continuously send legitimate and spoofed traffic from AS1 toward
       DUT.

   3.  Trigger a failure on the AS3–DUT link to activate the FRR path
       via AS2.

   4.  Measure false positive and false negative rates during and after
       switchover.

   5.  Restore the AS3 link and verify SAV table consistency.






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   The test records false positive and false negative rates during and
   after the FRR switchover, together with protocol convergence time.
   Any transient improper permits or improper blocks are reported rather
   than treated as a pass/fail criterion.

   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
   |               Test Network Environment           |
   |     +-----------+            +-----------+       |
   |     |   AS3     |------------|   AS2     |       |
   |     +-----------+            +-----------+       |
   |          /\                       /\             |
   |           |                        |             |
   |           | preferred path         | default path|
   |           | (C2P)                  | (C2P)       |
   |    +-----------------------------------------+   |
   |    |                  DUT                    |   |
   |    +-----------------------------------------+   |
   |                        /\                        |
   |                         | Legitimate and         |
   |                         | Spoofed Traffic        |
   |                         |                        |
   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                             | (C2P)
                      +-------------+
                      |    Tester   |
                      +-------------+

              Figure 14: Inter-domain SAV under PBR scenario.

   *SAV for Customer-facing ASes under PBR Scenario*: In inter-domain
   environments, routing policies such as local preference, route maps,
   or communities may alter path selection independently of shortest-
   path routing.  Such policy-driven forwarding can affect how the SAV
   rules are derived and applied.

   The *procedure* for testing SAV under PBR scenario is as follows:

   1.  Configure a routing policy on the DUT (e.g., set local
       preference) to prefer AS3 for specific prefixes while maintaining
       AS2 as an alternative path.

   2.  Generate legitimate and spoofed traffic from AS1 matching both
       policy-affected and unaffected prefixes.

   3.  Observe SAV filtering behavior before and after policy changes.

   4.  Modify the routing policy dynamically and measure false positive
       and false negative rates.



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   The test records false positive and false negative rates before,
   during, and after the routing-policy change, together with protocol
   convergence time.  Any transient improper permits or improper blocks
   are reported.

5.2.2.  Control Plane Performance

   The test setup, procedure, and metrics for evaluating protocol
   convergence and protocol message processing performance can refer to
   Section 5.1.2.  SAV convergence testing applies to dynamic SAV
   mechanisms whenever a relevant input-state change can cause the SAV
   table to be recomputed or updated.  SAV protocol message processing
   throughput is OPTIONAL and applies when the mechanism receives
   explicit control-plane messages carrying SAV-related or SAV-specific
   information.

5.2.3.  Data Plane Performance

   The test setup, procedure, and metrics for evaluating data-plane SAV
   table refresh performance and data-plane forwarding performance can
   refer to Section 5.1.3.

5.3.  Resource Utilization

   When evaluating the DUT for both intra-domain (Section 5.1) and
   inter-domain SAV (Section 5.2) functionality, CPU utilization (for
   both control and data planes) and memory utilization (for both
   control and data planes) SHOULD be recorded.  These metrics should be
   recorded continuously and be collected separately per plane to
   facilitate granular performance analysis.

6.  Reporting Format

   Each test report must include both global parameters and test-
   specific parameters.  The following parameters for test configuration
   and SAV mechanism settings must be documented in the test report.

   Test configuration parameters consist of:

   1.   Test device hardware and software versions.

   2.   DUT deployment type, such as hardware router, software router,
        VM, or container.

   3.   Network topology, including the location of the DUT and the
        interface on which SAV is evaluated.





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   4.   Intra-domain interface type, if applicable: single host, set of
        hosts, or customer network with no AS.

   5.   Inter-domain relationship type, if applicable: customer,
        provider, lateral peer, RS, or RS-client.

   6.   Routing configuration, including IGP, BGP, route-policy,
        NO_EXPORT/NO_ADVERTISE, selective export, and any other policy
        configuration relevant to the test.

   7.   SAV mechanism and configuration, including whether the DUT uses
        SAV-related information, SAV-specific information, or a
        combination of both.

   8.   SAV table size and update characteristics.

   9.   Test traffic attributes, including packet size, traffic rate,
        source prefix distribution, destination prefix distribution, and
        the ratio of spoofed to legitimate traffic.

   10.  System configuration, including CPU, memory, caches, operating
        system, interface capacity, and hardware offload features when
        applicable.

   11.  Measurement method, including DUT logs, counters, telemetry,
        Tester observations, and timestamp sources.

   12.  Number of repeated runs and statistical treatment of the
        results.

   For each accuracy test, the report must identify which packets are
   legitimate and which packets are spoofed, and why.  For each SAV
   convergence test, the report must identify the triggering event, the
   timestamping method, and, where observable, the distinction between
   underlying information convergence and SAV-table computation or
   installation.  For each performance test, the report must identify
   whether SAV was enabled or disabled and whether the DUT was operating
   in steady state or during SAV table update.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

8.  Security Considerations

   The benchmarking tests outlined in this document are confined to
   evaluating the performance of SAV devices within a controlled
   laboratory environment using isolated networks.



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   The network topology employed for benchmarking MUST constitute an
   independent test setup.  It MUST remain disconnected from devices
   that could relay test traffic into an operational production network.
   Spoofed traffic generated for the benchmarking tests MUST NOT be
   leaked outside the controlled test environment.

9.  Normative References

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
              May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2827>.

   [RFC3704]  Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, DOI 10.17487/RFC3704, March
              2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3704>.

   [RFC4061]  Manral, V., White, R., and A. Shaikh, "Benchmarking Basic
              OSPF Single Router Control Plane Convergence", RFC 4061,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4061, April 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4061>.

   [RFC5210]  Wu, J., Bi, J., Li, X., Ren, G., Xu, K., and M. Williams,
              "A Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA) Testbed
              and Deployment Experience", RFC 5210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5210, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5210>.

   [RFC8704]  Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., and J. Haas, "Enhanced
              Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding", BCP 84,
              RFC 8704, DOI 10.17487/RFC8704, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8704>.

   [RFC2544]  Bradner, S. and J. McQuaid, "Benchmarking Methodology for
              Network Interconnect Devices", RFC 2544,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2544, March 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2544>.

   [I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement]
              Qin, L., Li, D., Wu, J., Huang, M., and N. Geng, "Problem
              Statement, Gap Analysis, and Requirements for Intra-domain
              Source Address Validation", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement-
              26, 1 June 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement-26>.






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   [I-D.ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement]
              Li, D., Qin, L., Liu, L., Huang, M., and K. Sriram,
              "Problem Statement, Gap Analysis, and Requirements for
              Inter-Domain Source Address Validation", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-
              statement-21, 19 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-savnet-
              inter-domain-problem-statement-21>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Aijun Wang, Nan Geng, Susan Hares, Giuseppe Fioccola,
   Minh-Ngoc Tran, Shengnan Yue, Changwang Lin, Yuanyuan Zhang, Xueyan
   Song, Yangfei Guo, Shenglin Jiang, Tian Tong, Meng Li, Ron Bonica,
   and Mohamed Boucadair for their valuable comments and reviews on this
   document.  Apologies to any others whose names the authors may have
   missed mentioning.

Appendix A.  Summary of Changes (to be removed by RFC Editor before
publication)

A.1.  Changes from Version -03 to Version -04

   The major changes from version -03 to version -04 are as follows:

   *  Aligned the terminology and scope more closely with the latest
      intra-domain and inter-domain SAV problem statements, including
      Proper Block, Proper Permit, SAV Table, SAV-related Information,
      SAV-specific Information, and Configuration Information.

   *  Reorganized the accuracy-test descriptions around the SAVNET gap
      scenarios: asymmetric routing and hidden prefix for intra-domain
      SAV, and LPP, HP, SCC, and spoofing from providers for inter-
      domain SAV.  Clarified the applicability of the tests to peer and
      RS/RS-client interfaces.







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   *  Clarified that accuracy benchmarking records improper blocks and
      improper permits rather than defining pass/fail conformance
      requirements, and required SAV-induced drops to be distinguishable
      from unrelated packet loss.

   *  Refined SAV protocol convergence and control-plane performance
      measurements by using message/update rates and changed-prefix or
      object rates rather than percentages of link capacity.

   *  Refined SAV-table refresh benchmarking to vary initial table size
      and the number or percentage of changed entries, and report
      refresh rate and installation latency.

   *  Refined data-plane forwarding benchmarking so that intentional
      blocking of spoofed packets is not counted as forwarding loss, and
      separated legitimate forwarding performance from supplementary
      mixed legitimate/spoofed traffic tests.

   *  Classified FRR and routing-policy-change tests as additional
      operational-dynamics scenarios, and corrected editorial and
      consistency issues in the figures, terminology, and references.

A.2.  Changes from Version -02 to Version -03

   The major change from version -02 to version -03 is as follows:

   *  Added an appendix summarizing the major changes introduced across
      document revisions to improve revision traceability.  No technical
      changes to the benchmarking methodology or benchmark procedures
      were introduced in version -03.

A.3.  Changes from Version -01 to Version -02

   The major changes from version -01 to version -02 are as follows:

   *  Clarified the scope of the document as a black-box laboratory
      benchmarking methodology for individual SAV devices and refined
      the generic test methodology.

   *  Expanded and refined the SAV terminology and deployment scope to
      align with the intra-domain and inter-domain SAV problem
      statements.

   *  Restructured the intra-domain SAV accuracy tests into symmetric
      routing, asymmetric routing, and hidden-prefix scenarios, and
      added an explicit hidden-prefix benchmarking scenario.





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   *  Refined the inter-domain SAV accuracy tests according to the
      relationship of the tested interface with the neighboring AS, and
      clarified the limited prefix propagation and DSR scenarios.

   *  Refined the SAV performance indicators and clarified the
      generation and classification of legitimate and spoofed test
      traffic.

   *  Expanded the reporting requirements and strengthened the security
      considerations for isolated benchmarking environments.

A.4.  Changes from Version -00 to Version -01

   The major changes from version -00 to version -01 are as follows:

   *  Clarified the computation method of false positive rate and false
      negative rate.

   *  Updated the example IP prefixes in the intra-domain test scenarios
      to use IPv6 documentation prefixes.

   *  Revised the DSR test scenario by introducing a dedicated anycast
      prefix and clarifying the corresponding route propagation and
      legitimate traffic paths.

   *  Clarified the collection of resource utilization metrics,
      including continuous measurement and separate control-plane and
      data-plane measurements where possible.

Authors' Addresses

   Li Chen
   Zhongguancun Laboratory
   Beijing
   China
   Email: lichen@zgclab.edu.cn


   Dan Li
   Tsinghua University
   Beijing
   China
   Email: tolidan@tsinghua.edu.cn








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   Libin Liu
   Zhongguancun Laboratory
   Beijing
   China
   Email: liulb@zgclab.edu.cn


   Lancheng Qin
   Zhongguancun Laboratory
   Beijing
   China
   Email: qinlc@zgclab.edu.cn







































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