← Reading listAgendaReviewdatatracker ↗ draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework-03 · none · 20 pp · 2026-11-02 · offline copy



Network Management Research Group                            Y. Ahn, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                             J. Jeong, Ed.
Intended status: Informational                   Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: 6 May 2027                                               Y. Kim
                                                     Soongsil University
                                                         2 November 2026


   An Agentic AI Security Framework for Security Management in Mobile
                                Networks
             draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework-03

Abstract

   This document proposes an Agentic AI Security Framework for security
   management in mobile networks.  A Security Application Function (SAF)
   Agent translates a network administrator's security intent to hold
   security objectives into a high-level security policy.  A Security
   Control Function (SCF) Agent receives the high-level policy and
   translates it into a low-level security policy that will be enforced
   by distributed Network Security Functions (NSFs) in mobile networks.
   The SCF Agent sends the low-level security policy to an apporiate
   NSF.  Policy generation, monitoring, and continuity across a data
   path are integrated into a closed-loop control with an Observe-
   Reason-Act-Verify process.  The proposed framework can be applied to
   enterprise, campus, cloud, and edge networks along with existing
   network-management mechanisms.  This document describes the
   architecture, a policy-continuity example, standard integration
   points, and security considerations.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.





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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Agentic AI Architecture for Network Security Management . . .   4
     3.1.  SAF Agent: Goal Interpretation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  SCF Agent: Policy Planning and Verification . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Context Exchange and Network Control  . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Distributed NSFs: Policy Execution  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.5.  Observation, Analytics, and Policy Memory . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Agentic Security Management Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Policy Generation, Delivery, and Continuous
           Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Policy Continuity during an Enforcement-Point
           Transition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Policy State and Failure Handling . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.  Handling an Unplanned Path Change . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.5.  Application Example: Mobility-Driven Enforcement
           Transition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Multi-Domain Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix A.  Changes from
           draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework-02 . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19











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1.  Introduction

   Distributed networks require security objectives to remain effective
   as topology, traffic paths, workloads, and enforcement resources
   change.  A policy that protects traffic at one location can become
   ineffective when the traffic moves to another path or administrative
   domain.  Maintaining the intended outcome therefore requires
   coordination between policy interpretation, enforcement placement,
   and observation of the resulting behavior.

   An Agentic AI Security Framework in this document uses an intent,
   intent fulfillment, and intent assurance defined in Intent-Based
   Networking (IBN) in [RFC9315].  This framework develops the IBN
   approach into an agentic AI security management system.

   In the proposed framework, a Security Application Function (SAF)
   Agent translates a network administrator's security intent to hold
   security objectives into the corresponding high-level security
   policy.  A Security Control Function (SCF) Agent receives the high-
   level policy and translates it into the corresponding low-level
   security policy.  This low-level security policy will be enforced by
   distributed Network Security Functions (NSFs) in mobile networks
   (e.g., 5G networks and WiFi networks).  The SCF Agent sends the low-
   level security policy to an apporiate NSF to provision the required
   security service.  Thus, policy generation, monitoring, and
   continuity across a data path in the mobile networks are integrated
   into a closed-control loop with an Observe-Reason-Act-Verify process
   to satisfy the give security intent.

   The framework in this document integrates policy generation,
   distributed enforcement, monitoring, and policy continuity across
   enterprise, campus, cloud, and edge networks.  Its enforcement-point
   transition in this document autonomously addresses configuration
   changes caused by workload relocation, failover, rerouting, or a
   change in network attachment in the mobile networks.

   This document clarifies the progression from a security intent to
   security enforcement, monitoring, and policy continuity with NSFs in
   the mobile networks.  It details the roles of the SAF and SCF into AI
   agents.  These AI agents receive security objectives, evaluate
   context, validate outcomes of the security policy, and reconfigures
   the policy in a closed-loop control.  The sequence of security
   enforcement in the mobile networks is autonomously adapted according
   to the workload and path changes in the target mobile networks.

   Agentic AI empowers persistent security objective with context-
   sensitive reasoning in the proposed framework.  The AI agents observe
   the environment, reason permitted actions, act accordingly through



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   authorized tools, and validate the results of the security
   operations.  The framework can revise an unsuccessful operations
   while preserving the administrator's security intent and the
   constraints in the mobile networks in terms of the capabilities and
   resources of the available NSFs.  Note that a model-generated
   recommendation is validated before execution in this framework, but
   the use of AI does not authorize a security policy without any report
   to the network administrator.

   Therefore, this document proposes an architecture of an Agentic AI
   Security Framework along with an operational example.  It focuses on
   mobile-network-side security enforcement such as traffic filtering
   and access control in the target mobile networks.  Application
   traffic can be protected by the proposed framework with the available
   NSFs with security capabilities.  However, device-specific
   application configuration and unrestricted control over routing are
   out of the scope of this document.

2.  Terminology

   *  Intent: A declarative expression of desired outcomes, using the
      intent definition in [RFC9315].
   *  SAF Agent: The security-application agent that interprets intent
      and maintains the objective and constraints.
   *  SCF Agent: The security-control agent that plans policy actions,
      coordinates execution, and verifies results.
   *  NSF: A Network Security Function that enforces approved filtering
      or access-control policies and provides telemetry.
   *  Policy Context: The policy revision, protected traffic scope,
      enforcement bindings, and relevant applied state.
   *  Enforcement Point: The NSF instance and traffic-path location at
      which a policy is applied.

3.  Agentic AI Architecture for Network Security Management

   The architecture separates objective interpretation, security
   planning, context exchange, and distributed enforcement.  Figure 1
   shows these logical relationships.  Interface A carries the
   objective, high-level policy, and outcomes between agents; interface
   B supplies authorized context and change coordination; interface C
   manages NSFs and returns telemetry.  These labels identify
   responsibilities rather than defining new wire protocols.









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   The management, modeling, telemetry, and domain-integration
   mechanisms cited below are implementation options rather than
   prescribed dependencies.  Agent coordination needs agreed definitions
   for objective scope, action representation, readiness, verification,
   and failure reporting.  The architecture identifies these
   relationships without defining a protocol-specific implementation
   profile.

   +--------------+   Intent / feedback  +------------------------+
   | User / Admin |----------------------| SAF Agent              |
   +--------------+                      | Objective owner        |
                                         | Application integration|
                                         +------------+-----------+
                                                      |
                           Proposed agent interface A |
                           High-level policy / outcome|
                                                      |
                                         +------------v-----------+
                                         | SCF Agent              |
                                         | Translate / plan /     |
                                         | verify / recover       |
                                         +------------+-----------+
                                                      |
                           NSF management interface C |
                            Low-level policy / telemetry
                                       +--------------+-------+
                                       |                      |
                                +------v------+        +------v------+
                                | Edge / NSF1 |        | Edge / NSF2 |
                                +-------------+        +-------------+

   SCF Agent ----- interface B ----- Context / controller adapter
              |                    authorized context / coordination
              +---- inventory maps traffic scope to NSF endpoints

   Controllers retain routing, workload and path-change authority.

       Figure 1: Agentic AI Network Security Management Architecture

3.1.  SAF Agent: Goal Interpretation

   The SAF Agent receives administrator intent and identifies the
   protected user, workload, service, or traffic scope.  AI-assisted
   interpretation produces a high-level security policy describing the
   desired outcome, constraints, priority, and validity.  Ambiguous
   requests require clarification, and unsupported or unauthorized
   objectives are reported rather than silently approximated.




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   The SAF Agent retains the objective independently of the current
   device or path.  It uses SCF feedback to distinguish satisfied,
   degraded, unknown, and pending outcomes.

   During an enforcement-point transition, it preserves the security
   constraints and decides whether a proposed alternative or recovery
   action remains within the original authorization.  A changed location
   does not by itself justify weakening protection.

3.2.  SCF Agent: Policy Planning and Verification

   The SCF Agent combines the high-level policy with current topology,
   traffic bindings, NSF capabilities, and observed enforcement state.
   AI-assisted reasoning supports selection of a target realization or
   recovery plan.  Deterministic checks validate the proposed rules,
   their scope, and their compatibility with operator constraints before
   an authorized executor installs them.

   Planning can select an existing enforcement point, prepare a target,
   or retain a reachable protected path.  The SCF Agent records the
   expected outcome and the evidence needed to verify it.

   Installation, activation, and post-change verification remain
   separate results.  If the observed result does not meet the
   objective, the agent can revise the plan within a bounded action
   budget or request operator intervention.

   The proposed architecture does not depend on a particular model or
   prompting mechanism.  An implementation must identify where AI
   contributes interpretation or planning and how generated proposals
   are checked.  The agent's persistent objective and evidence-driven
   replanning are the relevant behavior; a fixed rule-copy operation
   alone does not provide the full decision and assurance loop.

3.3.  Context Exchange and Network Control

   Inventory, topology services, telemetry collectors, and existing
   network controllers supply authorized observations.  The SCF Agent
   maps a protected traffic scope and candidate location to the
   appropriate NSF endpoint and capability set.  A generic topology
   model such as RFC 8345 [RFC8345] can provide a basis for representing
   network resources; policy bindings and technology-specific details
   still need a deployment-specific model.

   The security agent does not acquire ownership of routing merely
   because it can configure an NSF.  A path or workload change remains
   under the authority of the relevant controller or orchestrator.




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   Where that controller supports advance notification and preparation
   acknowledgment, the agents may coordinate target readiness with the
   pending transition.  Otherwise, target preparation is opportunistic
   and a continuity policy must cover late or unexpected changes.

   The context exchange should distinguish a candidate path from a
   selected or active path.  Readiness prepared for one candidate cannot
   establish protection on a different destination.  When observations
   are incomplete, the SCF Agent records the uncertainty and obtains
   updated context or follows an authorized fallback rather than
   claiming that the original plan remains valid.

3.4.  Distributed NSFs: Policy Execution

   NSFs execute approved filtering or access-control rules and return
   their policy revision, binding, and operational status.  They may
   reside on routers, security appliances, virtual machines, containers,
   or service edges.  The deployment must establish the traffic path
   through the selected function; simply running an NSF beside a
   workload does not ensure enforcement.

   The SCF Agent maintains desired policy and revision history.  NSF
   readback supplies evidence of the applied realization and, where
   supported, transferable runtime state.  Different targets can expose
   different capabilities, so migration may require translation instead
   of a byte-for-byte rule copy.  A target that cannot preserve the
   requested behavior is rejected or escalated.

   YANG [RFC7950] can model supported configuration and state.  NETCONF
   [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040] can provide NSF management interfaces
   when suitable models and capabilities are implemented.  These choices
   do not make the proposed SAF-SCF interface an existing standard
   protocol.

   For packet filtering, the ACL model in RFC 8519 [RFC8519] can
   represent supported match and action rules.  It does not by itself
   express every stateful or application-level requirement.  The SCF
   Agent checks the target capabilities and traffic binding before
   treating a policy realization as equivalent.

3.5.  Observation, Analytics, and Policy Memory

   Rule status, counters, relevant security events, and path-binding
   evidence support outcome verification.  Collection and correlation
   can follow the Network Telemetry Framework [RFC9232] without
   requiring a particular telemetry transport.  The observations are
   associated with their objective revision, operation, protected scope,
   enforcement endpoint, and time.



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   The SAF Agent retains objective history, while the SCF Agent retains
   target realizations and verification evidence.  The distinction
   between intended configuration and operational state follows NMDA
   [RFC8342] where supported.  Configuration readback alone does not
   establish live traffic protection, and historical evidence cannot
   prove current enforcement.

   Monitoring and analysis can be separate supporting services.  This
   deployment choice does not create another independent policy owner.
   Shared records allow the agents to correlate a plan with its results
   while keeping desired state, observed state, and inferred conclusions
   distinguishable.

4.  Agentic Security Management Procedures

   Initial policy generation and continuity across network changes form
   one lifecycle.  The agents retain the objective and policy history
   while adapting its low-level realization.  The following sequence
   describes logical coordination rather than a new routing or device-
   management protocol.

4.1.  Policy Generation, Delivery, and Continuous Verification

   The administrator submits intent to the SAF Agent, which derives the
   high-level policy and confirms its scope.  The SCF Agent then selects
   the current enforcement point, validates a low-level realization, and
   coordinates delivery.  Figure 2 summarizes the Observe-Reason-Act-
   Verify loop used for both initial policy generation and later
   adaptation.

   Administrator -- intent --- SAF Agent -- policy (A) --- SCF Agent
                                ^                           |
                                |                           | policy (C)
                           reported outcome                 v
                                |                     Distributed NSFs
                                |                           |
                                +---- SCF verification -----+
                                         ^              telemetry (C)
                                         |
   Context / controller -- adapter (B) -- authorized context
    Operator inventory ------------------+  endpoint/capability mapping

                  Figure 2: Agentic Security Control Loop

   1.  Observe: Collect the intent, current policy, relevant topology
       and traffic context, enforcement bindings, and NSF capabilities.
       Check that the observations are authorized and sufficiently
       current for the decision.



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   2.  Reason: The SAF Agent establishes or confirms the objective.  The
       SCF Agent selects an authorized realization and checks
       capability, scope, and policy-conflict constraints.  The plan
       includes the expected outcome and how to verify it.

   3.  Act: The SCF Agent invokes an authorized executor to install and
       activate the approved low-level policy.  Responses are correlated
       with the intended policy revision, operation, and traffic
       binding.

   4.  Verify: The SCF Agent compares fresh enforcement evidence with
       the required outcome and returns the result to the SAF Agent.
       Failed or insufficient evidence leads to bounded replanning, an
       approved recovery action, or human escalation.

   The management exchange remains separate from the actual traffic
   path.  Initial verification records the active policy, protected
   scope, and evidence that traffic uses the intended enforcement point.
   An installation response demonstrates configuration progress, but
   does not alone establish that the security objective has been
   achieved.

   For example, an administrator can request that a defined flow remain
   blocked while its workload moves between network segments.  The SAF
   Agent maintains this persistent outcome.

   The SCF Agent determines the supported match and action, installs the
   current realization, and checks its operation.  When the workload or
   path changes, the next procedure adapts that realization without
   treating the event as an unrelated policy request.

4.2.  Policy Continuity during an Enforcement-Point Transition

   This procedure covers preparation, policy migration, and verification
   when the traffic path or enforcement location changes.  It applies to
   workload relocation, failover, rerouting, and changes in network
   attachment.  The source and target can be different devices, service
   edges, or virtual security functions; a transition may be planned or
   unexpected.

   The procedure assumes that the agent can obtain permitted path and
   endpoint information and can manage the relevant NSFs.  Advance
   preparation also requires notice before the actual traffic change.

   These are deployment conditions, not capabilities supplied
   automatically by the agent architecture.  If the enforcement point
   does not change, the SCF Agent verifies or updates the existing
   binding.



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   Observe: The context service reports the relevant change.  The SCF
   Agent associates it with the protected traffic and current policy
   revision and uses inventory to resolve candidate NSF endpoints.

   The authorized network controller remains responsible for the
   traffic-path decision.  The agent checks whether the current
   enforcement point remains usable or a target must be prepared.

   A location label or a candidate node is not sufficient to determine
   the complete enforcement binding.  The SCF Agent needs the applicable
   traffic scope and a supported mechanism for placing that traffic
   through the target NSF.  It records whether the mapping is tentative
   or selected and refreshes it when the controller chooses another
   path.

   Context API      SAF Agent       SCF Agent          S-NSF      T-NSF
       |                |               |               |          |
       | Authorized     |               |               |          |
       | path context   |               |               |          |
       |----------------| context (A)   |               |          |
       |                |---------------|               |          |
       |                |               | [Policy repository /     |
       |                |               |  endpoint inventory]     |
       |                |               | Applied-state readback*  |
       |                |               |---------------|          |
       |                |               | [Validate target plan]   |
       |                |               | Install / bind / activate|
       |                |               |--------------------------|
       |                |               |--------------------------|
       |                | Readiness (A) | revision / binding / result
       |                |---------------|               |          |
       | Decision (B)   |               |               |          |
       |----------------|               |               |          |
       | [Optional supported controller coordination (B)]          |

   Interface B: authorized context and controller coordination.
   Interface A: proposed agent coordination, not a domain API.
   * Source readback is used when available.
   Installation and activation are not post-switch verification.

      Figure 3: Proposed Policy Preparation and Target NSF Activation










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   Reason: The SCF Agent retrieves the desired policy and, when the
   source NSF is reachable, compares it with source readback.  If
   readback is unavailable, it uses the stored desired policy and
   available current context, recording uncertainty about the applied
   source state.  It checks target capabilities, traffic-binding
   semantics, and the constraints retained by the SAF Agent.  It can
   reuse an existing realization, translate it for another target, or
   select an authorized alternative.

   Act: The SCF Agent installs and activates the applicable low-level
   policy and obtains a result for the specified revision and binding.

   It reports target readiness to the SAF Agent.  If the path controller
   supports coordinated preparation, this result may inform the
   controller's decision to proceed.  The proposed Policy-Ready
   Indication does not itself provide routing control or require every
   controller to wait.

   Readiness is scoped to the prepared destination.  If the target
   changes, the SCF Agent reevaluates the plan and prepares the selected
   enforcement point before claiming protection there.  Rules can be
   installed in advance only when doing so is safe for the existing
   traffic and the deployment can distinguish the applicable bindings.

   Verify: The authorized controller performs or confirms the path
   change.  The target NSF applies the prepared policy to the traffic
   using its binding.

   The SCF Agent evaluates fresh path and enforcement evidence for the
   protected scope and policy revision, then reports the outcome to the
   SAF Agent.  Missing evidence remains an unknown result rather than a
   successful verification.

   The source policy binding is retired only after target enforcement is
   verified and the old protected path is no longer needed.

   During forwarding overlap or concurrent paths, both enforcement
   points may need protection.  Cleanup must not remove a shared rule
   still required by other traffic.  Keeping an unused source rule does
   not protect packets already taking an unprotected target path.

   When a change occurs without advance notice, protection cannot be
   guaranteed merely by applying this sequence afterward.  The
   configured continuity policy must specify whether to retain a
   reachable protected path, use a pre-provisioned fallback, block the
   affected traffic, or escalate.  The agent reports any unresolved
   protection state and availability impact.




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   Policy migration covers rules and bindings.  Connection-tracking,
   NAT, or cryptographic state may need additional transfer or recovery
   support.  A target lacking the required semantics cannot be treated
   as equivalent just because it accepts a similar rule.  The chosen
   continuity action should reflect these capability limits and the
   administrator's constraints.

4.3.  Policy State and Failure Handling

   Accepted objectives, prepared policies, and verified enforcement are
   separate results.  The SAF Agent tracks the objective, while the SCF
   Agent records the desired revision, target realization, action
   result, and evidence.  A target can be ready before it carries
   traffic; the objective is reported as satisfied only when the
   relevant evidence supports that outcome.

   Correlate migration messages with the objective revision, operation,
   and intended traffic binding.  A new objective or another path change
   may supersede an earlier plan.

   Repeated requests should have consistent effects, stale responses
   must not advance the current operation, and retry budgets should
   prevent repeated oscillation.  Failed or uncertain outcomes remain
   visible until verification or an authorized recovery resolves them.

4.4.  Handling an Unplanned Path Change

   An unplanned device failure differs from a coordinated workload move:
   the network may already be carrying traffic on another path before
   the agent receives the event.

   The SCF Agent first determines the active path and whether an
   existing or pre-provisioned NSF protects it.  The target prepared for
   an earlier plan cannot be assumed to match the new destination.

   The continuity policy determines the immediate permitted behavior.  A
   deployment may already have equivalent controls on a backup path or
   may support restricting affected traffic until verification
   completes.

   The agent can select only mechanisms that the authorized controllers
   and enforcement points actually provide.  An unavailable source
   device cannot preserve protection merely because its last reported
   policy was correct.







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   Recovery establishes a valid binding and verifies the required
   outcome on the active path.  The SAF Agent reports any period of
   unknown or degraded protection, while the SCF Agent records the
   failure, action, and evidence.

   This separation avoids confusing rapid connectivity recovery with
   security-policy continuity.  Evaluation should report both service
   interruption and any traffic delivered without the intended control.

4.5.  Application Example: Mobility-Driven Enforcement Transition

   The same procedure can support a mobility event in a 5G deployment.
   The following simplified N2 handover diagrams retain the preparation
   and execution sequence used in the earlier framework.  They
   illustrate one application of Section 4.2; they do not restrict the
   architecture to mobile networks.  The underlying handover procedure
   is specified in clauses 4.9.1.3.2 and 4.9.1.3.3 of [TS-23.502].

   UE denotes User Equipment; S- and T- identify source and target; NG-
   RAN denotes the radio access network.  AMF and SMF are the Access and
   Mobility Management Function and Session Management Function, and UPF
   is the User Plane Function.  These domain-specific roles remain
   separate from the SAF and SCF Agents.

   S-NG-RAN       AMF          SMF       T-UPF      T-NG-RAN
       |           |            |          |           |
       | Handover Decision      |          |           |
       | Handover Required      |          |           |
       |-----------|            |          |           |
       |           |            |          |           |
       |           | PDU Session Update Request        |
       |           |------------|          |           |
       |           |            | Target User-Plane    |
       |           |            | Selection and Preparation
       |           |            |----------|           |
       |           |            |----------|           |
       |           |            |          |           |
       |           | PDU Session Update Response       |
       |           |------------|          |           |
       |           |    Handover Request   |           |
       |           |-----------------------------------|
       |           |    Handover Request Acknowledge   |
       |           |-----------------------------------|

    Figure 4: N2 Handover Preparation: Illustrative Target-Path Context






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   The SMF determines the applicable user-plane arrangement.  A handover
   does not necessarily select a different UPF or NSF; the target-UPF
   exchange shown is conditional on the applicable deployment and
   procedure.  If the active enforcement point remains unchanged, the
   SCF Agent checks the existing policy and binding rather than
   migrating it unnecessarily.

   Where authorized context identifies a changed enforcement point, the
   agents apply Figure 3.  A 5G Application Function adapter can provide
   permitted context through NEF or another authorized exposure API,
   while operator inventory resolves the corresponding NSF endpoints.
   NEF exposure is not the SAF-SCF interface, and an exposed service or
   location identifier is not by itself an NSF management address.

   Target preparation uses the desired policy and available source
   readback, capability validation, and a readiness result.  Readiness
   does not introduce a new N2 message or a mandatory handover barrier.
   Any preparation acknowledgment affects the network transition only
   where an existing, authorized integration supports that coordination;
   otherwise, the configured continuity policy governs the interval.

   UE       S-RAN      T-RAN       AMF        SMF       T-UPF
    |         |          |          |          |          |
    |         | Handover Command    |          |          |
    |         |---------------------|          |          |
    | Handover Command   |          |          |          |
    |---------|          |          |          |          |
    |         | Uplink RAN Status Transfer     |          |
    |         |---------------------|          |          |
    |         |          | Downlink RAN Status Transfer   |
    |         |          |----------|          |          |
    | [Target-cell synchronization] |          |          |
    | Handover Confirm   |          |          |          |
    |--------------------|          |          |          |
    |         |          | Handover Notify     |          |
    |         |          |----------|          |          |
    |         |          |          | Session context update
    |         |          |          |----------|          |
    |         |          |          |          | N4 update|
    |         |          |          |          |----------|
    |         |          | [Updated user-plane path]      |

    Figure 5: N2 Handover Execution: Illustrative User-Plane Path Update








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   After the network updates the user-plane path, the SCF Agent verifies
   the selected traffic binding and live enforcement at the applicable
   NSF.  Handover completion alone is not security verification.  Old
   bindings are retired only after verification and confirmation that
   they are no longer needed.  A UPF path update and migration of a
   stateful security function are separate operations.

5.  Multi-Domain Coordination

   The SAF Agent can maintain a shared security objective across
   different network environments.  Figure 6 illustrates a 5G domain
   alongside a cloud or campus domain.  Each has a domain-local SCF
   Agent and its own enforcement functions.  The example shows how the
   general framework can be applied to different networks while
   preserving a common objective.

                    +-----------------------------+
                    | SAF Agent: shared objective |
                    +--------------+--------------+
                                   |
                        +----------+-----------+
                        |                      |
                 Agent interface A     Authorized domain interface
                        |                      |
                +-------v------+     +---------v----------------+
                | 5G SCF Agent |     | Cloud / campus SCF Agent |
                +-------+------+     +---------+----------------+
                        |                      |
                +-------v------+     +---------v----------------+
                | UPF / NSFs   |     | Cloud / campus NSFs      |
                +--------------+     +--------------------------+

   5G context: SAF AF adapter --- NEF / authorized 5G exposure.
   All domains return local outcome evidence to the SAF Agent.

       Figure 6: Shared Objective with Domain-Local Security Control

   In the 5G example, a User Plane Function (UPF) is associated with the
   applicable NSFs.  Authorized context can be obtained through an
   Application Function (AF) integration and the Network Exposure
   Function (NEF), consistent with the 5G architecture [TS-23.501].  The
   NEF provides 5G capability exposure; it is not a general transport
   for SAF-SCF objective messages.  Cloud and campus domains use their
   own authorized interfaces.

   The shared objective does not grant access across administrative
   boundaries.  Each SCF Agent validates local permissions and
   capabilities and reports whether its realization is satisfied,



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   unsupported, or unverifiable.  The SAF Agent combines these outcomes
   and reports partial protection when necessary.  Success in one domain
   does not establish an end-to-end result.

   The architecture does not assume an atomic transaction across
   independently managed domains.  Coordinated recovery retains local
   authority and the shared constraints.  A failure in one domain cannot
   be rolled back by changing an unrelated domain's rule; each local
   outcome must remain visible to the SAF Agent.

6.  Security Considerations

   Authenticate administrators, agents, context providers, and
   enforcement functions, and authorize actions for the relevant
   objective and traffic scope.  Protect policy, context, and telemetry
   exchanges against disclosure, modification, and replay.  On supported
   NETCONF or RESTCONF endpoints, NACM [RFC8341] can restrict management
   operations and data access.  It does not define SAF-SCF
   authorization; other interfaces need explicit authorization
   mechanisms.

   Treat intent text, telemetry, and retrieved records as potentially
   untrusted data.  AI-generated interpretations and plans must pass
   independent scope, capability, and policy checks before an executor
   uses credentials or changes enforcement.  A model cannot expand its
   own authority by generating instructions or interpreting a lower-
   trust observation as an operator command.

   Bind readiness and evidence to the current objective revision,
   operation, target, and traffic scope.  Keep audit records of the
   observations, decisions, actions, and outcomes while minimizing
   unnecessary user or workload identifiers.

   Missing or stale telemetry is not proof of protection.  Source
   cleanup requires both target verification and confirmation that the
   old binding is no longer required.

   Define fallback, rollback, and human-escalation behavior in advance.
   Routing ownership and security-rule ownership remain explicit, and
   availability pressure alone does not authorize a weaker security
   objective.

   If no permitted plan can satisfy the request, report the limitation
   and use the approved continuity action.  An agent cannot undo a
   completed network transition simply by restoring an obsolete rule.






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7.  Conclusion

   This document develops distributed security management into an
   Agentic AI framework for heterogeneous networks.  The SAF Agent
   maintains the objective; the SCF Agent plans, executes, and verifies
   its realization at distributed NSFs.

   Policy generation and continuity across path or enforcement-point
   changes form one Observe-Reason-Act-Verify lifecycle.  Existing
   management, modeling, telemetry, and access-control mechanisms
   provide integration foundations while agent interoperability remains
   further work.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC9315]  Clemm, A., Ciavaglia, L., Granville, L. Z., and J.
              Tantsura, "Intent-Based Networking - Concepts and
              Definitions", RFC 9315, DOI 10.17487/RFC9315, October
              2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9315>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

   [RFC8341]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
              Access Control Model", RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341,
              STD 91, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.






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   [RFC8342]  Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
              and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
              (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.

   [RFC8345]  Clemm, A., Medved, J., Varga, R., Bahadur, N.,
              Ananthakrishnan, H., and X. Liu, "A YANG Data Model for
              Network Topologies", RFC 8345, DOI 10.17487/RFC8345, March
              2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8345>.

   [RFC8519]  Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
              "YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)",
              RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519>.

   [RFC9232]  Song, H., Qin, F., Martinez-Julia, P., Ciavaglia, L., and
              A. Wang, "Network Telemetry Framework", RFC 9232,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9232, May 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9232>.

   [TS-23.501]
              3GPP, "System architecture for the 5G System (5GS)", 3GPP
              TS 23.501 V18.5.0, May 2024,
              <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
              etsi_ts/123500_123599/123501/18.05.00_60/
              ts_123501v180500p.pdf>.

   [TS-23.502]
              3GPP, "Procedures for the 5G System (5GS)", 3GPP TS 23.502
              V18.5.0, May 2024, <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
              etsi_ts/123500_123599/123502/18.05.00_60/
              ts_123502v180500p.pdf>.

Appendix A.  Changes from draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework-02

   This document revises draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework-02.
   The major changes are as follows:

   *  This version introduced Agentic AI for intent interpretation,
      policy planning, execution, and continuous verification.
   *  It broadened the scope to mobile and wireless networks including
      5G networks and WiFi networks.  It reduced dependence on the I2NSF
      framework, while retaining 5G use case as an example.
   *  It refined policy-continuity procedures, including target
      readiness, enforcement verification, and failure handling.
   *  It updated security considerations, integration with existing
      standards, and references.




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Acknowledgments

   This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications
   Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
   Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) (No.  RS-2024-00398199).

Contributors

   This document has benefited from discussions in NMRG and from inputs
   and texts by Linda Dunbar (Futurewei), Yong-Geun Hong (Daejeon
   University), and Joo-Sang Youn (Dong-Eui University).  The authors
   sincerely appreciate their contributions.

   The following is the coauthor of this document:

   Mose Gu
   Department of Computer Science & Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
   Republic of Korea
   Phone: +82 31 299 4106
   Email: rna0415@skku.edu
   URI:   http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-Moses-Gu.php


Authors' Addresses

   Yoseop Ahn (editor)
   Department of Computer Science & Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
   Republic of Korea
   Phone: +82 31 299 4106
   Email: ahnjs124@skku.edu
   URI:   http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-Ahn-Yoseop.php


   Jaehoon Paul Jeong (editor)
   Department of Computer Science & Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
   Republic of Korea
   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   Email: pauljeong@skku.edu
   URI:   http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php



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   Younghan Kim
   School of Electronic Engineering
   Soongsil University
   369, Sangdo-ro, Dongjak-gu
   Seoul 06978
   Republic of Korea
   Email: younghak@ssu.ac.kr












































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