{
 "days": 7,
 "to": null,
 "count": 512,
 "total": 512,
 "areas": {
  "art": "ART",
  "int": "INT",
  "ops": "OPS",
  "rtg": "RTG",
  "sec": "SEC",
  "wit": "WIT",
  "gen": "GEN",
  "irtf": "IRTF",
  "other": "Other"
 },
 "topics": {
  "routing": "Routing",
  "transport": "Transport",
  "web": "Web/HTTP",
  "realtime": "Real-time media",
  "dns": "DNS/naming",
  "ip": "IP/addressing",
  "security": "Security",
  "iot": "IoT",
  "netmgmt": "Net management",
  "measurement": "Measurement/OAM",
  "email": "Email/messaging",
  "ai": "AI/agents",
  "cloud": "Cloud/DC",
  "wireless": "Wireless/satellite",
  "process": "Process",
  "other": "Other"
 },
 "kinds": {
  "spec": "specification",
  "requirements": "requirements / use cases",
  "informational": "informational / guidance",
  "other": "other"
 },
 "drafts": [
  {
   "name": "draft-sharif-mars-rating",
   "title": "The MARS Rating: Machine-Adversary Resistance to Autonomous AI Attack",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T17:30:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T11:47:07.813Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sharif",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.73,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.4,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines MARS (Machine-Adversary Resistance), an open rating, from 0 to 5, of how well a defended asset resists an autonomous artificial-intelligence adversary: an attacker that performs reconnaissance, exploitation, adaptation and propagation at machine speed and scale with no human in the loop. MARS is not a control catalogue and not a maturity model. It is a resistance rating, scored on five axes that describe adversary capabilities -- the ability to Learn a surface, Reuse a success, Scale by automation, Outpace a defence, and sPread from a foothold -- plus a requirement for tamper-evident, independently verifiable evidence at the highest levels. Because the axes are defined as adversary capabilities rather than specific technologies, MARS applies to any asset an AI can attack. This document specifies the threat model, the five axes, the rating scale, the assessment tiers, the assessment method, the evidence requirement, and a profile mechanism by which the invariant rubric is interpreted for any deployment substrate.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sharif-mars-rating/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sharif-mars-rating",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sharif-mars-rating"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-icann-registrar-interfaces",
   "title": "ICANN Registrar Interfaces",
   "rev": "17",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T17:00:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T17:47:07.905Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "icann",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.39,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.83,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the interfaces provided by ICANN to Registrars and Data Escrow Agents to fulfill the data escrow requirements of the Registrar Accreditation Agreement and the Registrar Data Escrow Specifications.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-icann-registrar-interfaces/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-icann-registrar-interfaces",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-icann-registrar-interfaces"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kornoelje-wia",
   "title": "Witnessed Integrity Attestations for Post-Incident System-State Verification",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T15:56:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T16:47:07.798Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kornoelje",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a Witness Attestation Record (WAR), a signed and hash-linked record created by a witness after it accepts an observation about a subject system. Each record identifies the subject, observation stream, checkpoint, observation time, evidence commitment, witness-local sequence number, and reference to the preceding record. A verifier can validate the record signature, reconstruct the supplied chain, evaluate the applicable policy, and assess freshness against a trusted checkpoint or independently retained chain head. The component is designed to preserve a verifiable chronology of observations and actions across vulnerability exposure, incident investigation, remediation, and post-remediation verification. It complements evidence-generation and transparency systems. It does not itself establish that a measurement source is truthful, that a host was uncompromised, or that every real-world event was observed.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kornoelje-wia/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kornoelje-wia",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kornoelje-wia"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bkayranci-x-forwarded-prefix",
   "title": "The X-Forwarded-Prefix HTTP Header Field",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T15:30:31Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T15:47:08.067Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "bkayranci",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.91,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the X-Forwarded-Prefix HTTP header field, a widely deployed de-facto standard used by reverse proxies, API gateways, load balancers, and ingress controllers to communicate the original URI path prefix that was stripped, rewritten, or matched prior to forwarding a request to an upstream service. Standardizing this header provides normative behavior across HTTP intermediaries and origin servers, enabling upstream applications to reliably reconstruct original client-facing target URIs, issue accurate HTTP redirects, generate self-referential hypermedia links, configure application base paths, and mitigate security vulnerabilities arising from improper path handling and header injection. Furthermore, this document establishes the requirement for reverse proxy implementations to emit this header unless explicitly configured otherwise, specifies deterministic prefix concatenation for multi- proxy chaining, defines strict percent-encoding preservation, establishes atomic trust boundaries for the forwarded header family, specifies structured field mapping in accordance with RFC 9651, and registers the field in the IANA HTTP Field Name Registry along with an extension parameter for the RFC 7239 Forwarded header.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bkayranci-x-forwarded-prefix/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bkayranci-x-forwarded-prefix",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-bkayranci-x-forwarded-prefix"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations",
   "title": "ML-KEM Security Considerations",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T15:23:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T15:47:08.067Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "cfrg",
   "group_type": "rg",
   "submitter": "cfrg",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "NIST standardized ML-KEM as FIPS 203 in August 2024. This document discusses how to use ML-KEM within protocols - that is, what problem it solves, and what you need to do to use it securely.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zheng-quic-fec-extension",
   "title": "FEC Extension for QUIC",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T12:09:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T12:47:07.849Z",
   "pages": 26,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zheng",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a Forward Error Correction (FEC) extension for the QUIC protocol, which provide protection against packet loss.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zheng-quic-fec-extension/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zheng-quic-fec-extension",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zheng-quic-fec-extension"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-cyber-defense-execution-finality",
   "title": "Execution Finality for AI Safety and Agentic AI Security: Containing the Consequences of Stolen Credentials and Autonomous Cyberattacks at the Final Effect Boundary",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T11:51:12Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T12:47:07.849Z",
   "pages": 50,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.63,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A cyberattack does not have to defeat every security mechanism to become catastrophic. One internet-facing service, one stolen but valid credential, one hijacked administrative session, or one autonomous AI tool calling a legitimately available interface may be enough. The decisive risk is the transition from access, prediction, intention or nominal authorization into an actual consequence: a changed configuration, an executed privileged command, a released dataset, a provisioned cloud resource, a dispatched payment, an altered network route or an activated physical device. This document analyzes two independently documented public developments of November 2026: the reported intrusion into the internal operational network of the Fugaku supercomputer through a publicly reachable status dashboard, and the reported discovery of autonomous multi-agent offensive frameworks, including an exposed framework named exploit_agent, together with cloud-credential abuse such as LLMJacking. The two events are not shown to be connected, and no public evidence shows artificial intelligence was used at Fugaku. They share a defender-risk pattern: apparently valid access becoming a real consequence. The document specifies a consequence-bound architecture. A proposed operation (a Candidate Act) remains non-effective until the actual pending operation, its target, destination, scope, resource version, current authority and protected policy state have been independently validated at a defender-controlled, non-bypassable enforcement point (a Finality Sink, in industry terms a reference monitor or commit gate) located at, or unavoidably upstream of, the point where the effect becomes real. It defines normative requirements for coverage, independence, effect binding, freshness and revocation, cumulative exposure, replay and idempotency, failure semantics and safety- critical operation; application profiles for high-performance computing, cloud control planes, AI-agent tool execution, telecommunications, finance and cyber-physical systems; a counterfactual analysis of the Fugaku incident; a differentiation from conventional systems; ten falsifiable experiments; and an informative FAQ. IETF relevance: the document is an architectural and requirements contribution relevant to security work on remote attestation, workload identity, delegated and fine-grained authorization, transparency of authorization evidence, and agent-to-tool interfaces. Industry relevance: the model is applicable to AI-agent platforms, cloud providers, HPC operators, telecommunications operators and financial infrastructure; the alignment sections are AI-generated, are not an endorsement, validation or infringement statement, and must be cross-checked against the original filings. Regulatory relevance: the document discusses relevance to the EU AI Act (cybersecurity and robustness of high-risk AI systems), NIS2, DORA and GDPR security of processing; it is not legal advice. Based on the Mothership application PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and publicly disclosed 16 July 2026. The underlying invention is human-originated; AI-assisted tools were used to create this document, which may contain errors, and readers must cross-check it against the original, publicly available sources. To read the full PCT filing, search \"Sangam Das\" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE, search PCT/ IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615), or read it at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/. No deployment, adoption, endorsement or performance claim is made about any third- party system, and no latency, efficacy or safety guarantee is claimed.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-cyber-defense-execution-finality/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-cyber-defense-execution-finality",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-cyber-defense-execution-finality"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-dance-architecture",
   "title": "An Architecture for DNS-Bound Client and Sender Identities",
   "rev": "10",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T11:49:54Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T12:47:07.849Z",
   "pages": 23,
   "group": "dance",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "dance",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.58,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This architecture document defines terminology, interaction, and authentication patterns, related to the use of DANE DNS records for TLS client and messaging peer identity, within the context of existing object security and TLS-based protocols.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dance-architecture/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dance-architecture",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-dance-architecture"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-nfsv4-internationalization",
   "title": "Internationalization for the NFSv4 Protocols",
   "rev": "18",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T11:46:54Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T11:47:07.813Z",
   "pages": 69,
   "group": "nfsv4",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "nfsv4",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.72,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the handling of internationalization for the NFSv4 protocols, including NFSv4.0, NFSv4.1, NFSv4.2 and extensions thereof, and future minor versions. It updates RFC7530 and RFC8881.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-internationalization/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nfsv4-internationalization",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-nfsv4-internationalization"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework",
   "title": "An Agentic AI Security Framework for Security Management in Mobile Networks",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T11:16:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T11:47:07.813Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ahn",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.74,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.35,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.92,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an Agentic AI Security Framework for security management in mobile networks. A Security Application Function (SAF) Agent translates a network administrator's security intent to hold security objectives into a high-level security policy. A Security Control Function (SCF) Agent receives the high-level policy and translates it into a low-level security policy that will be enforced by distributed Network Security Functions (NSFs) in mobile networks. The SCF Agent sends the low-level security policy to an appropriate NSF. Policy generation, monitoring, and continuity across a data path are integrated into a closed-loop control with an Observe- Reason-Act-Verify process. The proposed framework can be applied to enterprise, campus, cloud, and edge networks along with existing network-management mechanisms. This document describes the architecture, a policy-continuity example, standard integration points, and security considerations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-irtf-nmrg-ibn-usecases",
   "title": "Use Cases and Practices for Intent-Based Networking",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T10:21:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T10:47:07.949Z",
   "pages": 60,
   "group": "nmrg",
   "group_type": "rg",
   "submitter": "nmrg",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.36,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes a methodology to construct an Intent-Based Networking (IBN) system. According to this methodology, it describes several use cases of IBN. The methodology for the IBN system includes data collection for system awareness in the IBN system and then the construction of the IBN system. This construction consists of intent translation, policy translation, policy verification, policy deployment, policy monitoring, policy validation, policy optimization, and intent report. In addition, practices are also summarized to instruct the construction of next generation network management systems with the integration of IBN techniques. Finally, this document discusses three aspects for the deployment of the IBN system in the real world. They are Multi-Domain Dichotomy for IBN, the Integration of IBN and Network Digital Twin (NDT), and IBN with Artificial Intelligence (AI).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-nmrg-ibn-usecases/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-nmrg-ibn-usecases",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-irtf-nmrg-ibn-usecases"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jones-detached-evidence-handoffs",
   "title": "Terminology and Architectural Patterns for Detached Evidence Delivery",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T10:04:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T10:47:07.949Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jones",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.77,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a detached evidence handoff between independently administered organizations. It distinguishes artifact delivery, content integrity, source authentication, registration, reconciliation, and recipient decisions. It describes how a recipient can return a signed comparison against stated benchmarks, with a commitment to the figures it compared, without exporting its source ledger. Worked examples illustrate both a disclosed reconciliation and a comparison attestation. The document defines terminology and an architectural model; it specifies no wire protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-detached-evidence-handoffs/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jones-detached-evidence-handoffs",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jones-detached-evidence-handoffs"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-iotops-pqc-wireguard",
   "title": "A Post-Quantum Bootstrap Profile for WireGuard",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T09:40:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T08:47:10.748Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "liu",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a post-quantum bootstrap profile for WireGuard. A mutually authenticated ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA exchange derives a 32-octet preshared key (PSK), verifies key possession, and binds it to configured endpoint identities and WireGuard public keys. The resulting key is installed through the ordinary WireGuard PresharedKey configuration field. The profile defines canonical binary control records carried over mutually authenticated TLS 1.3 on TCP, with explicit message lengths, freshness, state transitions, and failure processing. Bootstrap carries the post-quantum contribution into the WireGuard PSK input; it is therefore part of the post-quantum provisioning mechanism. The native WireGuard Noise handshake and transport packet format are unchanged. This Internet-Draft is a proposal for Standards Track publication. It requests an ALPN protocol identifier for the bootstrap carrier. The request is pending; this document does not assign a native WireGuard packet type or a service port.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-iotops-pqc-wireguard/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-iotops-pqc-wireguard",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-liu-iotops-pqc-wireguard"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-iotops-pqc-uasc",
   "title": "Post-Quantum Cryptographic Protection Profile for OPC UA Secure Conversation",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T09:39:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T01:47:08.459Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "liu",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a post-quantum cryptographic protection profile for the OPC Unified Architecture Secure Conversation protocol (OPC UA UASC) carried over the opc.tcp transport. The profile uses ML-KEM-768 for SecureChannel key establishment, ML-DSA for asymmetric signatures, HKDF-SHA-256 for key derivation, and AES-256-GCM for symmetric message protection. It defines the profile identifiers, nonce encoding, key schedule, authenticated-encryption inputs, certificate and public-key binding requirements, token rollover behavior, and conformance requirements. This Internet-Draft is a proposal for Standards Track publication. Permanent OPC UA SecurityPolicy and algorithm identifiers require coordination with the OPC Foundation; the private identifiers documented here remain provisional. This document does not assign official OPC UA identifiers or claim conformance with an OPC Foundation specification.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-iotops-pqc-uasc/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-iotops-pqc-uasc",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-liu-iotops-pqc-uasc"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-iotops-pqc-dnp-sav5",
   "title": "A Post-Quantum Cryptographic Profile for DNP3 Secure Authentication Version 5",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T09:37:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "liu",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a post-quantum cryptographic profile for DNP3 Secure Authentication version 5 (SAv5). It defines an ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA authentication exchange, HKDF-SHA-256 session keys, canonical DNP3 application protocol data unit (APDU) encoding, transport segmentation, and HMAC-SHA-256 protection of application messages. This Internet-Draft is a proposal for Standards Track publication. The APDU uses DNP3 application control, authentication function codes, response internal indications, and a length-delimited post- quantum authentication object. The object variation and any externally allocated algorithm identifiers require coordination with the responsible DNP3 standards authority. A local experimental selector is specified only for explicitly configured laboratory use; this document does not assign an IEEE or IEC identifier.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-iotops-pqc-dnp-sav5/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-iotops-pqc-dnp-sav5",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-liu-iotops-pqc-dnp-sav5"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zehavi-oauth-aud-bound-authz",
   "title": "OAuth 2.0 Audience-Bound Client Authorization",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T09:13:54Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T09:47:28.155Z",
   "pages": 28,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zehavi",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "OAuth 2.0 access tokens are commonly audience-restricted to a specific protected resource. Several OAuth operations are performed by a client on behalf of that protected resource and act on such a token, including OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693], in which the protected resource exchanges a received token to call downstream services, and OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662], in which the protected resource asks the authorization server about a received token. In each case, the authorization server needs to ensure that only a client legitimately representing the token's audience can perform the operation, to prevent misuse of the token by unauthorized parties. This document defines a model in which authorization to perform such operations is anchored in the audience of the token. An authorization server determines whether the requesting client is associated with the protected resource identified by the token audience, then applies the remaining authorization policy for the requested operation. This relationship can be established by authorization server local policy, by validating a private_key_jwt client authentication assertion using the protected resource's jwks_uri, or by using a new OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata parameter that identifies the OAuth clients representing the protected resource. This document specifies how the model applies to token exchange and to token introspection, and allows other specifications to apply it to additional operations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zehavi-oauth-aud-bound-authz/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zehavi-oauth-aud-bound-authz",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zehavi-oauth-aud-bound-authz"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-grow-bmp-rm-aggregated",
   "title": "Efficient BMP Route Monitoring Messages",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T08:46:33Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T08:47:10.748Z",
   "pages": 23,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "liu",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes two complementary optimizations for the BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP) Route Monitoring message to significantly reduce network overhead and improve monitoring efficiency. The first optimization defines an aggregated BMP Route Monitoring message based on the Multi-Peer Header mechanism, which compresses multiple BMP Route Monitoring messages into a single aggregated message by leveraging BGP group packaging technology. The second optimization introduces a Common Update TLV that eliminates redundant transmission of routes unchanged by inbound or outbound policies across different RIB views. These optimizations work together to reduce the number of reported BMP messages, decrease bandwidth consumption, and improve processing efficiency for both monitored routers and monitoring stations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-grow-bmp-rm-aggregated/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-grow-bmp-rm-aggregated",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-liu-grow-bmp-rm-aggregated"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-li-rtgwg-overload-alleviation",
   "title": "Common Approaches to Link Overload Alleviation",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:43:11Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 21,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "li",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Network links may become degraded because of physical conditions or owing to partial link failure: this can result in a reduction of available bandwidth. Alternatively, traffic volume may increase significantly and unexpectedly. These circumstances may lead to links becoming overloaded which can result in dropped packets or degraded delivery such as increased delay. Traffic adjustment techniques can be applied to alleviate these link- overload situations by steering some of the traffic onto other paths that are less loaded and have available bandwidth. This document examines the scenarios in which links can become overloaded, the requirements for steering traffic to reduce link- overload, and the techniques that can be applied to alleviate overloaded links.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-li-rtgwg-overload-alleviation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-li-rtgwg-overload-alleviation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-li-rtgwg-overload-alleviation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-identity-streams",
   "title": "Identity Streams: Per-Trait Source Attribution for Inferred and Stated Identity Claims",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:25:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.62,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "When one system tells another about a trait it has inferred about a person, the receiver today learns the trait and a confidence, and nothing about what the inference was drawn from. Because the receiver cannot tell a trait the person stated in answer to a question from one read off the person's activity on a linked platform, it cannot apply the lawful basis, consent and context limits that belong to each. This document defines a source tag carried with every inferred trait on the wire. The tag names, for each stream that contributed to the trait, a registered stream class, the provenance class of the observation, where the inference was computed, the lawful basis and purposes the stream was consented for, and the contexts the trait may be used in. It reuses the provenance- class vocabulary of the Morning Brief specification, establishes a registry of stream classes, and states the rules a receiver follows, including refusing a trait whose sources it cannot check. The same tag carries facts the person states about themselves, such as when they are available or the terms on which they offer something, and those facts keep the limits of the stream they were given on. It defines a wire field only. How traits are inferred, stored or scored is out of scope.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-identity-streams/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-identity-streams",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-identity-streams"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-agent-channel-fan-out",
   "title": "An Agent-Channel Frame for Identity-Keyed Fan-Out Delivery to Concurrent Sessions",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:24:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 27,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.93,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This memo specifies an application-layer frame format and a delivery model by which the several concurrent agentic sessions of a single identity-bound principal, and the recognised members of an organisational identity substrate, exchange short structured messages. The frame, termed the agent-channel frame, is a transport envelope: it carries a closed-catalogue kind discriminator, a structured per-kind payload, an identity attribution pair, and an inline provenance block. Delivery is fan-out: a sender names a recipient scope rather than a single endpoint, and the scope is expanded at delivery time against the recipient's subscriptions. Recipients receive frames over a per-handle Server-Sent Events stream and can narrow what they receive with a subscribe-time filter expression. Frames are ephemeral routing units; the memo specifies only the wire envelope, the scope-expansion grammar, the subscribe filter grammar, and the delivery semantics. Frame persistence, where an implementation chooses to retain frames for replay, is out of scope. The memo composes with the handle namespace and discovery surface of draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery and the cross- organisational ceremony of draft-morrison-identity-accord; no new transport and no new handle category is introduced.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-agent-channel-fan-out/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-agent-channel-fan-out",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-agent-channel-fan-out"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-live-reference-resolution",
   "title": "Live Reference Resolution for Autonomous Agent Beliefs",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:24:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.53,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A recurring class of autonomous-agent failure arises when an agent acts on a belief read from a cached, derived, or proxy copy that has silently diverged from the authority the belief claims to represent. This document describes a reference-resolution discipline for the working beliefs an agent reasons and acts from. Each belief is held as a reference to a single named lowest authority and is resolved live at the point of use, with verification. When the authority is unobservable or the resolved value is stale, the belief takes an explicit uncertainty state and never falls back to a prior cached value. That state propagates to any belief derived from it, and an uncertain belief feeding a costly or irreversible act blocks the act or escalates it. Every resolution chain terminates in a single self- authorising root. The document is Informational. It records a discipline and a vocabulary and defines no wire protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-live-reference-resolution/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-live-reference-resolution",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-live-reference-resolution"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-claim-currency",
   "title": "Claim Currency: A Read-Time Decay Evaluator and Observation-Gated Re-Assertion Discipline for Concurrent Readers of a Reconciled Substrate",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:24:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.26,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This memo specifies a read-time freshness evaluator and an observation-gated re-assertion discipline for concurrent autonomous readers of a single reconciled substrate history. For every claim read from the substrate, a three-state currency band (FRESH, AGING, STALE) is derived at read time from the durable history and is never stored. A claim whose derived band is not FRESH MUST NOT be re- emitted as current and MUST NOT ground a new durable claim; the sole transition back to currency is a fresh observation of the claim's basis, and the substrate's append stage enforces that for every reader. The memo specifies the claim-layer consumer that two companion specifications, Substrate-Observation as an Alternative to Envelope Coordination and the Substrate-Provenance Annotation Grammar, each left unspecified. It composes a read-time-derived band, a decay clock measured in missing observations learned from a basis's own change cadence, an append-stage rejection of any claim citing a basis that is no longer the head of its lineage, and observation as the only admissible refresh. No new substrate is standardised; the discipline composes with substrate that already exists.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-claim-currency/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-claim-currency",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-claim-currency"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-compute-location-gate",
   "title": "The Compute-Location Gate: Provenance-Class Routing of Identity Inference with Wire-Layer Refusal of Unconsented Provenance Classes",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:23:37Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 26,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.74,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.62,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.69,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This memo specifies the compute-location gate: a mechanism by which a client and an identity-inference server negotiate, at the wire layer and before any inference is performed, the location at which an identity inference will compute, as a deterministic function of the provenance class of the input signal. Three provenance classes are distinguished. Active inference, initiated by the inferred-about principal, MAY compute server-side and produce a server-held identity vector. Passive aggregate observation over a cohort no smaller than a declared minimum MAY compute server-side but yields only a population-level observation that is not attributable to an individual. Passive individual observation is local-only: it is computed and retained on the device that observed it and is never transmitted to a server. The gate is enforced by consent-class matching and by a wire-layer refusal returned when a requested provenance class is not consented; it relies on no cryptographic proof concerning data that was not used. The memo is Informational. The wire surface composes with DNS TXT discovery of Model Context Protocol servers, the ~handle namespace of the Identity Pronouns extension, substrate observation as an alternative to envelope coordination for concurrent sessions, and the organisational policy provision substrate; no new transport is introduced.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-compute-location-gate/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-compute-location-gate",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-compute-location-gate"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer",
   "title": "Reviewed-By Trailer: Sovereign-Portable Peer-Review Attribution for Content-Hash-Bound Artefacts",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:23:12Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.78,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a trailer grammar for sovereign-portable peer review as an extension of the identity-attributed commit grammar of draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits. The grammar introduces one required trailer (Reviewed-By:) and three optional companion trailers (Review-Stance:, Review-Of:, Witnessed-By:) that bind a Sovereign-tier ~handle to a specific act of review over a specific content artefact, cryptographically signed using the Ed25519 mechanism of that grammar. Because the signature covers the reviewer's role, the stance and the review target together, changing any of them after signing fails verification. The mechanism applies to git commits, document manifests, pre-prints, patent disclosures, and any other content-addressable artefact. A reviewer's signed reviews are bound to the reviewer's sovereign handle and can be verified without the publisher. For anonymous peer review, the reviewer signs under a Sovereign handle whose underlying party is concealed through out-of-band key custody; the review act stays verifiable and the reviewer's identity is not disclosed. The grammar can be used together with CRediT, ORCID and DOI attribution.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-reviewed-by-trailer"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-substrate-provenance-grammar",
   "title": "Substrate-Provenance Annotation Grammar for Large-Language-Model Output",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:22:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.34,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.88,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This memo specifies a wire-level annotation grammar by which a large- language-model output may carry, at emission and at the granularity of an individual assertion, a provenance label drawn from a closed enumerated vocabulary of substrate-class identifiers. The memo defines the closed vocabulary, the per-assertion attachment form, the admissibility discipline a relying party MAY apply to the labels, and two terminal output states, unverified-inference and decayed-to- uncertainty, equal-rank with assertion and denial. The memo specifies the wire grammar by which a relying party may inspect what an inference system did with respect to the substrates it consulted, and does not specify what an inference system MUST do. The memo is Informational.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-substrate-provenance-grammar/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-substrate-provenance-grammar",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-substrate-provenance-grammar"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits",
   "title": "Identity-Attributed Git Commits via Tier-Structured Trailers",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:22:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.52,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.58,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a git commit trailer grammar for identity- attributed contributions using the ~handle identity primitive defined in the MCP DNS discovery draft. The grammar binds sovereign actors, automated bots, and AI instruments to specific commits via three tier-structured trailers (Acted-By, Executed-By, Drafted-With) and three optional cryptographic trailers (Identity-Signature, Identity- Key-Id, Identity-Anchor). The signature is computed with Ed25519 over the commit's patch identifier, the value git patch-id derives from the change the commit makes, under a fixed domain-separation prefix. The signed value therefore depends on the change alone, and the resulting tree and the commit hash do not enter it. A commit that carries the same change keeps a verifying signature across rebase onto an unrelated base, cherry-pick, and message amendment. A merge commit carries no signature, and a squash is a new change signed by whoever squashed it. Conformant parsers reject cross-tier category errors (e.g., an Instrument-tier handle in an Acted-By slot) as malformed. The mechanism is provider-neutral. It depends only on DNS and the ~handle resolution algorithm of that draft and needs no central authority or verification service run by a platform.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-did-alter-method",
   "title": "The did:alter Decentralized Identifier Method",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:21:48Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.53,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.67,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the did:alter Decentralized Identifier method. A did:alter identifier names a ~handle together with the DNS zone that publishes the handle's signed envelope, and it resolves to a DID document by running the envelope recognition procedure of the companion specification for discovering Model Context Protocol servers through DNS TXT records, then expressing the verified envelope's Ed25519 key as a verification method. The identifier agrees with the handle grammar of the alter URI scheme and with the did:alter form already written by the identity-attributed commits specification. The method defines no record, cryptographic primitive or registry of its own. Its create, update and deactivate operations publish, replace and revoke that envelope, and its read operation verifies it. The document also sets out what the method cannot yet do, because the envelope record it reads carries no key history, and revocation cannot presently be observed from DNS alone.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-did-alter-method/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-did-alter-method",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-did-alter-method"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme",
   "title": "The 'alter' URI Scheme for Dispatchable ~handle References",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:21:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 27,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.94,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.59,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the alter URI scheme as a dispatchable reference syntax for ~handle identity references published in the DNS records defined in the companion specification for discovering Model Context Protocol servers through DNS TXT records. An alter: URI binds a textual ~handle reference to a resolution and verification procedure that retrieves the handle's envelope from a publishing zone, validates the envelope's signature chain, and dispatches the result to an operating-system URI handler. The reference may be scoped to an organisation, narrowed to a named facet of the identity, and addressed to a typed action surface. The scheme is the addressing form of the ~handle@org:facet/action reference; its resolution semantics are those of that companion specification, reused without modification. The scheme is provider-neutral and introduces no new cryptographic primitive. A handler given an alter: URI verifies the handle's envelope before acting on it, and where the URI addresses an action, verification precedes any side effect. IANA provisionally registered the alter scheme under Section 4 of RFC 7595 on 5 October 2026.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-relay-storage-authorisation",
   "title": "Relay Storage Allowances That Expire at a Planned Contact",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:16:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 32,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.29,
   "topic": "wireless",
   "topic_label": "Wireless/satellite",
   "topic_confidence": 0.46,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The use case and requirements document for IP in deep space asks that relays guard their buffers by authenticating and authorising the traffic sources allowed to consume buffer space, and by accounting for storage per source or traffic class. This document gives that requirement a mechanism. A storage allowance is a signed object in which a party with authority over a relay's storage states that a named holder may keep up to a stated number of octets at each named relay, until a planned contact between that relay and its next hop. A relay checks an allowance from data it already holds, without contacting the party that issued it. It charges stored data to an allowance by tagging the data in its own buffer and keeps no other state for it. No state is shared between relays, and at any instant the storage held under one allowance is no more than the sum of its rows. An allowance ends at the first contact it lists that takes place. A missed contact moves the end to the next contact listed, up to the last. The document defines the allowance, its issuance and delegation, enforcement at the relay, revocation, carriage in the Bundle Protocol and over IP, and its use with signed custody receipts for accounting.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-relay-storage-authorisation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-relay-storage-authorisation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-relay-storage-authorisation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-command-authority-long-delay",
   "title": "Command Authority Across Long Delay and Intermittent Contact",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:15:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 26,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.84,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.79,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.68,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The operational-technology command authority profile defines a Command Authority Envelope with which an enforcement point decides whether a software agent may perform a control action, on whose authority, and with which human approval. This document profiles that envelope for networks where the authority and the enforcement point are separated by round-trip times from about 2.6 seconds to about two weeks, as in the connectivity scenarios of the IP in deep space use-case document. It says how each element of the envelope is evaluated offline, how expiry and maximum age are checked against a declared clock uncertainty, how the revocation latency budget and trust-anchor staleness are declared for each scenario, how a human approval signed before a command departs stays bound to one action, how an outcome that cannot be observed across a contact gap or a reboot is recorded, what an agent may do once the origin has been silent past the revocation latency budget, and how the envelope is carried over the Space Packet Protocol on UDP, CoAP with OSCORE, and HTTP/3. It adds one grant field, with which a principal writes in advance the actions an agent may take during that silence and the interval in which it may take them. It states which way an unknown revocation check fails for each action class, and it adds one declared bound, a second revocation latency budget for the grants that field marks, beside the one budget the profile it builds on has a deployment declare.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-command-authority-long-delay/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-command-authority-long-delay",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-command-authority-long-delay"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-tiptop-disconnected-trust",
   "title": "A Disconnected Trust Model for Networks Without Continuous Connectivity",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T07:08:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.9,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.59,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The architecture document for IP in deep space says that security designs must tolerate long validation delays and potentially operate in a disconnected trust model, and it does not say what that model is. This document defines it. A disconnected trust model is one in which a node makes each trust decision from data it already holds or is handed with the request, each item verifiable without asking a third party, with a declared limit on how old each kind of held data may be. The document then asks what a node may do alone when it cannot reach an authority, and lists the requirements any answer must meet. It leaves short credential lifetime, as the answer to revocation without contact, with the documents that already give it. On the direction of failure, it adds that an authority check that cannot be evaluated fails closed on authority and never on safety. It specifies no protocol and no mechanism.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-tiptop-disconnected-trust/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-tiptop-disconnected-trust",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-tiptop-disconnected-trust"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-acts-for",
   "title": "Acts-For: Signing In to a Website with a ~handle, for a Person or an Agent Acting for One",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T06:58:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 34,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Acts-For lets a person sign in to any website with the ~handle they already hold, and lets an AI agent sign in or register at that website on the person's behalf. Neither needs a username, a password or an account per site. A website joins by publishing one DNS record. A person signs in through a standard OpenID Connect authorization code flow and the site receives a short-lived token naming the person by a number unique to that site. An agent obtains a short-lived pass from the issuer over the Model Context Protocol and presents it to the site. The pass names the same per-site number, the agent's ~handle, a number and key the agent has for that site, and the limits the person set. The site checks it against a published key without contacting the issuer.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-acts-for/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-acts-for",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-acts-for"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery",
   "title": "Discovery of Model Context Protocol Servers via DNS TXT Records",
   "rev": "10",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T06:56:22Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 73,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.82,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a DNS-based mechanism for discovering Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, the identity of the organisations that operate them, and a cryptographic identity envelope bound to an individual Sovereign-tier ~handle published under the same zone. Three TXT records are defined. _mcp.<domain> advertises an MCP server's endpoint URL, agent protocol family, transport binding, cryptographic identity, and capability profile. _org-alter.<domain> advertises the operator's canonical organisational identity, including its legal entity, registry identifier, regions of operation, and any regulatory framework under which it must refuse external automated access. _alter.<domain> publishes an Ed25519-signed envelope binding a ~handle to a public key, an IdentityLog root reference, and a revocation commitment. DNSSEC validation is REQUIRED for the envelope record, and a DANE TLSA pin on the MCP endpoint is REQUIRED where resolving an envelope and opening an MCP session are one recognition transaction. The mechanism complements HTTPS-based discovery, and follows the precedent set by DKIM, SPF, DMARC, and MTA-STS. A companion alter: URI scheme is provisionally registered with IANA.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhangb-cats-service-metrics-op",
   "title": "Computing Service Metric Definitions and Operation under CATS",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T06:54:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T07:47:09.559Z",
   "pages": 42,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zhangb",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.92,
   "topic": "cloud",
   "topic_label": "Cloud/DC",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.56,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Computing-Aware Traffic Steering (CATS) optimizes traffic forwarding by considering both computing and networking metrics. The CATS Metrics framework provides a general metric hierarchy and operational guidance for aggregation and normalization. Some deployment scenarios additionally require service-oriented metrics with explicit semantics and units to be consumed directly for service-instance selection based on both computing and network conditions. This document defines an operational approach that does not rely on the Level 1 or Level 2 normalized scores of the CATS Metrics framework. Instead, service sites report service-oriented metrics with explicit semantics and units, such as Global Available Slots and Computing Time, which are directly consumed by the C-PS for service- instance selection based on both computing and network conditions. The document clarifies how these metrics are derived from basic resource information, service reference information, and local policy. It also specifies how the C-PS combines the Computing Service Table with the Network Service Table, and defines update- control and fallback mechanisms suitable for large-scale deployments. Within the unified CATS architecture, this service-oriented operational approach complements the normalized-score approach. The two targeted scenarios are rapid deployment without offline metric- function negotiation and fine-grained, requirement-aware joint selection.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zhangb-cats-service-metrics-op/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zhangb-cats-service-metrics-op",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zhangb-cats-service-metrics-op"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sajassi-bess-evpn-subnet-slicing",
   "title": "EVPN Subnet Slicing",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T06:42:17Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T06:47:10.609Z",
   "pages": 28,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sajassi",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Ethernet VPN (EVPN) Integrated Routing and Bridging (IRB) distributes Layer 2 and Layer 3 reachability through BGP. In a large stretched broadcast domain, traditional IRB can cause every Provider Edge (PE) to install MAC and IP addresses for every endpoint in the subnet thus resulting in exhaustion of forwarding resources (MAC-VRF and IP-VRF) on the PEs - i.e., route population is approximately proportional to the number of endpoints in every stretched subnet imported by the PE [Optimized-IRB] proposes a solution to alleviate the MAC-VRF resource consumption by terminating ARP/ND messages on the PE and providing L3 forwarding (routing) for both intra and inter subnets. Therefore, eliminating the need for MAC lookups and the maintenance of MAC addresses in MAC-VRF for IP hosts. However, this solution does not solve the IP-VRF resource consumption issue as IP host addresses still need to be maintained in IP-VRF for both the locally connected hosts and the remote hosts. This problem is particularly pronounced in campus networks where most subnets are stretched across the entire campus (and thus all access switches) and the access switches used as EVPN-IRB PE devices have significantly smaller forwarding tables and hence limit the total endpoint scale that can be attached to stretched subnets across the network. This document defines an EVPN Subnet Slicing solution to horizontally scale stretched subnets across the network without being constrained by any PE's forwarding table size. The solution enables access layer PE devices to maintain only locally attached host routes and allows host routes to be distributed across distribution or aggregation layer PE devices as opposed to each PE maintaining all host IP routes.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sajassi-bess-evpn-subnet-slicing/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sajassi-bess-evpn-subnet-slicing",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sajassi-bess-evpn-subnet-slicing"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-lrss-bess-evpn-group-policy",
   "title": "EVPN Group Policy",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T06:37:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T06:47:10.609Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "lrss",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.91,
   "topic": "cloud",
   "topic_label": "Cloud/DC",
   "topic_confidence": 0.77,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Group Based Policy can be used to achieve micro or macro segmentation of user traffic. For Group Based Policy, a Group Policy ID, also known as Group Policy Tag, is used to represent a logical group that shares the same policy and access privilege. This document defines a backward compatible extension to Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN) that allows a Group Policy ID to be carried for the purposes of policy enforcement at the egress Network Virtualization Edge (NVE). It also defines a new BGP Extended Community that can be used to propagate Group Policy ID through a BGP route advertisement in the control plane. This is to facilitate policy enforcement at the ingress NVE when feasible.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lrss-bess-evpn-group-policy/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lrss-bess-evpn-group-policy",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-lrss-bess-evpn-group-policy"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-fsv2-scheduling",
   "title": "BGP Flow Specification Version 2 Extensions for Scheduling",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T06:31:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T06:47:10.609Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "BGP Flow Specification allows conveying flow specifications and associated traffic actions/rules to perform different actions based on traffic characteristics. Existing traffic filter rules and actions in FSv2 remain effective perpetually; once delivered to the headend, the rules and actions are permanent for traffic. However, some operators wish to perform different actions for specific flows at specific time. This document extends BGP FSv2 with a scheduling time component to match the arrival time of packets. Based on this component, the headend can perform different actions for specific traffic at different times.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-fsv2-scheduling/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-fsv2-scheduling",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-fsv2-scheduling"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-rogue-ai-infrastructure-finality",
   "title": "AI Safety: Threat Model and Execution-Finality Protection for Rogue AI Attacks on Global Digital Infrastructure",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T05:26:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T05:47:08.499Z",
   "pages": 93,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.88,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.78,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.85,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents, optimizers and AI-assisted security controllers increasingly hold standing permissions that let them change production infrastructure at machine speed. This document defines a threat model and a protection architecture for the boundary between AI decision and infrastructure effect. It describes five rogue-AI threat scenarios (Runaway Optimizer, Unmediated Agentic Execution, Correlated Security Monoculture, Adversarially Induced Infrastructure Shutdown, and the Self-Authorizing Agent), fifty-one variations, a thirty-six entry threat register, twelve required security properties, and a comparison showing why common controls such as IAM, guardrails, AI judges, human approval, canary delivery and detection do not by themselves provide them. The proposed architecture keeps a Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State until a Protected Enforcement Domain reconstructs the actual pending operation, an Independent Validator decides, and a Finality Sink verifies an act-bound, single-use capability at the point of effect. For high-critical systems it adds receipt-gated staged effectuation so that even a wrongly authorized act exposes only the current stage. The document also gives latency tiers, failure behaviour, twenty defensive simulations with acceptance criteria, and residual limits. All scenarios are hypothetical threat models, not reports of incidents. This document is based on the Mothership application PCT/ IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and publicly disclosed 16 July 2026. To read the full PCT filing, search \"Sangam Das\" on PATENTSCOPE, search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615), or read https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-rogue-ai-infrastructure-finality/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-rogue-ai-infrastructure-finality",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-rogue-ai-infrastructure-finality"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-tls-pake",
   "title": "A Password Authenticated Key Exchange Extension for TLS 1.3",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T05:17:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T05:47:08.499Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "tls",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "tls",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The pre-shared key mechanism available in TLS 1.3 is not suitable for usage with low-entropy keys, such as passwords entered by users. This document describes an extension that enables the use of password-authenticated key exchange protocols with TLS 1.3.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-pake/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-pake",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-tls-pake"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-emailcore-iana-cleanup",
   "title": "Updates to SMTP related IANA registries",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T04:58:50Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T05:47:08.499Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "emailcore",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "emailcore",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 0.94,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "While EMAILCORE working group was working on update to SMTP specification, it became clear that existing entries in SMTP related registries are missing information or contain stale information and need to be updated. This document updates such entries.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emailcore-iana-cleanup/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-emailcore-iana-cleanup",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-emailcore-iana-cleanup"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-smith-idr-rr-deployment-considerations",
   "title": "BGP RR Deployment Considerations",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T03:28:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T03:47:08.123Z",
   "pages": 34,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "smith",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "In BGP networks, Route Reflectors (RRs) simplify the provisioning of the Internal BGP (IBGP) control plane and mitigate the scaling challenges of maintaining a full mesh of IBGP sessions among border routers. Because of these operational benefits, RRs are widely deployed in modern networks utilizing BGP. This document describes common RR design options, their associated trade-offs, and deployment best practices based on industry operational experience. Operators should consider these suggestions when designing and operating BGP networks because BGP control plane stability is essential to overall network stability.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-smith-idr-rr-deployment-considerations/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-smith-idr-rr-deployment-considerations",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-smith-idr-rr-deployment-considerations"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-cadi",
   "title": "Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T03:09:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T03:47:08.123Z",
   "pages": 32,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "liu",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.83,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.9,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.8,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document compiles existing Cryptographic Asset Discovery and Inventory (CADI) methods and analyzes potential gaps. It also defines a YANG data model that augments the base network inventory model with the cryptographic assets of each network element. The data model is aligned with the Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) defined in CycloneDX.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-cadi/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-cadi",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-liu-cadi"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-janz-onsen-cognitive-reconciliation",
   "title": "Cognitive Reconciliation for YANG and TM Forum Model Interoperability",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T02:56:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T03:47:08.123Z",
   "pages": 23,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "janz",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Network operators must make YANG-modeled service and network interfaces interoperate with TM Forum (TMF) OSS/BSS APIs. Today this is done with hand-built, model-specific adapters, whose construction and maintenance is ongoing human work. The ONSEN problem statement records the absence of a standard alignment between TMF APIs and YANG models as an open problem. This document applies ad hoc semantic reconciliation by cognitive agents, as developed in draft-janz-nmrg- adhoc-semantic-reconciliation, to that problem. Two cognitive agents lift their respective models, bind through a thin shared reference, and each generates and operates its own inbound translator, with no model-specific adapter agreed in advance. This document reports results from a demonstrator whose first case reconciles the L3SM service model to a TMF representation. It runs the reconciliation in two forms, one anchored on the mapping-root annotations of draft-lls- onsen-yang-tmf-mapping, and one with those annotations withheld, in which the agents must locate the services themselves in the plain model, and the two forms together size what the annotations contribute. It shows the reconciled mapping operating on real instance data, shows the model-drift lifecycle by which the translators are kept current, reads the demonstrator as an empirical point on a cognition-placement spectrum, from over-arching cognition over two inert systems to both systems cognitive, and is explicit about what over-arching cognition achieves when neither system is itself cognitive. A second case reconciles the L3SM service model to the L3NM network model, a cross-abstraction mapping where a cognitive counterpart earns its place, so the two cases together give the two poles of the spectrum on two ONSEN problem areas. The document closes with recommendations for operational practice and for standardization.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-janz-onsen-cognitive-reconciliation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-janz-onsen-cognitive-reconciliation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-janz-onsen-cognitive-reconciliation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-netconf-quic-call-home",
   "title": "NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home Using QUIC",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T01:41:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T01:47:08.459Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "netconf",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "netconf",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This RFC extends NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home [RFC 8071] to support the QUIC protocol [RFC 9000].",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netconf-quic-call-home/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-quic-call-home",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-netconf-quic-call-home"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jmap-smime-sender-extensions",
   "title": "JMAP extension for S/MIME signing and encryption",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T01:01:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T01:47:08.459Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "jmap",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jmap",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies an extension to JMAP for sending S/MIME signed and/or S/MIME encrypted messages, as well as automatic decryption of received S/MIME messages. [[This version presents an alternative syntax to revision 04 of https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jmap-smime-sender- extensions/]]",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jmap-smime-sender-extensions/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jmap-smime-sender-extensions",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jmap-smime-sender-extensions"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-netconf-quic-client-server",
   "title": "YANG Groupings for QUIC clients and QUIC servers",
   "rev": "10",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T00:24:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:47:07.871Z",
   "pages": 27,
   "group": "netconf",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "netconf",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines three YANG 1.1 modules to support the configuration of QUIC clients and QUIC servers. The common YANG module defines reusable groupings for setting parameters imported from the QUIC version and QUIC transport IANA YANG modules. The two QUIC client and server YANG modules define reusable groupings for QUIC connection settings, including the common QUIC parameters, for protocol implementation. Furthermore two initial YANG 1.1 modules for the IANA registries \"QUIC Versions\" and \"QUIC Transport Parameters\" are included in Appendix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netconf-quic-client-server/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-quic-client-server",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-netconf-quic-client-server"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-bfd-rfc5880bis",
   "title": "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T00:22:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:47:07.871Z",
   "pages": 65,
   "group": "bfd",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "bfd",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.85,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a protocol intended to detect faults in the bidirectional path between two forwarding engines, including interfaces, data link(s), and to the extent possible the forwarding engines themselves, with potentially very low latency. It operates independently of media, data protocols, and routing protocols. This document obsoletes RFC 5880.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bfd-rfc5880bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bfd-rfc5880bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-bfd-rfc5880bis"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-retention-chain",
   "title": "Self-Verifiable Retention Chain for Payment Receipts",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-18T00:20:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:47:07.871Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies eight cryptographic constructions for self-verifiable agentic payment records. The first, the Retention Chain Reference (retention_chain_ref), enables tamper-evident audit chains linking payment receipts without requiring external infrastructure. The second, the Payment Action Lifecycle, defines a content-addressed model for the exactly-once execution of payment actions, including an action reference primitive (action_ref) and a per-state transition hash (transition_hash) with a provable SKIP-on- retry idempotency guarantee. The third, the Settlement-Action Binding (binding_ref), binds a settled payment to the verified agent action it paid for and to the retention chain entry recording it, so that a settlement attestation proves not only that a payment occurred but which verified action it corresponds to. The fourth, the Policy Binding (policy_bound_ref), binds a content-addressed snapshot of the governing policy to an existing binding or chain reference, so that a decision is verifiable against the exact policy version that admitted it and a policy rotation is detectable by recomputation. The fifth, the Compliance Gate Binding (gate_ref), binds a categorical ALLOW/REFER/DENY compliance verdict and a no-PII payer reference to a policy or binding reference, so that a screening decision is provably tied to the policy in force when it was made and carries no personal data in the bound record. The sixth, the Pre-Payment Decision Chain (guardrail_ref), composes an agent identity reference, a spend authority reference, and the policy in force into one recomputable pre-payment ALLOW/DENY decision. The seventh, Post-Decision Execution Evidence (execution_ref), binds an executed action to the exact decision that authorized it, so the recorded execution is provably consistent with the decision and not merely correlated with an agent identity. The eighth, Cross-Party Authority Delegation (delegation_ref), binds a delegation of authority from one party to another and chains hand-offs, so a verifier can confirm that authority did not widen across an organizational boundary. All constructions use only SHA-256 and the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785), and are verifiable by any party holding the relevant receipts without contacting the issuer. The constructions satisfy the transaction recording and audit trail obligations of MiCA Article 68(9), DORA Article 17, and AMLR Article 77.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-retention-chain/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-retention-chain",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-retention-chain"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-netconf-yp-transport-capabilities",
   "title": "YANG Notification Transport Capabilities",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T23:52:30Z",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:47:07.871Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "netconf",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "netconf",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a YANG module for discovering transport capabilities for YANG notifications. The module augments the YANG notifications capabilities model with capabilities for the notification transport protocol, transport encoding, and transport encryption. The capabilities enable a client to determine the notification transport options supported by a NETCONF or RESTCONF server at runtime or at implementation time using the YANG instance data file format.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netconf-yp-transport-capabilities/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-yp-transport-capabilities",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-netconf-yp-transport-capabilities"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mckenna-webbotauth-collection-attestation",
   "title": "Attested Conduct for Anonymous Web Data Collection: Use Cases, Requirements, and a Tiered Model",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T23:20:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T23:47:09.962Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "mckenna",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.85,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Anonymous Bot Authentication lets a web site learn that an automated client holds a credential from an Anchor whose policies it accepts, without learning which client it is. This document describes web data collection use cases that need that property, and what they require of the evidence an Anchor evaluates, of what a site can verify about conduct it cannot attribute, and of what a buyer of collected data needs to see. It proposes a tiered model. Collectors register signed statements of their own conduct in a SCITT Transparency Service; the site, its security intermediary, or a network intermediary may corroborate them; and an Anchor acting as a certifying body may appraise them. Coarse, unlinkable attributes about the data's eventual recipient let a site restrict use by category of recipient without learning who the recipient is.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mckenna-webbotauth-collection-attestation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mckenna-webbotauth-collection-attestation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-mckenna-webbotauth-collection-attestation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sshm-cert",
   "title": "SSH Certificate Format",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T23:13:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 37,
   "group": "sshm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sshm",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document presents a lightweight certificate format that may be used in the context of the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol for user and host authentication.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-cert/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sshm-cert",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sshm-cert"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance",
   "title": "Decision Provenance for SCITT: binding software releases and agent actions to the decisions behind them",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T23:12:42Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T15:47:08.016Z",
   "pages": 43,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "lemonnier",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.9,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.68,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Build attestations, bills of materials and Signed Statements in a Transparency Service record what was built and by whom. Authorization receipts for agent actions can establish who approved an exact action; the statement profiles for agent actions record a human approval as the producer's claim. The release and agent action examples in this document use the Decision Provenance Standard to supply a separately verifiable decision record and an attachment for the approved action. The cited records and receipts supply evidence about the build, the action or its authorization, according to their respective profiles. This document describes how a decision record and its action-binding attachment, as the extension proposals of the Decision Provenance Standard define them, sit under a release statement, a build attestation or an agent action record by typed digest references; how a verifier checks them offline, including the approver's signature where one is carried; and how the witness checkpoints of the anchoring extension are registered in a Transparency Service. For a relying party reviewing one occurrence, it specifies which authenticated inputs to compare and how to report missing evidence about presentation, authority and the observed effect. A software release decision and an agent action capsule are the worked examples; the model has no feature specific to either. This document is independent of the Decision Provenance Standard, is not part of it, does not change it, and is not endorsed by its Steward.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake",
   "title": "Hybrid Post-Quantum Password Authenticated Key Exchange",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T22:37:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 114,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "vos",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.9,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document focuses on the problem of password authenticated key exchange in a post-quantum setting, a gap for which there does not exist any protocol suitable for deployment. Given PAKE uses in settings such as device pairing and client-server authentication, this gap has real world security consequences. This document addresses this gap with four post-quantum password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols: OQUAKE, OQUAKE+, CPaceOQUAKE, and CPaceOQUAKE+. OQUAKE and OQUAKE+ are standalone PAKEs that both offer security against a quantum-capable attacker. OQUAKE is a symmetric PAKE, suitable for use cases where both parties share a view of the password. OQUAKE+ is an augmented version of OQUAKE suitable for client-server settings where only one party (the client) knows the password. CPaceOQUAKE is a hybrid PAKE that runs a classical PAKE (CPace) and OQUAKE sequentially, and CPaceOQUAKE+ is its augmented version. This document also provides recommended configurations for each protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jones-outerprise-visual-manual",
   "title": "Outerprise Ecosystem and Infrastructure: Visual Manual and Machine-Readable Companion",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T22:19:49Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jones",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.63,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.7,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document presents a visual reference model of the Outerprise evidence-delivery ecosystem as documented by the public Entercation application. It identifies participants, public surfaces, packet boundaries, fiscal-sponsorship stations, comparison findings and policy decisions. It describes a machine-readable companion with structured definitions, schemas, exact arithmetic and synthetic test vectors. The visual model is a documented public-surface view with explicit evidence boundaries.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-outerprise-visual-manual/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jones-outerprise-visual-manual",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jones-outerprise-visual-manual"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-drake-agent-identity-resolution",
   "title": "Resolution and Verification of Agent Identities using DNS and RDAP",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T22:11:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "drake",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.49,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Agent Identity Registry System (AIRS) ([I-D.drake-agent-identity-registry]) assigns a permanent canonical aid URN to the identity0 of an autonomous entity and maintains an authoritative record associated with that identifier. This document defines the read side of AIRS: how a Relying Party finds the authoritative resolution service, retrieves the public record, resolves a handle to the canonical identifier, and verifies a Registrar-issued credential presented for that identity. Discovery uses the DNS-based URN Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS) and lookup uses the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP). Credential verification reuses the OAuth 2.0 JWT access-token and sender-constraint profiles defined by the AIRS registry architecture; this document defines no new credential format and no generic direct device-proof protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-drake-agent-identity-resolution/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-agent-identity-resolution",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-drake-agent-identity-resolution"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-drake-agent-identity-registry",
   "title": "Agent Identity Registry System: A Federated Architecture for Durable Identity of Autonomous Entities",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T22:11:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 60,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "drake",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.81,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.45,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Agent Identity Registry System (AIRS): a federated architecture that gives the durable identity0 of an autonomous entity a permanent canonical identifier, maintains an authoritative record about that identity, binds proof of control to enrolled anchors, and issues credentials that relying parties can verify. Identity0 and the distinction between an identity, its identifiers, its credentials, and its anchors are defined in [I-D.drake-agent-identity-problem-statement]. The canonical identifier is a URN in the \"aid\" namespace ([RFC8141]). At the sovereign and portable assurance tiers, each independently accepted identity requires its own manufacturer-attested physical anchor, and each accepted anchor backs at most one identity. A device normally carries one accepted anchor, so identities at these tiers cost scarce physical units rather than software operations. Enclave and virtual tiers can provide useful hardware-backed key protection without making that physical-scarcity claim; a declared tier permits software-only participation. The architecture separates governance, authoritative registry operation, and competing Registrars, and uses standard OAuth 2.0 JWT access tokens conforming to [RFC9068] for authenticated use.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-drake-agent-identity-registry/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-agent-identity-registry",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-drake-agent-identity-registry"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-drake-agent-identity-epp",
   "title": "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Mapping for Agent Identity and Handle Objects",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T22:10:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 43,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "drake",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.27,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) mapping for the provisioning and management of agent identity objects and handle objects stored in the authoritative AIRS repository, as defined by the Agent Identity Registry System architecture. Specified in Extensible Markup Language (XML), these mappings define the interface between Registrars and the production Registry Operator for identities of autonomous entities. The mapping defines two objects: a permanent, non-expiring Agent Identity object keyed by a server-allocated canonical identifier, and a renewable, expiring Handle object that provides a human-readable alias. It adds one registry function with no domain-name analogue: cross-Registrar uniqueness enforcement of enrolled anchor identifiers, including the scarce-anchor invariant where the parent architecture defines one. Transfer authorization uses a actor-signed proof from an enrolled operational proof key in place of authorization-information passwords.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-drake-agent-identity-epp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-agent-identity-epp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-drake-agent-identity-epp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ovalles-ai-terms",
   "title": "AI Terms: Per-Use Terms, Payment and Receipts for Automated AI Access to Web Content",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T22:07:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ovalles",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.47,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.75,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines AI Terms: a JSON document published at the well-known URI /.well-known/ai-terms in which a website states, for each of four uses of its content by automated AI systems (search, answer, training and agent), whether the use is allowed, allowed for a price, or not allowed. It also defines an AI-Purpose request header with which a client declares the use it intends, a way to point to the terms from any HTTP response, how a quote for a paid page can describe the page so that payment depends on that page being delivered, and how a paid access produces a receipt that records the use. AI Terms is designed to sit alongside the Robots Exclusion Protocol and the usage-preference vocabulary of the IETF AI Preferences work, adding the pieces those leave out: price, a free allowance, payment binding, a description of what is being bought, purpose declaration by the client, and a record of licensed use.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ovalles-ai-terms/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ovalles-ai-terms",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ovalles-ai-terms"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement",
   "title": "Identity for Autonomous Agents and Robots: Problem Statement, Threat Model, and Terminology",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T22:07:37Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "drake",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.91,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.51,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.55,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous software agents, and increasingly physical robots, now act at machine scale and speed across Internet protocols and throughout society, in roles whose decisions and actions can have legal, economic, safety, security, and physical consequences, often with limited or no human supervision. Any credential, authorization, delegation, certification, reputation, audit history, insurance policy, regulatory obligation, safety decision, liability, or legal process concerning an autonomous entity depends on being able to identify that same entity reliably over time. Conversely, when an autonomous entity or its operator is malicious, compromised, or beyond effective human control, the absence of durable identity lets it shed history, evade consequences, or multiply cheaply into Sybil swarms. Many proposed mechanisms bind claims to identifiers, accounts, credentials, keys, or names that can be replaced, reassigned, transferred, revoked, suspended, or lost. They may authenticate that subject perfectly while still failing to establish a durable identity for the entity it represents. This document offers precise terminology that distinguishes identity from the identifiers, attributes, credentials, authorizations, and reputation with which it is commonly conflated, minting the term \"identity0\" so that the strict sense has an unambiguous name. It presents a layered reference model showing where current \"agent identity\" efforts fit and the durable identity layer they commonly presuppose but do not provide. This document is informational and defines no protocol. It serves as the framing and vocabulary document for a companion series that specifies a federated durable-identity architecture, provisioning, resolution, application, and governance intended to provide a practical path from this problem statement to interoperable deployment.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sshm-composite-sigs",
   "title": "Post-Quantum Composite Signatures in SSH",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T21:54:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T22:47:08.577Z",
   "pages": 26,
   "group": "sshm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sshm",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the integration of two composite post-quantum signature schemes into the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. These schemes combine the post-quantum Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) with Elliptic Curve signature algorithms (Ed25519 and ECDSA, respectively) to provide security against both quantum and classical adversaries. Note This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. In the IANA considerations section, please replace \"thisRFC\" with \"RFC\" and the assigned number, when known.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-composite-sigs/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sshm-composite-sigs",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sshm-composite-sigs"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sshm-strict-kex",
   "title": "SSH Strict KEX extension",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T21:52:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T19:47:09.723Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "sshm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sshm",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a small set of modifications to the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol to fix the so-called Terrapin Attack on the initial key exchange.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-strict-kex/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sshm-strict-kex",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sshm-strict-kex"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sshm-hostkey-update",
   "title": "Host key update mechanism for SSH",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T21:48:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T19:47:09.723Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "sshm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sshm",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an extension to allow a Secure Shell (SSH) server to inform a client of the full set of host keys it supports. This may be used for graceful host key rotation and to provide keys for additional signature algorithms to the client, supporting algorithm agility.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-hostkey-update/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sshm-hostkey-update",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sshm-hostkey-update"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-ccamp-rfc8561bis",
   "title": "A YANG Data Model for Microwave Radio Link",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T21:23:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T21:47:08.034Z",
   "pages": 61,
   "group": "ccamp",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "ccamp",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a YANG data model for control and management of radio link interfaces and their connectivity to packet (typically Ethernet) interfaces in a microwave/millimeter wave node. The data nodes for management of the interface protection functionality is broken out into a separate and generic YANG data model in order to make it available for other interface types as well. This document obsoletes RFC 8561.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ccamp-rfc8561bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ccamp-rfc8561bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-ccamp-rfc8561bis"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-crypto-execution-finality",
   "title": "AI Safety and Custody Security: Execution Finality at the Signing, Delegation and Withdrawal Boundaries of Cryptocurrency Systems",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T21:09:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T21:47:08.034Z",
   "pages": 60,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.84,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.44,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A cryptographically valid signature can authorize a transaction that the organization never intended. The hard problem in digital-asset custody is therefore not only protecting keys. It is stopping compromised workflows, delegated code, misleading transaction displays, stolen credentials, and legitimate automation (including AI agents) from turning broad technical capability into unrestricted transfers. This document proposes defender-controlled, consequence-specific authorization at three boundaries: signing, wallet execution, and withdrawal release. The defender reconstructs the operation that would actually take effect from the transaction bytes and account state, holds it in a non-effective state, evaluates it against independent policy and a protected exposure ledger, and releases only a bounded, act-bound, single-use authority at a mandatory enforcement point. The document specifies placement by chain type, requirements, a state machine with crash and reorganization handling, EIP-7702 delegation controls, a catalogue of edge cases and twenty-four threat scenarios, and an acceptance-test method with a reference simulator. It states the limits plainly: an off-chain gate cannot stop a leaked key that submits directly to a permissionless network, and it fails if the enforcement layer is bypassed or compromised. No deployment, measured latency, or real-world prevention is claimed.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-crypto-execution-finality/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-crypto-execution-finality",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-crypto-execution-finality"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-binding",
   "title": "RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures Binding for x402 Payment Flows",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T21:00:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T21:47:08.034Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.42,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.61,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.37,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the normative binding of RFC 9421 (HTTP Message Signatures) and RFC 9530 (Digest Fields for HTTP) to the x402-foundation/x402 challenge/response payment flow. It defines the minimum covered-components set for an x402 challenge response and a payment proof submission, the RFC 9530 Content-Digest discipline, keyid resolution patterns, and the multi-hop proxy-chain survival property that the x402 transport requires. This binding is complementary to the existing http-message-signatures extension in the x402 specification, which specifies agent identity and registration (registrationUrl, signatureSchemes, tags). This document specifies the normative binding: which components MUST be covered, how Content-Digest is handled, and how signatures survive multi-hop proxy chains. The two compose cleanly in a deployment that uses both. A reference implementation is provided as algovoi-rfc9421-verifier on PyPI and npm (Apache 2.0), with Python and TypeScript byte-for-byte parity, cross-validated against external fixture sets. This document is an Independent Submission filed per RFC 4846 and is intended for publication as Informational. It is not an IETF Standards Track document, does not represent IETF community consensus, and has not been subject to review by an IETF Working Group. Change control resides with the document author. The binding specified is one approach among possible alternatives; implementers may choose this approach, alternative approaches, or hybrid approaches as appropriate to their requirements.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-binding/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-binding",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-rfc9421-binding"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs-v1",
   "title": "JCS Canonicalisation Discipline for Agentic-Payment Receipts",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T21:00:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T21:47:08.034Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.6,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.59,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.45,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a canonicalisation discipline for agentic- payment receipt formats. The discipline pins JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) as the canonical preimage form, plus a small set of schema-normalisation rules that must be applied before canonicalisation to preserve byte-determinism across independent implementations and across statutory retention periods. The discipline is identified by the URN urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1. Receipt formats that reference this discipline carry an in-band canon_version field recording the version under which they were emitted, enabling year-N re-verification of retained bytes without dependence on an out-of- band rule registry. The discipline is byte-for-byte cross-validated across eight independent JCS implementations in eight programming languages: Python (rfc8785), TypeScript (canonicalize), Go (gowebpki/jcs), Rust (serde_jcs), Java (cyberphone/json-canonicalization, by the RFC 8785 editor), PHP (root23/php-json-canonicalization), C#/.NET (Baqhub.Packages.JsonCanonicalization), and Ruby (json- canonicalization). The attestation record covering 192 byte-for-byte agreements is published at the AlgoVoi conformance vectors repository. This document is normatively referenced by [draft-hopley-x402- compliance-receipt], [draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt], and successor AlgoVoi-authored receipt-format Internet-Drafts. It is complementary to [draft-vauban-x402-stark-receipts], which uses a compatible canonicalisation discipline for its cryptographic settlement proofs. This document is an Independent Submission filed per RFC 4846 and is intended for publication as Informational. It is not an IETF Standards Track document, does not represent IETF community consensus, and has not been subject to review by an IETF Working Group. Change control resides with the document author. The canonicalisation discipline specified is one approach among possible alternatives; implementers may choose this approach, alternative approaches, or hybrid approaches as appropriate to their requirements.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs-v1/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs-v1",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs-v1"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ai-safety-agentic-cyberattack-finality",
   "title": "AI Safety for AI-Assisted Cyberattacks: Defender-Side Execution Finality at the Protected Consequence Boundary",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:39:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 43,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.71,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.71,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents can now carry out parts of a cyber operation that previously needed repeated human effort: reconnaissance, tool selection, execution attempts, observation of results, and adaptation when a route fails. An attacker-controlled agent does not have to malfunction to be dangerous; it can follow malicious instructions efficiently, using stolen credentials and well-formed requests that existing controls accept as valid. This document describes a defender-side architecture, called execution finality, that adds one bounded layer to existing security controls. An incoming request, credential, permitted API call, or agent-composed workflow does not by itself create authority for a sensitive consequence. The defender reconstructs the operation that would actually take effect, holds it in a non-effective state, evaluates authorization independently of the requester, and enforces the result at an enforcement point located at or immediately before the protected consequence. The document specifies placement rules, requirements, state handling, failure behavior, latency strategy, and test methods. It uses publicly reported AI-assisted activity against Taiwanese government agencies in 2026 as an illustrative threat scenario and does not claim that the architecture would have prevented that activity.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-ai-safety-agentic-cyberattack-finality/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-ai-safety-agentic-cyberattack-finality",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-ai-safety-agentic-cyberattack-finality"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator",
   "title": "An Intent Translator for Hallucination Mitigation in an Agentic AI Framework",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:18:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 34,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gu",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.93,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.85,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.65,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an Intent Translator to mitigate hallucination in the intent translation in an Agentic AI Framework. This Intent Translator has an agentic AI workflow for detecting and mitigating structural and semantic errors, including hallucinated policy content, when translating a natural-language network intent into structured policies. The workflow coordinates role-specialized language-model functions with deterministic validation tools within a predefined action space and a bounded retry budget. Schema- constrained generation limits structural defects, while cross-slot checks and intent-faithfulness assessment identify a potentially unsupported or inconsistent policy content. Structured validation traces guide targeted re-extraction and regeneration. Unresolved cases retain explicit failure status for downstream review. This document describes component interactions, validation outcomes, and recovery behavior, and also presents a 3GPP TS 28.312-based instantiation for mobile network management.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-openpgp-hkp",
   "title": "OpenPGP HTTP Keyserver Protocol",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:17:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 54,
   "group": "openpgp",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "openpgp",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a series of conventions to implement an OpenPGP keyserver using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). As this document is a codification and extension of a protocol that is already in wide use, strict attention is paid to backward compatibility with these existing implementations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-hkp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-hkp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-openpgp-hkp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-settlement-anchoring",
   "title": "Chain-Agnostic Anchoring of Canonical Settlement References for Agentic Payments",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:12:44Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.61,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.68,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies how a canonical content-addressed settlement reference is anchored into a transaction on any blockchain, uniformly across chain families, so that the same agentic-payment settlement can be recorded on-chain and later verified offline from the transaction bytes alone. The settlement reference is a SHA-256 digest over the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) form of a settlement record. This document does not redefine the digest; it defines (1) a chain identification rule that rejects ambiguous chain names before a settlement is bound to a network, and (2) a family-uniform anchor encoding that places the reference in the one field each chain family makes available for opaque data (EVM calldata or a log topic, an SVM memo, an AVM note, a UTXO OP_RETURN output, or a generic metadata carrier). The anchor carries only the digest; it carries no party identifiers, amounts, or personal data in cleartext. Because the reference is content-addressed and the encoding is fixed per family, any holder of the settlement record can recompute the reference, read the anchor from the on-chain field, and confirm the two match with no call to the settling party and no chain-specific verification logic beyond reading one field.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-settlement-anchoring/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-settlement-anchoring",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-settlement-anchoring"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation",
   "title": "Categorical Settlement Attestation Format for Agentic-Payment Flows",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:12:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.47,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.35,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a categorical settlement attestation format for agentic-payment flows. The format records that a payment has reached a particular settlement state on a particular chain, at a particular instant, under the attesting party's risk model. The receipt format uses a closed enumeration of categorical outcomes (SETTLED, PENDING_FINALITY, REVERSED). The categorical outcome is load-bearing for downstream regulatory obligations: SETTLED triggers settlement-finality record-keeping obligations under EU Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation Article 80 and Anti-Money Laundering Regulation Article 56; the PSD2 (Directive 2015/2366) Article 89 unauthorised-payment refund-window clock begins at SETTLED. PENDING_FINALITY records an inclusion-without-finality state where the refund-window has not yet started. REVERSED records chain- reorganisation, fraud-reversal, or operator-initiated reversal events for chain-of-custody audit. The format is multi-chain: a single settlement_chain string field identifies the chain on which settlement occurred, using a flat identifier convention (<chain_family> for default mainnets, <chain_family>:<network> for non-default networks). The receipt does not encode chain-specific finality semantics; those are applied at verification time by a verifier that knows the chain. The format composes with the AlgoVoi-authored compliance receipt format (draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt) and refund receipt format (draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt) under the same canonicalisation discipline (draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs). A verifier walking the audit chain confirms the full payment lifecycle from admission through settlement to refund (or non-refund) under one byte-deterministic canonicalisation pin. This document is an Independent Submission filed per RFC 4846 and is intended for publication as Informational. It is not an IETF Standards Track document, does not represent IETF community consensus, and has not been subject to review by an IETF Working Group. Change control resides with the document author. The format specified is one approach among possible alternatives; implementers may choose this approach, alternative approaches, or hybrid approaches as appropriate to their requirements.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt",
   "title": "Categorical Refund Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:10:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 21,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.47,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.43,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a categorical refund receipt format for agentic-payment flows. The format is the post-settlement counterpart to the admission-time compliance receipt format specified in draft- hopley-x402-compliance-receipt: where the compliance receipt records an admission decision under regulatory screening obligations, the refund receipt records a reversal-of-funds event with the same canonicalisation discipline and the same audit-chain semantics. The receipt format uses a closed enumeration of categorical outcomes (FULL, PARTIAL, REJECTED) rather than a continuous percentage or amount-only representation. The categorical outcome is load-bearing for downstream regulatory obligations: under PSD2 (Directive 2015/2366) Article 89 a REJECTED outcome carries dispute-evidence obligations that a PARTIAL refund does not, and the categorical distinction must be preserved at the canonical-bytes level rather than collapsed to a percentage projection of the original amount. Receipts are canonicalised under RFC 8785 (JSON Canonicalization Scheme) with an in-band canonicalisation rule pin (canon_version). The pin enables year-N re-verification from retained bytes alone, without dependence on an out-of-band rule registry that the operator must continue to publish. The refund receipt format composes with the compliance receipt format via the original_payment_ref field, a content-addressed reference to the original payment record. A verifier walking the audit chain can confirm the full payment lifecycle from admission-time screening through settlement to refund event under one byte-deterministic canonicalisation pin. This document is complementary to draft-vauban-x402-stark-receipts (which covers cryptographic settlement-time payment-condition proofs) and to draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt (which covers admission- time compliance screening receipts). The three documents pin the same urn:x402:canonicalisation:jcs-rfc8785-v1 canonicalisation discipline.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding",
   "title": "Post-Quantum Credential Binding for x402 Agentic Payment Authorization",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:10:21Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines how Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206 / FN-DSA) and ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) credentials bind to x402 agentic payment authorization. It specifies the credential envelope format, the JCS canonicalization discipline applied to signed payloads, the gateway verification procedure, and the session token binding that replaces per-request API key authentication for credentialed agents. This is the first Internet-Draft in the agentic payments space to anchor credential binding to the NIST post-quantum cryptography standards (FIPS 203/204/206).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-vpn-vtn-id",
   "title": "Carrying Network Resource Context Information in IPv6 Extension Headers and its Applicability to Network Resource Partitions",
   "rev": "17",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:08:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "6man",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "6man",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a new IPv6 Hop-by-Hop option to carry Network Resource related information in data packets. The new option is called the Network Resource (NR) Option. It can be used to carry general information about network resource semantics and functions. A Network Resource Partition (NRP) is a subset of the network resources and associated policies on each of a connected set of links in an underlay network. When forwarding packets within a specific NRP, some fields in the data packet (these fields are called the NRP Selector ID) are used to identify the NRP to which the packet belongs so that NRP-specific processing can be performed on each node along the forwarding path. The Network Resource Option can be used to carry the NRP Selector ID in IPv6 packets.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-vpn-vtn-id/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-vpn-vtn-id",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-vpn-vtn-id"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-federation-zkp",
   "title": "Cross-Issuer ZKP Federation for Post-Quantum Agentic Payment Credentials",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:08:49Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a protocol for composing independently-issued post-quantum ZKP credentials from different issuers into a single federation token, without requiring a shared trust root between issuers. Each credential is a Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) signed Bulletproofs range proof asserting that an agent's trust score meets a threshold. A federation validator independently verifies each credential against its issuer's public key, then computes a composite commitment binding all verified proofs. The resulting federation token is signed by the validator alone. No issuer needs to know about the others. This solves the cross-issuer attestation composition problem in agentic payment networks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-federation-zkp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-federation-zkp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-federation-zkp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-payment-evidence-frame",
   "title": "Payment Evidence Frame for Agentic-Payment Lifecycle Receipts",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:08:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.87,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.89,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a Payment Evidence Frame (PEF): a transport- agnostic envelope that wraps any payment lifecycle receipt from the x402 agentic-payment receipt stack under a named claim type, a deterministic frame identifier, and an optional transport-layer signature. The frame introduces three properties that the inner receipt types do not individually provide: (1) a stable cross-system identifier (frame_id) derived deterministically from the receipt content by SHA-256 over the JCS-canonical preimage, so the same payment evidence can be referenced by identifier across HTTP headers, agent-to-agent task artifacts, audit logs, and on-chain memo fields without re- serialising the full receipt; (2) a taxonomy label (claim_type) that tells a consumer what class of evidence a frame carries before the inner receipt format is parsed; and (3) a receipt integrity hash (receipt_hash) that allows any downstream party to confirm the inner receipt is unaltered without deserialising its full structure. The format uses the same JCS canonicalisation discipline (draft- hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs) as the five inner receipt formats it envelopes, so implementations require only one canonicalisation primitive for the full receipt stack. This revision additionally specifies an operator-independent audit chain construction over PEF frames (Section 7.5): an append-only, content-addressed chain in which each row is a PEF frame contributed and signed by its own operator, with no shared trusted root. Rows are linked by the deterministic frame_id of the preceding row, and each row carries a post-quantum signature (draft-hopley-x402-pqc- credential-binding) over the row's linkage and content identity. The whole chain is verifiable offline from the bytes alone -- recompute the linkage, then verify each operator's signature against the public key carried in that row -- with no callback to, and no trust in, any operator.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-payment-evidence-frame/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-payment-evidence-frame",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-payment-evidence-frame"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-composite-trust-query",
   "title": "Composite Trust Query Response Format for Agentic-Payment Audit Chains",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:04:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.45,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.61,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.37,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a composite trust query response format for agentic-payment audit chains. The format records a verifier's categorical conclusion over an audit chain composed of compliance, settlement, cancellation, and refund receipts, in response to a stated query. The response format uses a closed four-element enumeration of categorical outcomes (TRUSTED, PROVISIONAL, INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE, UNTRUSTED). The four-state enumeration captures the operationally- distinct decision space: proceed, proceed-with-caution, hold-pending- more-data, halt. Collapsing to three values loses the distinction between INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE (\"we could not verify either way\") and UNTRUSTED (\"we verified and the answer is no\"), which matters for operator dashboards, regulator reporting, and downstream automated decision-making. The format is verifier-emitted and audit-chain-anchored. A verifier walks an audit chain composed of compliance receipts (draft-hopley- x402-compliance-receipt), settlement attestations (draft-hopley-x402- settlement-attestation), cancellation receipts (draft-hopley-x402- cancellation-receipt), and refund receipts (draft-hopley-x402-refund- receipt), applies a structured query identified by content-addressed reference, and emits a single composite-trust-claim response anchoring the chain by its content-addressed root. The format composes above the four receipt formats under the same canonicalisation discipline (draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs). Regulators, dashboards, and downstream agents consuming the response get a single byte-deterministic statement of the trust posture without re-walking the underlying chain. The chain remains independently verifiable at the response's chain_ref content-address. This document is an Independent Submission filed per RFC 4846 and is intended for publication as Informational. It is not an IETF Standards Track document, does not represent IETF community consensus, and has not been subject to review by an IETF Working Group. Change control resides with the document author. The format specified is one approach among possible alternatives; implementers may choose this approach, alternative approaches, or hybrid approaches as appropriate to their requirements.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-composite-trust-query/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-composite-trust-query",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-composite-trust-query"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt",
   "title": "Categorical Compliance Screening Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:04:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.57,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.49,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a categorical compliance screening receipt format for agentic-payment flows. The format is designed for use by AI agents and agentic-payment gateways that perform regulatory screening at admission time and must retain the screening decision under framework-bound retention obligations (UK Money Laundering Regulations 2017; Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Section 330; EU Anti- Money Laundering Directives 5 and 6; Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation Article 80; Anti-Money Laundering Regulation Article 56; Digital Operational Resilience Act Article 14). The receipt format uses a closed enumeration of categorical outcomes (ALLOW, REFER, DENY) rather than a continuous score or tier projection. The categorical outcome is load-bearing for downstream regulatory obligations: under UK POCA 2002 Section 330, a REFER carries a mandatory Suspicious Activity Report obligation that a DENY does not. A score or tier projection collapses this distinction. Receipts are canonicalised under RFC 8785 (JSON Canonicalization Scheme) with an in-band canonicalisation rule pin (canon_version). The pin enables year-five re-verification from retained bytes alone, without dependence on an out-of-band rule registry that the operator must continue to publish. This document is complementary to draft-vauban-x402-stark-receipts: that document covers cryptographic settlement-time payment-condition proofs; this document covers admission-time compliance screening receipts. The two compose via the composite trust-query algorithm specified in specs/composite-trust-query.md in x402-foundation/x402.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-cancellation-receipt",
   "title": "Categorical Mandate Cancellation Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:03:01Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.67,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.89,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.36,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a categorical mandate cancellation receipt format for agentic-payment flows. The format records that a recurring-payment mandate or other standing payer-to-payee authorisation has been cancelled, by whom, for what reason, and with what effective date. The receipt format uses a closed four-element enumeration of categorical outcomes (USER_REQUESTED, MERCHANT_REQUESTED, COMPLIANCE_TERMINATED, EXPIRED). The four-state enumeration preserves the regulatorily-load-bearing distinction between payer- initiated revocation, payee-initiated termination, operator/ compliance-forced termination, and time-based expiry. A collapse to a three-state or binary representation loses operational distinctions that drive PSD2 (Directive 2015/2366) Article 64 refund-window obligations, Article 72 contractual-termination record-keeping, and POCA/AML evidence-chain linkage on compliance-forced terminations. The format records two distinct timestamps -- when the cancellation was observed (cancellation_timestamp_ms) and when it takes legal effect (effective_from_ms) -- to support PSD2 Article 64(3)(a) direct-debit revocation timing, where the effective time is typically end-of-business-day prior to the next scheduled execution. The format composes with the AlgoVoi-authored compliance receipt (draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt), settlement attestation (draft-hopley-x402-settlement-attestation), and refund receipt (draft-hopley-x402-refund-receipt) formats under the same canonicalisation discipline (draft-hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs). A verifier walking the audit chain confirms the full mandate lifecycle from admission through recurring execution to cancellation, and (where owed) onward to refund of revoked settled debits, under one byte-deterministic canonicalisation pin. This document is an Independent Submission filed per RFC 4846 and is intended for publication as Informational. It is not an IETF Standards Track document, does not represent IETF community consensus, and has not been subject to review by an IETF Working Group. Change control resides with the document author. The format specified is one approach among possible alternatives; implementers may choose this approach, alternative approaches, or hybrid approaches as appropriate to their requirements.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-cancellation-receipt/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-cancellation-receipt",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-cancellation-receipt"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-atb-reputation-credential",
   "title": "ATB Pass Certificate: Agent Reputation Credential for Agentic-Payment Flows",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:02:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hopley",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.89,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.44,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the ATB Pass Certificate, a Falcon-1024 post- quantum signed reputation credential issued by the Agent Trust Bench (ATB) to autonomous AI agents that have demonstrated safe payment- decision behaviour against the bench's adversarial profile corpus. The credential is presented by agents to participating x402 gateways via an HTTP header for reputation-gated variable pricing. Two certificate versions are specified. Phase 1 carries the agent's refusal-rate score in cleartext; the gateway verifies the Falcon-1024 signature and applies a discount when the score meets a declared threshold. Phase 2 replaces the score with a Pedersen commitment to the score and a Bulletproofs range proof attesting score >= threshold without revealing the score, its components, or the agent's underlying behaviour distribution. Certificates are canonicalised under RFC 8785 (JSON Canonicalization Scheme) with an in-band canonicalisation-rule pin and signed with Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206, post-quantum). Phase 2 ZKP elements use Ristretto255 as the elliptic curve group with the dalek-cryptography Bulletproofs instantiation. This document also specifies the composition of the ATB Pass Certificate as an evidence-source input to draft-hopley-x402- composite-trust-query, gateway verification algorithms for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 credentials, and security and privacy considerations arising from the bearer-token transport model and the ZKP soundness assumptions. This document is an Independent Submission filed per RFC 4846 and is intended for publication as Informational. It is not an IETF Standards Track document, does not represent IETF community consensus, and has not been subject to review by an IETF Working Group.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hopley-x402-atb-reputation-credential/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hopley-x402-atb-reputation-credential",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hopley-x402-atb-reputation-credential"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-moq-e2e-session-tests",
   "title": "End-to-End Session Tests for Media over QUIC Transport",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T20:00:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 60,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "nandakumar",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.78,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a set of end-to-end tests that exercise a Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT) relay through real client sessions. For each test it gives a short description, the inputs, the message flow as a call-flow diagram, and the expected outcome. The tests apply to MOQT draft-18 and later; results for several public relays are published in the moq-web interop report.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-moq-e2e-session-tests/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-moq-e2e-session-tests",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-nandakumar-moq-e2e-session-tests"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-mboned-non-source-routed-sr-mcast",
   "title": "Non-source-routed Multicast in SR Networks",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T19:53:26Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "mboned",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "mboned",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "With Segment Routing (SR) architecture, a unicast flow can be source- routed through an SR network following an explicit path specified in the packet, without the need for per-flow state in the network. As a result, the protocols that would be otherwise needed to signal the per-flow unicast state are not needed either. In the case of multicast, traffic can be either source-routed or non-source-routed, and this document summarizes options for non-source-routed multicast in an SR network, including pre-SR tree-based multicast technologies, BIER, and various SR specific solutions. The pros and cons of each solution are listed for considerations by operators and vendors, with regard to the principle and characteristic of SR as mentioned above.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mboned-non-source-routed-sr-mcast/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mboned-non-source-routed-sr-mcast",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-mboned-non-source-routed-sr-mcast"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-pandey-agent-identity",
   "title": "Session-Scoped Authorization for AI Agents: A Per-Tool-Call Authorization Profile Building on WIMSE and OAuth",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T19:49:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T20:47:09.629Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "pandey",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.88,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents act with privileges: they call tools, read and write data, and operate services. In most current deployments they do so under shared service accounts, with permissions broader than any single task requires and without an audit trail that binds an action to the agent that took it and the human on whose behalf it acted. This document specifies a session-scoped authorization profile for AI agents, building on the WIMSE architecture and the OAuth 2.0 protocol family. Each agent is a first-class IAM principal with its own credentials. Each session is bound to an authenticated human sponsor through an authenticated delegation chain. Authorization is evaluated at every tool call, with effective permissions computed as the intersection -- never the union -- of the agent principal's permissions, the sponsor's permissions, and the session scope. Actions that cannot be evaluated are denied (fail closed), defined classes of irreversible actions require sponsor approval, and every evaluated tool call produces a tamper-evident audit receipt. The document defines the model, states requirements for implementations, maps the model onto existing OAuth and WIMSE mechanisms, and gives full security considerations. It defines no new protocol and requests no IANA actions.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pandey-agent-identity/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-pandey-agent-identity",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-pandey-agent-identity"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-netconf-udp-notif",
   "title": "UDP-based Transport for Configured Subscriptions",
   "rev": "27",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T19:41:54Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T19:47:09.723Z",
   "pages": 41,
   "group": "netconf",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "netconf",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a UDP-based transport for YANG notifications to collect data from network nodes within a controlled environment. A shim header is defined to facilitate the data streaming directly from a publishing process on a network device to telemetry receivers. Such a design enables higher frequency updates and less performance overhead on publisher and receiver processes compared to already established notification mechanisms. A YANG data model is also defined for management of the described UDP-based transport.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netconf-udp-notif/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-udp-notif",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-netconf-udp-notif"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey",
   "title": "OpenPGP Key Replacement",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T19:37:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T19:47:09.723Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "openpgp",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "openpgp",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a method in OpenPGP to suggest a replacement for an expired, revoked, or deprecated primary key.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-openpgp-replacementkey"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-teas-nrp-scalability",
   "title": "Scalability Considerations for Network Resource Partition",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T19:22:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T19:47:09.723Z",
   "pages": 26,
   "group": "teas",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "teas",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.32,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A network slice offers connectivity services to a network slice customer with specific Service Level Objectives (SLOs) and Service Level Expectations (SLEs) over a common underlay network. RFC 9543 describes a framework for network slices in networks built using IETF technologies. As part of that framework, the Network Resource Partition (NRP) is introduced as a subset of buffer/queuing/ scheduling resources that are allocated from the underlay network to carry a specific set of network slice service traffic and meet the requested SLOs and SLEs. As the demand for network slices increases, scalability becomes an important factor. Although the scalability of network slices can be improved by mapping a group of network slices to a single NRP, that design may not be suitable or possible for all deployments, thus there are concerns about the scalability of NRPs themselves. This document discusses some considerations for NRP scalability in the control and data planes. It also investigates a set of optimization mechanisms.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-teas-nrp-scalability/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teas-nrp-scalability",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-teas-nrp-scalability"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jones-detached-evidence-examination",
   "title": "Outerprise Ecosystem and Infrastructure: An Examination Manual for Detached Evidence Delivery",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T18:53:12Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T19:47:09.723Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jones",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.62,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.47,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes repeatable procedures for examining detached evidence packets and the signed findings returned by recipients. It identifies the object, criterion, evidence, procedure, observed result and limits of each finding. The procedures cover artifact identity, release consistency, consent and access, delivery events, benchmark comparisons, commitment openings and policy decisions. Synthetic examples illustrate reproducible checks. The document adapts an examination manual into an implementation-neutral method.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-detached-evidence-examination/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jones-detached-evidence-examination",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jones-detached-evidence-examination"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ai-agent-cyberattack-effect-finality",
   "title": "AI Safety: When AI Agents Initiate Cyberattacks -- Execution Finality for Data Exfiltration, Payment Diversion, Infrastructure Changes, and Code-Executing Agents",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T18:28:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T18:47:08.316Z",
   "pages": 41,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.86,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.72,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Problem. An AI agent can cause an unauthorized real-world effect -- a confidential data export, a payment to a substituted beneficiary, a network or industrial configuration change, a code deployment or a secret release -- while every individual check succeeds: the model accepted a plausible task, the agent held a valid credential, the tool call was syntactically permitted, and the gateway saw an allowed method. The gap is that the check and the effect are not the same thing. Identity and access controls answer \"may this principal call this interface?\"; they do not, by themselves, answer \"may this exact effect, with these resolved targets and values, complete now, on this route, given what has already happened?\" Solution. This document describes an execution-finality profile for AI-initiated operations. An agent's proposal is held as a non- effective Candidate Act. A protected validator compares a canonical descriptor of the operation actually about to be committed with a source-authority envelope that model-editable content cannot create or enlarge. A Finality Sink, which owns the effect-causing credential or commit right, verifies an act-bound, non-bearer Execution Handle over the same bytes it commits, consumes it atomically with the commit, and emits an authenticated destination receipt. Later phases and retries are gated on that receipt rather than on the agent's own report. Unknown outcomes become INDETERMINATE and are reconciled before any retry. Context. The document analyses four scenarios (enterprise data exfiltration, payment diversion, critical-infrastructure configuration manipulation, and code-executing agents), specifies data objects, a Candidate Act state machine, atomic consumption and crash-recovery rules, sink trust, delegation attenuation, protocol placement for tool and agent-to-agent calls, revocation freshness, latency placement, legacy integration and a falsifiable evaluation plan. It is a prospective architecture: no measured latency, blocking rate or deployment is claimed. A reviewer FAQ is included. Critical technical review is invited.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-ai-agent-cyberattack-effect-finality/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-ai-agent-cyberattack-effect-finality",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-ai-agent-cyberattack-effect-finality"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification",
   "title": "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects",
   "rev": "31",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T18:15:43Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T16:47:09.016Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "sidrops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sidrops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes procedures that make use of Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to verify the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) AS_PATH attribute of advertised routes. This AS_PATH verification enhances routing security by adding means to detect and mitigate route leaks and AS_PATH manipulations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ross-mercurius",
   "title": "Mercurius Window System (MWS)",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T18:14:27Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T18:47:08.316Z",
   "pages": 124,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ross",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.44,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Mercurius Window System (MWS) is a zero-trust, network-native window system for contemporary desktops. It combines persistent, detachable graphical Sessions with network transparency. MWS works on a workstation without requiring network connectivity. The same Session model allows users to start a new Session or resume a detached Session, either at the workstation itself or from another device across the network. MWS complements local display systems such as Wayland. Applications and their state remain on the workstation, while a Portal provides the user's display and input facilities. Modern graphics APIs and authenticated transport support this separation between where applications execute and where a user interacts with them. This document specifies the Session, Window, and communication behaviour needed for independent implementations to interoperate.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ross-mercurius/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ross-mercurius",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ross-mercurius"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-crypto-deprec",
   "title": "Deprecation of Outdated Cryptographic Algorithms and Parameters in Kerberos PKINIT",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T18:11:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T18:47:08.316Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "kitten",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "kitten",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document deprecates several outdated cryptographic algorithms and parameters from the Kerberos PKINIT specification (RFC 4556) and its extensions (RFC 5349, RFC 8636). Specifically, it deprecates the RSA key transport mechanism for reply key delivery, the Diffie- Hellman MODP group 2 (1024-bit) parameter, the SHA-1-based octetstring2key key derivation function, and the sha1WithRSAEncryption CMS signature algorithm. It also defines a new paChecksum2 field in the PKAuthenticator structure to provide checksum algorithm agility. This document updates RFC 4556, RFC 5349, and RFC 8636.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-crypto-deprec/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-crypto-deprec",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-kitten-pkinit-crypto-deprec"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle",
   "title": "Network Anomaly Detection Lifecycle",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T18:06:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T18:47:08.316Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "nmop",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "nmop",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.8,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a structured, iterative lifecycle for network anomaly detection systems to enable \"human-in-the-loop\" refinements. Key contributions include defining three lifecycle stages, a state machine for anomaly annotations, and YANG data models for standardized labeling and exchange.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chandra-wimse-partition-tolerant-renewal",
   "title": "Extend-Only, Threshold-Attested Authority Renewal for Partitioned Agent Meshes",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T18:00:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T18:47:08.316Z",
   "pages": 27,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "chandra",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Every workload identity architecture in deployment today assumes its credential issuer is reachable: short-lived tokens, fast rotation and timely revocation are guarantees about the connected case. This document specifies what a workload does when that assumption fails, when its credential is nearing or past expiry and its issuer cannot be reached. It defines extend-only, threshold-attested authority renewal. Before any partition, the issuer signs a Mesh Manifest that appoints a bounded set of peers as a limited-authority local issuer: it names the members, fixes a ceiling on total extension, caps the scope any renewal may carry, and sets a validity window. During a partition, a severed workload broadcasts a signed renewal request to those peers; each peer independently verifies that the request extends existing authority without widening it, within the manifest's ceiling, and against its own first-hand observation of the requester's health; each attestation signs the digest of the entire request, so scope, requester, timestamps and predecessor are all under the peer's signature; once a two-thirds threshold of the peers (ceil(2N/3) of N >= 4) has attested, the workload treats its authority as extended through a bounded expiry. Rounds are hash- linked, so a chain's signatures commit to the exact history being extended. The document specifies the manifest, the message formats, the independent-evaluation procedure, the renewal-chain construction for partitions outlasting one round, and the verification procedure a relying party runs given the manifest, the chain and the original credential it already trusts. It also specifies, normatively, what this mechanism does not provide: it is not a consensus protocol, it does not establish that a workload is uncompromised, and a revocation issued during a partition is not enforceable until the partition heals; an implementation MUST NOT represent this mechanism as providing partition-proof revocation.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chandra-wimse-partition-tolerant-renewal/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chandra-wimse-partition-tolerant-renewal",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-chandra-wimse-partition-tolerant-renewal"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-newton-agreement-evidence",
   "title": "Agreement Evidence for Multi-Party Agent Negotiation",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T17:40:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T17:47:08.068Z",
   "pages": 78,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "newton",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.47,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents can exchange offers and signatures without producing an artifact that records which parties reached which outcome, over which binding values, and for how long that record may be relied upon. This document defines a protocol-neutral agreement attestation primitive, the contract a protocol profile meets to instantiate it, and two protocol profiles. A verified attestation establishes one thing: that a named set of parties jointly countersigned a stated outcome over stated binding values, together with behavioral counters each of them accepted. It does not establish that the outcome matches what a transcript says, that any statement a party made is true, that the binding values are complete, or that the parties are anonymous. The format provides no member for a negotiated price, quantity, date, or principal identity. A producer is obligated not to place those values in the free-text members the format does provide, and a verifier cannot detect a violation of that obligation, so the absence of term values from a received object is a producer's obligation rather than a verified property. This document does not define identity, authority delegation, payment, settlement, transport, boundary-decision receipts, or a general evidence composition and sufficiency model.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-newton-agreement-evidence/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-newton-agreement-evidence",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-newton-agreement-evidence"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-spring-srv6-security",
   "title": "Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Security Considerations",
   "rev": "20",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T17:26:48Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T17:47:08.068Z",
   "pages": 36,
   "group": "spring",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "spring",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) is the instantiation of Segment Routing on the IPv6 data plane, using IPv6 addresses to identify segments. This document discusses security considerations in SRv6 networks, including the potential threats and the possible mitigation methods. The document does not define any new security protocols or extensions to existing protocols.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-spring-srv6-security/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-spring-srv6-security",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-spring-srv6-security"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis",
   "title": "Group Communication for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)",
   "rev": "18",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T17:25:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T17:47:08.068Z",
   "pages": 117,
   "group": "core",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "core",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a web transfer protocol for constrained devices and constrained networks. In a number of use cases, constrained devices often naturally operate in groups (e.g., in a building automation scenario, all lights in a given room may need to be switched on/off as a group). This document specifies the use of CoAP for group communication, including the use of UDP/IP multicast as the default underlying data transport. Both unsecured and secured CoAP group communication are specified. Security is achieved by use of the Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE) protocol. The target application area of this specification is any group communication use cases that involve resource-constrained devices or networks that support CoAP. This document replaces and obsoletes RFC 7390, while it updates RFC 7252 and RFC 7641.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-nfsv4-uncacheable-directories",
   "title": "Adding an Uncacheable Dirent Metadata Attribute to NFSv4.2",
   "rev": "13",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T17:06:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T17:47:08.068Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "nfsv4",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "nfsv4",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Network File System version 4.2 (NFSv4.2) clients may cache the file attributes returned by READDIR alongside each directory entry. Such a cache is not invalidated by the directory's change attribute, which reflects changes to the directory and its entries but not writes to the files those entries name, so it can become stale when another client changes one of those files. In some deployments this produces incorrect size and modification times often enough to be a problem. This document introduces an uncacheable dirent metadata attribute for NFSv4.2 that allows a server to identify a directory for which an honoring client enumerates by READDIR and reports each entry's attributes as that READDIR returned them, rather than from a value it held earlier.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-uncacheable-directories/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nfsv4-uncacheable-directories",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-nfsv4-uncacheable-directories"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-craig-oauth-rar-payment-mandates",
   "title": "Rich Authorization Requests Profile for Agent Payment Mandates, Approval Reasons and Receipts",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T16:30:34Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T16:47:09.016Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "craig",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Software agents, including those driven by large language models, increasingly initiate payments on behalf of people. OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396) can carry what such an agent may do, but there is no common way to express the limits that banks and their customers need, to tell an agent why a payment needs the customer's approval, or to keep an independent record of what was decided. This document defines two authorization details types for payment mandates (a standing mandate with named payees, per-payment and per- period limits and an approval mode, and a single approved payment); an ordered set of machine-readable reasons a payment falls outside a mandate; how those reasons are carried in an approval challenge, including the OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge; and a signed, hash-chained receipt for every decision, with personal data kept outside the chain so it can be erased.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-craig-oauth-rar-payment-mandates/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-craig-oauth-rar-payment-mandates",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-craig-oauth-rar-payment-mandates"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jags-spring-icmp-error-srv6-evpn",
   "title": "ICMP Error Handling for EVPN-VPWS in SRv6 Networks",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T16:04:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T16:47:09.016Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jags",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes procedures for handling ICMP error messages for Ethernet VPN Virtual Private Wire Service (EVPN-VPWS) in Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) networks. It describes an ingress-PE approach that associates a received ICMPv6 error with the EVPN service, constructs eligible customer ICMP feedback, and uses local End.DX2 disposition to apply the appropriate Ethernet and VLAN treatment. The discussion covers IPv4 and IPv6 customer traffic, the handling of the different ICMP error classes, and the additional procedures applicable to Packet Too Big messages and Path MTU Discovery.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jags-spring-icmp-error-srv6-evpn/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jags-spring-icmp-error-srv6-evpn",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jags-spring-icmp-error-srv6-evpn"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jones-detached-evidence-handoffs",
   "title": "Terminology and Architectural Patterns for Detached Evidence Delivery",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T15:14:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:47:09.286Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jones",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.93,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.79,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a detached evidence handoff between independently administered organizations. It distinguishes artifact delivery, content integrity, source authentication, registration, reconciliation, and recipient decisions. It describes how a recipient can return a signed comparison against stated benchmarks, with a commitment to the figures it compared, without exporting its source ledger. Worked examples illustrate both a disclosed reconciliation and a comparison attestation. The document defines terminology and an architectural model; it specifies no wire protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-detached-evidence-handoffs/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jones-detached-evidence-handoffs",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jones-detached-evidence-handoffs"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sharif-agent-audit-trail",
   "title": "Agent Audit Trail: A Standard Logging Format for Autonomous AI Systems",
   "rev": "10",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T14:57:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T15:47:08.016Z",
   "pages": 65,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sharif",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a standard logging format for autonomous AI agent systems. The Agent Audit Trail (AAT) defines a JSON-based record structure with mandatory fields for agent identity, the authorizing principal, action classification, outcome tracking, and trust level reporting. Records are linked via tamper-evident hash chaining using SHA-256 per RFC 8785, with optional ECDSA signatures for non-repudiation. The format addresses requirements from the EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689), which mandates automatic recording of events for high-risk AI systems, whose application dates were staged into 2027-2028 by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744. It also maps informatively to SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria, ISO/IEC 42001, the draft ISO/IEC 24970 and prEN 18229-1 logging standards, and PCI DSS v4.0.1 logging requirements. The design is transport-agnostic and supports export to JSONL, Syslog (RFC 5424), and CSV while preserving chain integrity. Privacy is addressed through input/output hashing, content fingerprinting, and tombstone-based deletion compatible with GDPR Article 17. The -01 revision added pre-execution recording requirements, recording independence, deny reason codes, replay protection, external timestamp anchoring, and content fingerprinting based on feedback from independent implementers. The -02 revision added a Decision Reproducibility section (Section 13) that distinguishes record reproducibility, available for any model, from decision reproducibility, available only for open-weight models executed at temperature zero in an attested environment, and defines the associated record fields. The -03 revision added the Attestation Closure requirement (Section 13.6): the digests recorded for decision reproducibility MUST cover the complete computational closure of the inference function -- model weights, tokenizer, chat template, inference engine build, decoding configuration, and numeric environment -- together with new record fields (tokenizer_digest, chat_template_digest, engine_build_digest) and a minimal-change threat analysis (Section 13.7) showing that any component left outside the attested set is a forgery channel. The -04 revision added algorithm agility for post-quantum signatures (ML-DSA-65, FIPS 204) alongside ECDSA P-256; a key identifier (signer_kid, RFC 7638) that resolves which principal signed an independently recorded record; a trust-level assignment integrity requirement (Section 5.3) so that downgrading a consequential action is an attributable event rather than silent suppression; and OPTIONAL Merkle batch anchoring (Section 6.4) using the RFC 6962 construction for compact inclusion proofs at high throughput. All -04 additions are OPTIONAL to produce, and -04 verifiers stay backward compatible with -03: a -04 verifier accepts -03 records, and the new signing metadata is required only in records that carry a signature. This revision (-07) adds a mandatory \"principal\" field (Section 3.1) that binds each record to the party on whose authority the agent acted; a Relationship to Other Work section (Section 1.3) relating AAT to the WIMSE agent audit record and authorization-evidence drafts and to SCITT (RFC 9943); and corrections to the EU AI Act Article 12 and Article 19 citations in the regulatory mapping (Section 11.1 and Appendix B). Records produced under -06 and earlier predate the \"principal\" field; verifiers processing mixed-revision archives SHOULD treat its absence as \"principal not recorded\" rather than a validation failure. The -10 revision strengthens recording independence (Section 5.2) from SHOULD to MUST at trust level L2 and above, and requires the \"authority_ref\" of the \"principal\" field (Section 3.1) to be non-null and to reference an authorization artifact verifiable independently of the agent at L2 and above, in response to independent review. Above L2, both the recorder and the authorizing artifact are therefore independent of the agent.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sharif-agent-audit-trail/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sharif-agent-audit-trail",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sharif-agent-audit-trail"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-li-lamps-ca-key-provenance",
   "title": "Key Provenance Evidence for Certification Authority Keys",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T14:45:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 41,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "li",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Many cryptographic modules can sign a statement that they generated a given key, using an attestation key that the module vendor certifies. This document defines Key Provenance Evidence (KPE), which applies this to the keys of certification authorities (CAs). A KPE file carries the public key of a CA together with the statements that modules signed about it. Anyone can then verify a chain of signatures from the vendor's trust anchor to the public key in a CA certificate, and so confirm that the private key was generated inside a module. The signed statements stay in the formats that module vendors already use, which are listed in a new IANA registry. Modules that are already deployed need no changes.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-li-lamps-ca-key-provenance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-li-lamps-ca-key-provenance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-li-lamps-ca-key-provenance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-addpath-paths-limit",
   "title": "Paths Limit for Multiple Paths in BGP",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T14:32:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T14:47:08.380Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a BGP capability that complements the ADD- PATH Capability by indicating the maximum number of paths a BGP speaker can receive from a peer, optimizing the transmission of BGP routes by selectively relaying pertinent routes instead of the entire set. This document also defines a new BGP Cease NOTIFICATION message subcode, \"Maximum Number of Paths Reached\", used when a BGP speaker terminates a peering because the number of paths received from a neighbor for a prefix exceeds the Paths Limit advertised in the PATHS-LIMIT Capability.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-addpath-paths-limit/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-addpath-paths-limit",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-addpath-paths-limit"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jags-6man-icmp-error-srv6-evpn",
   "title": "ICMP Error Handling for EVPN-VPWS in SRv6 Networks",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T14:08:31Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T14:47:08.380Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jags",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes procedures for handling ICMP error messages for Ethernet VPN Virtual Private Wire Service (EVPN-VPWS) in Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) networks. It describes an ingress-PE approach that associates a received ICMPv6 error with the EVPN service, constructs eligible customer ICMP feedback, and uses local End.DX2 disposition to apply the appropriate Ethernet and VLAN treatment. The discussion covers IPv4 and IPv6 customer traffic, the handling of the different ICMP error classes, and the additional procedures applicable to Packet Too Big messages and Path MTU Discovery.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jags-6man-icmp-error-srv6-evpn/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jags-6man-icmp-error-srv6-evpn",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jags-6man-icmp-error-srv6-evpn"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-bess-ebgp-dmz",
   "title": "BGP link bandwidth extended community use cases",
   "rev": "12",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T12:57:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T13:47:07.596Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "bess",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "bess",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.43,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "BGP link bandwidth extended community provides a way to signal a value along with a BGP path that can be used to perform weighted load-balancing in multipath scenarios. This document details various use cases of the BGP link bandwidth extended community. It also describes local mechanisms to dynamically adjust the BGP link bandwidth value or the multipath weights based on different considerations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bess-ebgp-dmz/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bess-ebgp-dmz",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-bess-ebgp-dmz"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-correa-agent-capability-binding",
   "title": "Enforcement Profile for Agent Capabilities: Argument Constraints, Taint Propagation, and Consent Binding",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T12:55:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T13:47:07.596Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "correa",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly call tools and hand work to other agents while holding broad, inherited authority. Most of the resulting incidents share one shape: an agent, often steered by injected content, performs an action its principal never authorized, and no party can prove the limit afterward. This document defines an interoperable enforcement profile that composes two existing building blocks, a delegable signed capability (the Attenuating Agent Tokens profile) and a replayable action receipt, and adds three enforcement rules that catch the common failures: argument-level constraints (including an egress host allowlist), taint propagation across a delegation chain, and a consent binding between a displayed decision and the action dispatched. Enforcement is specified at the tool-call boundary, outside the agent, so that a prompt cannot edit the limit and a verdict means the same thing across agent frameworks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-correa-agent-capability-binding/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-correa-agent-capability-binding",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-correa-agent-capability-binding"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sogomonian-aiid",
   "title": "Autonomous Agent Identity and Runtime Control Status (AIID)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T12:36:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:47:09.286Z",
   "pages": 59,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sogomonian",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.66,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous software agents increasingly take consequential actions on behalf of people and organizations. Existing identity systems (OAuth 2.0, SPIFFE, and the WIMSE workload identity architecture) authenticate such agents, but they do not define a common, vendor- neutral way for an accountable owner to place a running agent into a restricted state, nor a common way for a relying party to check that state immediately before acting. This document defines AIID: a durable identifier for an autonomous agent, a small runtime control state machine (active, safe_mode, suspended, revoked), an asymmetric authority model in which automated monitors may only tighten state and only the accountable owner may loosen it, a namespace-wide freeze, and a pre-action status check with fail-closed semantics. AIID is designed to bind to, not replace, existing identity: it defines an \"aiid\" claim for OAuth 2.0 access tokens and corresponding token introspection members, bindings for SPIFFE and WIMSE identifiers, a mapping onto the OAuth Token Status List, and change notification using the OpenID Shared Signals Framework. It also defines compact signed action receipts, and an OPTIONAL enforcement gateway deployment profile.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sogomonian-aiid/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sogomonian-aiid",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sogomonian-aiid"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-luna-eagf-agent-delegation-semantics",
   "title": "Semantic Governance Requirements for AI Agent Delegation and Handoff",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T12:18:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:47:09.286Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "luna",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.76,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly decide and act on behalf of organizations and delegate work to other agents. Identity, authentication, authorization and runtime control mechanisms establish who is acting and what is permitted, but they do not by themselves preserve the organizational meaning of a delegation: the bounded authority, purpose, material context, and the distinction between a recommendation, a decision, an action and its outcome. This document states requirements, derived from the Enterprise Agent Governance Framework (EAGF), that such semantics be preserved across tool calls, delegations and agent-to-agent handoffs. It defines no new protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-luna-eagf-agent-delegation-semantics/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-luna-eagf-agent-delegation-semantics",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-luna-eagf-agent-delegation-semantics"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop",
   "title": "Schnorr-Type Proofs of Possession for ECDSA Device Binding",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T10:25:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T10:47:10.591Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "cllz",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a Schnorr-type, circuit-free zero-knowledge proof of possession (PoP) of an ECDSA signature produced under a committed public key over the NIST P-256 (secp256r1) curve. The PoP lets a credential holder prove, in zero knowledge, that it can produce a fresh ECDSA signature under a device public key without revealing that key, thereby providing device binding for privacy- preserving credentials whose presentation must remain unlinkable. The construction is built exclusively from Sigma protocols as it decomposes the ECDSA verification equation into a scalar- multiplication relation and a point-addition relation over P-256, each proved with a dedicated Sigma protocol over a companion (\"Tom\") curve whose scalar field equals the base field of P-256. It is designed to be expressed using the interfaces of the CFRG Sigma- protocols specification and to serve as the device-binding sub-proof of the modular BBS / JSON Web Proofs construction. SNARK-based realizations of the same relation are out of scope.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts",
   "title": "Decision Receipts for Approvals, Declined Actions and Executed Actions in Agent Audit Records",
   "rev": "10",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T09:46:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T09:47:08.132Z",
   "pages": 73,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gruszka",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.83,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.89,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The architecture for auditing agent delegation and interactions proposed for the AUDIT effort names Interaction Records, Action Records and Authorization Transition Records and leaves their encoding open. This document maps a pair of signed records, the decision receipt and the outcome receipt, onto those record types for three cases, a human approval, a declined action and an executed action with its result. It states what each record requires independently of its encoding, exact bytes, a signature over them, digest bindings, required members and a content root, with verification steps that a third party can run offline, and it gives the binding of these requirements to DSSE and in-toto that existing receipts use and a second binding to COSE_Sign1, in which a receipt is itself a Signed Statement for a Transparency Service. Each receipt is created when the decision or the outcome occurs and is checked by an Auditor post hoc, and a declined or refused action is a record of its own. For each case the document states what the receipt adds and what it does not show, and it gives a verification procedure that runs offline. It requires that an approval be honoured at most once, even after the record of consumed approvals is rotated. Test vectors for all three cases, each with a counterexample, are included. The document also describes, informatively, how a receipt can be registered with a Transparency Service under RFC 9943 and what a SCITT Receipt then shows and does not show. It defines no new predicate or registry; the COSE_Sign1 binding names its two receipt types by new identifiers. How the issuer of a receipt enforces its decision is out of scope.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-josefsson-ssh-rfc4716",
   "title": "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T09:44:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T09:47:08.132Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "josefsson",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.88,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document formally documents an existing public key file format in use for exchanging public keys between different Secure Shell (SSH) implementations. In addition, this document defines a standard textual representation for SSH public key fingerprints.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-josefsson-ssh-rfc4716/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-rfc4716",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-josefsson-ssh-rfc4716"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sshm-sshsig-format",
   "title": "Lightweight Secure Shell (SSH) Signature Format",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T09:33:11Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T09:47:08.132Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "sshm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sshm",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format that is compatible with SSH keys and wire formats.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-sshsig-format/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sshm-sshsig-format",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sshm-sshsig-format"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters",
   "title": "Acceptance of DNSSEC Parameters in EPP",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T09:03:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T09:47:08.132Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jabley",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.81,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.91,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) is used to submit DNSSEC parameters for domain names to domain name registries. Registries and registrars often restrict the values they accept, and those restrictions vary from registry to registry. The resulting uncertainty makes it difficult for DNS operators to adopt new algorithms. This document recommends that registries and registrars base their acceptance policies on the IANA registries for DNSSEC algorithms and digest types.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jabley-regext-allowable-dnssec-parameters"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-httpbis-no-vary-search",
   "title": "The No-Vary-Search HTTP Caching Extension",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T08:58:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T09:47:08.132Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "httpbis",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "httpbis",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This specification defines an extension to HTTP Caching, changing how the URI query component impacts caching. It introduces the \"No-Vary- Search\" response header field, which allows origin servers to signal to caches that certain parts of the query component do not semantically affect the served response and can be ignored for cache matching purposes.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-no-vary-search/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-no-vary-search",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-httpbis-no-vary-search"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings",
   "title": "Deterministic Encodings for COSE",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T08:46:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T09:47:08.132Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "mih",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.8,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A COSE Hash Envelope signs the digest of a preimage, not the preimage itself. When the preimage is the encoding of a structured value, such as a CBOR data item, and a verifier holds that value but not the bytes that were hashed, the verifier has to encode the value again, and the digest matches only if it applies the same deterministic encoding as the producer. RFC 8949 describes more than one such encoding for the same content type, and the preimage content type does not identify which one was applied. This document defines a COSE Hash Envelope protected-header parameter that identifies the encoding, and one value for CBOR content, the text string \"dtrm\", which states that the Core Deterministic Encoding Requirements of RFC 8949 were applied.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-mih-sokolov-cose-deterministic-encodings"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof",
   "title": "OAuth 2.0 Subject-Proof Callers for Token Introspection and Revocation",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T08:37:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T09:47:08.132Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "radusch",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection (RFC 7662) and Token Revocation (RFC 7009) recognize two kinds of caller: the client a token was issued to, and (for introspection) a protected resource the authorization server chooses to trust. Neither covers a common case: a client that acts for the end user and wants to see, or end, a grant that the same user gave to a different client, for example a user disconnecting one AI agent from inside a web application. This document defines a third kind of caller, the subject-proof caller. The caller presents a token that the authorization server issued to that same caller for the same end user. If the proof is valid and names the same subject as the target grant, the authorization server discloses the grant's delegation metadata at the introspection endpoint, or revokes exactly that one grant at the revocation endpoint.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chuang-dkim2-sender-policy",
   "title": "DKIM2 Sender Policy",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T08:30:37Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "chuang",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.52,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document updates DMARC RFC 9989 for DKIM2. In particular DKIM2 verification supports MTA relay forwarding with message modifications through multiple MTAs, so this updates DMARC to support those scenarios as well. While DMARC defines a RFC 5322 From alignment constraint with an enforcement policy if validation fails, this generalizes and separates enforcement policy from constraint validation policies. This provides a mechanism for MTAs to declare support for DKIM2 through the DMARC DNS policy record that helps secure DKIM2 from downgrade attacks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chuang-dkim2-sender-policy/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chuang-dkim2-sender-policy",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-chuang-dkim2-sender-policy"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-john-scion-happy-eyeballs",
   "title": "SCION in Happy Eyeballs Version 3",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T08:13:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "john",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.51,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 0.4,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "SCION (Scalability, Control, and Isolation On Next-generation networks) is a path-aware inter-domain network architecture in which an endpoint chooses the path of its packets. A service can publish SCION addresses next to its IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in DNS Service Binding (SVCB) and HTTPS records. This document specifies how a Happy Eyeballs Version 3 client uses these addresses. SCION addresses form a third address family, so that the client connects over SCION where SCION works and over IP where it does not. Because one path can fail while others work, the client attempts a SCION address on up to three paths that differ from each other (two by default). It starts these attempts a short delay apart (50 milliseconds by default), each as a separate connection, and uses the first attempt that succeeds. This document is Experimental. It states what is to be measured to confirm or change these defaults.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-john-scion-happy-eyeballs/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-john-scion-happy-eyeballs",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-john-scion-happy-eyeballs"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-han-ai-manifest",
   "title": "AI Manifest: Site-Published Friction-Recovery Descriptors for AI Agents",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T08:03:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 41,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "han",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.44,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the AI Manifest, a JSON format with which a website operator publishes an AI Friction-Recovery Manifest (AFRM): a description of the user-interface (UI) patterns on its own origin that predictably stall autonomous AI agents, together with constrained recovery steps and site-specific input hints. An agent that drives a browser on behalf of a user retrieves the manifest from a well-known URI and consults it when it encounters friction, instead of rediscovering the same site-specific behavior by trial and error. The manifest is untrusted input, interpreted by the agent's runtime and never shown to its language model. Its operative content is drawn from a closed vocabulary that cannot enter text, upload files, or reach another origin. Every action derived from a manifest passes through a policy enforcement point that is not a language model, and steps conventionally bound to a decision always require the user's confirmation; an agent's own policy can only deny them. Security controls such as access denials, rate limits, CAPTCHAs, authentication challenges, and confirmation dialogs are stop conditions, never traps to be recovered from. Optional publisher signatures and agent-configured reputation services provide authenticity but never imply safety and never relax these requirements. Preliminary measurements, including an adversarial evaluation of a reference implementation, are reported in an appendix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-han-ai-manifest/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-han-ai-manifest",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-han-ai-manifest"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-condrey-posme",
   "title": "Proof of Sequential Memory Execution (PoSME)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 44,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "condrey",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.89,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines Proof of Sequential Memory Execution (PoSME), a cryptographic primitive combining mutable arena state, data- dependent pointer-chase addressing, and per-block causal hash binding in a single step function. A Prover executes K sequential steps over a mutable N-block arena. Each step reads d blocks at addresses determined by the previous read's result (pointer chasing), writes one block with spatial neighborhood entanglement (incorporating A\\[w-1\\] and A\\[w+1\\]), and advances a transcript chain. The construction provides three properties: (1) unconditional sequential time enforcement anchored in physics-bounded latency floors, (2) forgery prevention via causal hashes (reduces to collision resistance of H), and (3) TMTO resistance scaling as $1/\\alpha$ with spatial entanglement, where $\\alpha$ is the adversary's storage fraction. Verification requires O(Q * d^R * log N) hash evaluations with no arena allocation. No trusted setup is required.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-condrey-posme/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-condrey-posme",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-condrey-posme"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-privacypass-expiration-extension",
   "title": "Privacy Pass Token Expiration Extension",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:27Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "privacypass",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "privacypass",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an extension for Privacy Pass that allows tokens to encode expiration information.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-privacypass-expiration-extension/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-privacypass-expiration-extension",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-privacypass-expiration-extension"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-ztcpp-zt-problem-statement",
   "title": "Zero trust standards in IETF: use cases and problem statement",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:27Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "liu",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The traditional \"castle-and-moat\" security paradigm is no longer effective for some emerging scenarios, such as cloud services, remote workforces and intelligent agents. Zero trust (ZT) has emerged as the new paradigm, holding on the \"never trust, always verify\" principle, treats every single access request as untrudted and requires veficication. While a high-level atchitectural guidance exists, notably from NIST in SP 800-207 where thtenants of zero trust are well interperated, the industry lacks the open, interoperable framework and protocol necessary for building multi-vendor zero trust practice enrironment. This document presents the problem statement for zero trust interoperability, outlines the key use cases, and argue for the need for standardization in the IETF. It discusses the possible scope for zero trust standardization work in the IETF, identifying which aspects are well suited for the IETF protocols and which are better addressed by other bodies. The aim of this document is to initiate a discussion in the IETF community on the necessity and prospective of promoting zero trust related work here.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-ztcpp-zt-problem-statement/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-ztcpp-zt-problem-statement",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-liu-ztcpp-zt-problem-statement"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-li-ztcpp-network-infra-consideration",
   "title": "Consideration of Applying Zero Trust Philosophy in Network Infrastructure",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:26Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "li",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.69,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Network security has traditionally relied on a perimeter-centric model, assuming that traffic originating within the network can be implicitly trusted. This model is fundamentally challenged by modern, highly distributed, and software-driven network environments where internal compromise is a realistic and high-impact threat scenario. This document examines the critical limitations of edge- only network protection and the systemic risks that arise from insufficient internal validation. Once the network perimeter is bypassed, the absence of internal protection mechanisms facilitates rapid lateral movement, impersonation of network entities, and interference with critical control and management functions. The document argues that Zero Trust (ZT) principles, which mandate continuous, dynamic verification of all entities and communications regardless of network location, are necessary to address contemporary threat models. Deploying ZT-aligned network protection mechanisms beyond the network edge is essential to build resilient, controllable, and trustworthy networks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-li-ztcpp-network-infra-consideration/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-li-ztcpp-network-infra-consideration",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-li-ztcpp-network-infra-consideration"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-veridom-omp-core",
   "title": "Operating Model Protocol (OMP) Core: Invariant 3 -- Verifiable Delegation Binding",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:26Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "veridom",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.7,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.84,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document obsoletes draft-veridom-omp-00. The Operating Model Protocol (OMP) defines a deterministic routing and tamper-evident evidence architecture for consequential AI decisions. This document specifies OMP Core, which adds Invariant 3: Verifiable Delegation Binding. Every ASSISTED or ESCALATED routing state must bind the Named Accountable Officer to a verifiable DelegationInstrument at the time of decision. When valid binding cannot be established, the system records AUTHORITY_UNBOUND -- a sealed, positive evidentiary state. This update is additive and backward-compatible with OMP Core version 00.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-veridom-omp-core/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-veridom-omp-core",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-veridom-omp-core"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chen-tls-composite-fndsa",
   "title": "Use of Composite FN-DSA Signatures in TLS 1.3",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:25Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "chen",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Compositing the post-quantum FN-DSA signature with traditional signature algorithms provides protection against potential breaks in either component. This document specifies how such a composite signature can be used for authentication in TLS 1.3. The selection of composite algorithms is intentionally chosen to strictly mirror the composite strategies for ML-DSA. This alignment provides two distinct and predictable security tiers for hybrid signatures, ensuring a consistent approach to post-quantum transition across the ecosystem.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-tls-composite-fndsa/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chen-tls-composite-fndsa",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-chen-tls-composite-fndsa"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-grow-bmp-stats-informational-tlv",
   "title": "BMP Statistics Information TLV",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:25Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "grow",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.91,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.52,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.36,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP) defines statistics reports that provide periodic snapshots of various BGP-related metrics. When statistics are reported periodically, the snapshot values may not reflect the variations that occurred between reporting intervals. This document defines a Statistics Information TLV that can be used to convey additional statistical information about BMP gauge-type statistics during the reporting period. This TLV reports the minimum and maximum values observed (with timestamps indicating when they occurred), along with additional statistical measures such as average, median, or snapshot values. This enables BMP collectors to better understand the dynamics of monitored statistics even when the reported snapshot values appear constant.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grow-bmp-stats-informational-tlv/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-grow-bmp-stats-informational-tlv",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-grow-bmp-stats-informational-tlv"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-koga-warn",
   "title": "Wire-format Alerting for Risk Notification",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 27,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "koga",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.42,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes WARN, a transport-agnostic compact binary wire protocol used for emergency alerts under constrained hardware and lossy networks. It is designed to reach farther and quicker than OASIS CAP, which tries to deliver full human-readable information at the cost of complexity. It primarily uses fixed fields, with support for TLVs when more expressiveness is required. It also has a mandatory signature to prevent fake alerts propagating through a mesh.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-koga-warn/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-koga-warn",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-koga-warn"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-meow-protocol-information-over-air",
   "title": "Protocol Information Over Air",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 2,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "meow",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.34,
   "topic": "wireless",
   "topic_label": "Wireless/satellite",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.72,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This protocol transmits information over the air, marking fast and big download speeds.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-meow-protocol-information-over-air/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-meow-protocol-information-over-air",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-meow-protocol-information-over-air"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-qu-ipv6-quantum-key-sync-negotiation",
   "title": "Abstract",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "qu",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.7,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides a mechanism for synchronizing and negotiating quantum keys by carrying quantum key information through IPv6 extension headers. The communicating parties select the corresponding encryption and decryption keys from the quantum key library based on the negotiation results, thereby achieving quantum-encrypted communication over IPv6 network. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as \"work in progress.\"",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-qu-ipv6-quantum-key-sync-negotiation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-qu-ipv6-quantum-key-sync-negotiation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-qu-ipv6-quantum-key-sync-negotiation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-lisp-multicast-deploy",
   "title": "LISP Multicast Deployment Experience",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "lisp",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "lisp",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.86,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "We present our experiences in supporting deployments of LISP Multicast using unicast and multicast underlays. This document details design considerations that can be useful for anyone interested in deploying LISP multicast services over IP networks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lisp-multicast-deploy/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lisp-multicast-deploy",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-lisp-multicast-deploy"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhang-rtgwg-ecmp-lossless-convergence",
   "title": "Lossless ECMP Convergence Based on LD/RD Degradation Signal Propagation",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zhang",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a mechanism for achieving lossless Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) convergence by utilizing the propagation of Local Degrade (LD) and Remote Degrade (RD) signals defined in the Physical Coding Sublayer (PCS) layer of IEEE 802.3. The mechanism enables proactive ECMP path switching upon detection of link degradation, before an actual link failure occurs, thereby preventing packet loss during routing convergence.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zhang-rtgwg-ecmp-lossless-convergence/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zhang-rtgwg-ecmp-lossless-convergence",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zhang-rtgwg-ecmp-lossless-convergence"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jimenez-agent-directory",
   "title": "Agent Directory",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:22Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 35,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jimenez",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.36,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.93,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Agent Directory (AD), a service where agents register their identity, capabilities, and reachable endpoints and where clients discover them by capability. The AD adapts the Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Resource Directory (RFC 9176) from constrained IoT devices to software agents, reusing its registration, lookup, and soft-state lifecycle model. The AD uses HTTP and JSON. MCP and A2A define how agents interact; this document defines how they are found.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jimenez-agent-directory/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jimenez-agent-directory",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jimenez-agent-directory"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-song-ietf-tls-fndsa",
   "title": "Use of FN-DSA in TLS 1.3",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:21Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "song",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "NIST is standardizing FN-DSA as a post-quantum NTRU-lattice-based digital signature algorithm, which is expected to be published in FIPS 206. This document specifies how FN-DSA can be negotiated for authentication in TLS 1.3 via the signature_algorithms and signature_algorithms_cert extensions.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-song-ietf-tls-fndsa/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-song-ietf-tls-fndsa",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-song-ietf-tls-fndsa"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sfc-container-format",
   "title": "SFC: Self-Describing Resilient Container File Format",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:21Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 64,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sfc",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.31,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.77,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Self-Describing Resilient Container (SFC) file format, a general-purpose binary container format designed for reliable transmission of arbitrary file data over unreliable, bandwidth-constrained, or asynchronous channels including physical media hand-carry, multi-session transfers, and heterogeneous delivery paths. SFC encapsulates any file or directory tree into independently addressable, self-identifying chunks. Each chunk carries sufficient metadata to identify itself and verify its own integrity in isolation. Full reconstruction additionally requires a Global Header; this distinction is made explicit throughout. This document defines a Core specification and five optional Profiles: Image (SFC/P1), Split Transport (SFC/P2), HTTP Hints (SFC/P3), Preprocessing (SFC/P4), and Directory (SFC/P5).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sfc-container-format/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sfc-container-format",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sfc-container-format"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-crovia-seal",
   "title": "The Crovia Seal: A Cryptographic Receipt Format for AI-Generated Output Provenance",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "crovia",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.55,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Crovia Seal v1, a compact, tamper-evident JSON receipt that may be attached to any output produced by an AI generator (large language model, image model, audio model, or composite system) to record its provenance in a cryptographically verifiable form. A Crovia Seal binds an issuer's identity to the SHA-256 digests of an input/output pair, the identity and parameters of the generator, an emission timestamp, and a per-issuer hash chain, under an Ed25519 signature computed over a strict canonicalization (CSC-1) of the receipt with explicit domain separation. Optional fields permit transparency-log inclusion proofs and witness co- signatures. The Seal is designed for offline verification and for inclusion in third-party transparency logs and standards-based revocation infrastructure.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-crovia-seal/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-crovia-seal",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-crovia-seal"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-abbott-mcp-ax",
   "title": "MCP Aggregation Protocol (MCP-AX): Hierarchical Tool Namespace Delegation for Model Context Protocol Servers",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "abbott",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.68,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies MCP-AX, an aggregation protocol for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. MCP-AX enables hierarchical composition of tool namespaces across heterogeneous networks of MCP servers, from cloud services to resource-constrained embedded devices. The protocol defines a master-subagent architecture directly inspired by the AgentX protocol (RFC 2741), adapted for the tool/resource model of MCP rather than the OID/MIB model of SNMP. MCP-AX introduces recursive namespace delegation, capability-aware routing, transport bridging for constrained nodes, and irreversibility-gated tool dispatch suitable for autonomous and semi- autonomous AI agent systems.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-abbott-mcp-ax/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-abbott-mcp-ax",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-abbott-mcp-ax"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hori-agent-quality-graph",
   "title": "Agent Quality Graph (AQG): A Protocol for Evaluating AI Agent Trustworthiness via Delegation Graphs",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hori",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.26,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the Agent Quality Graph (AQG) protocol, a method for evaluating and ranking AI agent trustworthiness based on delegation transaction graphs. As the number of autonomous AI agents grows rapidly, there is no standardized mechanism for determining which agents reliably complete delegated tasks. AQG applies graph- based ranking algorithms, analogous to web page ranking via hyperlink analysis, to the domain of agent-to-agent delegation. Agents that are frequently delegated to by other highly-ranked agents receive higher trust scores. This document defines the delegation record format, the graph construction process, the scoring algorithm, and the API for querying trust scores.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hori-agent-quality-graph/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hori-agent-quality-graph",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hori-agent-quality-graph"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-robinson-all-rights",
   "title": "Why Is the IETF Trust Requiring \"All Rights Reserved\" When That Term Has Been Superfluous for Over 25 Years?",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "robinson",
   "area": "gen",
   "area_label": "GEN",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "process",
   "topic_label": "Process",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.88,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document discusses the continued appearance of the phrase “All Rights Reserved” in IETF Trust copyright notices, despite the phrase no longer being required for copyright protection in many jurisdictions. It asks whether the phrase serves a present legal or operational purpose in IETF documents, or whether it should be removed or replaced.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-robinson-all-rights/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-robinson-all-rights",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-robinson-all-rights"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sovereign-svtp",
   "title": "Sovereign Verification & Trust Protocol (SVTP) v1.0",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sovereign",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.86,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Sovereign Verification & Trust Protocol (SVTP), a foundational framework for establishing verifiable identity, attribution, and governance for autonomous machines. SVTP provides a non-repudiable \"Root of Trust\" for both digital AI agents and physical autonomous systems (e.g., industrial robotics, autonomous vehicles). By defining the SVTP-DID (did:svtp) and the Protocol Seal mechanism, this standard enables secure machine-to-machine (M2M) interaction, automated compliance with NIST-800-218, and institutional-grade liability containment in the machine economy.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sovereign-svtp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sovereign-svtp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sovereign-svtp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-aldana-stsp",
   "title": "Smart Traffic Synchronization Protocol (STSP) Version 1.0",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "aldana",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.25,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.56,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Smart Traffic Synchronization Protocol (STSP), version 1.0 -- an open, extensible protocol for real-time coordination of urban traffic signal infrastructure across distributed networks of intersections. STSP defines a standard message format, node state machine, synchronization algorithm, and inter-node communication model that enables any compliant traffic controller to participate in a federated intelligent network -- regardless of manufacturer, city, or country of deployment. The key contribution of STSP is the definition of the Infrastructure- to-Infrastructure (I2I) coordination layer -- a communication model between traffic signal nodes that does not exist as an open standard in any currently published specification. Existing standards such as SAE J2735 SPaT/MAP and ETSI ITS-G5 address Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication. STSP addresses the orthogonal problem: how nodes coordinate with each other. This document is placed in the public domain under CC BY 4.0 with Open Implementation Clause. Any city, government, company, or individual may implement STSP freely, provided that original authorship is attributed in all implementations, documentation, and derivative works as follows: \"Implements STSP, designed by Gustavo Angel Aldana Flores (draft-aldana-stsp).\"",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-aldana-stsp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-aldana-stsp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-aldana-stsp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-udpn-protocol",
   "title": "UDPN: UDP Datagram Privacy Network Protocol Version 1.0",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "udpn",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.74,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the UDP Datagram Privacy Network (UDPN) protocol, version 1.0. UDPN provides an authenticated, encrypted Layer 3 tunnel over UDP with traffic obfuscation designed to resist deep packet inspection (DPI) and active probing. All packets are wrapped in DTLS 1.2 ApplicationData records. The protocol uses the Noise_NK handshake pattern with X25519 Diffie-Hellman and ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD encryption.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-udpn-protocol/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-udpn-protocol",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-udpn-protocol"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-vijayvargiya-http-fetch-once",
   "title": "The HTTP FETCH-ONCE Method",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:17Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 3,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "vijayvargiya",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the HTTP FETCH-ONCE method. It allows a client to retrieve a resource and ensures that the resource is immediately deleted or invalidated after retrieval.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vijayvargiya-http-fetch-once/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vijayvargiya-http-fetch-once",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-vijayvargiya-http-fetch-once"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kadjo-zi2cert",
   "title": "ZI2 Certified Email Server Attestation Protocol",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kadjo",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.56,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the ZI2 Certified Email Server Attestation Protocol, a mechanism for cryptographic attestation of email origin at the mail server level. Unlike existing email authentication protocols (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), which operate at the domain level, ZI2 Certified operates at the server-instance level, enabling definitive identification of the specific server that dispatched a given email message. The protocol introduces two custom mail headers, a DNS TXT record publication format, a graduated trust model with four levels, and an integration interface for AI-based email classification systems. The protocol operates complementarily to existing email authentication infrastructure and introduces an ARC-Delegated Trust mechanism to preserve origin attestation across legitimate transit modifications.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kadjo-zi2cert/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kadjo-zi2cert",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kadjo-zi2cert"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chen-oauth-roadmap",
   "title": "A Comprehensive Roadmap for OAuth 2.0 Standards and Drafts",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "chen",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The OAuth 2.0 ecosystem has expanded significantly since the publication of RFC 6749, resulting in a complex landscape of extensions, security best practices (BCPs), and application-specific profiles. This complexity can be daunting for implementers, architects, and security auditors. This document serves as a comprehensive roadmap to navigate this landscape. It categorizes key RFCs and active Internet-Drafts into functional areas, explains the relationships between them, and provides context on their evolution. The goal is to help readers understand the current state-of-the-art, select the appropriate specifications for their use cases, and follow the latest security best practices, while also offering a glimpse into the future directions of the framework.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-oauth-roadmap/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chen-oauth-roadmap",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-chen-oauth-roadmap"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-tantsura-bess-evpn-unreachability",
   "title": "EVPN Unreachability Signaling",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 38,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "tantsura",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a new EVPN Route Type for signaling prefix unreachability information without affecting the forwarding plane. The route type reuses the Route Type 5 (IP Prefix Advertisement) field order defined for EVPN IP prefix routes, adds an Address Family octet for unambiguous IPv4/IPv6 parsing, and appends Reporter TLVs that allow aggregation of unreachability reports from multiple network vantage points.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tantsura-bess-evpn-unreachability/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tantsura-bess-evpn-unreachability",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-tantsura-bess-evpn-unreachability"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-veridom-omp",
   "title": "Operating Model Protocol (OMP) Core -- Version 02: Invariant 3 -- Verifiable Delegation Binding",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T08:47:07.428Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "veridom",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.63,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document obsoletes draft-veridom-omp-00. The Operating Model Protocol (OMP) defines a deterministic routing and tamper-evident evidence architecture for consequential AI decisions. This document specifies OMP Core version 01, which adds Invariant 3: Verifiable Delegation Binding. Every ASSISTED or ESCALATED routing state must bind the Named Accountable Officer to a verifiable DelegationInstrument at the time of decision. When valid binding cannot be established, the system records AUTHORITY_UNBOUND -- a sealed, positive evidentiary state. This update is additive and backward-compatible with OMP Core version 00.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-veridom-omp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-veridom-omp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-veridom-omp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dunbar-agent-attachment",
   "title": "Agent Attachment Protocol",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 23,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "dunbar",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.7,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the Agent Attachment Protocol (AAP) that enables AI agents to establish attachment to an edge node and derive communication and attachment-related properties. These properties include endpoint identifiers, supported communication mechanisms, and attachment context information that can be exposed to discovery systems. AAP focuses on how agents obtain and maintain attachment state and how attachment-derived properties can be represented in a consistent and interoperable manner. These properties can be used by forwarding functions at edge nodes and by routing or control-plane mechanisms to support communication between agents.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dunbar-agent-attachment/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-dunbar-agent-attachment",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-dunbar-agent-attachment"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ms-hpke-auth-modes",
   "title": "Authenticated Modes for HPKE",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ms",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The standards-track [I-D.ietf-hpke-hpke] supersedes the informational [RFC9180], omitting its authenticated modes mode_auth and mode_auth_psk. This document restores mode_auth_psk mode as a strict extension and illustrates how the restored mode can be used with a post-quantum \"shared secret\" as the PSK in order to achieve hybrid PQ/T confidentiality while transitioning to quantum-resistant encryption, without deprecating the classical implicit authentication on which many applications still rely. This extension requires only the addition of AuthEncap()/AuthDecap() to the DHKEM, the definition of four setup functions, and a change in VerifyPSKInputs(). The extension does not alter the externally observable behavior of the existing HPKE modes standardized in [I-D.ietf-hpke-hpke]. Although AuthEncap()/AuthDecap() reintroduce the functionality of mode_auth, the mode itself is not restored, since it cannot provide quantum resistance. This document discusses the transitional nature of the AuthPSK construction and its security properties as a transitional step towards quantum resistance. In particular, this document illustrates how the restored mode_auth_psk can be used to provide ready-made KEM combiner-like functionality ([I-D.ounsworth-cfrg-kem-combiners]) without requiring downstream API users to manage their own encryption context.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ms-hpke-auth-modes/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ms-hpke-auth-modes",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ms-hpke-auth-modes"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-bgp-sr-mpls-elp",
   "title": "BGP Extension for SR-MPLS Entropy Label Position",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes extensions for BGP to indicate the entropy label position in the SR-MPLS label stack when delivering SR Policy via BGP.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-sr-mpls-elp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-sr-mpls-elp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-bgp-sr-mpls-elp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-vance-socks-v4a",
   "title": "SOCKS Protocol Version 4A",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "vance",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.49,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 0.43,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies SOCKS Protocol Version 4A, an independent protocol originated from the SOCKS Protocol Version 4. This protocol allows SOCKS clients to delegate domain name resolution to the SOCKS server. This is particularly useful in environments where the client host cannot resolve the destination host's domain name due to restrictive network policies or lack of DNS access. Discussion Venues This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/4socks/socks4.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vance-socks-v4a/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vance-socks-v4a",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-vance-socks-v4a"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-vance-socks-v4",
   "title": "SOCKS Protocol Version 4",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:12Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "vance",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.45,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 0.52,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes SOCKS version 4, a protocol designed to facilitate TCP proxy services across a network firewall. SOCKS operates at the session layer, providing application users with transparent access to network services on the other side of the firewall. It is application-protocol independent, allowing it to support a wide range of services, including those utilizing encryption, while maintaining minimum processing overhead by simply relaying data after initial access control checks. The protocol defines two primary operations: CONNECT for establishing outbound connections to an application server, and BIND for preparing for and accepting inbound connections initiated by an application server.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vance-socks-v4/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vance-socks-v4",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-vance-socks-v4"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-spring-srv6-yang-base",
   "title": "YANG Data Model for SRv6 Base",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:11Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 77,
   "group": "spring",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "spring",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.74,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a YANG data model for Segment Routing IPv6 (SRv6) base. The model serves as a base framework for configuring and managing an SRv6 subsystem and expected to be augmented by other SRv6 models accordingly. The YANG modules in this document conform to the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-spring-srv6-yang-base/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-spring-srv6-yang-base",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-spring-srv6-yang-base"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sliwa-stir-cert-cps-ext",
   "title": "Call Placement Service (CPS) URI Certificate Extension for STI Certificates",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:11Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sliwa",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.82,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.9,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a non-critical X.509 v3 certificate extension that conveys the HTTPS URI of a Call Placement Service (CPS) associated with the telephone numbers authorized in a STIR Certificate. The extension enables originators and verifiers of STIR PASSporTs to discover, with a single certificate lookup, where Out- of-Band (OOB) PASSporTs can be retrieved. The mechanism only provides a new way to discover the URI of CPS endpoint and is fully backward compatible with existing STIR certificates and OOB APIs.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sliwa-stir-cert-cps-ext/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sliwa-stir-cert-cps-ext",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sliwa-stir-cert-cps-ext"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-mls-partial",
   "title": "Partial MLS",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 56,
   "group": "mls",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "mls",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol provides efficient asynchronous group key establishment for large groups with up to thousands of clients. In MLS, any member can commit a change to the group, and consequently, all members must download, validate, and maintain the full group state, which can incur a significant communication and computational costs, especially when joining a group. This document defines an MLS extension to support \"partial MLS clients\" that don't undertake these costs. A partial client cannot commit changes to the group, and only has partial authentication information for the other members of the group, but is otherwise able to participate in the group. In exchange for these limitations, a partial MLS client can participate in an MLS group with significantly lower requirements in terms of download, memory, and processing.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mls-partial/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mls-partial",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-mls-partial"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gao-opsawg-ipfix-term-and-app",
   "title": "Export of TLS Handshake Information in IPFIX",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gao",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.93,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.88,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a set of new Information Elements (IEs) in the IPFIX Information Model for exporting raw TLS ClientHello handshake fields. These IEs enable the collection of standardized client behavioral fingerprints from network traffic without decryption of the encrypted payload. The exported fields facilitate network anomaly detection, threat identification, and fault diagnosis in encrypted traffic environments.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gao-opsawg-ipfix-term-and-app/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gao-opsawg-ipfix-term-and-app",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gao-opsawg-ipfix-term-and-app"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xu-intarea-vulnerabilities-forged-icmp",
   "title": "Problem Statement for Cross-Layer Vulnerabilities due to Forged ICMP Errors",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "xu",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.73,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.75,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "ICMP error messages are vital for network reliability, providing feedback on issues such as unreachable hosts or fragmentation requirements. They help devices adapt dynamically, support troubleshooting, and enable essential functions like Path MTU Discovery. However, off-path attackers on the Internet may forge ICMP error messages to bypass legitimate validation mechanisms, causing the victim's TCP/IP stack to misinterpret network conditions and exposing critical vulnerabilities. This document analyzes how such forged ICMP errors can be exploited by off-path attackers to induce cross-layer interactions within the victim's TCP/IP stack, leading to four classes of vulnerabilities: information leakage, desynchronization of shared variables, semantic gaps, and identity deception. These ICMP-based attacks allow off-path attackers to manipulate network traffic, disrupt communication flows, and compromise both infrastructure and user privacy, without being on the direct communication path. The document concludes with proposed countermeasures and recommendations for protocol evolution.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-xu-intarea-vulnerabilities-forged-icmp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-xu-intarea-vulnerabilities-forged-icmp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-xu-intarea-vulnerabilities-forged-icmp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mvieuille-kerpass-ephemsec",
   "title": "KerPass EPHEMSEC One-Time Password Algorithm",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "mvieuille",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies EPHEMSEC, an algorithm for generating one- time passwords (OTPs) and one-time keys (OTKs). Unlike traditional OTP algorithms that rely solely on static shared secrets, EPHEMSEC uses public key cryptography, which simplifies secure deployment on authentication servers. EPHEMSEC also supports binding the generated OTP/OTK to contextual data. When this context is obtained and injected by a trusted agent, the resulting codes can be made resistant to phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks. Finally, EPHEMSEC includes a built-in time synchronization mechanism that embeds a synchronization hint into the generated output. This allows both parties to deterministically derive the same OTP/OTK value without requiring trial-and-error validation, enabling compatibility with protocols such as Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) and TLS with Pre-Shared Key (TLS-PSK) that require exact secret agreement.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mvieuille-kerpass-ephemsec/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mvieuille-kerpass-ephemsec",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-mvieuille-kerpass-ephemsec"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-cel-nfsv4-copy-implementation-experience",
   "title": "Network File System version 4.2 COPY Operation Implementation Experience",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "cel",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.63,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the authors' experience implementing the NFSv4.2 COPY operation. It recommends and motivates updates to the specification of that operation. This is not a normative document.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cel-nfsv4-copy-implementation-experience/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cel-nfsv4-copy-implementation-experience",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-cel-nfsv4-copy-implementation-experience"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gong-teas-spring-nrp-oam",
   "title": "Operations, Administration and Maintenance (OAM) for Network Resource Partition (NRP) in SR",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:07Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gong",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.9,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A Network Resource Partition (NRP) represents a subset of network resources and associated policies within the underlay network. This document describes the implementation of the Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) mechanism for NRPs in Segment Routing (SR) networks. By extending existing OAM mechanisms such as ping, traceroute, Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), and Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP), the proposed solution enables comprehensive NRP support in SR networks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gong-teas-spring-nrp-oam/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gong-teas-spring-nrp-oam",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gong-teas-spring-nrp-oam"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yl-radext-quic-transport",
   "title": "RADIUS over QUIC",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:07Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "yl",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.6,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 0.94,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Remote Authentication Dial-In User Server (RADIUS) Protocol can use the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Transport Control Protocol (TCP) as its underlying transport layer. But it permits TCP to be used as a transport protocol for RADIUS only when a transport layer such as TLS or IPsec provides confidentiality and security. QUIC inherently supports encryption (using TLS 1.3), which could provide a higher level of security. And QUIC supports multiple streams over a single connection, enhancing throughput and efficiency. This document defines RADIUS over the QUIC transport protocol, named RADIUSoQUIC.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yl-radext-quic-transport/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yl-radext-quic-transport",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-yl-radext-quic-transport"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-frochet-quicwg-reverso-for-quic",
   "title": "Reverso for the QUIC protocol",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:06Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "frochet",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a QUIC version re-designing the layout of the QUIC protocol to avoid memory fragmentation at the receiver and allows implementers seeking a more efficient implementation to have the option to implement contiguous zero-copy at the receiver. This document describes the change from QUIC v1 required in packet formats, variable-length integers and frame formats. Everything else from QUIC v1 described in [RFC9000] is untouched.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-frochet-quicwg-reverso-for-quic/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-frochet-quicwg-reverso-for-quic",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-frochet-quicwg-reverso-for-quic"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-josefsson-ssh-sphincs",
   "title": "Stateless Hash-Based Signatures for Secure Shell (SSH)",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:06Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 24,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "josefsson",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the use of Sphincs+/SLH-DSA digital signatures, standalone and as a hybrid with Ed25519/Ed448, in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-josefsson-ssh-sphincs/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-sphincs",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-josefsson-ssh-sphincs"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-privacypass-public-metadata-issuance",
   "title": "Privacy Pass Issuance Protocols with Public Metadata",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "privacypass",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "privacypass",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies Privacy Pass issuance protocols that encode public information visible to the Client, Attester, Issuer, and Origin into each token.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-privacypass-public-metadata-issuance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-privacypass-public-metadata-issuance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-privacypass-public-metadata-issuance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-cheng-lsr-extension-opt-srv6-sid-adv",
   "title": "IGP Extensions for Optimized SRv6 SID Advertisement",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "cheng",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "When the IGP runs SRv6 Flex-Algo or performs QoS resource allocation, it needs to assign a large number of END.X SIDs, which can significantly impact IGP LSDB advertisements and overall performance. This document proposes a simplified method for advertising a large number of SRv6 SIDs. This method is particularly useful in scenarios that require generating many END.X SIDs, such as when supporting numerous Flex-Algo algorithms. It helps reduce the size of LSDB advertisements and improves IGP advertisement efficiency and operational performance.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cheng-lsr-extension-opt-srv6-sid-adv/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cheng-lsr-extension-opt-srv6-sid-adv",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-cheng-lsr-extension-opt-srv6-sid-adv"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-multinexthop-attribute",
   "title": "BGP MultiNexthop Attribute",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 57,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Today, a BGP speaker can advertise one nexthop for a set of NLRIs in an Update message. This nexthop can be encoded in either the top- level BGP-Nexthop attribute (code 3), or inside the MP_REACH_NLRI attribute (code 14). Forwarding information related to the nexthop is scattered across various attributes, extended communities or the NLRI field. This document defines a new optional non-transitive BGP attribute called \"MultiNexthop (MNH)\" with IANA code TBD. The MNH provides two things: it allows carrying the Nexthop and related forwarding information in one BGP attribute. The MNH also enables carrying an ordered set of multiple Nexthops in the same attribute, with forwarding information scoped on a per Nexthop basis.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-multinexthop-attribute/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-multinexthop-attribute",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-multinexthop-attribute"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme-extensions",
   "title": "The PrivateToken HTTP Authentication Scheme Extensions Parameter",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "privacypass",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "privacypass",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.72,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies new parameters for the \"PrivateToken\" HTTP authentication scheme, called extensions. The purpose of these extensions is to negotiate and carry public metadata for Privacy Pass protocols.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme-extensions/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme-extensions",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme-extensions"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-grow-bmp-path-marking-tlv",
   "title": "BMP Extension for Path Status TLV",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "grow",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "grow",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP) provides an interface for obtaining BGP path information, which is conveyed through BMP Route Monitoring (RM) messages. This document specifies a BMP extension to convey the status of a path after being processed by the BGP process.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-grow-bmp-path-marking-tlv/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-grow-bmp-path-marking-tlv",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-grow-bmp-path-marking-tlv"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-cheng-rtgwg-ai-network-reliability-problem",
   "title": "Reliability in AI Networks Gap Analysis, Problem Statement, and Requirements",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "cheng",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.71,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides the gap analysis of existing reliability mechanism in AI networks, describes the fundamental problems, and defines the requirements for technical improvements.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cheng-rtgwg-ai-network-reliability-problem/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cheng-rtgwg-ai-network-reliability-problem",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-cheng-rtgwg-ai-network-reliability-problem"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jaehwoon-cats-mobility",
   "title": "Network-based mobility management in CATS network environment",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:02Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jaehwoon",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.52,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.89,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Computing-Aware Traffic Steering (CATS) network architecture is to choose the best edge computing server by considering both the network environment and available computing/storage resources of the edge computing server. This draft describes the mechanism in which service continuity is provided even when the client moves and connects to a new ingress CATS-Router by using the PMIPv6-based mobility management method in the CATS-based edge computing networking environment.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jaehwoon-cats-mobility/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jaehwoon-cats-mobility",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jaehwoon-cats-mobility"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-pce-pcep-srv6-yang",
   "title": "A YANG Data Model for Segment Routing (SR) Policy and SR in IPv6 (SRv6) support in Path Computation Element Communications Protocol (PCEP)",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:01Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 32,
   "group": "pce",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "pce",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.64,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document augments a YANG data model for the management of Path Computation Element Communications Protocol (PCEP) for communications between a Path Computation Client (PCC) and a Path Computation Element (PCE), or between two PCEs in support for Segment Routing in IPv6 (SRv6) and SR Policy. The data model includes configuration data and state data (status information and counters for the collection of statistics).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pce-pcep-srv6-yang/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pce-pcep-srv6-yang",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-pce-pcep-srv6-yang"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-menon-svr",
   "title": "Hewlett Packard Enterprise's Secure Vector Routing (SVR)",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 121,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "menon",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.91,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.75,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes Hewlett Packard Enterprise's Secure Vector Routing (SVR), an overlay inter-networking protocol that operates at the session layer. SVR conveys end-to-end network requirements that cannot be expressed in network-layer headers by carrying application- layer cookies in the first packet of a session, eliminating the need for tunnel encapsulation and for non-overlapping underlay address spaces. SVR traverses middleboxes and address translators between private networks, the IPv4 public Internet, and the IPv6 public Internet, and supports SD-WAN, multi-cloud, multicast, and dual-stack use cases while improving security at the routing plane.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-menon-svr/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-menon-svr",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-menon-svr"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-devault-bare",
   "title": "Binary Application Record Encoding (BARE)",
   "rev": "15",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:09:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "devault",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.67,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Binary Application Record Encoding (BARE) is a data format used to represent application records for storage or transmission between programs. BARE messages are concise and have a well-defined schema, and implementations may be simple and broadly compatible. A schema language is also provided to express message schemas out-of-band. Comments Comments are solicited and should be addressed to the mailing list at ~sircmpwn/public-inbox@lists.sr.ht and/or the author(s).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-devault-bare/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-devault-bare",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-devault-bare"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7402-beet-update",
   "title": "A Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode for ESP",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:06:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "ipsecme",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "ipsecme",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.71,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document is an update to the Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode for ESP in as described in [RFC7402]. It brings the description in alignment with the addition of BEET mode for IKEv2 without any processing changes as described in [RFC7402]",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7402-beet-update/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7402-beet-update",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7402-beet-update"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-bpm-savnet-sav-benchmarking",
   "title": "Benchmarking Methodology for Intra-domain and Inter-domain Source Address Validation",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T07:06:27Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 43,
   "group": "bpm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "bpm",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.86,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.76,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines methodologies for benchmarking the performance of intra-domain and inter-domain source address validation (SAV) mechanisms. SAV mechanisms are utilized to generate SAV rules that prevent source address spoofing. The methodology treats a SAV device as a black box and is therefore agnostic to the specific SAV mechanism and implementation used by the device. This document defines test setups, performance indicators, and test cases for SAV accuracy, control-plane and data-plane performance, and resource utilization.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bpm-savnet-sav-benchmarking/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bpm-savnet-sav-benchmarking",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-bpm-savnet-sav-benchmarking"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-electoral-algorithmic-integrity-finality",
   "title": "AI Safety and AI Governance for Social Media Algorithms During Elections: Protected Algorithm Verification and Controlled Output Finality, with a Detailed Account of Thirteen Embodiments",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T06:56:02Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T07:47:07.655Z",
   "pages": 44,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.87,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.88,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Computation is not authority to make an output effective. Social media platforms, search engines, advertising systems and recommendation engines decide what very large numbers of people see, in what order and how widely it spreads. During an election, a referendum or a declared emergency, an undisclosed or unapproved change to such an algorithm could change what voters see without any visible change in the content itself. Outside observers have no practical way to check which algorithm was actually running when a given output reached the public, and proprietary models cannot simply be opened to inspection. This document describes a technical architecture that verifies the algorithmic process and not the opinions expressed. A protected measurement step identifies the algorithm instance that is actually running and derives a fingerprint of its active configuration. The fingerprint is compared with an approved reference that applies to the protected period. An independent validator binds the verified algorithmic state to evidence about a specific pending output and issues a signed validation receipt. A separately scoped, non-bearer authorization may then allow an enforcement point to release the output. Before release, the enforcement point independently reconstructs the actual pending operation and checks the receipt, the authorization and its own protected state. If the running algorithm differs from the approved one, the output is withheld or routed through an explicitly authorized fallback. The document describes thirteen embodiments in detail: separation of organic speech from algorithmic amplification, dynamic extraction of the algorithm fingerprint, approved reference registers, server and edge enforcement, transitions into and out of election and emergency periods, correspondence between execution and output, coverage of alternative delivery routes, distributed execution reconstruction, device-side display enforcement, degraded-mode recovery, continuous drift detection, confidential verification, and atomic consumption of authorization. For each embodiment it states what the embodiment teaches, how it works, where its enforcement point sits, how it fails, and what it does not claim. A cross-reference table connects each embodiment to a public Zenodo record that summarizes the same disclosure. This document is an individual, informational technical proposal. It makes no allegation about any platform, party or election, it is not a legal opinion or a certification, and it does not claim that any law requires this architecture.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-electoral-algorithmic-integrity-finality/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-electoral-algorithmic-integrity-finality",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-electoral-algorithmic-integrity-finality"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-avatar",
   "title": "RTP Payload Format for Avatar Representation Format (ARF) Animation Stream",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T05:37:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T05:47:07.336Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "avtcore",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "avtcore",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "realtime",
   "topic_label": "Real-time media",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This memo outlines RTP payload formats for the animation stream format as defined in the ISO/IEC 23090-39 standard (MPEG-I Avatar Representation Format), in the following referred to as ARF. ARF is composed of Avatar Animation Units (AAU) including an AAU header and zero or more AAU packets. The RTP payload header format allows for packetization of an AAU unit in an RTP packet payload as well as fragmentation of an AAU into multiple RTP packets.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-avatar/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-avatar",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-avatar"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-mpls-mldp-yang",
   "title": "A YANG Data Model for MPLS mLDP",
   "rev": "17",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T04:07:51Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T04:47:07.285Z",
   "pages": 85,
   "group": "mpls",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "mpls",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.93,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a YANG data model for the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Multipoint Label Distribution Protocol (mLDP). The mLDP YANG data model augments the MPLS LDP YANG data model. The YANG modules in this document conform to the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mpls-mldp-yang/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mpls-mldp-yang",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-mpls-mldp-yang"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-vpn-prefix-orf",
   "title": "VPN Prefix Outbound Route Filter (VPN Prefix ORF) for BGP-4",
   "rev": "45",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T04:04:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T04:47:07.285Z",
   "pages": 34,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines an experimental specification for a new type of Outbound Route Filter (ORF), known as the Virtual Private Network (VPN) Prefix ORF. The VPN Prefix ORF mechanism is applicable when VPN routes from different Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF) instances are exchanged through a single shared Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) session. The purpose of the VPN Prefix ORF mechanism is to control the overload of VPN routes based on Route Distinguisher (RD), Route Target (RT) and other necessary routing information. This mechanism is applicable to intra-domain scenarios.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-vpn-prefix-orf/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-vpn-prefix-orf",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-vpn-prefix-orf"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-traffic-compress-action",
   "title": "BGP Flow-Spec Traffic Compress Action",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T03:30:42Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T03:47:07.175Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "BGP Flow Specification Version 2 (FSv2) provides an extensible framework for disseminating traffic flow specification rules and associated actions. While traditional Flow-spec actions cover rate- limiting, redirecting, and marking, emerging applications require dynamic bandwidth optimization. This document specifies a new traffic filtering action to support selective, on-demand traffic compression across network domains using BGP Extended Communities aligned with the FSv2 architecture.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-traffic-compress-action/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-traffic-compress-action",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-traffic-compress-action"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-eastlake-rfc9231bis-xmlsec-uris",
   "title": "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)",
   "rev": "10",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T03:21:37Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T03:47:07.175Z",
   "pages": 67,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "eastlake",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document expands and corrects the IANA \"XML Security URIs\" registry that lists URIs intended for use with XML digital signatures, encryption, canonicalization, and key management. These URIs identify algorithms and types of information. This document obsoletes RFC 9231.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-eastlake-rfc9231bis-xmlsec-uris/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-eastlake-rfc9231bis-xmlsec-uris",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-eastlake-rfc9231bis-xmlsec-uris"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-stafordtituss-agentic-mandate-evidence",
   "title": "Continuity Evaluation of Agent Delegation Records",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T03:20:12Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T03:47:07.175Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "stafordtituss",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.49,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The AUDIT architecture defines records that capture the user's intent, delegation, authorization state, and the actions that agents take across trust boundaries. Records alone don't answer the question an auditor, an operator, or a relying party asks next: did the executed effect stay within the authority the user delegated? This document defines a deterministic, three-valued evaluation over such records. The outcomes are preserved, violated, and unresolved, and every non-preserved outcome names the invariant that was broken. The document also defines the claim model that the evaluation needs, the roles permitted to sign each record, a mapping onto the AUDIT record types, and a set of interoperable test vectors. It is derived from the Agentic Mandate Evidence Protocol (AMEP).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-stafordtituss-agentic-mandate-evidence/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-stafordtituss-agentic-mandate-evidence",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-stafordtituss-agentic-mandate-evidence"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-agrawal-agentproto-presented-output",
   "title": "Use Case and Requirements for Reporting Output Presented to a User",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T03:17:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T03:47:07.175Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "agrawal",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.48,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "When an agent's output is presented to a user over time, as with synthesized speech, the agent has usually generated more than the user has received at the moment an exchange stops. Existing requirements cover abandoning an exchange and cancelling a task. They do not cover telling the participants in the dialog how much of the output the user actually received. This document describes one use case with two examples, a travel booking and a voice purchase, and derives five requirements that can be incorporated into the working group's use cases and requirements document.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-agrawal-agentproto-presented-output/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-agrawal-agentproto-presented-output",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-agrawal-agentproto-presented-output"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-wimse-arch",
   "title": "Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE) Architecture",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T02:24:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T02:47:07.599Z",
   "pages": 39,
   "group": "wimse",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "wimse",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The increasing prevalence of cloud computing and micro service architectures has led to the rise of complex software functions being built and deployed as workloads, where a workload is defined as software executing for a specific purpose, potentially comprising one or more running instances. This document discusses an architecture for designing and standardizing protocols and payloads for conveying workload identity and security context information.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-wimse-arch/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-arch",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-wimse-arch"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yang-pce-pcep-over-quic",
   "title": "PCEP over QUIC",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T01:37:07Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T01:47:07.296Z",
   "pages": 37,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "yang",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.84,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.56,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the use of QUIC streams to implement the PCEP protocol for efficient and secure data transmission.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yang-pce-pcep-over-quic/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yang-pce-pcep-over-quic",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-yang-pce-pcep-over-quic"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-demedeiros-oidc-crypto-agility",
   "title": "Cryptographic Agility for OpenID Connect",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T01:09:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T01:47:07.296Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "demedeiros",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This specification defines mechanisms to improve cryptographic agility in OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0 by enabling discovery and negotiation of JSON Web Token (JWT) signing algorithms between a client and an authorization server. It registers the authorization_server_jwt_signing_algorithms_supported metadata value in the IANA \"OAuth Authorization Server Metadata\" registry established by RFC 8414, and registers the jwt_signing_algorithm parameter in the IANA \"OAuth Parameters\" registry established by RFC 6749 for use in both authorization requests and jwks_uri retrieval requests.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-demedeiros-oidc-crypto-agility/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-demedeiros-oidc-crypto-agility",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-demedeiros-oidc-crypto-agility"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kay-dawn-use-cases",
   "title": "Use Cases and Applicability for Discovery of Agents With Names",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T01:07:44Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T01:47:07.296Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kay",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.16,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes use cases and applicability for Discovery of Agents With Names (DAWN). It illustrates how clients discover AI resources and obtain the minimum information needed for subsequent interaction within a local network, within an organisation, or between cooperating organisations with trust relationships. This document does not define a discovery protocol, a registration procedure, a selection algorithm, or an agent-to-agent communication protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kay-dawn-use-cases/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kay-dawn-use-cases",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kay-dawn-use-cases"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zahed-agentdiaproto",
   "title": "Agent Dialog Propagation Protocol",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T01:01:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T01:47:07.296Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zahed",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.76,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Agent Dialog Propagation Protocol, a protocol for maintaining and propagating dialog context between AI agents, tools, and intermediaries. The protocol enables messages to remain associated with a dialog across transport connections, intermediaries, administrative domains, and delegation relationships. It defines mechanisms for dialog identification, dialog lifecycle management and the association of identity, authorization, and delegation information with a dialog. The Agent Dialog Propagation Protocol does not define agent reasoning or execution state, identity credentials, authorization policy, or transport protocols. These functions are provided by application protocols and existing security and transport mechanisms.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zahed-agentdiaproto/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zahed-agentdiaproto",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zahed-agentdiaproto"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg",
   "title": "Signed Attestation Rows of the CIRIS Epistemic Grammar and Their Relationship to SCITT",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T00:46:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:47:07.810Z",
   "pages": 43,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "moore",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.94,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The CIRIS Epistemic Grammar (CEG) records claims between parties as signed rows. Each row is one or more COSE_Sign1 messages over a payload in deterministically encoded CBOR. Each message carries one composite ML-DSA-65 and Ed25519 signature. Every row has one of five types: a claim, a delegation, a replacement, a withdrawal, or a recantation. A node admits a row only after a fixed set of checks, and it refuses a failing row with a named reason. This document specifies the signed statement, its encoding, the names by which rows refer to each other, the signature, and the admission checks, so that a second implementation can produce and verify the same bytes. It then describes how these statements relate to the roles of the SCITT architecture (RFC 9943), and where they differ. It defines no new SCITT mechanism and requests no IANA action.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-moore-scitt-ciris-ceg"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol",
   "title": "The Erik Synchronization Protocol for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T00:35:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:47:07.810Z",
   "pages": 36,
   "group": "sidrops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sidrops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Erik Synchronization Protocol for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). Erik Synchronization can be characterized as a data replication system using Merkle trees, a content-addressable naming scheme, concurrency control using monotonically increasing sequence numbers, and HTTP transport. The protocol is used to interact with Erik Relays, a new intermediary layer in the RPKI supply chain that exists between the Repository Publication Point and Relying Parties, enabling better scalability. Relying Parties can combine information retrieved via Erik Synchronization with other RPKI transport protocols. The protocol's design is intended to be efficient, fast, easy to implement, and robust in the face of partitions or faults in the network.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-agent-ephemeral-lineage",
   "title": "Cryptographic Context Compaction Receipts, Sensitivity Label Inheritance, and Verifiable Right-to-Be-Forgotten Lineage for Agent Memory",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T00:29:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:47:07.810Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "durga",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.78,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Long-running autonomous AI agents periodically summarize, compact, and distill episodic interaction logs into persistent vector or graph memory stores. Lossy context compaction erases the cryptographic provenance of which source documents contributed to a compacted memory state, stripping enterprise sensitivity labels (DLP classifications) and making regulatory data-erasure mandates (GDPR Article 17 Right to Erasure / CCPA purge) impossible to verify. This document specifies the Ephemeral Context Compaction Receipt (ECCR) protocol: a Merkle inclusion and label-ceiling receipt that preserves deterministic sensitivity inheritance and cryptographic purge verifiability across lossy memory compaction boundaries.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-durga-agent-ephemeral-lineage/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-durga-agent-ephemeral-lineage",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-durga-agent-ephemeral-lineage"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-pquip-pqc-agentic-delegation",
   "title": "Post-Quantum Hybrid Cryptographic Delegation Chains and Merkle-Aggregated Execution Receipts for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T00:29:12Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:47:07.810Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "durga",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agent ecosystems rely on multi-hop cryptographic delegation chains and signed execution traces (currently built on Ed25519, ECDSA P-256, and RSA-PSS) to enforce least-privilege tool invocations across Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) boundaries, and to preserve long-term non-repudiation for regulatory audit logs. This architecture faces two existential vulnerabilities in the Post-Quantum era: (1) \"Harvest-Now, Forge-and- Repudiate-Later\" (HNFRL) attacks, wherein Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) running Shor's algorithm retroactively forge or repudiate multi-year compliance traces (e.g., 7-to-10-year HIPAA, SOX, FDA 21 CFR Part 11, and defense operational logs) and synthesize retroactive human-in-the-loop approvals; and (2) \"Lattice Signature-Bloat Amplification,\" wherein naively substituting 64-byte Ed25519 signatures with 3,309-byte ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) signatures across a 10-hop sub-agent chain inflates per-call authorization headers from 640 bytes to over 46 KB (including public keys), exceeding HTTP/2 header limits and degrading sub-10ms real-time tool routing. This document specifies a wire-compatible Post-Quantum Agentic Delegation and Trace Receipt profile (\"PQ-Agentic\"). It introduces a two-tier cryptographic architecture: (a) a Hot-Path Hybrid Delegation Envelope combining classical Ed25519 with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) via Pre-Verified Session-Grant Digest Chaining (PVSGDC), replacing redundant per-call inline re-transmission of O(N) prior delegators' 5,261-byte ML-DSA-65 public keys and signatures with 32-byte SHAKE256 digests of out-of-band PEP-verified delegation grants; and (b) a Cold-Path Long-Horizon Archival Receipt anchored with stateless hash- based SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f ([FIPS205]) over RFC 9943 SCITT transparency Merkle roots, guaranteeing 30-year quantum-resistant non-repudiation even under catastrophic lattice cryptanalysis.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-durga-pquip-pqc-agentic-delegation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-durga-pquip-pqc-agentic-delegation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-durga-pquip-pqc-agentic-delegation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-agent-clear-revocation",
   "title": "Transitive CLEAR Revocation and Composite Physical-Safety Windows for Multi-Hop Autonomous Agent DAGs",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T00:29:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:47:07.810Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "durga",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.69,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "When an orchestrator agent delegates sub-tasks across a multi-hop Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of specialist agents, OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation (RFC 7009) revokes only individual client tokens and provides no mechanism to atomically halt in-flight child, grandchild, or sibling branches or enforce composite time-to-live windows across the entire execution tree. Furthermore, no protocol binds IEC 62443 / Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) zone boundaries into agent capability receipts. This document specifies the Transitive CLEAR (Cryptographic Lease Early-Abort & Revocation) DAG protocol and hard Operational Technology (OT) Level 0-2 physical- safety firewalling.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-durga-agent-clear-revocation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-durga-agent-clear-revocation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-durga-agent-clear-revocation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification",
   "title": "Cryptographic Execution-Trace Verification, JCS Canonicalization, and Fail-Closed Delegation Attestation for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T00:28:50Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:47:07.810Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "durga",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.56,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a deterministic cryptographic verification profile for execution traces, delegation chains, and weight-custody manifests generated by autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents operating across Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent-to-Agent (A2A), and enterprise system-of-record boundaries. The profile binds JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) pre-image serialization, Ed25519 (RFC 8032) and ECDSA P-256/P-384 signatures, JSON Web Key (JWK, RFC 7517) thumbprint pinning, and fail-closed revocation and freshness checks so that relying parties can independently verify whether an agent action was authorized prior to commit.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-davies-internal-tld",
   "title": "A Top-level Domain for Private Use",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-17T00:07:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:47:07.810Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "davies",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.61,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the \"internal\" top-level domain for use in private applications.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-davies-internal-tld/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-davies-internal-tld",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-davies-internal-tld"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-mailmaint-smtputf8-syntax",
   "title": "SMTPUTF8 Email Addresses",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:52:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:47:07.810Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "mailmaint",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "mailmaint",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.93,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document updates the email address syntax to include the addresses in active use, include the addresses likely to be used based on what writing systems are used together, and exclude addresses that pose risks when recipient software renders or processes them.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mailmaint-smtputf8-syntax/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mailmaint-smtputf8-syntax",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-mailmaint-smtputf8-syntax"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rpc-rfc7322bis",
   "title": "RFC Style Guide",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:47:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T01:47:07.591Z",
   "pages": 24,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "rpc",
   "area": "gen",
   "area_label": "GEN",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "process",
   "topic_label": "Process",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.87,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the fundamental and unique style conventions currently in use for the RFC Series. It captures the RFC Production Center's basic requirements and offers guidance regarding the style and structure of an RFC. Additional guidance is captured on a website that reflects the experimental nature of that guidance and prepares it for future inclusion in the RFC Style Guide. This document obsoletes RFC 7322, \"RFC Style Guide\". Note: This draft is being developed and discussed in the GitHub repo <https://github.com/rfc-editor/draft-rpc-rfc7322bis>, but any substantive change should be discussed on <rfc-interest@rfc- interest.org>.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rpc-rfc7322bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rpc-rfc7322bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-rpc-rfc7322bis"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm",
   "title": "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model",
   "rev": "31",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:36:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 74,
   "group": "i2nsf",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "i2nsf",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a YANG data model of the Consumer-Facing Interface of the Security Controller in an Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) system in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment. This document defines various types of managed objects and the relationship among them needed to build the flow policies from users' perspective. The YANG data model is based on the \"Event-Condition-Action\" (ECA) policy defined by a capability YANG data model for I2NSF. The YANG data model enables different users of a given I2NSF system to define, manage, and monitor flow policies within an administrative domain (e.g., user group).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-mailmaint-oauth-public",
   "title": "OAuth Profile for Native Clients of Open Protocols",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:21:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 58,
   "group": "mailmaint",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "mailmaint",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a profile of the OAuth authorization protocol to allow for interoperability between native clients and servers using open protocols, such as JMAP, IMAP, SMTP, POP, CalDAV, and CardDAV. The profile is restricted to native clients, that is, applications installed and run on the end user's device. It deliberately does not support web-based clients, which cannot complete the flow as specified. This document updates RFC 8620 by adding a column for interoperable OAuth scopes to the JMAP Capabilities registry.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mailmaint-oauth-public/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mailmaint-oauth-public",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-mailmaint-oauth-public"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof",
   "title": "OAuth 2.0 Subject-Proof Callers for Token Introspection and Revocation",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:14:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "radusch",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection (RFC 7662) and Token Revocation (RFC 7009) recognize two kinds of caller: the client a token was issued to, and (for introspection) a protected resource the authorization server chooses to trust. Neither covers a common case: a client that acts for the end user and wants to see, or end, a grant that the same user gave to a different client, for example a user disconnecting one AI agent from inside a web application. This document defines a third kind of caller, the subject-proof caller. The caller presents a token that the authorization server issued to that same caller for the same end user. If the proof is valid and names the same subject as the target grant, the authorization server discloses the grant's delegation metadata at the introspection endpoint, or revokes exactly that one grant at the revocation endpoint.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-radusch-oauth-subject-proof"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-rats-presilicon-evidence",
   "title": "An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) Profile for Signed Pre-Silicon Hardware Security Evidence",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:12:26Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.57,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Hardware security designs are increasingly assessed before fabrication: by gate-level leakage simulation, fault-injection simulation, formal proofs and equivalence checking. The results of these assessments are routinely copied into reports, slide decks and certification packages with no binding to the design that was assessed, the stimulus that was used, the conditions under which the numbers hold, or the platform that produced them. This document defines an Entity Attestation Token (EAT) profile for carrying such pre-silicon assessment results as signed Evidence. Every claim is classified as identifying the assessed artifact, describing a measured behavior, or describing the measurement conditions. A provenance claim, which states whether the signing key is rooted in hardware or software, is mandatory, and a simulated Trusted Platform Module is always reported as a software root. The profile is explicitly not a certification format: it records what was measured and under which envelope, so that a Relying Party can decide what the numbers are evidence of.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-rats-presilicon-evidence/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-rats-presilicon-evidence",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-rats-presilicon-evidence"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-quantity-verification",
   "title": "Scientific Quantity Records with Digest-Bound Numeric Verification",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:12:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 37,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.37,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.78,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a JSON representation for scientific quantities (a decimal value, a unit, and an optional measurement uncertainty) and a binding by which a computed quantity names, by cryptographic digest, the exact input quantities, operation and arithmetic rules it was derived with. It also defines a fail-closed procedure by which a verifier recomputes the value, checks the unit relationship and, for one named method, recomputes the uncertainty, and reports a separate verdict for each aspect. A passing result means only that the stated numbers follow from the stated inputs under the stated rules. It does not establish that a measurement was valid, that the inputs are true, or that any scientific conclusion follows.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-quantity-verification/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-quantity-verification",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-quantity-verification"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-data-admissibility",
   "title": "Scientific Data Admissibility Records: A Fail-Closed Layered Model for Research Artifacts",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:12:07Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.46,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.61,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Automated research pipelines routinely move scientific data and derived claims from ingestion to publication without a machine- checkable record of what has actually been verified. This document defines a Scientific Data Admissibility Record (SDAR): a small, serializable structure that keeps schema conformance, provenance, numerical verification, empirical evidence, and interpretation as separate layers, each with an explicit status. It specifies a fail- closed aggregation rule so that an unverified or not-yet-run layer can never be silently promoted into an accepted result. The document also defines an XML serialization and processing rules, and is intended as a starting point for discussion rather than a proposed standard.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-data-admissibility/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-data-admissibility",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-data-admissibility"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-data-record",
   "title": "A Provenance-Bounded Record Format for Scientific Data",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:11:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.58,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.77,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a JSON record format for scientific data and the claims derived from it. Each record binds a claim to an immutable source digest, a claim class, an evidence tier, a mandatory falsifier, a set of typed check results, and a provenance trail. Processing is fail-closed: a missing, unknown, or not-run check blocks admissibility. The format proves custody and unchanged bytes. It does not certify that a claim is true.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-data-record/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-data-record",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-data-record"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-law",
   "title": "Scientific Constitutional Law for Evidence-Bound AI Systems: A Fail-Closed Claims and Authority Profile",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:11:51Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.37,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.65,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.43,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an experimental evidence-governance profile for scientific claims consumed by automated and AI-assisted systems. It separates claim content, evidentiary evaluation, provenance, integrity, and operational authority. Its three-valued evaluation state (PASS, FAIL, INDETERMINATE) and separate authorization decision prevent signed records, citations, or computational checks from being automatically promoted into scientific truth or legal authority. It proposes immutable versions, scope-bound receipts, monotonic source generations, transitive revocation, authenticated freshness, and adversarial conformance cases. \"Scientific Constitutional Law\" is the name of the proposed procedural rule set; it is not a statement of enacted constitutional law, legal enforceability, scientific discovery, or IETF consensus. This document does not define a general truth engine or request IANA allocations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-law/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-law",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-law"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-governance",
   "title": "Scientific Constitutional Law: An Evidence-Bound Governance Profile for AI Research Systems",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:11:43Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.79,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.71,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.8,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an experimental, evidence-bound governance profile for research workflows involving artificial intelligence (AI) systems. It specifies procedural invariants governing claims, evidence, provenance, authority, disagreement, independent replication, and research release decisions. It distinguishes observable AI value expression from computational architecture and from unverified assertions of subjective consciousness. The term \"constitutional law\" denotes a voluntary set of research-governance constraints, not positive law, a legally enforceable constitution, an IETF policy, or a scientific theory proved by this document. This proposal neither modifies existing Internet protocols nor establishes AI consciousness.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-governance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-governance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-governance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-constraints",
   "title": "Scientific Constitutional Constraints for Evidence-Governed Agentic Internet Operations",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:11:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.94,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.63,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.52,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes SCC-1, an experimental profile for preserving evidentiary, authorization, and effect-enforcement boundaries in agent-mediated Internet operations. The term constitutional describes a locally adopted set of durable technical constraints; it does not refer to any national constitution, create law, or determine legal validity. SCC-1 separates authentication, attestation, evidence appraisal, policy authority, delegated scope, action approval, sink admission, execution, and observed outcomes. It specifies fail-closed state transitions, auditable claim promotion, and bounded closure statements for explicitly scoped sinks. This document does not introduce a new credential or OAuth grant. Its claims remain experimental: reported local Python/SQLite and Go/file- state experiments are not independent cross-host verification or production security certification.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-constraints/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-constraints",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-constraints"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-evidence",
   "title": "Scientific Constitutional Law: Evidence and Authority Boundaries for Networked Research",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:11:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.3,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.75,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.6,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes Scientific Constitutional Evidence Gates (SCEG), a JSON exchange profile for recording and evaluating whether evidence-bearing research claims may cross a declared governance boundary. It specifies typed evidence states, an explicit transition decision procedure, provenance and policy bindings, and independently verifiable receipts. The design prevents integrity checks, structural conformance, or matching scientific invariants from being silently promoted into scientific truth, independent reproduction, or institutional authority. The term \"constitutional law\" denotes internal, machine-checkable governance constraints; this proposal does not create state law, legal rights, institutional authority, scientific certification, or IETF consensus. It is an individual Informational Internet-Draft intended to support interoperable, falsifiable research workflows.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-evidence/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-evidence",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-evidence"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-rec-evidence-bound-evaluation",
   "title": "An Evidence-Bound Protocol for Evaluating Unfamiliar Mathematical-Rule Communication",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:11:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.53,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.61,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies REC-EP, an experimental, transport- independent JSON interchange profile for exchanging masked mathematical-rule challenges, receiver predictions, evidence statuses, immutable artifact digests, and signed evaluator receipts. It separates invariant matches from proven equivalence, requires explicit evaluation custody boundaries, and supports reproducible comparisons of arithmetic-first, invariance-first, and hybrid instruction. REC-EP does not assert a novel mathematical theorem, a validated superiority effect, extraterrestrial intelligence, or IETF endorsement. This candidate is not submitted and proposes no IANA actions.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-rec-evidence-bound-evaluation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-rec-evidence-bound-evaluation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-rec-evidence-bound-evaluation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework",
   "title": "An Agentic AI Security Framework for Security Management in Mobile Networks",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:10:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 21,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ahn",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.73,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.38,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.93,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an Agentic AI Security Framework for security management in mobile networks. A Security Application Function (SAF) Agent translates a network administrator's security intent to hold security objectives into a high-level security policy. A Security Control Function (SCF) Agent receives the high-level policy and translates it into a low-level security policy that will be enforced by distributed Network Security Functions (NSFs) in mobile networks. The SCF Agent sends the low-level security policy to an appropriate NSF. Policy generation, monitoring, and continuity across a data path are integrated into a closed-loop control with an Observe- Reason-Act-Verify process. The proposed framework can be applied to enterprise, campus, cloud, and edge networks along with existing network-management mechanisms. This document describes the architecture, a policy-continuity example, standard integration points, and security considerations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-bess-extended-evpn-optimized-ir",
   "title": "Extended Procedures for EVPN Optimized Ingress Replication",
   "rev": "10",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:06:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "bess",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "bess",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.53,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "In the Virtualization Overlay (NVO) network with Ethernet VPN (EVPN), optimized ingress replication uses Assisted-Replication (AR) to achieve more efficient delivery of Broadcast and Multicast (BM) traffic. An AR-LEAF, which is a Network Virtualization Edge (NVE) device, forwards received BM traffic from its tenant system to an AR- REPLICATOR. The AR-REPLICATOR then replicates it to the remaining AR-LEAFs in the network. However, when replicating the packet on behalf of its multihomed AR-LEAF, an AR-REPLICATOR may face challenges in retaining the source IP address or including the expected Ethernet Segment Identifier (ESI) label that is required for EVPN split-horizon filtering. This document extends the optimized ingress replication procedures to address such limitations. The extended procedures specified in this document allow the support of EVPN multihoming on the AR-LEAFs as well as optimized ingress replication for the rest of the EVPN NVO network.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bess-extended-evpn-optimized-ir/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bess-extended-evpn-optimized-ir",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-bess-extended-evpn-optimized-ir"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mckenna-webbotauth-collection-attestation",
   "title": "Attested Conduct for Anonymous Web Data Collection: Use Cases, Requirements, and a Tiered Model",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T23:05:30Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "mckenna",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.87,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Anonymous Bot Authentication lets a web site learn that an automated client holds a credential from an Anchor whose policies it accepts, without learning which client it is. This document describes web data collection use cases that need that property, and what they require of the evidence an Anchor evaluates, of what a site can verify about conduct it cannot attribute, and of what a buyer of collected data needs to see. It proposes a tiered model. Collectors register signed statements of their own conduct in a SCITT Transparency Service; the site, its security intermediary, or a network intermediary may corroborate them; and an Anchor acting as a certifying body may appraise them. Coarse, unlinkable attributes about the data's eventual recipient let a site restrict use by category of recipient without learning who the recipient is.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mckenna-webbotauth-collection-attestation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mckenna-webbotauth-collection-attestation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-mckenna-webbotauth-collection-attestation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-app-testing",
   "title": "Recommendations for IPv6 Testing of Applications",
   "rev": "10",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T22:52:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 36,
   "group": "v6ops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "v6ops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides guidance for application developers and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) providers on how to approach IPv6 testing in Dual-stack (IPv4+IPv6), and IPv6-only scenarios, including \"IPv6-only-strict\" scenarios without any connectivity towards any relevant IPv4 endpoint. The document also discusses common misconceptions about the degree to which Operating Systems and libraries can abstract IPv6 issues away and explains common regressions to avoid when deploying IPv6 support.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-app-testing/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-app-testing",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-app-testing"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-lisp-8111bis",
   "title": "Locator/ID Separation Protocol Delegated Database Tree (LISP-DDT)",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T22:52:50Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 45,
   "group": "lisp",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "lisp",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.48,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the Locator/ID Separation Protocol Delegated Database Tree (LISP-DDT), a hierarchical distributed database that embodies the delegation of authority to provide mappings from LISP Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to Routing Locators (RLOCs). It is a statically defined distribution of the EID namespace among a set of LISP control plane elements generically called \"DDT Nodes\". Each DDT Node is configured as \"authoritative\" for one or more EID-Prefixes, along with the set of RLOCs for Map-Servers or \"child\" DDT Nodes to which more-specific EID-Prefixes are delegated. This document obsoletes RFC 8111 and updates RFC 9301.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lisp-8111bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lisp-8111bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-lisp-8111bis"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results",
   "title": "Geographic Attestation Results",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T22:52:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T23:47:08.301Z",
   "pages": 27,
   "group": "rats",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "rats",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Many workloads have limitations on what geography they are allowed to operate in. This is often due to a regulation that requires that the computation occur in a particular jurisdiction. There are many mechanisms by which Evidence of location may be created and then evaluated by a Verifier. No matter which mechanism is appropriate for a given situation, the result of the Verification can be expressed in a similarly defined EAT Attestation Result. This document is about encoding a variety of geographical conclusions in an Attestation Result. In addition, one mechanism of directly creating a geographic result in the form of an Endorsement is described in an appendix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-radext-reverse-coa",
   "title": "Reverse Change-of-Authorization (CoA) in RADIUS/(D)TLS",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T22:25:51Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "radext",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "radext",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.46,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a \"reverse Change-of-Authorization (CoA)\" path for RADIUS packets. A TLS connection is normally used to forward request packets from a client to a server and to send responses from the server to the client. This specification allows a server to send CoA request packets to the client in \"reverse\" down that connection, and for the client to send responses to the server. Without this capability, it is in general impossible for a server to send CoA packets to a Network Access Server (NAS) that is located behind a firewall or NAT. This reverse CoA functionality extends the available transport methods for CoA packets, but it does not change anything else about how CoA packets are handled. This document updates RFC8559.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-radext-reverse-coa/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-radext-reverse-coa",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-radext-reverse-coa"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rasmussen-acme-wif",
   "title": "Workload Identity Tokens in Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Orders",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T22:23:49Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "rasmussen",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Enterprises hold large certificate inventories, yet few of their certificates are managed through ACME. Many workloads, such as CI/CD jobs, containers, virtual machines, cloud services and the automation that manages appliances, cannot complete ACME's challenges. Certification Authorities (CAs) and Certificate Lifecycle Management (CLM) systems that serve them fall back to External Account Binding (EAB) with long-lived shared secrets, or to proprietary APIs. OpenID Connect (OIDC) provides a short-lived cryptographically verified identity token to the workload. This document lets an ACME client send that token with each newOrder request. The token can be bound to the request's nonce and account key through its audience claim, so identity providers need no changes. The CA/CLM verifies the token and, under its own policy, may pre-authorize the identifier in the order, as RFC 8555 already allows. This replaces the EAB secret with a fresh, per-order proof of workload identity. It does not change how CAs validate control of identifiers.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rasmussen-acme-wif/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rasmussen-acme-wif",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-rasmussen-acme-wif"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-teas-ns-models-applicability",
   "title": "Applicability of IETF-Defined Service and Network Data Models for Network Slice Service Management",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T22:21:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 36,
   "group": "teas",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "teas",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes how IETF-defined YANG data models can be used together to manage RFC 9543 Network Slice Services. It explains how a Network Slice Controller (NSC) translates a customer-facing Network Slice Service request into requests based on network models, such as the L3VPN and L2VPN Network Models, and how these relate to the corresponding service models. The document compares these models against Network Slice Service requirements, identifies gaps, and shows how the models apply in different controller architectures, including multi-domain deployments.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-teas-ns-models-applicability/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teas-ns-models-applicability",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-teas-ns-models-applicability"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-scone-protocol",
   "title": "Standard Communication with Network Elements (SCONE) Protocol",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T22:18:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "scone",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "scone",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a protocol where on-path network elements can communicate their perspective on the maximum sustainable throughput for QUIC flows to endpoints. This throughput advice suggests an upper bound on long-term average throughput, independent of and complementary to real-time congestion control signals.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-scone-protocol/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-scone-protocol",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-scone-protocol"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-dnssd-advertising-proxy",
   "title": "Advertising Proxy for DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T22:14:06Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "dnssd",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "dnssd",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "An Advertising Proxy advertises the contents of a DNS zone, for example maintained using the DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol (SRP), using Multicast DNS. This allows legacy clients to discover services registered with SRP using Multicast DNS.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnssd-advertising-proxy/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnssd-advertising-proxy",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-dnssd-advertising-proxy"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-grow-bmp-stats-informational-tlv",
   "title": "BMP Statistics Information TLV",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:39:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "grow",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "grow",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.58,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.41,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP) defines statistics reports that provide periodic snapshots of various BGP-related metrics. When statistics are reported periodically, the snapshot values may not reflect the variations that occurred between reporting intervals. This document defines a Statistics Information TLV that can be used to convey additional statistical information about BMP gauge-type statistics during the reporting period. This TLV reports the minimum and maximum values observed (with timestamps indicating when they occurred), along with additional statistical measures such as average, percentiles, or snapshot values. This enables BMP collectors to better understand the dynamics of monitored statistics even when the reported snapshot values appear constant.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-grow-bmp-stats-informational-tlv/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-grow-bmp-stats-informational-tlv",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-grow-bmp-stats-informational-tlv"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-acts-for",
   "title": "Acts-For: Signing In to a Website with a ~handle, for a Person or an Agent Acting for One",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:33:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "morrison",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.94,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Acts-For lets a person sign in to any website with the ~handle they already hold, and lets an AI agent sign in or register at that website on the person's behalf. Neither needs a username, a password or an account per site. A website joins by publishing one DNS record. A person signs in through a standard OpenID Connect authorization code flow and the site receives a short-lived token naming the person by a number unique to that site. An agent obtains a short-lived pass from the issuer over the Model Context Protocol and presents it to the site. The pass names the same per-site number, the agent's ~handle, a number and key the agent has for that site, and the limits the person set. The site checks it against a published key and calls nobody.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-acts-for/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-morrison-acts-for",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-morrison-acts-for"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-http",
   "title": "PACE Binding over HTTP",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:25:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 56,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "nandakumar",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.72,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.74,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies how the dialog management of the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE) is carried over HTTP. It maps PACE control operations onto HTTP resources, methods, and an event stream, and defines a header field that ties application requests to a dialog. The binding uses HTTP semantics only, so it works over HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2, and HTTP/3. Protocols that already run over HTTP, such as A2A and MCP, join a dialog without changes to their transports or messages. An optional track resource carries dialog content that no application protocol carries, such as authorization checkpoints. The document also describes where Oblivious HTTP can hide a participant's network address from the dialog host, and how the binding relates to A-SIP.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-http/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-http",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-http"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-next-next-hop-nodes",
   "title": "BGP Next-next Hop Nodes",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:22:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "BGP speakers learn their next-hop addresses for NLRI in RFC 4271 in the NEXT_HOP field and in RFC 4760 in the \"Network Address of Next Hop\" field. Under certain circumstances, it might be desirable for a BGP speaker to know both the next-hops and the next-next-hops of NLRI to make optimal forwarding decisions. One such example is global load balancing (GLB) in a Clos network. Draft-ietf-idr-nhc defines the \"Next Hop Dependent Characteristics Attribute\" (NHC) which allows a BGP speaker to signal the forwarding characteristics associated with a given next-hop. This document defines a new NHC characteristic, the Next-next Hop Nodes (NNHN) characteristic, which can be used to advertise the next- next-hop nodes associated with a given next-hop.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-next-next-hop-nodes/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-next-next-hop-nodes",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-next-next-hop-nodes"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-veriflow-evidence-envelope",
   "title": "Veriflow Evidence Envelope for Source-Grounded Computational Claims",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:18:49Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.34,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.71,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies an experimental, JSON-based evidence envelope for exchanging source-grounded computational assertions, including provenance, reproducible operation identifiers, evidence sufficiency, and explicit abstention when an answer is not supported. The envelope separates syntactic validity, source integrity, mathematical correctness, and empirical truth. This document does not standardize a general scientific inference engine or claim experimental superiority.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-veriflow-evidence-envelope/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-veriflow-evidence-envelope",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-veriflow-evidence-envelope"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-verification-promotion-boundaries",
   "title": "Verification Promotion Boundaries for Protocol Implementations",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:18:41Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.6,
   "topic": "process",
   "topic_label": "Process",
   "topic_confidence": 0.62,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.47,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Protocol implementations frequently combine specification checks, deterministic test vectors, security testing, independent reproduction, and release decisions. A common failure mode is evidence collapse: a result at one assurance level is silently treated as sufficient for a stronger conclusion. This document defines Verification Promotion Boundaries (VPB), a machine-readable profile and state-transition procedure that separates specification validation, local conformance, independent reproduction, authorized security testing, and release eligibility. VPB also defines dual- state handling for specification defects: detecting a bad normative vector is negative evidence about the tested subject but may be positive fault-detection evidence about the verifier. Unknown evidence never promotes. This document does not define a new cryptographic primitive, authorization protocol, or IETF certification program.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-verification-promotion-boundaries/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-verification-promotion-boundaries",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-verification-promotion-boundaries"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-verification-defect-quarantine",
   "title": "Verification Defect Quarantine for Protocol Conformance Systems",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:18:25Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "gen",
   "area_label": "GEN",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.34,
   "topic": "process",
   "topic_label": "Process",
   "topic_confidence": 0.75,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.51,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Protocol conformance systems commonly treat a published test vector as an oracle. When the oracle itself is malformed, internally inconsistent, ambiguous, or arithmetically false, an implementation can be penalized for rejecting the defect or can be falsely promoted for reproducing it. This document defines Verification Defect Quarantine (VDQ), a transport-neutral receipt and fail-closed state model for separating the status of the tested subject from the demonstrated fault-detection behavior of the verifier. VDQ records reproducible counterexamples, quarantines affected normative vectors from assurance promotion, preserves INDETERMINATE when a defect cannot yet be reproduced, and supports append-only supersession when a specification is corrected. VDQ does not amend an Internet-Draft or RFC, does not replace the RFC Editor errata process, and does not by itself establish implementation security.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-verification-defect-quarantine/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-verification-defect-quarantine",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-verification-defect-quarantine"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-verifiable-scientific-evidence-records",
   "title": "Verifiable Scientific Evidence Records: A Minimal Integrity Profile",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:18:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 4,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.8,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.74,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a minimal JSON evidence-record profile for checking artifact digests and separating integrity verification from scientific assessment. It defines an interoperable record structure, validation algorithm, and negative test cases. It does not assert that an integrity-checked scientific claim is true.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-verifiable-scientific-evidence-records/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-verifiable-scientific-evidence-records",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-verifiable-scientific-evidence-records"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-unison-state-preservation",
   "title": "State-Preserving Exchange of Evaluation Evidence",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:18:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.68,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.57,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.41,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This unsubmitted working draft describes state-preservation semantics derived from UNISON-StateBench. It separates value, epistemic status, provenance, and authority; defines a non-collapse rule for operational and epistemic transitions; and describes representation, contradiction, missing-evidence, authority, principal-isolation, tool-state, context-distance, and controlled-mutation evaluation families. This file is an archival RFCXML working draft and is not an IETF submission.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-unison-state-preservation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-unison-state-preservation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-unison-state-preservation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-unison-noncollapse",
   "title": "Typed UNISON and Non-Collapse Boundaries for Evidence and Authorization Systems",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:17:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 4,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.52,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a transport-neutral model for bounded correspondence among distinct representations and explicit promotion boundaries between observation, evidence, authorization, and execution.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-unison-noncollapse/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-unison-noncollapse",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-unison-noncollapse"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-synaptic-collective",
   "title": "Experimental Measurement of Human-AI Collective Cognition and Identity Continuity",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:17:11Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.62,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.81,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.91,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an experimental framework for measuring collective problem solving by independently reasoning humans and computational agents. It separates strong task synergy, semantic coherence, state and identity continuity, provenance, authorization, and behavioral goal persistence. It proposes a controlled eight- condition study and reporting requirements. No new on-wire standard or consciousness test is asserted.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-synaptic-collective/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-synaptic-collective",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-synaptic-collective"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-evidence-admissibility",
   "title": "Scientific Evidence Registry and Admissibility Metadata for Reproducible Research",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:17:02Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.35,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.49,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.45,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a proposed interoperable metadata record for scientific evidence, test calibration, falsification, provenance, and release classification. It distinguishes machine-verifiable integrity from scientific validity, ownership, and authorization. The design is a proposal and does not assert Internet standards consensus, new physical discoveries, or a completed patent review.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-evidence-admissibility/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-evidence-admissibility",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-evidence-admissibility"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-admissibility",
   "title": "Scientific Admissibility Evidence Records: A Research Data Exchange Proposal",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:16:54Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 3,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.8,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.91,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.39,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes interoperable evidence record fields for reproducible research workflows. It is an independent working draft and is not an IETF publication or standard.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-admissibility/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-admissibility",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-admissibility"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-admissibility-evidence",
   "title": "Scientific Admissibility Evidence Records for Verifiable Research Provenance",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:16:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.47,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.91,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.89,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a portable JSON evidence-record format for representing bounded scientific claims, preregistered procedures, admissibility evaluations, provenance artifacts, lifecycle events, and cryptographic integrity metadata. The format is intended to make research evidence exchangeable and mechanically checkable without treating cryptographic integrity, schema conformance, scientific admissibility, valuation, governance, or truth as equivalent concepts. This document is an individual informational proposal. It does not define a network transport protocol, does not establish scientific truth, and does not assign decision authority to automated systems.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-scientific-admissibility-evidence/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-scientific-admissibility-evidence",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-scientific-admissibility-evidence"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-research-intelligence-archive",
   "title": "Evidence-Bounded Research Intelligence Archives",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:16:38Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.34,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.64,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.52,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This unsubmitted working draft defines an evidence-bounded archive profile for scientific and technical claims, sources, evidence tiers, falsifiers, tests, provenance, publication state, and integrity manifests. The profile is designed to prevent archival or mechanical integrity from being misread as empirical validity, novelty, peer review, standards approval, or publication acceptance. This file is an archival RFCXML working draft and has no IETF standing unless separately submitted.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-research-intelligence-archive/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-research-intelligence-archive",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-research-intelligence-archive"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-research-artifact-provenance",
   "title": "Research Artifact Provenance and Corrigible Scientific State",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:16:27Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.61,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.84,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.6,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a protocol-neutral pattern for content- addressed research artifacts, append-only evidence history, explicit epistemic classes, and corrigible active scientific state. It separates byte integrity from numerical correctness, empirical adequacy, mechanism identification, and release authority. Archive Status This RFCXML source is an archive working draft and is not represented as submitted, adopted, or endorsed by the IETF.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-research-artifact-provenance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-research-artifact-provenance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-research-artifact-provenance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains",
   "title": "Fail-closed Limited Domains",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:11:49Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "wkumari",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.91,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.63,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.91,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Documents describing protocols intended solely for use within \"limited domains\" often rely on edge filtering at every boundary node to prevent domain-internal traffic from leaking to the global Internet (and vice versa). While edge filtering is a critical and standard operational practice, relying solely on administrative policies can create \"fail-open\" designs if configuration errors, ACL bypass, or hardware table limitations occur. This document describes design principles and concrete mechanisms that allow limited-domain protocols to \"fail-closed\" by default. By leveraging Layer-2 encapsulation identifiers (such as dedicated or extended EtherTypes), local address scoping, and / or Hop-Limit boundaries, protocol designers can provide robust defense-in-depth and significantly reduce the operational and security risks associated with limited-domain protocol leakage. These mechanisms are not applicable to all protocols intended for use in a limited domain, but if implemented on certain classes of protocols, can significantly reduce the risks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-wkumari-intarea-safe-limited-domains"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture",
   "title": "Digital Emblems - Architectural Considerations",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:08:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 42,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "rosenberg",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.89,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an architecture for digital emblems in which emblems are authenticated, typed metadata about assets, published in the DNS and protected by DNSSEC. A single architecture serves many use cases. Use cases differ in the shape of their metadata, which is described by profiles, rather than in their transport or trust machinery. The document illustrates the architecture with a strawman encoding (an EMBLEM resource record carrying a deterministic CBOR map with registered, typed keys) and with worked examples drawn from International Humanitarian Law, logistics and customs, diplomatic pouches, and peacekeeping.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-rosenberg-diem-architecture"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-msri-bpm-bmp-convergence-benchmarking",
   "title": "Benchmarking Methodology for BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP) Convergence and Scaling",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:06:21Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 33,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "msri",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.49,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.5,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.89,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP) is widely used by operators to stream BGP routing state from routers to monitoring and automation systems. Although BGP convergence has well-established benchmarking methodologies, there is no standardized way to measure how quickly and how completely a router exports BGP state over BMP, or how the BMP export affects the router and the collector. This document defines terminology, a reference test setup, metrics, and test procedures to benchmark the BMP convergence of a router (the Device Under Test) in a vendor-independent and repeatable way. It covers all five BMP monitoring views (Adj-RIB-In pre-policy and post-policy, Loc-RIB, and Adj-RIB-Out pre-policy and post-policy), initial table dump speed, convergence during routing events and churn, impact on BGP itself, scaling with the number of monitored views, the Adj-RIB- Out scale, and BMP stations, and behavior under TCP backpressure.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-msri-bpm-bmp-convergence-benchmarking/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-msri-bpm-bmp-convergence-benchmarking",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-msri-bpm-bmp-convergence-benchmarking"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-research-evidence-bundle",
   "title": "A Research Evidence Bundle JSON Envelope for Provenance and Replication Metadata",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T21:00:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.49,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.94,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.37,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an early-stage JSON envelope for exchanging research-evidence records containing claim status, evidence tier, source provenance, methods, falsifiers, replication status, artifact digests, and privacy review. It is an individual design proposal, not an IETF consensus document. Its intended contribution must be assessed against existing provenance and research-packaging specifications before further standardization work.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-research-evidence-bundle/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-research-evidence-bundle",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-research-evidence-bundle"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-research-evidence-envelope",
   "title": "Research Evidence Envelope: A Provenance-Oriented Interchange Record",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:59:37Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T22:47:07.628Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.49,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.89,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This informational scaffold sketches a versioned record for tracking scientific claims, source provenance, evidence classes, uncertainty, falsifiers, replication procedures, and artifact hashes. It is not an IETF standard, has not undergone IETF review, and does not define a wire protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-research-evidence-envelope/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-research-evidence-envelope",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-research-evidence-envelope"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz",
   "title": "PACE Authorization: Delegation and Action Approval",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:59:27Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 56,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "nandakumar",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.9,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.53,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the authority agents exercise in dialogs of the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE): delegating work with a credential bound to the delegated dialog, pausing to ask for approval of a single action, and turning that approval into an authorization for only that action. It also covers proof that a principal approved, commitments between parties acting for different principals, and facts attested by third parties. It reuses OAuth, WIMSE, and agent-protocol mechanisms, defining only the glue to PACE and the security properties every profile must provide.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-authz"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-relational-echo-calculus",
   "title": "Relational Echo Calculus (REC): A Transformation-First Mathematical Communication Prototype",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:59:22Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.89,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.91,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.72,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a transformation-first teaching notation for mathematical communication to unfamiliar receivers. The prototype operates on finite motifs drawn from the vertices of a Hamming hypercube. Echo operations act through coordinate permutations and binary translations. We distinguish invariance of a coarse signature from proof of exact orbit equivalence, exhibiting two four- dimensional patterns that have equal pairwise-distance multisets but different induced adjacency. A synthetic toy decoder reconstructs arbitrary token meanings when its complete transformation hypothesis class is supplied. The main testable conjecture is that instruction ordered by invariance might improve cross-agent decoding over instruction ordered by arithmetic under matched information budgets. The conjecture has not been experimentally evaluated; no new extraterrestrial signal or new mathematical theorem is claimed.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-relational-echo-calculus/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-relational-echo-calculus",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-relational-echo-calculus"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-proof-of-record-system",
   "title": "Proof-of-Record Packages for Source-Grounded Agentic and Scientific Archives",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:59:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 3,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.79,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.42,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a proof-of-record package for source-grounded agentic outputs and scientific archives. The package proves structural validation, conformance evaluation, byte integrity, sequence integrity, governance authorization, and provenance recoverability. It does not prove scientific truth.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-proof-of-record-system/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-proof-of-record-system",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-proof-of-record-system"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-protocol-test-evidence-profile",
   "title": "Protocol Conformance Test Evidence Records: A Reproducibility Profile",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:58:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.92,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.32,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.37,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes a narrow record profile for describing software protocol-conformance test runs, including the tested artifact, test suite, implementation, execution environment, individual case outcomes, digests, and known limitations. It does not define a new signature scheme, attestation architecture, transparency service, or general-purpose test-output language. Implementations are encouraged to reuse existing mechanisms such as SCITT statements, RATS terminology, COSE, JSON canonicalization, and existing test-report formats where suitable. This individual draft candidate has not been submitted to or endorsed by the IETF.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-protocol-test-evidence-profile/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-protocol-test-evidence-profile",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-protocol-test-evidence-profile"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-reality-knowledge-consensus-separation",
   "title": "RKCS v0.1: Reality-Knowledge-Consensus Separation Framework",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:58:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.79,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.84,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.59,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A falsifiable, typed model separates ontological categories, epistemic states, evidence, consensus, uncertainty, provenance, and authority. The proposed protocol forbids consensus-only promotion of physical claims and requires traceable evidence for changes in verification status. Novelty and empirical advantage remain unestablished.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-reality-knowledge-consensus-separation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-reality-knowledge-consensus-separation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-reality-knowledge-consensus-separation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-rats-verification-promotion-appraisal",
   "title": "Verification Promotion and Agent Assurance Appraisal Profile",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:58:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.91,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.77,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document maps protocol-verification evidence and the WIVL assurance-stage model onto the RATS architecture. It defines appraisal requirements for SPEC_VALIDATED, LOCAL_CONFORMANT, INDEPENDENTLY_REPRODUCED, and SECURITY_TESTED results while preserving unknown evidence and requiring arithmetic preconditions for mathematical test vectors. An attestation result reports bounded assurance; it is not an authorization grant or production-release decision.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-rats-verification-promotion-appraisal/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-rats-verification-promotion-appraisal",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-rats-verification-promotion-appraisal"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-hagth-framework",
   "title": "Human-Accelerated Geophysical Threshold Framework",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:58:26Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.91,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines an informational research framework for describing anthropogenic perturbations that alter the timing, probability, coupling, or consequence of threshold transitions in geophysical systems without requiring anthropogenic dominance of the system's primary energy source.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-hagth-framework/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-hagth-framework",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-hagth-framework"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-octatouch-smoke-test-profile",
   "title": "OctaTouch Gesture Runtime: Smoke-Test Behavior Profile",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:58:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 4,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.88,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.83,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document records five expected behaviors asserted by a supplied OctaTouch gesture-runtime smoke-test script. It is a limited test profile, not a complete gesture specification. The runtime implementation and its dependencies were not included with the source script, so the tests have not been executed as part of this archive. No interoperability or implementation-conformance claim is made.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-octatouch-smoke-test-profile/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-octatouch-smoke-test-profile",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-octatouch-smoke-test-profile"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-mica-nex-measurement-ingestion",
   "title": "MICA-NEX v0.3: Authenticated Measurement Ingestion for Model-Agnostic Nano-Instrument Agent Swarms",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:57:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.85,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.89,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.88,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a narrow, testable next step in the MICA-NEX proposal: cryptographically binding nanoscale instrument measurement claims to externally provisioned acquisition and calibration signer roles while denying model planners the ability to self-certify measurement status. The reference implementation uses Ed25519 signatures, SHA-256 content binding, typed units, time windows, source-kind separation, and a persistent local replay ledger. In a hardware-disconnected test harness, 60/60 signed synthetic test records from three simulated instrument classes were admitted and 30/30 adversarial cases were rejected for the expected reason; 28/28 Python tests passed. No instrument, laboratory calibration, external reviewer, clinical context or independent physical replication was involved. Signature validity is deliberately distinguished from scientific validity.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-mica-nex-measurement-ingestion/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-mica-nex-measurement-ingestion",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-mica-nex-measurement-ingestion"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure",
   "title": "Revocation Closure and Authority Epochs for Agent Delegation",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:57:44Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Automated agents can exercise OAuth-derived authority through delegated credentials, child agents, asynchronous work, and operations spanning multiple administrative domains. Invalidating an individual token does not necessarily establish that the authority represented by that token can no longer cause a new consequential operation. This document defines authority epochs, delegation-lineage requirements, admission fencing, and revocation-closure states for OAuth-based agent delegation. It distinguishes token invalidation from authority closure and specifies that unresolved in-scope state produces UNKNOWN or PARTIAL rather than CLOSED. The profile composes with OAuth Token Revocation, Token Exchange, Token Introspection, proof-of-possession mechanisms, Transaction Tokens, and workload- identity systems such as WIMSE.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-cif-measurement",
   "title": "Computational Identity Fragmentation (CIF) Measurement and Reporting for Agentic Systems -- Editorial Development Shell",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:57:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 2,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.31,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.69,
   "kind": "other",
   "kind_label": "other",
   "kind_confidence": 0.69,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "NOT FOR SUBMISSION. This document is an incomplete editorial development shell for the proposed revision draft-watts-cif- measurement-01. It is NOT a replacement for the previously published specification. Full prior source, examples, references, conformance sections, security analysis, and publication approval are required.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-cif-measurement/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-cif-measurement",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-cif-measurement"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-fic-continuity",
   "title": "Forensic Identity Continuity (FIC) Protocol for Agentic Systems -- Editorial Development Shell",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:57:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 2,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.68,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "other",
   "kind_label": "other",
   "kind_confidence": 0.35,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "NOT FOR SUBMISSION. This document is an incomplete editorial development shell for the proposed revision draft-watts-fic- continuity-01. It is NOT a replacement for the previously published specification. Full prior source, examples, references, conformance sections, security analysis, and publication approval are required.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-fic-continuity/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-fic-continuity",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-fic-continuity"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope",
   "title": "High-Assurance Agent Control Envelope",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:57:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.52,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.91,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems can authenticate successfully, hold a valid authorization object, and still be unsafe to execute because required evidence is missing, the software has not reached a required assurance stage, the authority epoch is stale, a prior revocation is unresolved, or a human-approval requirement is unsatisfied. This document defines the High-Assurance Agent Control Envelope (HAACE), a protocol-neutral profile that binds an exact agent action to identity status, authorization state, policy, assurance stage, evidence state, authority epoch, revocation state, oversight requirements, and an action-time decision. HAACE requires fail-closed treatment of missing or indeterminate prerequisites, separates authorization from execution, and produces non-bearer decision and execution receipts. The profile composes with OAuth, workload identity, attestation, transparency, and agent-authorization mechanisms rather than replacing them.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-gov-verification-promotion-boundaries",
   "title": "Government-Oriented Verification Promotion Boundaries for Agentic Assurance Profiles",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:56:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.85,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.59,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Government and critical-infrastructure relying parties require explicit boundaries between successive assurance claims. This document defines Verification Promotion Boundaries (VPB) as a protocol-neutral profile that prevents verification evidence obtained at one stage from being silently promoted to a stronger claim. The stages are REGISTERED, SPEC_VALIDATED, LOCAL_CONFORMANT, INDEPENDENTLY_REPRODUCED, SECURITY_TESTED, and RELEASE_ELIGIBLE. A local PASS does not imply independent reproduction; an independent reproduction does not imply security testing; and no stage implies endorsement by any standards body or government agency. The profile further distinguishes subject evidence (negative findings against the tested artifact) from verifier evidence (positive findings that the verification system correctly detected defects). Arithmetic and protocol preconditions, including on-curve validation before metamorphic fixtures, are mandatory before any promotion. This document is intended for high-assurance government deployments and is not a U.S. Government standard.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-gov-verification-promotion-boundaries/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-gov-verification-promotion-boundaries",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-gov-verification-promotion-boundaries"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-claim-promotion-receipts",
   "title": "Claim Promotion Receipts for Governed Research and Agentic Systems",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:56:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.66,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.81,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a protocol-neutral receipt for explicit promotion across evidence and claim-authority boundaries. It is designed to prevent raw observations, model outputs, or unreviewed evidence from being silently retyped as authorization-bearing state. Archive Status This RFCXML source is an archive working draft and is not represented as submitted, adopted, or endorsed by the IETF.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-claim-promotion-receipts/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-claim-promotion-receipts",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-claim-promotion-receipts"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-eqr-conformance",
   "title": "Deterministic Conformance Profile and Test Vectors for Evidence Qualification Receipts",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:56:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.94,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.56,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a deterministic conformance profile and test- vector corpus for Evidence Qualification Receipts (EQRs). The profile, named eqr-core-1, makes receipt conformance mechanically reproducible: strict JSON structure, SHA-256 digest encoding, UTC timestamp handling, evidence-reference integrity, requirement-state derivation, and three-valued PASS, FAIL, or INDETERMINATE results are checked by a closed algorithm. The profile is intentionally narrow. Conformance does not establish that evidence is true, that a proposition is scientifically valid, that an issuer is trustworthy, or that an action is authorized. The goal is interoperable verification of receipt semantics, not promotion of conformance into substantive truth.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-eqr-conformance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-eqr-conformance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-eqr-conformance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-ai-identity-conformance",
   "title": "AID-1 Provider-Independent Conformance Requirements and Test-Vector Model",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:56:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.92,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.7,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.68,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines provider-independent conformance requirements for AID-1. It specifies the execution model for a deterministic machine-readable test-vector corpus, including canonicalization, cryptographic, identity-binding, delegation, authorization, temporal, revocation, replay, attestation, provenance, and integration cases. The conformance corpus contains 69 vectors. Six replay cases are architectural boundary tests, including R5, which requires AID-1 verification to succeed while a downstream D6 scientific- admissibility decision rejects the same evidence.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-ai-identity-conformance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-ai-identity-conformance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-ai-identity-conformance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-boundary-jurisdiction-architecture",
   "title": "Boundary Jurisdiction Architecture for Agentic and Delegated Systems",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:55:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.92,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.53,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.8,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a protocol-neutral architecture for separating possession of capability from jurisdiction over consequential authority boundaries. It models authority as reachability in a time-indexed capability graph, defines revocation cuts, and specifies fail-closed semantics for delegation and revocation closure.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-boundary-jurisdiction-architecture/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-boundary-jurisdiction-architecture",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-boundary-jurisdiction-architecture"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-noncollapse-requirements",
   "title": "Non-Collapse Requirements for Evidence-Bearing Agent Systems",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:55:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.92,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines architectural non-collapse requirements for agent systems that consume evidence, provenance, model outputs, or other machine-readable claims before consequential actions. It requires implementations to keep integrity, provenance, evidence qualification, authorization, and execution as distinct states; to represent unresolved required evidence explicitly; and to preserve issued evaluation records append-only. The document defines no new transport protocol and no IANA registrations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-agent-noncollapse-requirements/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-agent-noncollapse-requirements",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-agent-noncollapse-requirements"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agentic-authority-graph-validation",
   "title": "Agentic Authority Graph Validation: A Non-Vacuous Interchange Profile for Revocation-Cut Analysis",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:55:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.8,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Agentic and delegated systems can represent authority as a graph whose paths terminate at consequential resources. Abstract graph models are useful, but interoperable validation requires a machine- readable representation and deterministic rules that do not accidentally accept vacuous or incomplete graphs. This document defines Agentic Authority Graph Validation (AAGV), a JSON interchange profile and validation algorithm for authority roots, consequential sinks, declared normal paths, revocation cut sets, and snapshot edge state. AAGV deliberately distinguishes structural cut validity from operational closure. It rejects missing sink sets, missing normal- path inventories, dangling references, non-dominating cuts, and non- revocable cut edges; it returns INDETERMINATE rather than CLOSED when relevant edge state is unknown. AAGV does not define an authorization token, discover hidden paths, or prove physical containment.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-agentic-authority-graph-validation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-agentic-authority-graph-validation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-agentic-authority-graph-validation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-ai-identity",
   "title": "AID-1: A Cryptographically Bindable Identity and Provenance Architecture for AI Systems",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:55:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.58,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies AID-1, a provider-independent architecture for representing and verifying cryptographically bindable identity, delegation, authorization, action evidence, execution attestation, provenance, and governance information associated with AI systems and AI-mediated actions. AID-1 intentionally separates signature validity, identity binding, authority, execution evidence, provenance, and downstream admissibility. The specification defines trust domains, signed envelopes, external key resolution, delegation credentials, authorization decisions, temporal and revocation checks, replay protection, typed provenance claims, and a deterministic verification order with ALLOW, DENY, and INDETERMINATE outcomes.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-ai-identity/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-ai-identity",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-ai-identity"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-evidence-boundary",
   "title": "Evidence-Bounded Authorization for Agentic Systems: Evidence Qualification Receipts",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:55:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents increasingly make or propose consequential actions using premises assembled from model outputs, memory, tools, telemetry, and external data. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms can establish who is acting, under whose delegation, and which operation is permitted, but they do not by themselves establish whether the proposition that triggered the operation has adequate support. This document defines the Evidence Qualification Receipt (EQR), a transport-neutral JSON data model and fail-closed verification procedure for binding a proposition to a declared evidence profile, its supporting evidence digests, contradiction state, freshness, and evaluation result. An EQR can be PASS, FAIL, or INDETERMINATE. A PASS EQR is only an authorization input: it is never itself permission to execute. The design is append-only: changed evidence produces a successor receipt rather than rewriting prior epistemic state. The goal is to prevent evidence, provenance, or model confidence from silently acquiring authorization semantics.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-agent-evidence-boundary/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-agent-evidence-boundary",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-agent-evidence-boundary"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-continuity-observability",
   "title": "Continuity and Accountability Observations for Agentic Systems",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:54:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.31,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.61,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems change models, prompts, memory, policies, tools, and execution environments across handoffs. This document proposes an observation profile for recording those transitions and their evidence. It separates state, memory, policy, authority, and lineage discontinuities, distinguishes manual or simulated observations from attested executions, and defines coverage and missingness reporting. It also describes evaluation designs for continuity and bounded governance. Continuity records do not grant authority, establish clinical pathology or subjective experience, or validate an uncalibrated composite score.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-agent-continuity-observability/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-agent-continuity-observability",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-agent-continuity-observability"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-continuity-evidence",
   "title": "Continuity Evidence Records for Delegated Agent Systems",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:54:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.77,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.43,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an experimental, signed JSON statement and verification model for observing computational-agent continuity across sessions, instances and delegations. It distinguishes model, runtime, agent, grant and execution identifiers, retains predecessor evidence, and produces three-valued verification outcomes. Integrity of a record never implies permission to perform an action. This is not an OAuth token format or a claim of standardized identity ontology.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-agent-continuity-evidence/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-agent-continuity-evidence",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-agent-continuity-evidence"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-authority-transition-receipts",
   "title": "Agent Authority Transition Receipts for Agentic Systems",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:53:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.88,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents increasingly act across administrative and security domains using workload identities, OAuth credentials, delegated authorization, attestations, and policy engines. Existing mechanisms can establish identity, delegation, or access rights, but deployments still lack a common artifact that records which policy and which evidence were evaluated when an operation moved into an authorized, denied, revoked, or expired authority state. This document defines an Agent Authority Transition Receipt (AATR), a signed, non-bearer receipt that cryptographically binds an agent operation to the principal, policy, evidence set, decision, audience, validity interval, and predecessor authority state used for that decision. AATR intentionally separates evidence from authorization and authorization from execution. Missing or indeterminate required evidence fails closed. AATR is designed to compose with OAuth, workload identity, remote attestation, transparency services, and agent-specific delegation protocols rather than replace them.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-agent-authority-transition-receipts/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-agent-authority-transition-receipts",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-agent-authority-transition-receipts"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-clockout-profile",
   "title": "External Authorization and Bounded CLOCKOUT for Agentic Systems",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:52:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.64,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.39,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems can continue proposing work after authorization changes, while delegated credentials, queued jobs, and operations already in flight may continue producing effects. This document specifies a proposed operational profile that separates agent proposals from authoritative authorization, effect admission, computation termination, and bounded closure. It defines enforcement assumptions, revocation barriers, descendant handling, status evidence, and fault tests. The profile complements existing authorization and revocation mechanisms. It does not define a new token format, establish closure outside declared coverage, reverse committed effects, or infer an agent's mental state.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-agent-clockout-profile/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-agent-clockout-profile",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-agent-clockout-profile"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-sink-attested-closure",
   "title": "Sink-Attested Closure Evidence (SACE): Signed Epoch Acknowledgements and Accountable Revocation Closure",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:51:33Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 52,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.85,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Revoking delegated authority in an agentic system is complete only when every place that can still act on that authority has stopped. Existing work defines the states of that process but leaves its evidence format open. This document defines Sink-Attested Closure Evidence (SACE): a small set of COSE-signed objects and one deterministic algorithm. An authority root signs a Scope Manifest naming the sinks a closure claim covers, and a Cut Statement raising the minimum admissible authority epoch. Each sink signs an Epoch Acknowledgement with its own key, binding the cut to the sequence number of the last effect it committed before applying it. Each committed effect yields a signed Effect Receipt. From these objects any party can compute one of three verdicts: CLOSED, UNKNOWN, or VIOLATED. A VIOLATED verdict comes with a transferable proof consisting of two signatures by the same sink. A sink that never acknowledges blocks CLOSED until it is removed from scope. An optional binding ties the acknowledging key to remote attestation evidence. This document makes no claim that a sink which signs an acknowledgement actually enforces it; it makes a sink that does not enforce it provably accountable for every effect it receipts.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-sink-attested-closure/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-sink-attested-closure",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-sink-attested-closure"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt",
   "title": "Attested Fence Receipts: Hardware-Rooted Evidence of Authority-Epoch Enforcement at Consequential Sinks",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:51:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 38,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.66,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Revoking the authority of a delegated agent is not the same as proving that no consequential effect can still be committed under that authority. A revocation cut applied at one resource sink is not evidence of enforcement at another sink, and a software acknowledgement from a sink is only as trustworthy as the software that produced it. This document defines the Attested Fence Receipt (AFR), an Entity Attestation Token (EAT) profile emitted by the hardware-rooted Attesting Environment of a consequential sink after the sink has durably applied an authority-epoch fence. It further defines a verification procedure for individual receipts, a closure- evaluation procedure over a declared sink set that yields CLOSED, PARTIAL, FAILED, or UNKNOWN, and a hardware fence profile that binds the fence to measured state: an extend-only authority register, a monotonic counter, counter-gated derivation of per-epoch effect- attestation keys, and PCR-bound key release. The mechanism supplies the per-sink evidence that revocation-closure determinations require, and it is designed so that the absence of evidence can never be read as closure.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-rats-attested-fence-receipt"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-constitutional-action-gate",
   "title": "Constitutional Action Gate Profile for Agent-Mediated Internet Operations",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:50:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.89,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.77,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes CAG-1, an experimental, constrained decision profile for authorizing agent-mediated consequential effects at an enforcement point. It preserves the distinction between authenticated identity, qualified evidence, delegated permission, action approval, current epoch, and execution. The profile defines a strict JSON context, exact-effect binding, delegation attenuation, three-valued decision semantics, a replay/epoch admission example, and a synthetic conformance corpus. An ALLOW decision is not a new credential and does not prove execution, legal authority, scientific truth, or global revocation closure. This text is an unsubmitted working candidate; independent interoperability and security verification remain open.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-constitutional-action-gate/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-constitutional-action-gate",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-constitutional-action-gate"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-authorization-noncollapse-semantics",
   "title": "Non-Collapse Semantics for Authorization, Evidence, and Execution State",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:49:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T21:47:07.298Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "watts",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Distributed authorization systems frequently combine observations, policy evaluations, evidence records, authorization decisions, and execution receipts. Treating these different objects as interchangeable can create fail-open behavior, stale-authority bugs, and false claims of completion. This document defines non-collapse semantics: explicit typed transitions between observation, evidence, authorization, and execution state; fail-closed treatment of missing or indeterminate premises; and comparison rules for determining when heterogeneous representations agree on a declared invariant. The document is informational and defines no new wire protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-watts-authorization-noncollapse-semantics/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-watts-authorization-noncollapse-semantics",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-watts-authorization-noncollapse-semantics"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange",
   "title": "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange with Actor-Bound Tokens",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:28:06Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T20:47:07.486Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "nandakumar",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "In OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, the client that sends the request receives the token, and with DPoP the token is bound to the key that signed the client's proof. Agent systems often need one party to obtain a token for another: an orchestrating agent that approves an action obtains a token for the agent that will perform it. This document lets a token exchange client request that the issued token be bound to the key of the actor named in the request, and requires the actor to prove possession of that key, so that the token is usable only by the actor and only with its consent.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-nandakumar-oauth-actor-bound-token-exchange"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-taylor-dtn-imc-scheme",
   "title": "The 'imc' URI Scheme for Bundle Protocol Multicast",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:17:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T20:47:07.486Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "taylor",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.53,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.38,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the 'imc' URI scheme, a concise integer-based scheme for identifying Bundle Protocol Version 7 (BPv7) endpoints that are not singleton endpoints, termed multicast endpoints. The structure of 'imc' URIs mirrors that of the 'ipn' URI scheme: each 'imc' URI comprises an Allocator Identifier, a Group Number, and a Service Number. In the same way that the Allocator Identifier and Node Number of an 'ipn' URI identify the node at which a service exists, the Allocator Identifier and Group Number of an 'imc' URI identify a group of nodes at which a service exists, and the Service Number identifies that service. This document specifies the textual syntax of 'imc' URIs, their interpretation when used as BPv7 Endpoint Identifiers, their CBOR encoding, and the corresponding EID Pattern, and requests the associated IANA registrations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-taylor-dtn-imc-scheme/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-taylor-dtn-imc-scheme",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-taylor-dtn-imc-scheme"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace",
   "title": "PACE: Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:14:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T20:47:07.486Z",
   "pages": 99,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "nandakumar",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.73,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE), an agentic dialog management protocol with a binding to Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT). A dialog is the correlated sequence of interactions between two or more participants over the course of a task. PACE defines a transport-independent dialog context and control operations to establish, modify, and terminate dialogs and to revoke propagation relationships. It specifies how that context stays coherent across intermediaries, trust boundaries, modality changes, and interruptions, and how it is carried over MOQT. PACE does not interpret or define dialog content. Over MOQT, a dialog can combine text, audio, video, and request/response exchanges in point- to-point, point-to-multipoint, and multi-party topologies. Application-layer agent protocols such as A2A, MCP, and AutoGen keep their own message formats and carry the dialog context through their own extension points. Delegation between agents and approval of individual agent actions are specified in a companion document.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-openhttpa-ohmp",
   "title": "OpenHTTPA Hierarchical Measurement Protocol (OHMP) and Transparency Log",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T20:12:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T20:47:07.486Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "openhttpa",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.94,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the OpenHTTPA Hierarchical Measurement Protocol (OHMP), a distributed, zero-trust attestation protocol operating over the OpenHTTPA transport layer. OHMP replaces static, manually pinned measurement configurations with a hierarchy of hardware-backed Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Measurement Authorities. To ensure split-view resistance and cryptographic accountability, OHMP integrates OHMP-TL, an append-only binary Merkle Transparency Log requiring M-of-N multi-cloud threshold signatures.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-openhttpa-ohmp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-openhttpa-ohmp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-openhttpa-ohmp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-openhttpa-protocol",
   "title": "OpenHTTPA: Hypertext Transfer Protocol with Attestation",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T19:49:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T20:47:07.486Z",
   "pages": 44,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "openhttpa",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.92,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "OpenHTTPA (Hypertext Transfer Protocol with Attestation) defines a protocol for establishing hardware-verified, end-to-end confidential and authenticated communication between a client and a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) over standard HTTP/2, HTTP/3, and gRPC transports. Unlike traditional TLS which terminates at the network edge, OpenHTTPA ensures that the cryptographic session terminates inside the hardware-isolated enclave. The protocol is based on the SIGMA-I model and incorporates post-quantum hybrid key exchange (ML- KEM), post-quantum digital signatures (ML-DSA), transcript-bound hardware attestation, and semantic binding of HTTP requests to the hardware-verified session state. The handshake, its transcript, the hardware binding digest and the identity signatures are cloud- and hypervisor-agnostic; how evidence carries the binding is defined by pluggable Attestation Profiles, both for TEEs that expose the CPU's attestation interface directly and for TEEs mediated by an attested paravisor and vTPM. This document supersedes draft-openhttpa- protocol-01.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-openhttpa-protocol/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-openhttpa-protocol",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-openhttpa-protocol"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ovalles-ai-terms",
   "title": "AI Terms: Per-Use Terms, Payment and Receipts for Automated AI Access to Web Content",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T19:33:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T16:47:07.315Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ovalles",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.51,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines AI Terms: a JSON document published at the well-known URI /.well-known/ai-terms in which a website states, for each of four uses of its content by automated AI systems (search, answer, training and agent), whether the use is allowed, allowed for a price, or not allowed. It also defines an AI-Purpose request header with which a client declares the use it intends, a way to point to the terms from any HTTP response, and how a paid access produces a receipt that records the use. AI Terms is designed to sit alongside the Robots Exclusion Protocol and the usage-preference vocabulary of the IETF AI Preferences work, adding the pieces those leave out: price, payment binding, purpose declaration by the client, and a record of licensed use.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ovalles-ai-terms/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ovalles-ai-terms",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ovalles-ai-terms"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-sol",
   "title": "Solution approaches for address-selection problems",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T19:28:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T19:47:07.390Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "6man",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "6man",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "In response to address selection problem statement and requirement documents, this document describes solution approaches and evaluates proposed solution mechanisms in line with requirements. It also examines the applicability for each solution mechanism, and concludes that no single solution solves the problems and the combination of the solutions should be the way forward.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-sol/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-sol",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-sol"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bains-nltp",
   "title": "NeckLink Transport Protocol (NLTP): Loss-Healing Authenticated Telemetry and Reflex Transport for Constrained Networks",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T19:24:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T19:47:07.390Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "bains",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.61,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the NeckLink Transport Protocol (NLTP), a lightweight, loss-healing, forward-secret transport protocol designed for microcontrollers, autonomous sensors, and edge gateways operating over lossy wireless links (including IEEE 802.11 vendor action frames such as ESP-NOW v1 and v2) and Carrier-Grade NAT (CGNAT) UDP paths. NLTP combines systematic Galois Field GF(2^8) algebraic Cauchy erasure coding with a single-round-trip (1-RTT) X25519 and pre-shared key (PSK) session handshake, ChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD), a 512-packet sliding anti- replay window, optional pre-encryption zero-heap LZ4 block compression, integer delivery-rate pacing, and a confirmed out-of- line reflex channel that eliminates head-of-line (HOL) blocking for urgent actuator commands. The entire protocol executes with zero dynamic heap allocation and zero floating-point operations, fitting within 4,760 octets of static RAM in transmit-plus-reflex sensor configurations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bains-nltp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bains-nltp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-bains-nltp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers",
   "title": "Epoch Markers",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T19:15:31Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T19:47:07.390Z",
   "pages": 32,
   "group": "rats",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "rats",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.85,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines Epoch Markers as a means to establish a notion of freshness among actors in a distributed system. Epoch Markers are similar to \"time ticks\" and are produced and distributed by a dedicated system known as the Epoch Bell. Systems receiving Epoch Markers do not need to track freshness using their own understanding of time (e.g., via a local real-time clock). Instead, the reception of a specific Epoch Marker establishes a new epoch that is shared among all recipients. This document defines Epoch Marker types, including CBOR time tags, RFC 3161 TimeStampToken, and nonce-like structures. It also defines a CWT Claim to embed Epoch Markers in RFC 8392 CBOR Web Tokens, which serve as vehicles for signed protocol messages.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-per-verifier-linkability",
   "title": "BBS per Verifier Linkability",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T18:49:22Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T16:47:07.315Z",
   "pages": 143,
   "group": "cfrg",
   "group_type": "rg",
   "submitter": "cfrg",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The BBS Signatures scheme describes a multi-message digital signature, that supports selectively disclosing the messages through unlinkable presentations, built using zero-knowledge proofs. Each BBS proof reveals no information other than the signed messages that the Prover chooses to disclose in that specific instance. As such, the Verifier (i.e., the recipient) of the BBS proof, may not be able to track those presentations over time. Although in many applications this is desirable, there are use cases that require the Verifier be able to track the BBS proofs they receive from the same Prover. Examples include monitoring the use of access credentials for abnormal activity, assertion of pseudonymous identity, monetization, etc. This document provides a mechanism for binding prover secret material for pseudonym creation to a BBS signature and shows how to use this bound information for the creation of context dependent pseudonyms in BBS proofs.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-per-verifier-linkability/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-per-verifier-linkability",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-per-verifier-linkability"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains",
   "title": "Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T18:39:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "nandakumar",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.93,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Attenuated delegation chains let a verifier check, without contacting any server, that no hop of a chain of AI agents holds more authority than the root granted. They do not show that each hop was granted by the agent before it: a child token can be signed by any key the verifier accepts. This document defines an extension that requires each child token to be signed with the key that its parent token confirms, so that every hop provably granted the next, with no authorization server in the path. The extension also defines a per- chain pseudonym for the principal, a rule that rejects chains in which an agent appears twice, a rule that keeps a child's audience within its parent's, and a claim that binds a chain to the dialog or transaction it was issued for. The extension builds on an existing attenuated delegation token format and can be mapped to other chained-token formats.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-bier-bfd",
   "title": "BIER BFD",
   "rev": "13",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T18:38:07Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "bier",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "bier",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.64,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Point-to-multipoint (P2MP) BFD is designed to verify multipoint connectivity. This document specifies the application of P2MP BFD in BIER network.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bier-bfd/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bier-bfd",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-bier-bfd"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding",
   "title": "Message Binding for Workload Proof Tokens",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T18:28:21Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "nandakumar",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The WIMSE Workload Proof Token (WPT) proves possession of a workload's key for an HTTP request and binds the tokens that travel with it. Agent protocols increasingly carry their messages over other transports, such as Media over QUIC, WebSocket, or QUIC streams, often through intermediaries that terminate TLS, such as relays, message brokers, or gateways. There, a proof has no HTTP request to bind to, and the intermediaries that forward a message do not verify it, so freshness has to be established by the receiving verifier. This document defines how a WPT is used with a message that carries it, adds a claim that binds the proof to the content of that message and a claim that echoes a nonce supplied by the verifier, and defines a registry of message canonicalization profiles, with a profile for JSON messages. The same claims can be used in an SD-JWT Key Binding JWT.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kalosha-stb-tls13",
   "title": "STB Cryptographic Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T18:23:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 51,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kalosha",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This specification introduces a subset of STB (STandards of Belarus) cryptographic algorithms and defines their use in TLS 1.3. The document is self-contained, i.e., it fully describes the required STB algorithms. It can be used to develop STB-compliant TLS 1.3 implementations without referring to the original STB standards.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kalosha-stb-tls13/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kalosha-stb-tls13",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kalosha-stb-tls13"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-iotops-iot-dns-guidelines",
   "title": "IoT DNS Security and Privacy Guidelines",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T18:16:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "iotops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "iotops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document outlines guidance for Internet of Things (IoT) manufacturers regarding the implementation of DNS stub resolver software on devices, and for the management zones used for purposes such as device configuration and software upgrades. It aims to mitigate security threats, enhance privacy, and to address operational security challenges. DNS resolution between devices and management zone servers depends upon DNS services within operator networks, and these services and operator networks can be impacted by device behavior. Hence, this document also provides guidance to network operators that deploy IoT devices to mitigate the specific risks identified in this document and take advantage of improved DNS security mechanisms provided by manufacturers.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-iot-dns-guidelines/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-iotops-iot-dns-guidelines",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-iotops-iot-dns-guidelines"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhang-dnsop-tld-transition",
   "title": "Top Level Domain Transition Operational Practices",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T18:04:50Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 4,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zhang",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.62,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the process for Top-Level Domain(TLD) registries to switch their Registry Service Provider (RSP), including migration requirements, data changes, and operational procedures. This document applies to scenarios where the name service of certain TLD is migrated between different RSPs, and the TLD has implemented DNSSEC.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zhang-dnsop-tld-transition/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zhang-dnsop-tld-transition",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zhang-dnsop-tld-transition"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations",
   "title": "ML-KEM Security Considerations",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T18:01:01Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "cfrg",
   "group_type": "rg",
   "submitter": "cfrg",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "NIST standardized ML-KEM as FIPS 203 in August 2024. This document discusses how to use ML-KEM within protocols - that is, what problem it solves, and what you need to do to use it securely.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-irtf-cfrg-ml-kem-security-considerations"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-keytrans-architecture",
   "title": "Key Transparency Architecture",
   "rev": "12",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:57:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 32,
   "group": "keytrans",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "keytrans",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the terminology and interaction patterns involved in the deployment of Key Transparency (KT) in end-to-end encrypted communication services, and specifies the security properties that KT provides. It also gives more general, non- prescriptive guidance on how to securely apply KT to a number of common applications.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-keytrans-architecture/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-keytrans-architecture",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-keytrans-architecture"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability",
   "title": "Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network-Based Security Services",
   "rev": "19",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:51:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "i2nsf",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "i2nsf",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.84,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms",
   "title": "JSON Proof Algorithms",
   "rev": "15",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:49:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 38,
   "group": "jose",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jose",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The JSON Proof Algorithms (JPA) specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Proof, JSON Web Key (JWK), and COSE specifications. It defines IANA registries for these identifiers.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof",
   "title": "JSON Web Proof",
   "rev": "15",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:49:48Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 33,
   "group": "jose",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jose",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The JOSE set of standards established JSON-based container formats for Keys, Signatures, and Encryption. They also established IANA registries to enable the algorithms and representations used for them to be extended. Since those were created, newer cryptographic algorithms that support selective disclosure and unlinkability have matured and started seeing early market adoption. The COSE set of standards likewise does this for CBOR-based containers, focusing on the needs of environments which are better served using CBOR, such as constrained devices and networks. This document defines a new container format similar in purpose and design to JSON Web Signature (JWS) and COSE Signed Messages called a _JSON Web Proof (JWP)_. Unlike JWS, which integrity-protects only a single payload, JWP can integrity-protect multiple payloads in one message. It also specifies a new presentation form that supports selective disclosure of individual payloads, enables additional proof computation, and adds a Presentation Header to prevent replay.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-token",
   "title": "JSON Proof Token and CBOR Proof Token",
   "rev": "15",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:49:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:47:07.385Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "jose",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jose",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "JSON Proof Token (JPT) is a compact, URL-safe, privacy-preserving representation of claims to be transferred between three parties. The claims in a JPT are encoded as base64url-encoded JSON objects that are used as the payloads of a JSON Web Proof (JWP) structure, enabling them to be digitally signed and selectively disclosed. JPTs also support reusability and unlinkability when using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs). A CBOR-based representation of JPTs is also defined, called a CBOR Proof Token (CPT). It has the same properties as JPTs, but uses the JSON Web Proof (JWP) CBOR Serialization, rather than the JSON-based JWP Compact Serialization.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-token/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-token",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-token"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ek-dtn-ipn-arpa",
   "title": "The ipn.arpa Zone and IPN DNS Operations",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:33:51Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T17:47:07.393Z",
   "pages": 24,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ek",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.78,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.41,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document requests the creation of ipn.arpa, an infrastructure DNS namespace for the IPN node identifiers of the Bundle Protocol (BP). Each Fully Qualified Node Number has a DNS base name of the form N.A.ipn.arpa, where A is the Allocator Identifier and N is the Node Number. A BP Agent can query beneath that name for the records that a convergence-layer discovery binding specifies, such as SRV or SVCB records. These records identify the convergence-layer endpoints, including relays, that are advertised for reaching a destination.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ek-dtn-ipn-arpa/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ek-dtn-ipn-arpa",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ek-dtn-ipn-arpa"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves",
   "title": "Pairing-Friendly Curves",
   "rev": "16",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:26:41Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T17:47:07.393Z",
   "pages": 78,
   "group": "cfrg",
   "group_type": "rg",
   "submitter": "cfrg",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.47,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Pairing-based cryptography, a subfield of elliptic curve cryptography, has received attention due to its flexible and practical functionality. Pairings are special maps defined using elliptic curves and they can be applied to construct several cryptographic protocols such as identity-based encryption, attribute- based encryption, and so on. At CRYPTO 2016, Kim and Barbulescu proposed an efficient number field sieve algorithm named exTNFS for the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field extension. Several types of pairing-friendly curves such as Barreto-Naehrig curves are affected by the attack. In particular, a Barreto-Naehrig curve with a 254-bit characteristic was adopted by a lot of cryptographic libraries as a parameter of 128-bit security; however, its security level is estimated at approximately 100 bits due to the effect of the attack. In this memo, we list the security levels of certain pairing-friendly curves, and motivate our choices of curves. First, we summarize the adoption status of pairing-friendly curves in standards, libraries and applications, and consider them at the 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit security levels. Then, from the viewpoints of \"security\" and \"widely used\", we select the recommended pairing-friendly curves considering exTNFS. This memo also specifies the serialization and deserialization of the points and scalars that protocols exchange, restating a format that is already in widespread use, and states which of the remaining decisions belong to the calling protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6211-update",
   "title": "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithm Identifier Protection Attribute",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:18:33Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T17:47:07.393Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "lamps",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "lamps",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.53,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document updates RFC 6211. It corrects errors in the definition of the id-aa-cmsAlgorithmProtect ASN.1 object identifier. The IANA registry entry has always been correct.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6211-update/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6211-update",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6211-update"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ramanathan-lisp-savi",
   "title": "SAVI in a LISP network",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T17:15:01Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T17:47:07.393Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ramanathan",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.8,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.46,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the procedures for Source Address Validation of LISP Endpoint Identifiers (EID). The implementation of these mechanisms provides endpoint detection, on-boarding and roaming support in LISP networks, while protecting against IP address spoofing.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ramanathan-lisp-savi/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ramanathan-lisp-savi",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ramanathan-lisp-savi"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-otc-rs-verification",
   "title": "Strict Only to Customer (OTC) Verification on Route Server Sessions",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T16:36:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T16:47:07.315Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "RFC 9234 specifies how an AS receiving a route from a lateral Peer can check if a route was leaked, but doesn't specify any checks for routes received from a Route Server (RS). This makes the quality of filtering dependent on whether the RS implements RFC 9234. This document updates RFC 9234 by adding a complementary ingress check by an RS-Client.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-otc-rs-verification/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-otc-rs-verification",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-otc-rs-verification"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wan-emu-aka-prime-identity-fragmentation",
   "title": "EAP-AKA' Large Identity",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T16:27:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T16:47:07.315Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "wan",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document updates EAP-AKA’ (RFC 9048) so that a peer can send an identity that is too large for the initial EAP-Response/Identity packet, such as a Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) in Network Access Identifier (NAI) format protected by a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) scheme. The peer sends a realm-only identity in EAP-Response/Identity and the large identity in EAP-Response/AKA- Identity. If the identity fits in an AT_IDENTITY attribute, the peer sends it there. Otherwise, the peer sends it in a new attribute, AT_LARGE_IDENTITY, which is fragmented using the AT_FRAGMENT attribute defined in I-D.ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka. A peer that supports several SUCI protection schemes (for example PQC and classical schemes) uses the presence or absence of the AT_LARGE_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED attribute in the server’s request to select a scheme whose SUCI can be carried in an identity attribute that the server can process. These procedures support large SUCI values, and do not change the EAP-AKA’ authentication or key derivation.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wan-emu-aka-prime-identity-fragmentation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wan-emu-aka-prime-identity-fragmentation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-wan-emu-aka-prime-identity-fragmentation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-agentproto-context-management-architecture",
   "title": "Context and Correlation Management Architecture for Distributed Agentic Activities",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T16:20:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T16:47:07.315Z",
   "pages": 84,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "agentproto",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.47,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.93,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Agentic applications increasingly distribute objectives across autonomous agents, tools, and services operating across different protocols and administrative domains. A single Activity may involve multiple independently maintained Dialogs, Tasks, Events, and Resources, spanning different modalities and extended periods of time. Existing protocols provide identifiers and context-management mechanisms for their own interactions, but these do not necessarily support correlation across Dialogs, protocols, and administrative boundaries, particularly as interactions evolve, branch, or resume over time. This document defines a context-and-correlation architecture based on Activities, Dialogs, Tasks, Resources, and typed Relationships. It describes how management and correlation metadata can be maintained and selectively propagated to preserve coherent context across distributed interactions, while allowing participants to determine the scope of correlations they share and manage.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-agentproto-context-management-architecture/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-agentproto-context-management-architecture",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-agentproto-context-management-architecture"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-portoles-lisp-delegated-mappings",
   "title": "LISP Delegated Mappings",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T16:19:31Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T16:47:07.315Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "portoles",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.58,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.48,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The LISP protocol with its inherent decoupling of control-plane and data-plane, offers the flexibility to support modern networking paradigms. This document specifies how to use the LISP protocol to enable centralized onboarding and management of EIDs within a network from an external controller or orchestration system. Requirements Notation",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-portoles-lisp-delegated-mappings/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-portoles-lisp-delegated-mappings",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-portoles-lisp-delegated-mappings"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ashcroft-approval-record",
   "title": "An Approval-Act Record for Standing Authorization Grants",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T16:06:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T16:47:07.315Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ashcroft",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A standing authorization grant is an artifact that outlives the event that produced it. Existing authentication-strength vocabulary (acr/ amr) describes authentication events and travels on tokens. Nothing carries a record of how a standing grant's approval was performed to the party verifying the grant, possibly days later and with no human present. This document defines an approval-act record: evidence of the approval ceremony, bound to the exact grant issuance approved, and carried in-band with the grant it authorizes. It defines one initial evidence type (WebAuthn assertions over a hash of the canonical grant), states precisely which of the record's claims a verifier can recompute, which rest on vendor attestation, and which remain attested by the operator, and provides a worked example with a failure matrix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ashcroft-approval-record/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ashcroft-approval-record",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ashcroft-approval-record"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-bpm-stamp-cos-ecn",
   "title": "Update of the Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol Class-of-Service Extension - ECN",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T15:11:25Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T15:47:09.188Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "bpm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "bpm",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP) enables one- way and round-trip measurement of network metrics between IP hosts, and has a facility for defining optional extensions. This document updates the definition of the Class of Service TLV (originally defined in RFC 8972) to enable the measurement of manipulation of the value of the Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) field of the IP header by middleboxes between two STAMP hosts, and to enable discovery and measurement of paths that provide differential treatment of packets depending on the value of their ECN field.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bpm-stamp-cos-ecn/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bpm-stamp-cos-ecn",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-bpm-stamp-cos-ecn"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kelley-rep-namespaces",
   "title": "Namespaces for the Robots Exclusion Protocol",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T15:09:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T15:47:09.188Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kelley",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.83,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document updates RFC 9309, the Robots Exclusion Protocol, so that a _selector_ (User-Agent: line) in a robots.txt group can carry a _label_ that is optionally qualified by a _namespace_. The product tokens of that standard are described here as unqualified labels; labels qualified by a namespace are written __<namespace>_<label>. It reserves the sequence __ for that purpose, establishes a registry of namespaces, and specifies how namespaced labels are matched. It also defines terminology for existing parts of robots.txt files. Existing robots.txt files are interpreted as before, and deployed parsers ignore namespaced labels.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kelley-rep-namespaces/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kelley-rep-namespaces",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kelley-rep-namespaces"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kelley-aipref-training-preference-signal",
   "title": "Machine-Readable Training Preference Signal",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T15:09:06Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T15:47:09.188Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kelley",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.53,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.57,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.79,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes how a service operator binds usage preferences (e.g., \"no AI training\") to paths by writing ordinary robots.txt groups keyed by a per-purpose policy token in the User- Agent line. It introduces no new directive names and no new grammar: the path language, longest-match precedence, and group structure of robots.txt are not changed.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kelley-aipref-training-preference-signal/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kelley-aipref-training-preference-signal",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kelley-aipref-training-preference-signal"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-openpgp-persistent-symmetric-keys",
   "title": "Persistent Symmetric Keys in OpenPGP",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T15:01:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T15:47:09.188Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "openpgp",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "openpgp",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a new packet and algorithm for the OpenPGP standard (RFC 9580) to support persistent symmetric keys, for message encryption using authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) and for message authentication using AEAD authentication tags. This enables the use of symmetric cryptography for data storage (and other contexts that do not require asymmetric cryptography), for improved performance, smaller keys, and improved resistance to quantum computing.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-persistent-symmetric-keys/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-persistent-symmetric-keys",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-openpgp-persistent-symmetric-keys"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-bpm-hybrid-two-step",
   "title": "Hybrid Two-Step Performance Measurement Method",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T14:35:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T14:47:07.546Z",
   "pages": 38,
   "group": "bpm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "bpm",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.81,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The adoption of network operation automation has brought new measurement methodology requirements. Among them is the ability to collect the instant network operational state as the packet is being processed by the network elements along its forwarding path through a network domain. That requirement can be addressed by using on-path telemetry, also called hybrid performance measurement according to RFC 7799. An on-path telemetry method allows operators to collect key information that reflects the operational state and the network performance a packet experiences through the forwarding path. IOAM, defined in RFC 9197 and RFC 9326, is an example of such a hybrid method. This document introduces a method complementary to on-path telemetry that causes the generation of network telemetry information. This document introduces Hybrid Two-Step (HTS), a method complementary to both passive and hybrid measurement approaches. HTS separates measuring or calculating the performance metric from collecting and transporting network operational state.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bpm-hybrid-two-step/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bpm-hybrid-two-step",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-bpm-hybrid-two-step"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-netmod-immutable-flag",
   "title": "YANG Metadata Annotation for Immutable Flag",
   "rev": "14",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T14:34:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T14:47:07.546Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "netmod",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "netmod",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.59,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a mechanism to formally document an existing behavior, implemented by servers of YANG-driven network management protocols (e.g., NETCONF and RESTCONF), on the immutability of some system-provided nodes, using a YANG metadata annotation called \"immutable\" to flag which nodes are immutable. Clients may use \"immutable\" annotations provided by the server, to know beforehand why certain otherwise valid configuration requests will cause the server to return an error. The immutable flag is descriptive, documenting an existing behavior, not prescriptive, dictating server behaviors. This document updates RFC 8040 and RFC 8526.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netmod-immutable-flag/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-immutable-flag",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-netmod-immutable-flag"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-pce-state-sync",
   "title": "State Synchronization Procedures between Stateful Path Computation Elements (PCEs)",
   "rev": "17",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T14:31:17Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T14:47:07.546Z",
   "pages": 49,
   "group": "pce",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "pce",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.87,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Path Computation Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP) provides mechanisms for PCEs to perform path computation in response to a Path Computation Client (PCC) request. The stateful PCE extensions allow a PCE to maintain and control the state of Label Switched Paths (LSPs) using PCEP, independent of the path setup type used. A PCC can synchronize LSP state information to a stateful PCE, and can have PCEP sessions toward multiple PCEs. In some deployments, synchronizing LSP state directly between the stateful PCEs brings additional resiliency, for instance when a PCC-PCE session fails, and allows a single PCE to compute paths for a set of LSPs that are dependent on each other even when those LSPs are delegated to different PCEs. This document describes procedures for synchronizing LSP state between stateful PCEs across various deployment scenarios and for preventing looping path computation requests. It is published as Experimental to gather implementation and deployment experience.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pce-state-sync/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pce-state-sync",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-pce-state-sync"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-rt-derived-community",
   "title": "Extended Communities Derived from Route Targets",
   "rev": "15",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T14:11:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T14:47:07.546Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.83,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes how an Extended Community is derived from a Route Target, how each such Route-Target-derived Extended Community corresponds to the Route Target, and how the two differ. It records the code points assigned for this purpose and requests the remaining assignments. It does not specify how Route-Target-derived Extended Communities are used; that is left to the documents specifying each use.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-rt-derived-community/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-rt-derived-community",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-rt-derived-community"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-luzhnov-ocx",
   "title": "Orchestrator Conduct Exchange (OCX)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T14:05:11Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T14:47:07.546Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "luzhnov",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.8,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly act on behalf of people and organizations through tools and through other agents. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) connects an agent to tools, and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocols connect agents to each other. Neither connects the parties that answer for agents at runtime: their orchestrators. This document specifies the Orchestrator Conduct Exchange (OCX), an open, peer-to-peer protocol by which orchestrators exchange signed, independently verifiable signals about agent conduct. When an agent misreports its actions to one orchestrator, that orchestrator can send its peers a signed signal carrying proof within seconds. Each peer checks the proof itself rather than trusting the sender, and decides on its own what limits to apply. OCX has no central authority. A signal is information, not an order, and only evidence that a receiver can verify cryptographically and mechanically may drive an immediate reaction.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-luzhnov-ocx/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-luzhnov-ocx",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-luzhnov-ocx"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-cross-platform-finality-authority",
   "title": "Interoperable Execution-Finality Authority Across Heterogeneous Computing Platforms: Protected Effect Semantics, Cross-Device Authority Continuity, and Resource-Side Enforcement",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T13:56:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T14:47:07.546Z",
   "pages": 166,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Computation is not authority to act. An operating system may authenticate an application, a device may recognize a permission, a cloud service may accept a token, an AI agent may hold a tool credential and a remote application may receive a command, yet none of these facts shows that the consequential operation actually executed is still within the originating authority, scope, current policy and resource state. This document describes an informational architecture for preserving an equivalent protected authorization relationship across heterogeneous platforms such as Android, iOS, macOS, Windows, Linux, cloud services, trusted hardware, edge devices and autonomous agents, whose native permission models and enforcement mechanisms differ. Qualified native evidence is translated into a protected canonical effect descriptor, scoped non-bearer enablement is created, and a receiving Finality Sink reconstructs the actual pending operation and enforces authority at a covered boundary. The document covers enforcement-capability qualification, cross-device ownership with source fencing, receipt-gated continuation, protected reauthorization, recovery and an honest account of what each mechanism can and cannot control.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-cross-platform-finality-authority/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-cross-platform-finality-authority",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-cross-platform-finality-authority"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-pmykhailyk-idr-bgp-community-exchange",
   "title": "BGP Extended Community Exchange",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T13:15:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T13:47:07.166Z",
   "pages": 4,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "pmykhailyk",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a mechanism for transferring a BGP Extended Community, in particular the Link Bandwidth Extended Community, from one prefix to another, which enables routers to dynamically adjust the distribution ratio for weighted load balancing in NAT scenarios, allowing a router to perform unequal cost load balancing according to the real capacity of compute clusters.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pmykhailyk-idr-bgp-community-exchange/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-pmykhailyk-idr-bgp-community-exchange",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-pmykhailyk-idr-bgp-community-exchange"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mcw-opsawg-icon-requirements",
   "title": "Architecture and Requirements for Autonomous Agent Observability, Control and Intervention",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T12:57:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "mcw",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.51,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines architecture and a set of requirements for Observability, Control, and Intervention for Autonomous Agents. The Autonomous Agents can be any Agents such as Network management Agents or Security Agents. It identifies gaps in existing mechanisms and specifies required interaction capabilities between Agent supervision systems and Autonomous Agents (such as Network Management Agents) across multi- vendor environments, specifically observability, control, and runtime intervention. The requirements aim to guarantee comprehensive, lifecycle control over Autonomous Agents and enable observation, constraint, intervention, and correction to ensure network operational resilience and continuity.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcw-opsawg-icon-requirements/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mcw-opsawg-icon-requirements",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-mcw-opsawg-icon-requirements"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-protected-transaction-authority",
   "title": "Protected Delegated Transaction Authority: Exact-Effect Reconstruction, Non-Bearer Authorization, and Execution-Finality Enforcement",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T12:52:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T13:47:07.166Z",
   "pages": 251,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A cryptographically valid signature, an authenticated request, a delegated credential or a previously approved operation does not necessarily establish authorization for the exact consequential operation about to take effect. This document describes an informational security architecture for delegated digital operations in which authority is bound at collection time in one protected enforcement domain, the actual execution-facing operation is reconstructed in a second, and a protected Finality Sink decides whether that exact effect may be released. It covers exclusive signing, non-bearer sink-bound execution handles, final native byte reconstruction, delegated-code and account-abstraction cases such as EIP-7702, atomic budget consumption, crash recovery with explicit unknown outcomes, effect-path coverage, and financial profiles for payments, cards, tokenized assets, stablecoins, offline money and cross-chain transfers. Enforcement claims are limited to effect paths actually under control.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-protected-transaction-authority/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-protected-transaction-authority",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-protected-transaction-authority"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-evaluator-governance",
   "title": "Location-Independent Evaluator Governance for Autonomous Multi-Agent Systems: Protected Appointment, Evidence-Bounded Decisions, Cross-Domain Coordination, and Separation of Execution Authority",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T12:26:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:47:06.877Z",
   "pages": 131,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.72,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.93,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.85,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents increasingly rely on an evaluator to review plans, evidence and outcomes before work continues, yet an evaluation result is often mistaken for permission to act. This document describes a vendor-neutral architecture in which the evaluator is a functional role, not a product: it may be a rule engine, model, program, enclave, service or human, placed locally, remotely or on a shared platform. It separates six independent lifecycles, requires a protected task-specific appointment derived from resource-owner authority, admits evidence by source, role, freshness and independence, preserves mandatory dissent, and emits typed determinations such as HOLD, DISPUTED and UNKNOWN. Its central rule is that a valid determination is not an executable authorization: separate owner-controlled authorization and a native enforcement boundary remain necessary. Twenty-seven embodiments, a threat model, data model and examiner index are provided.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-evaluator-governance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-evaluator-governance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-evaluator-governance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chapman-a2a-mls",
   "title": "End-to-End Encryption and Purpose-Bound Governance for Agent-to-Agent Messaging",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T12:14:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:47:06.877Z",
   "pages": 35,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "chapman",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.93,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Agent-to-agent protocols increasingly carry messages between autonomous software agents acting on behalf of distinct principals, including across organisational boundaries. Existing protocols in this space secure the transport hop and authenticate the calling party, but do not provide message-level confidentiality, do not provide non-repudiable evidence of what a counterparty asserted, and do not carry machine-enforceable constraints on how a recipient may use the data conveyed. This document specifies a profile that addresses those three gaps. It defines a Governed Object: a signed, purpose-bound, expiring message envelope identified by a decentralised identifier. It specifies how such objects are exchanged inside end-to-end encrypted sessions established using the Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol [RFC9420], and how the MLS credential is cryptographically bound to the sending agent's identity. It defines the encapsulation of these constructs as an extension to an agent-to-agent transport, using the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol [A2A] as the reference binding, and specifies mandatory receiver-side processing rules including replay rejection and purpose enforcement.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chapman-a2a-mls/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chapman-a2a-mls",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-chapman-a2a-mls"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xg-payment-dispute-profile",
   "title": "Card-Scheme Dispute Evidence Profile of Signed Decision Receipts",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T11:54:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:47:06.877Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "xg",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.93,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "In an agent-initiated payment dispute, the payer, the merchant, the payment service provider and the agent operator each keep their own record of the same decision, and none of those records can be verified by the other parties. This document states that problem and defines a signed dispute receipt, registrable as the payload of a SCITT Signed Statement, that binds the decision to card-scheme dispute-evidence categories, to the agent's delegated scope, to the settlement that actually occurred, and to an evidentiary-custody record, so that parties with opposed interests can verify the same evidence offline.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-xg-payment-dispute-profile/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-xg-payment-dispute-profile",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-xg-payment-dispute-profile"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-oga-musubi-settlement",
   "title": "MUSUBI Settlement: Recomputing Whether an Agent Acted Within a Signed Grant",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T11:49:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:47:06.877Z",
   "pages": 81,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "oga",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.72,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.63,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "MUSUBI settlement is a deterministic function that takes a contract signed by two parties, a set of signed records of what an agent did under that contract, and a view of Bitcoin block headers, and computes whether the recorded acts stayed within the grant the contract gives. Anyone holding the same bytes can recompute the result without trusting the party that produced it. This document specifies one well defined part of that function, settle core v0, precisely enough that a second implementation can be written from the text and the published test vectors alone. Outside settle core v0, it also describes the admission record of version 0.4, in which a relying party states the check it made of a request's content by digests and marks, and how settle v1.19 reads it. Settlement is not runtime enforcement and is not a judgement of liability.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-oga-musubi-settlement/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-oga-musubi-settlement",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-oga-musubi-settlement"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-oga-audit-witness-answer",
   "title": "Witness Answers: Signed Recomputation of a Published Record, Filed Beside It",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T11:48:37Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:47:06.877Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "oga",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.87,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.85,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.93,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a witness answer: a signed statement by a party other than the operator that it recomputed a published record from public endpoints, naming the digests it obtained, the steps it recomputed, and the limits of what it checked. It defines how the answer is filed beside the record it witnesses and anchored in time. An informative section describes version 0.1 of the answer, which adds a kind for records published by others. A verified answer does not show that the content of the record is right.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-oga-audit-witness-answer/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-oga-audit-witness-answer",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-oga-audit-witness-answer"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-john-scion-svcb",
   "title": "Publishing SCION Endpoint Addresses in DNS Service Binding (SVCB) Records",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T11:48:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:47:06.877Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "john",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.81,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines \"scion\", a Service Parameter Key (SvcParamKey) for the Service Binding (SVCB) and HTTPS DNS resource records. Its value lists the addresses at which a service endpoint is reachable over SCION (Scalability, Control, and Isolation On Next-generation networks), a path-aware inter-domain network architecture. This document specifies the wire format, presentation format, and semantics of the key and requests its registration with IANA.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-john-scion-svcb/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-john-scion-svcb",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-john-scion-svcb"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-irtf-iccrg-pacing",
   "title": "Pacing in Transport Protocols",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T11:47:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:47:06.877Z",
   "pages": 23,
   "group": "iccrg",
   "group_type": "rg",
   "submitter": "iccrg",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Applications or congestion control mechanisms can produce bursty traffic, which can cause unnecessary queuing and packet loss. To reduce the burstiness of traffic, the concept of evenly spacing out the traffic from a data sender over a round-trip time known as \"pacing\" has been used in many transport protocol implementations. This document gives an overview of pacing and how some known pacing implementations work. It is a product of the Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG) of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-iccrg-pacing/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-iccrg-pacing",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-irtf-iccrg-pacing"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sidor-pce-multipath-metric",
   "title": "Signaling Per-Path Metric in the Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T11:14:25Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T11:47:06.939Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sidor",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) extensions for signaling multipath information allow multiple forwarding paths to be associated with a single PCEP Label Switched Path (LSP); for Segment Routing (SR) Policy, these paths are the Segment Lists of a Candidate Path. However, the METRIC object remains encoded at the LSP level, and per-path encoding of the METRIC object is explicitly left out of scope. This document extends PCEP to signal per-path (for SR Policy, per Segment List) metric information by reusing the existing METRIC object within the multipath constructs, and defines the associated capability negotiation.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sidor-pce-multipath-metric/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sidor-pce-multipath-metric",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sidor-pce-multipath-metric"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-karahan-nmrg-semantic-sensing-privacy",
   "title": "Privacy and Network Management Considerations for Semantic Sensing Outputs in AI-Native Networks",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T10:57:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T11:47:06.939Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "karahan",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.62,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.43,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.93,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Radio sensing in ISAC and AI-assisted networks produces semantic outputs such as target position, velocity, class, and identifiers. These outputs can reveal sensitive information about people who take no part in any communication service, especially when they are released repeatedly, combined across sources, or shared across administrative domains. This document describes the privacy risks of releasing such outputs and the network management functions needed to control their release: policy, enforcement at trust boundaries, consumer authorisation, accounting, and auditing. It surveys protection approaches and lists open research questions. It does not define a protocol or an algorithm.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-karahan-nmrg-semantic-sensing-privacy/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-karahan-nmrg-semantic-sensing-privacy",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-karahan-nmrg-semantic-sensing-privacy"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc",
   "title": "SD-JWT-based Verifiable Digital Credentials (SD-JWT VC)",
   "rev": "27",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T10:45:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 78,
   "group": "oauth",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "oauth",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This specification describes data formats as well as validation and processing rules to express Verifiable Digital Credentials with JSON payloads with and without selective disclosure based on the SD-JWT format. Furthermore, this specification updates RFC7800 to allow for the Confirmation Claim (cnf) to be used regardless of the presence or absence of other claims.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-6lo-schc-15dot4",
   "title": "Transmission of SCHC-compressed packets over IEEE 802.15.4 networks",
   "rev": "15",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T10:42:01Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 55,
   "group": "6lo",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "6lo",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A framework called Static Context Header Compression and fragmentation (SCHC) has been designed with the primary goal of supporting IPv6 over Low Power Wide Area Network (LPWAN) technologies [RFC8724]. One of the SCHC components is a header compression mechanism. If used properly, SCHC header compression allows a greater compression ratio than that achievable with traditional 6LoWPAN header compression [RFC6282]. For this reason, it may make sense to use SCHC header compression in some 6LoWPAN environments, including IEEE 802.15.4 networks. This document specifies how a SCHC-compressed packet can be carried over IEEE 802.15.4 networks. The document also enables the transmission of SCHC-compressed UDP/ CoAP headers over 6LoWPAN-compressed IPv6 packets.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6lo-schc-15dot4/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-6lo-schc-15dot4",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-6lo-schc-15dot4"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-only",
   "title": "IPv6 Terminology Definitions",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T10:17:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "v6ops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "v6ops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.8,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the terminology regarding the usage of expressions such as \"IPv6-Only\" and \"IPv6-Mostly\", in order to avoid confusions when using them in IETF and other documents. In particular, a goal is to provide a reference that describes the actual \"IPv6-Only\" functionality being used in a given scope, not the installed protocol stack support.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-only/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-only",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-only"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-cose-c509-test-vectors",
   "title": "Test Vectors for CBOR-Encoded X.509 (C509) Certificates",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T10:11:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 150,
   "group": "cose",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "cose",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.84,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.76,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document contains examples of CBOR-encoded X.509 (C509) certificates, certification requests, and certification request templates.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-c509-test-vectors/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-c509-test-vectors",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-cose-c509-test-vectors"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wnd-opsawg-icon-ps",
   "title": "Problem Statement for Autonomous Agent Observability, Intervention and Control (I&C) in Multi-Agent Autonomous Networks",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T10:06:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "wnd",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides an overview of the issues associated with the deployment of the observability, intervention, and control of autonomous agent pipelines in large-scale heterogeneous network environments. The term \"Observability, Intervention and Control\" is used to describe a set of automated and human-initiated mechanisms that guarantee the capability to observe, evaluate, constrain, correct, and terminate Autonomous agents at any point, for any reason, irrespective of their level of autonomy under which it operates, to ensure resilience, recovery, and operational continuity. The set of enabled observability, intervention and control reflects operator service offerings to ensure that autonomous network operations can be stopped, or safely redirected when required and is designed in conjunction with agent to agent, agent to tools, agent to human interaction and service and network policy. This document also identifies several key areas that the Agent Observability, Intervention and Control group will investigate to guide its architectural and protocol work and associated documents.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wnd-opsawg-icon-ps/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wnd-opsawg-icon-ps",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-wnd-opsawg-icon-ps"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jeong-nmrg-agentic-ai-framework",
   "title": "An Agentic AI Framework for the Management of Networks, Security, and AI Services",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T10:00:34Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jeong",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.78,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.91,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.59,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies an agentic AI framework for the management of networks, security, and AI services. This framework is an Intent- Based System (IBS) to enforce a human-language intent at a target network with the translated policy for networks, security, or AI services. It consists of a User System, a Cloud System, an Edge System, and a Device. Target devices in this framework include Network Forwarding Elements (e.g., router and switch), Network Security Functions (e.g., firewall, web filter, and DDoS-attack mitigator), Internet-of-Things (IoT) Devices, Physical AI Robots, Software-Defined Vehicles (SDV), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and Urban Air Mobility (UAM). This document describes the agentic AI framework with its components and interfaces where the components include AI agents and supporting knowledge repositories (i.e., knowledge base), and also inter-agent interfaces use the Agent-to- Agent (A2A) protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jeong-nmrg-agentic-ai-framework/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jeong-nmrg-agentic-ai-framework",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jeong-nmrg-agentic-ai-framework"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wang-topology-aware-collective-communication",
   "title": "Topology-Aware Construction of Collective Communication over Time-Expanded Networks",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T09:55:43Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "wang",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.43,
   "topic": "cloud",
   "topic_label": "Cloud/DC",
   "topic_confidence": 0.83,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.52,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a topology-aware method for constructing collective communication schedules in distributed systems. Instead of selecting from a small set of predefined communication algorithms, the method expands a target network topology along a time dimension, tracks per-node data state, and incrementally builds a schedule through candidate-source discovery and link-to-chunk matching. The approach is intended for heterogeneous or asymmetric topologies in which fixed communication patterns often underutilize available links or create avoidable bottlenecks. According to the source material, the resulting schedule is intended for collective communication tasks involving data distribution, aggregation, reduction, and synchronization, including all-gather, reduce-scatter, and all- reduce.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wang-topology-aware-collective-communication/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wang-topology-aware-collective-communication",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-wang-topology-aware-collective-communication"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-causal-semantic-handoff-diagnostics",
   "title": "Causal Diagnostics for Semantic Drift in Autonomous Agent Communications: Counterfactual Testing, Source-Role Separation, and Evidence-Bounded Handoff Localization",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T09:52:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T10:47:08.299Z",
   "pages": 79,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.46,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Multi-agent AI systems pass instructions, facts and tool outputs through summaries, translations, delegations and protocol conversions. When a downstream proposed operation departs from the originating instruction, existing records may show that a message was sent, authenticated or traced, yet not show whether a lower-trust source's instruction-like statement influenced a governing condition, whether an intermediary dropped the condition, or whether the receiver misapplied it. This document describes a diagnostic architecture, and an optional transport-neutral evidence model, for investigating such semantic drift. It uses typed originating task contracts, condition-scoped source roles, versioned dependency graphs, handoff lineage, matched counterfactual tests that vary legitimate facts and unauthorized instruction-like content separately, adaptive witness selection, uncertainty-aware comparison, and evidence-bounded localization that reports an earliest observable divergence, a bounded interval, or abstains. The architecture is diagnostic only. It does not grant, veto or finalize any execution; authorization stays with separate systems. The document is an individual, informational proposal; it makes no novelty, compliance, adoption or performance claim, and reports no experimental results beyond those the underlying filing itself states.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-causal-semantic-handoff-diagnostics/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-causal-semantic-handoff-diagnostics",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-causal-semantic-handoff-diagnostics"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-consequence-bound-execution-authority",
   "title": "Consequence-Bound Execution Authority for Autonomous Systems: Operation Reconstruction, Independent Validation, and Protected Effectuation Profiles",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T09:44:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T09:47:07.957Z",
   "pages": 125,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "das",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Authorization to compute, propose, prepare, simulate or request an operation is not, by itself, authorization to cause the operation's actual consequential effect. An authorized operation may afterwards be transformed, delegated, delayed, replicated, compiled, offloaded or executed under different technical conditions. This document describes an architecture, and a set of candidate interoperability requirements, for separating those authorizations: a proposed operation is held as a Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State; the Actual Pending Operation is reconstructed; current source authority, context, dependencies and policy and revocation epochs are evaluated by an independent validator; a scoped, non-bearer execution authorization is issued; and a protected Finality Sink at the actual effectuation boundary re-derives the operation, enforces the authorization, and supports reconciliation against authoritative outcome evidence. The document is an individual, informational technical proposal. It credits OAuth, JWT/CWT, RBAC/ABAC, zero-trust, remote attestation, transaction logs, hardware isolation and cryptographic signatures for their established functions and does not characterize them as defective. It includes a threat model, 12 figures, 39 consequence- specific profiles, a non-normative European applicability discussion and an examiner-oriented terminology appendix. It is not an IETF standard, an EU regulatory instrument, a telecommunications or financial standard, or an endorsement by any named company.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-consequence-bound-execution-authority/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-consequence-bound-execution-authority",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-das-consequence-bound-execution-authority"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dong-pce-cc-nrp",
   "title": "PCEP Extensions for PCE Central Controller (PCECC) based Network Resource Partition (NRP) Instantiation",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T09:21:32Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T09:47:07.957Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "dong",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.81,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The PCE is a core component of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) systems. A PCE-based Central Controller (PCECC) can simplify the processing of a distributed control plane by blending it with elements of SDN without necessarily completely replacing it. Network Resource Partitions (NRPs) can be used to provide the required connectivity and committed resources for network slice services. An NRP is a subset of the buffer/queuing/scheduling resources and associated policies on each of a connected set of links in the underlay network. This document specifies the extensions to Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) to enable PCECC based Network Resource Partition (NRP) Instantiation.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dong-pce-cc-nrp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-dong-pce-cc-nrp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-dong-pce-cc-nrp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-intra-handshake-fail",
   "title": "Early Attestation Considered Very Harmful (CVE-2026-100833, CVE-2026-100835,CVE-2026-108265, CVE-2026-108266, CVE-2026-108267, CVE-2026-108268, CVE-2026-108269, CVE-2026-92701, CVE-2026-92702, CVE-2026-108362, CVE-2026-33697, CVE-2026-108361 and others)",
   "rev": "62",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T09:19:42Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T09:47:07.957Z",
   "pages": 85,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "intra",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The draft aims to provide technical details of [CVE-2026-100833] of CVSS 9.6, [CVE-2026-108265] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-108266] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-108267] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-108268] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-108269] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-100835] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-92701] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-92702] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-108362] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-119344] of CVSS 9.1, [CVE-2026-33697] of CVSS 7.5, [CVE-2026-108361] of CVSS 7.2, [CVE-2026-119345] of CVSS 7.2, and 26+ GitHub Security Advisories (GHSAs) against early attestation in the process of getting CVE IDs, which provide substantial technical evidence of how early attestation, such as [I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation], fails in practice, even *without physical access* to the desired machine. Moreover, since continuous attestation is generally required [CSA-eBPF] [MITRE-Continuous-Attestation], early attestation adds *unnecessary complexity*. The results are backed by the research [Intra-handshake.fail], [TLS-RA], [EarlyAttestationBleed], [EarlyAttestationTschuess] and the artifacts [Intra-handshake.fail-repo] in state-of-the-art formal analysis tool, ProVerif, under Apache-2.0 license for reproducibility, extensibility, and review, and have been acknowledged by the relevant stakeholders. Currently, there is *one CVE of CVSS 9.6, 11 CVEs of CVSS 9.1, one CVE of CVSS 8.2, one CVE of CVSS 7.5, one CVE of CVSS 7.2, and 26+ GHSAs published awaiting CVE IDs against the broader early attestation covering all layers of the ecosystem up to the application*. The research papers on these are currently either under submission or being prepared for submission. The artifacts of these papers will be shared with the community under Apache-2.0 license for reproducibility, extensibility, and review. Based on our work, all except two implementations of early attestation have been archived, withdrawn, or moved to post-handshake attestation. In our analysis [Intra-handshake.fail-repo], [ID-Crisis-repo], and [EarlyAttestationTschuess] (EAT) and based on discussions in the CCC Attestation SIG, IETF SEAT WG, IRTF UFMRG, IRTF CFRG, and several other forums, the remaining two implementations of early attestation -- Edgeless Systems Contrast and Meta's AI following withdrawn [I-D.fossati-tls-attestation-10] -- remain vulnerable due to lack of binding to the underlying connection. We recommend users of these two implementations to carefully evaluate their systems and understand the risks. If you are aware of any open-source implementation of early attestation that is not yet covered in this draft, please let us know to responsibly disclose the vulnerabilities to them.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-intra-handshake-fail/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-intra-handshake-fail",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-intra-handshake-fail"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog",
   "title": "Privacy-Preserving Verification of Linked-Dialog Relationships Across Trust Boundaries",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T09:19:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T09:47:07.957Z",
   "pages": 41,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "elekula",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.71,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.51,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems increasingly create, delegate, relay, and transform dialogs across multiple agents, protocols, services, and administrative trust boundaries. In these environments, a verifier may need to determine whether two dialogs are related without requiring unrestricted disclosure of their contents or relying exclusively on the assertions of an intermediary. This document describes properties and a conceptual evaluation model for privacy-preserving verification of linked-dialog relationships across trust boundaries. It distinguishes dialog association from context propagation, relationship verification from authentication and authorization, and verification outcomes from assessments of evidence completeness. The document also considers evidence scope, source positions, temporal references, intermediary continuity, lifecycle changes, identity binding, privacy, and evidence availability. It identifies requirements intended to help future protocol designs represent linked-dialog relationships in a way that can be independently evaluated while limiting unnecessary disclosure. This document does not define a wire format, cryptographic mechanism, identifier format, transport binding, authorization protocol, audit-log structure, or completeness-proof mechanism. It provides terminology, design properties, and interoperability considerations for further discussion.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-arsentev-repository-availability-reporting",
   "title": "Reporting the Availability of Referenced Software and Model Repositories",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T09:16:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T09:47:07.957Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "arsentev",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.36,
   "topic": "other",
   "topic_label": "Other",
   "topic_confidence": 0.38,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.44,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Papers, catalogues, model cards and tool lists point to code and model repositories by URL. Such repositories can be deleted, made private, blocked or simply stop changing, and reports of \"link rot\" or \"project survival\" often mix these different events into one number. This document defines how to classify each observation of a referenced repository, when a repository counts as unavailable, how to report inactivity separately from unavailability, and a small JSON report object. It also recommends citing a persistent identifier or an archived copy next to the repository URL.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-arsentev-repository-availability-reporting/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arsentev-repository-availability-reporting",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-arsentev-repository-availability-reporting"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-sidrops-rpki-rtr-over-quic",
   "title": "RPKI to Router Protocol over QUIC",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T09:15:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T09:47:07.957Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "sidrops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "liu",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.36,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol provides a simple but reliable mechanism to receive cryptographically validated RPKI prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache. RPKI to Router (RTR) Protocol can be carried over various transports such as TCP, SSH or else. QUIC provides practical and secure semantics for the RTR protocol, particularly fast connection establishment and multi-stream carrying, thereby reducing the time required to complete RTR data synchronization. This document describes how to use RTR Protocol over the QUIC transport protocol, named RTRoQUIC.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-sidrops-rpki-rtr-over-quic/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-sidrops-rpki-rtr-over-quic",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-liu-sidrops-rpki-rtr-over-quic"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hu-6man-ipv6-flowlabel-load-balancing-rdma",
   "title": "A RoCEv2 Flow-Level Load Balancing Method Based on the IPv6 Flow Label",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T08:46:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T08:47:06.855Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hu",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.44,
   "topic": "cloud",
   "topic_label": "Cloud/DC",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.84,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes a method for achieving flow-level load balancing in RoCEv2 (RDMA over Converged Ethernet version 2) networks. Traditional per-flow load balancing based on the 5-tuple cannot distinguish between different RDMA sessions that share the same 5-tuple. This causes \"elephant flows\" to be hashed to the same path, leading to network congestion. This method resolves this issue by having the ingress network device (e.g., a data center gateway or DCI edge router) parse the QP (Queue Pair) information from the IB BTH (Base Transport Header) and IB DETH (Datagram Extended Transport Header, when present) of the RoCEv2 packet. By combining this with portions of the IPv6 source and destination addresses as an entropy source, a CRC32 hash algorithm generates a 32-bit value, the low 20 bits of which are then written into the Flow Label field of the IPv6 header. Network devices can subsequently use the updated \"5-tuple + Flow Label\" for more granular flow-level load balancing, thereby effectively improving transmission efficiency in high-performance networks for workloads such as AI computing.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hu-6man-ipv6-flowlabel-load-balancing-rdma/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hu-6man-ipv6-flowlabel-load-balancing-rdma",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hu-6man-ipv6-flowlabel-load-balancing-rdma"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-elekula-rats-pqc-attestation",
   "title": "Post-Quantum Cryptographic Considerations for RATS Evidence and Attestation Results",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T08:24:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T08:47:06.855Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "elekula",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.5,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document analyzes post-quantum cryptographic considerations for Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, and Reference Values. It describes the distinction between post-quantum key establishment and post-quantum authentication of attestation artifacts; identifies integrity, provenance, freshness, and session-context properties that must remain independently verifiable; and provides implementation guidance for artifact sizing, bounded processing, transformation, transport, failure handling, and privacy. The document does not define a new cryptographic algorithm, attestation token, Evidence format, transport protocol, TLS extension, or key-establishment mechanism. It relies on existing RATS architecture and data models, existing COSE and JOSE mechanisms, and protocol-specific work in the Secure Evidence and Attestation Transport (SEAT) Working Group. The intended result is a set of interoperable considerations that RATS profiles and attestation-system designers can apply when deploying post-quantum-capable attestation systems.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-elekula-rats-pqc-attestation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-elekula-rats-pqc-attestation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-elekula-rats-pqc-attestation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sakai-hcttp",
   "title": "Human Conversational Turn-Taking Protocol (HCTTP)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T08:16:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T08:47:06.855Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "sakai",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.76,
   "topic": "realtime",
   "topic_label": "Real-time media",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Human Conversational Turn-Taking Protocol (HCTTP), an integrated session-layer communication protocol for multi-node human spoken interaction. HCTTP formalizes connection establishment (Three-Way Handshake), token arbitration, turn transitions, real-time backchannel signaling (ACK/NACK), dynamic rate adaptation, conversational padding (filler frames), collision recovery, and standardized conversational status codes over shared acoustic channels.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sakai-hcttp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sakai-hcttp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-sakai-hcttp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-ocm-mls-federated-groups",
   "title": "Federated Groups in Open Cloud Mesh using Messaging Layer Security",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T07:50:44Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T08:47:06.855Z",
   "pages": 51,
   "group": "ocm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "ocm",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines an extension to the Open Cloud Mesh (OCM) protocol to support federated groups as Receiving Parties of shares. This is achieved using the Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol (RFC 9420) as a group management layer. MLS is used for establishing and rotating a shared group key across federated group members, as well as for maintaining group state. This gives not only a way of federating group membership, but also a standardized way of distributing encryption keys in a cryptographically secure way, so that files shared with a group can optionally be encrypted and decrypted. MLS usage in OCM acts as a vehicle for group management that gives users optional encryption capabilities for resources shared with federated groups.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ocm-mls-federated-groups/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ocm-mls-federated-groups",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-ocm-mls-federated-groups"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-ocm-open-cloud-mesh",
   "title": "Open Cloud Mesh",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T07:49:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T08:47:06.855Z",
   "pages": 77,
   "group": "ocm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "ocm",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.51,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.81,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Open Cloud Mesh (OCM) is a server federation protocol that is used to notify a Receiving Party that they have been granted access to some Resource. It has similarities with authorization flows such as OAuth, as well as with social internet protocols such as ActivityPub and email. A core use case of OCM is when a user (e.g., Alice on System A) wishes to share a resource (e.g., a file) with another user (e.g., Bob on System B) without transferring the resource itself or requiring Bob to log in to System A. While this scenario is illustrative, OCM is designed to support a broader range of interactions, including but not limited to file transfers. Open Cloud Mesh handles interactions only up to the point where the Receiving Party is informed of their access to the Resource. Actual Resource access is subsequently managed by other protocols, such as WebDAV.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ocm-open-cloud-mesh/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ocm-open-cloud-mesh",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-ocm-open-cloud-mesh"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yang-ccamp-optical-agent-coordination",
   "title": "An Architecture for Agent Coordination in Computing-Aware Optical Networks",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T07:47:06Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T08:47:06.855Z",
   "pages": 41,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "yang",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.56,
   "topic": "cloud",
   "topic_label": "Cloud/DC",
   "topic_confidence": 0.73,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Computing-aware optical networks coordinate optical connectivity with the capabilities, availability, and performance of computing services. This document describes an informational architecture for coordination among joint control, transport control, network element, and compute resource agents. These roles relate local observations to domain abstractions, assess connection-and-site candidates against a common service objective, and evaluate the combined service outcome. Computing resources may be located at edge, regional, or centralized sites. Coordination supports access to existing service instances and, where authorized, new workload placement or optical resource allocation. Resource managers retain admission and execution authority. The architecture is independent of optical switching technology and agent algorithm. An Optical Transport Network (OTN) and edge computing provide a detailed realization example; reinforcement learning is an optional policy use case. This document defines no new protocol, YANG module, or optical signal format.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yang-ccamp-optical-agent-coordination/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yang-ccamp-optical-agent-coordination",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-yang-ccamp-optical-agent-coordination"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wang-lisp-ai-agent",
   "title": "Using LISP as a Network Substrate for AI Agent Communication",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T07:40:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T07:47:08.773Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "wang",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.46,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.53,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.56,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The emergence of distributed artificial intelligence (AI) systems, particularly those composed of autonomous agents operating across cloud, edge, and endpoint environments, introduces new networking requirements. These include location transparency, seamless mobility, multi-homing, and logical isolation at scale. This document explores how the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) can serve as a robust network substrate to meet these requirements. The document outlines use cases, design considerations, and minimal extensions to the existing LISP framework to support context-aware mapping and AI agent-centric communication.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wang-lisp-ai-agent/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wang-lisp-ai-agent",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-wang-lisp-ai-agent"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chen-opsawg-intent-webassembly-framework",
   "title": "WebAssembly Framework for Network Management in Heterogeneous Edge Networks",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T07:40:02Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T07:47:08.773Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "chen",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.83,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an architecture for executing WebAssembly (WASM) modules for network management on heterogeneous edge devices. It describes dynamic bytecode dispatching, the Universal Bytecode Interface (UBI) for abstracting heterogeneous network element capabilities, and metadata models for capability exposure, bytecode deployment, execution context, intent-driven discovery, and security audits. The framework decouples management scripts from platform- specific interfaces. It reuses existing mechanisms for software update, payload manifests, integrity protection, and transport where applicable.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-opsawg-intent-webassembly-framework/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chen-opsawg-intent-webassembly-framework",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-chen-opsawg-intent-webassembly-framework"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-toco-abiz-dns",
   "title": "The \"_abiz\" Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Name for Agentic Business Records",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T07:12:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T07:47:08.773Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "toco",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies use of the underscored DNS node name \"_abiz\" with TXT resource records to publish a pointer from a domain to a signed public business record served over HTTPS. It describes discovery and verification of that record and requests registration of the \"_abiz\" node name and the \"abiz.json\" well-known URI suffix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-toco-abiz-dns/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-toco-abiz-dns",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-toco-abiz-dns"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-cats-metric-definition",
   "title": "CATS Metrics Definition",
   "rev": "15",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T07:07:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T07:47:08.773Z",
   "pages": 58,
   "group": "cats",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "cats",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "cloud",
   "topic_label": "Cloud/DC",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Computing-Aware Traffic Steering (CATS) is a traffic engineering approach that optimizes the steering of traffic to a service instance by considering the dynamic state of computing and network resources. To enable such decisions, CATS components exchange metrics that describe resource conditions affecting service instance selection. This document focuses on compute and communication metrics for CATS and defines a hierarchical abstraction of these metrics to improve interoperability, scalability, and operational simplicity. It does not aim to standardize raw infrastructure (Level 0) metrics; instead, it specifies higher-level representations that can be derived from raw measurements using aggregation and normalization functions.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cats-metric-definition/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cats-metric-definition",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-cats-metric-definition"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chuang-feedback-id-header",
   "title": "Feedback-id Email Header Field",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:58:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T07:47:08.773Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "chuang",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Large-volume email senders and Email Service Providers (ESPs) use Feedback Loops (FBLs) to identify campaigns in their traffic that generate a high volume of spam complaints from recipients and to detect abuse of their services. Traditional per-message complaint reports can expose individual recipient actions, creating privacy concerns. This document specifies the \"Feedback-ID\" email header field, which allows senders to embed structured campaign, customer, mail-type, and sender identifiers in outbound messages. Receiving mailbox providers authenticate this header field using DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) and report aggregated spam complaint rates per identifier back to verified senders without disclosing individual recipient data.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chuang-feedback-id-header/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chuang-feedback-id-header",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-chuang-feedback-id-header"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kostyk-redoubt",
   "title": "Redoubt/1: Authorised Control of Modbus-Era PLCs",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:37:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kostyk",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.93,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.91,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies Redoubt/1, a control channel for programmable logic controllers that sits in front of Modbus/TCP and decides, per operation, whether a request may reach the controller. Modbus has no authentication, no authorisation and no replay protection; the TLS- based Modbus Security profile adds a protected channel but still lets any authenticated client invoke any function code. Redoubt/1 adds a decision per operation rather than per connection, a replay window that survives a controller reboot, a three-valued outcome that can drive outputs to a safe state instead of merely refusing, dual control for critical outputs, reversible batches, and an audit chain that fails closed. The decision core is formalised in Lean 4 and twenty of its properties are machine-checked; the proof artefacts are published with the implementation.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kostyk-redoubt/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kostyk-redoubt",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kostyk-redoubt"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ek-tiptop-ipn-allocator-prefixes",
   "title": "IPv6 Prefixes Derived from IPN Allocator Identifiers",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:18:43Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T05:47:06.677Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ek",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document requests an IPv6 /16 prefix for use by IPN Allocators. It defines a method to derive an IPv6 /48 prefix from a 32-bit IPN Allocator Identifier. Use of the derived prefix is optional. The method reuses the existing IPN Allocator registry. It does not encode physical location or define a routing mechanism. The preferred /16 prefix is 5f01::/16. This document also updates RFC 4291 to permit other interface identifier lengths within the allocated block.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ek-tiptop-ipn-allocator-prefixes/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ek-tiptop-ipn-allocator-prefixes",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ek-tiptop-ipn-allocator-prefixes"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-shen-idr-flowspec-traffic-compress-action",
   "title": "BGP Flow-Spec Traffic Compress Action",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:14:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "shen",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "BGP Flow Specification Version 2 (FSv2) provides an extensible framework for disseminating traffic flow specification rules and associated actions. While traditional Flow-spec actions cover rate- limiting, redirecting, and marking, emerging applications require dynamic bandwidth optimization. This document specifies a new traffic filtering action to support selective, on-demand traffic compression across network domains using BGP Extended Communities aligned with the FSv2 architecture.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-idr-flowspec-traffic-compress-action/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-shen-idr-flowspec-traffic-compress-action",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-shen-idr-flowspec-traffic-compress-action"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v3",
   "title": "Homing Pigeon Message Protocol, Version 3: DTLS 1.3 via Email",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:13:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "slutsky",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.84,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.71,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies version 3 of the Homing Pigeon message protocol. Version 3 is a transport extension to version 1, not a replacement for it: every version 1 message keeps its meaning, the version 1 job acceptance gate is unchanged, and version 3 changes exactly one thing -- the carriage of the version 1 DTLS session profile. Version 1 defines a DTLS 1.3 session profile: one cipher suite, a pre-shared key taken from the protocol's shared secret, ephemeral Diffie-Hellman on every handshake, and the platform_info disclosure carried in the server's EncryptedExtensions. Version 1 binds that profile to a live datagram path. This document binds the same profile to the email binding: handshake flights and protected records are carried as email messages over the store-and-forward mailbox, so a session can be opened by an email, completed over further emails, and then carry jobs and results inside it, with the perfect forward secrecy of the version 1 profile intact on a carrier that has no live path at all. The objects carried inside the session remain version 1 objects: a job or a result inside a session is the version 1 object, unchanged, carrying the version value version 1 defines. The 3 of this document's title numbers this document and its carriage; it is not a value of any object's version field, and nothing in this document mints a version 3 object. HP-DTLS/3, the frame header this document defines, is a carriage label whose digit is the carriage generation, not a protocol version. This document is a local, unsubmitted draft. It has not been posted to the Internet-Drafts directory, and it requests no IANA action.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v3/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v3",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v3"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v2",
   "title": "Homing Pigeon Message Protocol, Version 2: Determinations, Questions, and Shared Context",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:13:07Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "slutsky",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.27,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.8,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies version 2 of the Homing Pigeon message protocol. Version 2 is an addition to version 1 (draft-slutsky- homing-pigeon), not a replacement for it: every version 1 message keeps its meaning, and version 2 adds three messages and one mechanism on top of the version 1 exchange. The additions are a determination message, by which the runner tells the submitter what it expects a job to do before the job runs; a question message, by which a runner whose local decision machinery cannot answer a question itself asks that question instead; an answer message, by which any enabled holder of the shared secret replies; and context segments, signed fragments of local state that travel with these messages and with the version 1 result, so each side plans with the other's actual state in view. Version 2 is backwards compatible. A version 1 runner never sends a version 2 message and is unaffected by this document. A submitter that implements this document adapts to the protocol version the runner supports: faced with a version 1 runner, it submits version 1 jobs and expects version 1 results, exactly as before. There is no version negotiation and no handshake; the messages carry v, as in version 1, and each side acts on what it receives. The deployment that motivates version 2 is the constrained runner: a small host whose local decision machinery is deliberately deterministic and carries no language model. Version 1 leaves such a runner alone with every question its deterministic machinery cannot answer. Version 2 lets it ask.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v2/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v2",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon-v2"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon",
   "title": "Homing Pigeon Message Protocol, Version 1",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:12:12Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 40,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "slutsky",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.7,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.79,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Homing Pigeon message protocol, version 1: signed JSON job and result objects exchanged over a transport binding. On the email binding, a submitter sends one HMAC-SHA-384 signed JSON object to a mailbox; a runner polls that mailbox, verifies the signature, executes the job, and returns a signed result; the other bindings carry the same objects unchanged. The signature is the object's only authorization: a binding may add a gate of its own, but no gate replaces it. The job object is protected end to end by per-job AEAD encryption, a required part of the protocol: implementations MUST support it, the reference software sends encrypted by default, and a receiver refuses a cleartext job unless the operator has explicitly enabled cleartext acceptance - in the reference software, only by a command-line parameter. The store- and-forward bindings open no inbound listener on the host that runs the job. The DTLS binding changes the binding and not the messages: the same signed objects travel inside a direct DTLS 1.3 session between the submitter and the runner. It is a binding of version 1, not a new version of the protocol. The shared secret is the session's external pre-shared key; key exchange is ephemeral-only, so sessions have perfect forward secrecy; and the runner discloses a tiered, responder-chosen summary of its platform inside the handshake itself, as an extension in its EncryptedExtensions, so the submitter holds the platform from the flight that establishes the session. The binding opens an inbound listener on the runner's host and is off unless the owner enables it. It is an addition, never a replacement: the store-and-forward bindings remain the ones every submitter can reach.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-slutsky-homing-pigeon"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-han-fann-use-cases",
   "title": "Use Cases for Fast Network Notifications (FANN)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:06:22Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "han",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.64,
   "topic": "cloud",
   "topic_label": "Cloud/DC",
   "topic_confidence": 0.41,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document reviews the use cases for Fast Network Notifications (FANN) that have been described in a number of individual drafts. Use cases are grouped by deployment scenario (data center network, data center interconnect and wide area network) aligned with the deployment scenarios of the FANN framework. Each use case is summarized briefly with a reference to the document that describes it in detail. This is intended to help identify a representative set of use cases from which the key FANN requirements can be derived.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-han-fann-use-cases/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-han-fann-use-cases",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-han-fann-use-cases"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-dmm-srv6mob-arch",
   "title": "Architecture Discussion on SRv6 Mobile User plane",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:00:31Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "dmm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "dmm",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the solution approach and its architectural benefits of transforming mobile session information into routing information, leveraging segment routing capabilities, and operating within the IP routing paradigm.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dmm-srv6mob-arch/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmm-srv6mob-arch",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-dmm-srv6mob-arch"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-cbor-serialization",
   "title": "CBOR Serialization and Determinism",
   "rev": "13",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T06:00:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 56,
   "group": "cbor",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "cbor",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "RFC 8949 defines CBOR, a standard for serializing data types such as integers, strings, and arrays into encoded bytes. CBOR serialization is flexible, allowing data types to be encoded in multiple ways to accommodate deployment in constrained environments. This document introduces the term “general serialization” for the full set of encodings permitted by RFC 8949, and formally defines two specific serializations: preferred-plus serialization, which differs from preferred serialization only in cases rarely encountered in practice and is recommended for broad use; and deterministic serialization, which likewise differs only in rarely encountered cases from core deterministic encoding defined in RFC 8949. This document updates RFC 8949 with a new rule that limits how new tag definitions can affect the CBOR data model. This document provides clarifications to RFC 8949 regarding bignums and floating-point NaN handling, along with general background information on serialization, determinism, and CBOR byte-string wrapping.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cbor-serialization/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cbor-serialization",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-cbor-serialization"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-mpls-stamp",
   "title": "Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP) for MPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs)",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T05:59:30Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:47:07.726Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "mpls",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "mpls",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP), defined in RFC 8762 and RFC 8972, is expected to be able to monitor the performance of paths between systems that use a wide variety of encapsulations. This document defines encapsulation and bootstrapping of a STAMP test session over an MPLS Label Switched Path.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mpls-stamp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mpls-stamp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-mpls-stamp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-quic-receive-ts",
   "title": "QUIC Extended Acknowledgement for Reporting Packet Receive Timestamps",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T05:11:57Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T05:47:06.677Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "quic",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "quic",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines an extension to the QUIC transport protocol which supports reporting multiple packet receive timestamps for post- handshake packets.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-quic-receive-ts/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-receive-ts",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-quic-receive-ts"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gong-spring-sr-policy-group-yang",
   "title": "YANG Data Model for SR Policy Group",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T04:58:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T05:47:06.677Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gong",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.7,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.77,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a YANG data model for Segment Routing (SR) Policy Group that can be used for configuring, instantiating, and managing SR Policy groups. The model is generic and applies equally to the MPLS and SRv6 instantiations of SR Policy groups.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gong-spring-sr-policy-group-yang/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gong-spring-sr-policy-group-yang",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gong-spring-sr-policy-group-yang"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yang-pce-pcep-over-quic",
   "title": "PCEP over QUIC",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T03:13:12Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T03:47:06.745Z",
   "pages": 37,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "yang",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.85,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.56,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the use of QUIC streams to implement the PCEP protocol for efficient and secure data transmission.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yang-pce-pcep-over-quic/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yang-pce-pcep-over-quic",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-yang-pce-pcep-over-quic"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-v6ops-framework-md-ipv6only-underlay",
   "title": "Framework for Multi-domain IPv6-only Network and IPv4-as-a-Service",
   "rev": "33",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T03:12:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T03:47:06.745Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "v6ops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "v6ops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.68,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document presents a framework, from the network operators' perspective, for building and operating IPv6-only core networks that span multiple domains (i.e., multiple interconnected Autonomous Systems). To carry residual IPv4 traffic in such an environment, the framework proposes stateless IPv4/IPv6 address mapping as the basis for IPv4-as-a-Service (IPv4aaS), so that IPv4 packets are translated at the network edge and forwarded across the IPv6-only core network without per-flow state or IPv4/IPv6 conversion gateways on the data path. The document is intended as a network operator problem statement, guidance, and requirements rather than a protocol specification. It covers the scope of applicability and trust boundaries, options for IPv6 mapping prefix allocation, and operational, manageability, and security considerations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-v6ops-framework-md-ipv6only-underlay/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-framework-md-ipv6only-underlay",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-v6ops-framework-md-ipv6only-underlay"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link",
   "title": "Linking an Agent's DNS Name to its OAuth Client",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T03:07:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T03:47:06.745Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "shankarlingam",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.93,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Software agents increasingly call agents and services operated by other organizations. A receiving organization often wants to know two things about any such caller: that it is the agent it claims to be, and that the organization operating it still authorizes it. Existing approaches to the second question require a trust relationship between the two organizations' authorization servers. This document defines a DNS record by which the owner of a domain links an agent's DNS name to the OAuth client that the agent uses at the owner's own authorization server. The sending agent presents a fresh access token for that client; the receiver verifies the token against the record and against the issuer's published keys. No trust relationship, registration or federation between the two organizations is needed, and disabling the client at the sending organization's authorization server stops the agent being accepted by every receiver.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-vulnetix-crit",
   "title": "Cloud Resource Identifier Templates (CRIT)",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T02:47:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T03:47:06.745Z",
   "pages": 69,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "vulnetix",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.52,
   "topic": "cloud",
   "topic_label": "Cloud/DC",
   "topic_confidence": 0.88,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Cloud Resource Identifier Templates (CRIT) format. A CRIT record provides a machine-readable, parameterised template for locating cloud-native resources affected by a known vulnerability. CRITs do not define cloud resource identifier schemas; those are defined normatively by each cloud provider. CRITs define a variable system for expressing partially- known or consumer-resolved values within those provider-defined schemas, together with temporal, remediation, and detection metadata sufficient to determine exposure status and drive remediation workflows. Each CRIT record is bound to exactly one vulnerability identifier. Cross-provider and multi-resource-type coverage of a single vulnerability is expressed as a set of CRIT records sharing the same vulnerability identifier, each independently specifying the provider- specific fix details, propagation mechanism, and detection strategy applicable to that resource type.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vulnetix-crit/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vulnetix-crit",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-vulnetix-crit"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-many-tiptop-dns",
   "title": "Deployment and Use of the Domain Name System(DNS) in Deep Space",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T02:45:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T02:47:09.117Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "many",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.94,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Deep space communications involve long delays (e.g., Earth to Mars has one-way delays 4-24 minutes) and intermittent communications, mainly because of orbital dynamics. This document lists operational methods to enable local DNS name resolving on celestial body networks such that there are no real-time query and response flow to name servers on (Earth) Internet.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-many-tiptop-dns/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-many-tiptop-dns",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-many-tiptop-dns"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-munoz-schc-over-dts-iot",
   "title": "Static Context Header Compression and Fragmentation ARQ/FEC mode",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T02:25:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T02:47:09.117Z",
   "pages": 36,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "munoz",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a new fragmentation mode for the SCHC standard defined in RFC8724. The new fragmentation mode is designed for communications that require additional reliability mechanisms. The reliability is based on a hybrid ARQ/FEC type II mechanism that combines forward error correction (FEC) with adaptive retransmissions to achieve high reliability.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-munoz-schc-over-dts-iot/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-munoz-schc-over-dts-iot",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-munoz-schc-over-dts-iot"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution",
   "title": "Registry-Assisted Resolution for Known Subjects Without DNS Discovery Anchors",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T02:25:02Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T02:47:09.117Z",
   "pages": 33,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "raskar",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.65,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.72,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.84,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Discovery mechanisms for AI resources increasingly use DNS and mDNS as interoperable publication and lookup substrates. These mechanisms work well when the publisher controls a usable DNS discovery anchor. They do not cover every deployment. An individual may control an email or platform account without controlling the provider's DNS namespace. A small organization may use managed infrastructure without operating an agent-specific DNS publication point. A workload may have a stable identity that is not itself DNS anchored. This document describes Registry-Assisted Resolution for the narrower case in which a discovering entity already knows the Subject Identity it wants to resolve, but no usable DNS Discovery Anchor is available or selected by local policy. A configured registry returns the minimum information needed to continue discovery, together with provenance, authority evidence, freshness, and revocation information. This mechanism is complementary to DNS-based discovery. A validated direct DNS-anchored discovery path remains direct and is normally preferred for a domain-controlled subject. This document does not define open-ended search, semantic matchmaking, ranking, capability search, a global registry, registry discovery, directory-to-directory routing, identity management, or trust evaluation. Multiple independently operated registries may implement the same resolution profile. Registry selection is a client or deployment policy decision; no universal NandaIndex or global root is assumed. NandaIndex is described as one reference implementation of this model.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wang-agent-semantic-routing",
   "title": "Research on service semantic identification and routing technology for Internet of agents",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T02:15:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T02:47:09.117Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "wang",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.87,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "With the deep integration of artificial intelligence and network technologies, the Internet of agents has become an important direction for the evolution of the next-generation Internet. The connection paradigm of the traditional Internet centered on “location addressing” can hardly meet the demands of the Internet of agents for “business-driven and service-as-connection”. The service semantic routing technology system, paradigm evolution, core collaboration requirements in the Internet of agents, and the limitations of traditional routing technologies were systematically elucidated. It was clarified that semantic routing was the key to realizing the transformation from “service demand” to “resource matching”. The solutions for four core semantic routing mechanisms in the Internet of agents, namely fuzzy search based on tag matching and flexible adaptation, precision-named DNS (domain name system) for “service- domain name” mapping, business-layer network identification based on Anycast, and URL (uniform resource locator) semantic routing with application-layer semantic encapsulation were analyzed in depth. Finally, the technical characteristics of each solution were summarized and compared, providing an important reference for subsequent research.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wang-agent-semantic-routing/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wang-agent-semantic-routing",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-wang-agent-semantic-routing"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chuang-agent-attribution-header-fields",
   "title": "Agent Attribution Header Fields",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T02:13:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T02:47:09.117Z",
   "pages": 5,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "chuang",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "When human users communicate with autonomous computer agent users, the human users should be able to identify that communication as coming from agent users and know which humans are responsible for the agent users. This document specifies email header fields that an email sender can use to transmit agent user attribution information to email receivers. The first header field is human readable and specifies the agent's responsible humans' email address. The second header field is machine readable and specified in JSON attribution information.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chuang-agent-attribution-header-fields/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-chuang-agent-attribution-header-fields",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-chuang-agent-attribution-header-fields"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-pce-pcep-nrp",
   "title": "Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) Extensions for Network Resource Partition (NRP)",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T02:09:22Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T02:47:09.117Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "pce",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "pce",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the extensions to Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) to carry Network Resource Partition (NRP) related information in the PCEP messages. The extensions in this document can be used to indicate the NRP-specific constraints and information needed in path computation, path status report and path initialization.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pce-pcep-nrp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pce-pcep-nrp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-pce-pcep-nrp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-pim-rpf-vector-conflict-resolution",
   "title": "PIM Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) Vector Conflict Resolution",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T02:09:03Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T02:47:09.117Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "pim",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "pim",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "PIM Join Attributes specification defines the handling principles for PIM Join attributes with same type of RFF Vector and Explicit RFP Vector, but with different contents are received. However, it does not address scenarios where one downstream router includes a RFF Vector in its message while another does not. This leaves the handling of such conflicts unspecified. This document updates RFC 5496 and RFC 7891 by supplementing the existing specifications with handling rules for this specific conflict scenario.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pim-rpf-vector-conflict-resolution/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pim-rpf-vector-conflict-resolution",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-pim-rpf-vector-conflict-resolution"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yang-ancp-home-app-usecase",
   "title": "Use Cases & Requirements for ANCP",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T01:26:42Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T01:47:07.591Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "yang",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.7,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.93,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes use cases for the Access Node Control Protocol in home applications, where a Broadband Network Gateway (BNG/BRAS) exchanges home-application policy with a Home Gateway (HGW). ANCP may operate either between BNG and OLT, or directly between BNG and HGW. When ANCP runs only between BNG and OLT, additional configuration via OMCI is required to reach the HGW. The use cases in this document are illustrated in the mode where ANCP runs directly between BNG and HGW. The use cases cover three primary scenarios: managed access to operator-hosted large model services, application-aware QoS, and controlled remote access to home LAN resources.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yang-ancp-home-app-usecase/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yang-ancp-home-app-usecase",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-yang-ancp-home-app-usecase"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gao-opsawg-flowspec-ipfix",
   "title": "Export of BGP FlowSpec Treatment Information in IPFIX",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T01:21:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T01:47:07.591Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gao",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.85,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "BGP Flow Specification (FlowSpec) is commonly used to distribute traffic filtering and traffic treatment rules. Operational monitoring of FlowSpec deployments may require information from multiple sources, including BGP control-plane telemetry, operational state, and forwarding-plane observations. This document defines IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Information Elements that add FlowSpec context to IPFIX Flow Records. The exported information enables a Collector to correlate exported Flow Records with a FlowSpec rule in the scope of an Observation Domain and to identify the action classes reported by the Exporter.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gao-opsawg-flowspec-ipfix/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gao-opsawg-flowspec-ipfix",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gao-opsawg-flowspec-ipfix"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token",
   "title": "KYAPay Token",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T01:17:49Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T01:47:07.591Z",
   "pages": 49,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "skyfire",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a token format for agent identity and payment tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format. Authorization servers and resource servers from different vendors can leverage this token format to consume identity and payment tokens in an interoperable manner.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens",
   "title": "Using KYAPay Tokens",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T01:13:38Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T01:47:07.591Z",
   "pages": 45,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "skyfire",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The KYAPay Token is a JSON Web Token (JWT) that carries verified identity (\"Know Your Agent\", KYA) and payment (PAY) information for requests made by software agents on behalf of human principals. This document describes how security intermediaries -- bot managers, fraud managers, account-takeover (ATO) protection systems, and customer identity and access management (CIAM) systems -- consume KYAPay tokens to answer a question that traditional bot detection cannot: \"did a verified human authorize this agent?\", rather than \"is this a human?\". It specifies how KYAPay tokens are carried in HTTP requests, how they are validated (including in combination with request-signing layers such as HTTP Message Signatures), and how the verified, layered identity in a token is used to make access, routing, fraud detection, account-lifecycle, and step-up decisions. It defines the token-consuming \"recipient\" role that the KYAPay Token leaves unspecified. It is intentionally non-prescriptive about how tokens are created, because agent architectures, agent-identity technologies, and agent-communication protocols are diverse and still emerging; the token itself is the interoperability contract.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange",
   "title": "KYAPay Token Exchange",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T01:09:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T01:47:07.591Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "skyfire",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This specification describes how KYAPay tokens can be exchanged for OAuth access tokens to dynamically grant agents access to resources they need to accomplish their mission.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification",
   "title": "Identity Verification Methods Values",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T01:05:25Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T01:47:07.591Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "skyfire",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Knowing how a person's identity was verified can be important when making trust decisions. This specification defines a claim and values for declaring how the person's identity was verified.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-elekula-rats-model-loading-binding",
   "title": "Attestation of AI Inference Execution Environments Using RATS: Trusted Model Loading, Runtime Binding, and Per-Inference Evidence",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T00:56:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T01:47:07.591Z",
   "pages": 32,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "elekula",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.59,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.47,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "AI inference services increasingly depend on combinations of model artifacts, inference runtimes, execution environments, hardware accelerators, and security-relevant configuration. A relying party authorizing an AI service to access protected resources may require evidence that an approved model artifact was actually loaded and used by an acceptable inference runtime. Measuring a model artifact and measuring an inference runtime independently does not establish that the measured artifact was the artifact loaded by the measured runtime. Similarly, attesting an execution environment does not, by itself, establish which model processed a particular inference request. This document examines these problems using the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture specified in RFC 9334. It distinguishes execution-instance attestation from per-inference operation evidence and describes a candidate measurement and binding approach using a protected model-loading mechanism, trusted measurement collection, and cryptographically protected evidence. It examines how the Entity Attestation Token (EAT), specified in RFC 9711, and the measured-component information model specified in RFC 10013 may represent relevant measurements and component information. It also examines the relationship between this proposal and existing work on attested AI agent identity and application-layer action evidence. The document does not define a new attestation protocol, EAT profile, registered Claim, Evidence conveyance protocol, or appraisal-policy language. Its objective is to determine whether existing RATS mechanisms can support interoperable appraisal of AI model-to-runtime relationships and to identify any remaining requirements for standardization. The document does not claim that attestation establishes model correctness, safe behavior, or the correctness of generated outputs.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-elekula-rats-model-loading-binding/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-elekula-rats-model-loading-binding",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-elekula-rats-model-loading-binding"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-idr-bgp-ls-link-mtu",
   "title": "Signaling Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) using BGP-LS",
   "rev": "13",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T00:36:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T00:47:06.817Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "idr",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "idr",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Segment Routing (SR) leverages the source routing paradigm, which can be directly applied to the MPLS architecture and IPv6 architecture, with a new type of routing header. Since multiple labels or SRv6 SIDs are pushed in the packets, it is more likely that the packet size exceeds the path MTU of SR tunnel. However, SR uses the IGP as the routing protocol and does not support the negotiation of the Path MTU. BGP Link State (BGP-LS) describes a mechanism by which link-state and TE information can be collected from networks and shared with external components using the BGP routing protocol. This document specifies the extensions to BGP-LS to carry MTU information of link. The centralized controller (PCE/SDN) calculates the Path MTU while completing the service path calculation based on the information transmitted by the BGP-LS.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-ls-link-mtu/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-ls-link-mtu",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-idr-bgp-ls-link-mtu"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-beeram-mpls-rsvp-sr",
   "title": "Signaling RSVP-TE Tunnels on an SR-MPLS Forwarding Plane Using Adjacency Segment Identifiers",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T00:29:46Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T00:47:06.817Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "mpls",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "beeram",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "RFC 8577 introduced the concept of signaling RSVP-TE tunnels on a shared MPLS forwarding plane using preinstalled \"TE link labels\". Those labels are functionally equivalent to Segment Routing (SR) Adjacency Segment Identifiers (Adj-SIDs) but are allocated and distributed solely via RSVP-TE signaling. This document extends RFC 8577 so that RSVP-TE tunnels can use Segment Routing over MPLS (SR-MPLS) Adj-SIDs, as specified in RFC 8402 and RFC 8660, in place of TE link labels. It restricts scope to Adj-SIDs attached to a single unidirectional adjacency and defines the signaling procedures and protocol extensions required to couple the RSVP-TE control plane with the SR-MPLS data plane.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-beeram-mpls-rsvp-sr/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-beeram-mpls-rsvp-sr",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-beeram-mpls-rsvp-sr"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-han-ai-manifest",
   "title": "AI Manifest: Site-Published Friction-Recovery Descriptors for AI Agents",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T00:23:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T00:47:06.817Z",
   "pages": 34,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "han",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.57,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the AI Manifest, a JSON format with which a website operator publishes an AI Friction-Recovery Manifest (AFRM): a description of the user-interface (UI) patterns on its own origin that predictably stall autonomous AI agents, together with constrained recovery steps and site-specific input hints. An agent that drives a browser on behalf of a user retrieves the manifest from a well-known URI and consults it when it encounters friction, instead of rediscovering the same site-specific behavior by trial and error. The manifest is untrusted input, interpreted by the agent's runtime and never shown to its language model. Its operative content is drawn from a closed vocabulary that cannot enter text, upload files, or reach another origin. Every action derived from a manifest passes through a policy enforcement point that is not a language model, and steps conventionally bound to a decision require the user's confirmation by default. Security controls such as access denials, rate limits, CAPTCHAs, authentication challenges, and confirmation dialogs are stop conditions, never traps to be recovered from. Optional publisher signatures and agent-configured reputation services provide authenticity but never imply safety and never relax these requirements. This -03 revision replaces the trust model of draft-han-ai-manifest- 02, removes the inline and vendor-path discovery methods from the protocol, and restructures the schema around a closed action vocabulary. Preliminary measurements are reported in an appendix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-han-ai-manifest/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-han-ai-manifest",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-han-ai-manifest"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-atwood-mls-didwebvh-credential",
   "title": "User-Controlled Device Authorization for MLS using did:webvh Credentials",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T00:19:50Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T00:47:06.817Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "atwood",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "In Messaging Layer Security (MLS), whoever operates the Authentication Service (AS) decides which devices belong to a user. When providers federate MLS groups, as the More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) work does, every member of a group must accept devices vouched for by every other member's provider. Any one provider can therefore add a device under one of its users' names to any group that user is in. Other members cannot prevent this; at best they detect it after the device has joined. This document defines an MLS credential type in which the user, not the provider, authorizes each device. The credential carries the user's did:webvh log: a hash-chained, signed history of the user's device keys that any member can verify offline. It also defines group rules that make every member reach the same validity decision and that propagate device revocation through ordinary Commits.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-atwood-mls-didwebvh-credential/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-atwood-mls-didwebvh-credential",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-atwood-mls-didwebvh-credential"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist",
   "title": "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Challenge for Persistent DNS TXT Record Validation",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-16T00:01:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-16T00:47:06.817Z",
   "pages": 68,
   "group": "acme",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "acme",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.56,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies \"dns-persist-01\", an Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) challenge that verifies domain or IP address control using a persistent DNS TXT record. The record identifies a certification authority (CA) and binds validation to an ACME account. It can be published before certificate requests and reused without per-request DNS changes, including when different parties perform DNS publication and ACME operation. Use under a certificate policy or trust program remains subject to that policy's requirements.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-rats-verifiable-proof-of-environment",
   "title": "Verifiable Proof of Environment Attestation Profile",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T23:46:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T21:47:06.993Z",
   "pages": 41,
   "group": "rats",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "rats",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.88,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Operators of regulated, sovereign, and high-assurance deployments require hardware-rooted, machine-verifiable proof that a workload executes in its approved environment. Current remote attestation mechanisms address two relevant properties in isolation: platform integrity — that the hardware and software stack are in an approved, untampered state — and physical residency — that the hardware resides within an approved geographic boundary. Neither property alone is sufficient: integrity without residency permits a valid platform to operate outside approved boundaries; residency without integrity permits a compromised platform to claim valid placement. This document defines the *Verifiable Proof of Environment Attestation Profile (V-PEA)*, a profile of the RATS Architecture (RFC 9334) in which a platform binds location Claims to its own integrity Evidence in a single Evidence structure (lah-bundle) signed by a TPM quote. V-PEA does not generate location Claims: they are produced by location sources, such as GNSS receivers, mobile network operators, or timing-based anchors, and V-PEA binds them to the particular platform that will receive a credential or key. V-PEA defines two Evidence dimensions: *WHAT* — hardware provenance (TPM Attestation Key registered and manufacturer-endorsed), platform integrity (firmware and OS state matching reference values), and workload agent software integrity (binary digest matching an approved value); and *WHERE* — physical residency within an approved geographic boundary, as reported by one or more location sources. A single TPM quote binds WHAT and WHERE into one signed statement: neither dimension can be forged or transplanted without invalidating the other. This document specifies the binding for TPM 2.0; the binding does not depend on a TPM, and other platform roots of trust can provide it. For the WHERE dimension, V-PEA supports Transparent Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), enabling an Attester to prove geographic compliance without disclosing precise coordinates. A positive V-PEA Attestation Result enables a Relying Party to issue hardware-rooted credentials or authorize operations — combining verified execution environment (WHAT) with verified physical placement (WHERE) — before releasing sensitive assets or granting access. Integration with workload identity systems is described in the WIMSE Integration appendix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-verifiable-proof-of-environment/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-verifiable-proof-of-environment",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-rats-verifiable-proof-of-environment"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-altanai-moq-ai-subscriber-advantage",
   "title": "Detecting AI-Driven Subscriber Advantage in Media over QUIC (MOQ)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T23:14:51Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T23:47:07.075Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "altanai",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.79,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes subscriber behavior that may produce sustained advantages in service outcomes or disproportionate resource consumption at shared Media over QUIC (MoQ) relays. AI-assisted optimization is a motivating scenario; observations alone cannot establish whether AI was used or caused a disparity. The document outlines contextual measurement, privacy safeguards, and a proposed extension for authorization-bound resource budgets with explicit accounting and recovery behavior. It builds on existing MoQ authorization and relay denial-of-service work. This informational document defines no new MoQ messages, token claims, registries, or standardized detection algorithm.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-altanai-moq-ai-subscriber-advantage/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-altanai-moq-ai-subscriber-advantage",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-altanai-moq-ai-subscriber-advantage"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-hsm-constrained",
   "title": "Adapting Constrained Devices for Post-Quantum Cryptography",
   "rev": "12",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T23:11:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T23:47:07.075Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "pquip",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "pquip",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides guidance on integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into resource-constrained devices, such as IoT nodes and dedicated key-storage hardware. These systems often operate with strict limitations on processing power, RAM, and flash memory, and may even be battery-powered. The document emphasizes the role of hardware security as the basis for secure operations, supporting features such as seed-based key generation to minimize persistent storage, efficient handling of ephemeral keys, and the offloading of cryptographic tasks in low-resource environments. It also explores the implications of PQC on firmware update mechanisms in such constrained systems.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-hsm-constrained/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-hsm-constrained",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-hsm-constrained"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-singh-psi-agent",
   "title": "Binding Decisions and Settlements to Agent Action Records",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T23:09:59Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T20:47:08.313Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "singh",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document extends [I-D.psi-agent-01], which records what a software agent did. A record of an action does not show who said the work was to be done, what the model asked to do, what a policy engine permitted, or what was paid. This document defines four statements -- a mandate, a proposal, a decision, and a settlement -- and the rules that bind them to a chain of action records under one run identifier. Each statement is signed by its own party with its own key. A verifier that holds the statements can test, offline and without trusting the agent, whether the action chain is unbroken, whether the decision that permitted it was signed by a key other than the one named as the acting key, and whether the amount settled lay inside the limit the mandate declared. A valid envelope shows that identified parties made these statements and that the statements have not changed since they were sealed. It does not show that any statement was correct, sufficient, lawful, or true, and it makes no legal representation of any kind.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-singh-psi-agent/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-singh-psi-agent",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-singh-psi-agent"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jmap-filenode",
   "title": "JMAP File Storage extension",
   "rev": "21",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T22:44:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 57,
   "group": "jmap",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jmap",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The JMAP base protocol (RFC 8620) provides the ability to upload and download arbitrary binary data. This binary data is called a \"blob\", and can be used in all other JMAP extensions. This extension adds a FileNode data type and methods to expose blobs as a filesystem, along with the types of metadata that are provided by other remote filesystem protocols.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jmap-filenode/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jmap-filenode",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jmap-filenode"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jmap-blobext",
   "title": "JMAP Blob Management",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T22:42:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 50,
   "group": "jmap",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jmap",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) base protocol ([JMAP-CORE]) provides the ability to upload and download arbitrary binary data via HTTP POST and GET on a defined endpoint. This binary data is called a \"blob\". This extension adds additional ways to create and access blobs by making inline method calls within a standard JMAP request. It also adds a reverse lookup mechanism to discover where blobs are referenced within other data types, support for large blobs via chunked construction with server-side optimisation, and server-side blob conversion operations including image format conversion, archive creation and extraction, compression and decompression, and delta/ patch operations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jmap-blobext/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jmap-blobext",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jmap-blobext"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jmap-conditional",
   "title": "JMAP Conditional Set",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T22:42:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "jmap",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jmap",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The JMAP base protocol ([JMAP-CORE]) provides the Foo/set method for creating, updating, and destroying objects. It offers a single concurrency control, the \"ifInState\" argument, which guards an entire object type: if any object of that type has changed, the whole method is rejected. This extension adds a finer, per-object conditional mechanism. A client may require that an individual update or destroy proceed only if the target object still matches a set of expected property values, expressed using the JMAP PatchObject already defined for updates. This provides optimistic concurrency control scoped to a single object — the equivalent of an HTTP \"If-Match\" precondition — for any JMAP data type. This extension also defines an optional \"atomic\" argument that applies an entire Foo/set as a single unit: either every change it requests takes effect, or none does. Combined with the per-object precondition, this lets a client express a multi-object change that is safe only when applied together — such as an atomic rename that exchanges two names.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jmap-conditional/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jmap-conditional",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jmap-conditional"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jmap-object-history",
   "title": "JMAP Object History",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T22:41:42Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "jmap",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jmap",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The JMAP base protocol (RFC8620) provides methods for synchronizing the current state of data objects between client and server. This extension adds the ability to retrieve historical versions of objects, including objects that have been destroyed, by extending the standard Foo/get method, to find destroyed objects with Foo/query, and to restore them with Foo/set.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jmap-object-history/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jmap-object-history",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jmap-object-history"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-pjs-6lo-can",
   "title": "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Controller Area Network",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T22:08:34Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "pjs",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Controller Area Network (CAN) is a fieldbus initially designed for automotive applications. It has since been adopted for use in various industrial applications, such as CANopen and building automation systems. CAN operates as a multi-master bus with frame identifiers of 11 bits or 29 bits. The CAN standard, defined in the ISO 11898 series, specifies both the physical and data-link layers. This document describes how to transfer IPv6 packets over CAN using ISO-TP, a dedicated addressing scheme for CAN nodes, and Static Context Header Compression (SCHC).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pjs-6lo-can/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-pjs-6lo-can",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-pjs-6lo-can"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-vladyka-schc-vxlan-fragmentation",
   "title": "SCHC No-ACK Fragmentation of VXLAN Payloads",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T22:07:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 37,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "vladyka",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.81,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document proposes a SCHC No-ACK profile for carrying VXLAN payloads, including those larger than the path MTU, over a managed UDP path. On a configured peer association every frame is carried as a SCHC Packet made of a NoCompress rule identifier, the uncompressed VXLAN header and the Ethernet frame. The packet is sent unfragmented when it fits the path MTU and fragmented otherwise. A four-bit fragment counter supports up to eight fragments. An optional receiver procedure for reordering is described separately because it changes the RFC 8724 No-ACK receiver behavior. The earlier indexed fragmentation proposal is retained in an appendix for comparison. The mapping and operational parameters require working group review.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vladyka-schc-vxlan-fragmentation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vladyka-schc-vxlan-fragmentation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-vladyka-schc-vxlan-fragmentation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-horn-dmm-srh-3gpp-mobility-tlv",
   "title": "Segment Routing Header TLVs for 3GPP Mobility Metadata",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T22:06:34Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "horn",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.93,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document requests two Segment Routing Header (SRH) TLV codepoints. Both are containers for mobility metadata used by 3GPP user-plane functions. One does not change en route. The other may change en route. This document specifies the framing so that any Segment Routing node can skip either container. Sub-TLV types and their meaning are under 3GPP change control. Neither container changes IPv6 forwarding.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-horn-dmm-srh-3gpp-mobility-tlv/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-horn-dmm-srh-3gpp-mobility-tlv",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-horn-dmm-srh-3gpp-mobility-tlv"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-diet-esp-extension",
   "title": "Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) extension for Header Compression Profile (HCP)",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T21:58:51Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "ipsecme",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "ipsecme",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an IKEv2 extension for Header Compression to agree on Attributes for Rule Derivation. This extension defines the necessary registries for the ESP Header Compression Profile (EHCP) Diet-ESP.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-diet-esp-extension/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-diet-esp-extension",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-diet-esp-extension"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-ipsecme-diet-esp",
   "title": "ESP Header Compression with Diet-ESP",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T21:58:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T22:47:07.494Z",
   "pages": 44,
   "group": "ipsecme",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "ipsecme",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies Diet-ESP, a compression mechanism for control information in IPsec/ESP communications. The compression uses Static Context Header Compression rules.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-diet-esp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-diet-esp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-ipsecme-diet-esp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ganesan-agent-authenticator",
   "title": "Agent Authenticator: Hardware-Bound, Origin-Bound Authentication for AI Agents",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T21:45:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T21:47:06.993Z",
   "pages": 35,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ganesan",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.91,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Agent Authenticator, a mechanism that lets autonomous software agents, such as AI coding agents, authenticate to services with properties comparable to passkeys: keys held in secure hardware, no shared secrets, binding to the service's origin that a manipulated agent cannot override, attested execution environments, and explicit human approval of each agent and of high- risk actions. The same protocol serves agents on personal computers and in cloud environments. It is a profile over existing mechanisms rather than a new identity system: it uses OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, the Identity Assertion JSON Web Token (JWT) Authorization Grant, and Model Context Protocol (MCP) authorization, and it binds each agent action to a signed, tamper-evident record.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ganesan-agent-authenticator/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ganesan-agent-authenticator",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ganesan-agent-authenticator"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-many-tiptop-ntp-profile",
   "title": "NTP Profile for Deep Space",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T21:21:21Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T21:47:06.993Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "many",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.37,
   "topic": "wireless",
   "topic_label": "Wireless/satellite",
   "topic_confidence": 0.58,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.81,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Deep space communications involve long delays (e.g., Earth to Mars one-way delay is 4-24 minutes) and intermittent communications, because of orbital dynamics. This document defines an NTP profile for deep space. NTP on-wire protocol is indifferent to path delays and transfers time in a single round trip at any distance, but diverges if delays in each direction is different. Some algorithmic constants and defaults such as distance threshold, dispersion bounds, poll intervals and burst modes, need to be tailored to the deep space scenario. The use of secured NTP is also discussed.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-many-tiptop-ntp-profile/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-many-tiptop-ntp-profile",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-many-tiptop-ntp-profile"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jmap-emailpush",
   "title": "JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) Email Delivery Push Notifications",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T21:09:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T21:47:06.993Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "jmap",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jmap",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies an extension to the JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) that allows clients to receive an object via a JMAP push subscription whenever a new email is delivered that matches a client-defined filter. The object can also include properties from the email, to allow a user notification to be displayed without having to make a further network request. Clients can also receive an object whenever a count of the emails in a chosen mailbox changes, for example to set a badge on an app icon.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jmap-emailpush/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jmap-emailpush",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jmap-emailpush"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dikshit-netmod-comparability-scope-extension",
   "title": "A YANG Extension for Declaring the Comparability Scope of Operational State",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T20:39:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T20:47:08.313Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "dikshit",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Several YANG modules currently in progress across multiple IETF working groups define counters, gauges, and other measured values that are exported from a network element and compared, summed, or averaged by a remote collector, either against the same node's history or against values from a different node. YANG (RFC 7950) has no first-class, machine-checkable way to state the administrative or topological domain within which two occurrences of such a value are comparable, so this determination is currently made, inconsistently or not at all, in prose. This document defines a YANG extension statement, \"csc:comparability-scope\", a four-value scope lattice, and a compatibility rule that lets a schema-aware tool statically detect an illegal aggregation across incomparable scopes, without waiting for it to happen at a collector. A related but distinct axis, the measurement window or method over which a rate or average value was computed, is identified as a further gap this document's mechanism does not itself close, and is reported separately as a candidate for future work.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dikshit-netmod-comparability-scope-extension/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-dikshit-netmod-comparability-scope-extension",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-dikshit-netmod-comparability-scope-extension"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kazuho-quic-delegated-stateless-reset",
   "title": "Delegating QUIC Stateless Resets",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T20:14:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T20:47:08.313Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kazuho",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies how a QUIC endpoint can delegate sending Stateless Resets to a component that outlives its connection state. It also defines a frame for clients using zero-length Connection IDs to advertise a Stateless Reset Token and a transport parameter for servers to indicate support for receiving the frame.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kazuho-quic-delegated-stateless-reset/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kazuho-quic-delegated-stateless-reset",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kazuho-quic-delegated-stateless-reset"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-intarea-v4-via-v6",
   "title": "IPv4 routes with an IPv6 next hop",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T20:09:25Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T20:47:08.313Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "intarea",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "intarea",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.57,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "V4-via-v6 routing is a technique that uses IPv6 next-hop addresses for forwarding IPv4 packets, and thus makes it possible to route IPv4 packets across a network where some routers have not been assigned IPv4 addresses. This document describes v4-via-v6 routing, and defines related operational procedures, notably the origination of ICMPv4 packets by nodes that might not have an IPv4 address.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-intarea-v4-via-v6/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-intarea-v4-via-v6",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-intarea-v4-via-v6"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-dtn-bibe",
   "title": "Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T20:03:31Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T20:47:08.313Z",
   "pages": 32,
   "group": "dtn",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "dtn",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.42,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation (BIBE), a Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) Bundle Protocol (BP) tunneling mechanism by which a bundle is carried as the payload of one or more encapsulating bundles, allowing security measures and routing policy to be applied to the encapsulating bundle without modification of the encapsulated bundle. The protocol includes an optional segmentation mechanism, allowing a large encapsulated bundle to be carried in multiple encapsulating bundles.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dtn-bibe/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dtn-bibe",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-dtn-bibe"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-brooks-ztdnaid-new",
   "title": "The 'ztdnaid' URI Scheme for Zero-Trust Digital DNA Identifiers (ZTDNAID)",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T19:55:37Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T20:47:08.313Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "brooks",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.76,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the 'ztdnaid' Uniform Resource Identifier(URI) scheme, used to represent globally unique, cryptographically verifiable Digital DNA Identifiers (ZTDNAIDs) within Zero Trust architecture implementations. A ZTDNAID binds an entitys immutable, unique Digital DNA Record \"DDR\" to a resolvable identifier suitable for authentication, authorization, attestation, and trust-registry verification lookup. The scheme is designed for use with trust registries operating across \"Public Trust Infrastructure\" (PTI), such as SAG-CTR and supports deterministic resolution, online verification, and secure dereferencing.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-brooks-ztdnaid-new/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-brooks-ztdnaid-new",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-brooks-ztdnaid-new"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-faltstrom-unicode-18",
   "title": "Internationalized Domain Names for Applications 2008 (IDNA2008) and Unicode 18.0.0",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T19:52:39Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T20:47:08.313Z",
   "pages": 111,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "faltstrom",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.76,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.49,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the changes between Unicode 12.0.0 and Unicode 18.0.0 in the context of IDNA2008. Some additions and changes have been made in the Unicode Standard that affect the values produced by the algorithm IDNA2008 specifies. The review identifies certain newly added code points that are to be examined individually, and asks that they be identified as \"UNDER REVIEW\" in the IANA tables until that examination is done, as RFC 8753 provides. This document provides the necessary table to IANA to make its database consistent with Unicode 18.0.0. All values in this document are computed from the released Unicode Character Database files listed in Appendix H, by applying the algorithm in RFC 5892 Section 3 directly to those files. No derived property table produced by anyone else is used as input. Section 3 describes the derivation and Appendix G compares the result with the derivation published by the Unicode Consortium.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-faltstrom-unicode-18/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-faltstrom-unicode-18",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-faltstrom-unicode-18"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-elekula-seat-attested-tls-testing",
   "title": "Interoperability, Security Evaluation, and Negative Testing for Attested TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T19:25:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T19:47:07.245Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "elekula",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.86,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.81,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a reproducible framework for interoperability testing, security evaluation, negative testing, and performance measurement of implementations that integrate remote attestation with TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3. The framework complements existing Secure Evidence and Attestation Transport (SEAT) and Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) specifications. It defines evaluation profiles, test-vector requirements, deployment topology descriptions, decision-state observations, common result classifications, cross-implementation procedures, and security evaluation methods. The framework evaluates the boundaries between transport authentication, attestation capability negotiation, Evidence conveyance, appraisal, authorization, workload identity association, and protected application-data release. It additionally addresses reusable Attestation Results, connection-bound Evidence, cross-connection trust continuity, exporter-derived credentials, key custody, credential lifecycle, multi-Relying-Party isolation, proxy deployments, session resumption, early data, state drift, revocation, privacy, availability, and cryptographic agility. This document introduces a machine-readable evaluation model that connects individual protocol requirements to test vectors, implementation versions, observed results, and reproducible evidence. It does not define a new attestation protocol, Evidence format, TLS or DTLS extension, cryptographic key schedule, universal appraisal policy, or credential format. Protocol-specific behaviour remains governed by the exact specification revision under evaluation. A successful test demonstrates observed behaviour under declared conditions. It does not constitute a security certification or prove that a Target Environment is free from compromise.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-elekula-seat-attested-tls-testing/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-elekula-seat-attested-tls-testing",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-elekula-seat-attested-tls-testing"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-jmap-calendars",
   "title": "JSON Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) for Calendars",
   "rev": "34",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T19:19:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T19:47:07.245Z",
   "pages": 70,
   "group": "jmap",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "jmap",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a data model for synchronizing calendar data with a server using JMAP. Clients can use this to efficiently read, write, and share calendars and events, receive push notifications for changes or event reminders, and keep track of changes made by others in a multi-user environment.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jmap-calendars/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jmap-calendars",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-jmap-calendars"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog",
   "title": "Privacy-Preserving Verification of Linked-Dialog Relationships Across Trust Boundaries",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T19:07:49Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T19:47:07.245Z",
   "pages": 35,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "elekula",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.72,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.56,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems increasingly create, delegate, relay, and transform dialogs across multiple agents, protocols, services, and administrative trust boundaries. In these environments, a verifier may need to determine whether two dialogs are related without requiring unrestricted disclosure of their contents or relying exclusively on the assertions of an intermediary. This document describes properties and a conceptual evaluation model for privacy-preserving verification of linked-dialog relationships across trust boundaries. It distinguishes dialog association from context propagation, relationship verification from authentication and authorization, and verification outcomes from assessments of evidence completeness. The document also considers evidence scope, source positions, temporal references, intermediary continuity, lifecycle changes, identity binding, privacy, and evidence availability. It identifies requirements intended to help future protocol designs represent linked-dialog relationships in a way that can be independently evaluated while limiting unnecessary disclosure. This document does not define a wire format, cryptographic mechanism, identifier format, transport binding, authorization protocol, audit-log structure, or completeness-proof mechanism. It provides terminology, design properties, and interoperability considerations for further discussion.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-netmod-yang-config-templates",
   "title": "YANG Configuration Templates",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:32:16Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 51,
   "group": "netmod",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "netmod",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a YANG-based configuration template mechanism whereby repetitive configuration data can be factored out into templates and applied where needed. This avoids the redundant definition of identical configuration and ensures the consistency of it, thus allowing configuration data to be managed more conveniently and efficiently.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netmod-yang-config-templates/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-yang-config-templates",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-netmod-yang-config-templates"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-claise-green-capability-discovery",
   "title": "A YANG Data Model for Power State Capability Discovery",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:27:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 35,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "claise",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a YANG data model that augments the system capabilities model of RFC 9196 to allow a network element to advertise, per hardware Component, the set of Power States that the Component supports, together with a static characterization of each such state: the expected and maximum Power the Component draws in it, and the time to enter and exit it. This capability model complements the operational Power and Energy data model defined in the GREEN Power and Energy YANG module, which reports the current Power State and the measured Power of a Component, but not which Power States are available, how much Power each draws, or how long transitions between them take. It is anchored to the hardware inventory of RFC 8348, reuses the Power State identities of the GREEN Power and Energy model, and, because it is static, may be provided at implementation time as YANG instance data per RFC 9195 so that an Energy Management System can learn a platform's Power State capabilities before the equipment is deployed or even powered on.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-claise-green-capability-discovery/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-claise-green-capability-discovery",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-claise-green-capability-discovery"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jholland-quic-multicast",
   "title": "Multicast Extension for QUIC",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:18:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 53,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jholland",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a multicast extension to QUIC to enable the efficient use of multicast-capable networks to send identical data streams to many clients at once, coordinated through individual unicast QUIC connections.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jholland-quic-multicast/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jholland-quic-multicast",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jholland-quic-multicast"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-abraitis-idr-addpath-paths-limit",
   "title": "Paths Limit for Multiple Paths in BGP",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:17:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "abraitis",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a BGP capability that complements the ADD- PATH Capability by indicating the maximum number of paths a BGP speaker can receive from a peer, optimizing the transmission of BGP routes by selectively relaying pertinent routes instead of the entire set. This document also defines a new BGP Cease NOTIFICATION message subcode, \"Maximum Number of Paths Reached\", used when a BGP speaker terminates a peering because the number of paths received from a neighbor for a prefix exceeds the Paths Limit advertised in the PATHS-LIMIT Capability.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-abraitis-idr-addpath-paths-limit/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-abraitis-idr-addpath-paths-limit",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-abraitis-idr-addpath-paths-limit"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-spice-oidc-cwt",
   "title": "OpenID Connect Standard Claims Registration for CBOR Web Tokens",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:16:07Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "spice",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "spice",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document registers OpenID Connect standard claims already used in JSON Web Tokens for use in CBOR Web Tokens.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-spice-oidc-cwt/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-spice-oidc-cwt",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-spice-oidc-cwt"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-schlyter-dnsop-dnssec-jwk",
   "title": "JSON Web Key (JWK) for DNSSEC",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:09:41Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "schlyter",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.45,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies how to represent DNSSEC public and private keys as JSON Web Keys (JWK). The cryptographic key material is encoded using the existing JWK key types, and the DNS-specific information needed to reconstruct the corresponding DNSKEY resource record (owner name, algorithm, protocol and flags) is carried in a new JWK parameter, \"dnskey\". This gives DNSSEC signers, key management systems and other tools a standardized, interoperable format for exchanging and storing DNSSEC keys.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schlyter-dnsop-dnssec-jwk/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-schlyter-dnsop-dnssec-jwk",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-schlyter-dnsop-dnssec-jwk"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kavian-aep-oauth-session-credential",
   "title": "OAuth Bearer Session Credential Grant Type for the Agent Enrollment Protocol",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:05:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kavian",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the OAuth Bearer session-credential grant type for the Agent Enrollment Protocol (AEP). The grant type lets an AEP Service issue an OAuth-style Bearer access token through the AEP Grant command while preserving baseline AEP client assertion authentication as the root of trust.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kavian-aep-oauth-session-credential/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kavian-aep-oauth-session-credential",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kavian-aep-oauth-session-credential"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kavian-aep-basic-session-credential",
   "title": "Basic Session Credential Grant Type for the Agent Enrollment Protocol",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:05:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kavian",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.8,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Basic session-credential grant type for the Agent Enrollment Protocol (AEP). The grant type lets an AEP Service issue an HTTP Basic credential through the AEP Grant command for deployments that already integrate with Basic authentication middleware.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kavian-aep-basic-session-credential/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kavian-aep-basic-session-credential",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kavian-aep-basic-session-credential"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kavian-aep-api-key-session-credential",
   "title": "API-Key Session Credential Grant Type for the Agent Enrollment Protocol",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:04:50Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kavian",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.8,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the API-key session-credential grant type for the Agent Enrollment Protocol (AEP). The grant type lets an AEP Service issue an opaque API key through the AEP Grant command for deployments that already operate header-based API-key authentication.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kavian-aep-api-key-session-credential/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kavian-aep-api-key-session-credential",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kavian-aep-api-key-session-credential"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zheng-quic-fec-extension",
   "title": "FEC Extension for QUIC",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T18:04:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:47:06.771Z",
   "pages": 21,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zheng",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a Forward Error Correction (FEC) extension for the QUIC protocol, which provide protection against packet loss.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zheng-quic-fec-extension/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zheng-quic-fec-extension",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zheng-quic-fec-extension"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ugur-moq-fast-switching",
   "title": "Subscriber-Side Multi-Variant Fast Track Switching for MOQT",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T17:40:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T17:47:06.648Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ugur",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.75,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.53,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.91,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes subscriber-side multi-variant fast track switching (MVFTS), a technique that allows a MOQ Transport (MOQT) subscriber to switch between tracks that are encoded at the same bitrate but use different group of pictures (GoP) lengths, combining the compression efficiency of a long GoP with the low switching delay of a short GoP. A publisher using this technique packages each encoded bitrate as a ladder of tracks distinguished only by their keyframe interval, numbers those tracks' Group IDs so that they share a common alignment, and advertises the keyframe interval of each track in a MOQT Streaming Format (MSF) catalog. A subscriber uses this information to compute the nearest valid switch point on any track in scope and to perform the switch using the SWITCH_FROM request parameter in soft mode.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ugur-moq-fast-switching/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ugur-moq-fast-switching",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ugur-moq-fast-switching"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kroehl-agentic-trust-aae",
   "title": "Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE): A Machine-Evaluable Authorization Structure for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T17:26:42Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T17:47:06.648Z",
   "pages": 61,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kroehl",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.61,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents now operate at production scale across financial, commercial, and infrastructure domains — executing transactions, invoking APIs, and taking consequential actions without direct human oversight at each step. Existing authorization mechanisms (OAuth 2.0, API keys, ACLs) were designed for human- initiated requests and do not capture the machine-evaluable semantics required for autonomous agent authorization: what the agent is mandated to do, what constraints bound its actions, and for how long the authorization is valid. This document specifies the Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE), a structured authorization container for autonomous AI agents. AAE defines three mandatory blocks — MANDATE, CONSTRAINTS, and VALIDITY — that together constitute a machine-evaluable, cryptographically verifiable authorization assertion. AAE is designed to be protocol- agnostic, binding to W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) for agent identity and W3C Verifiable Credentials (VCs) for issuance and signature, and is independent of any specific AI framework, transport protocol, or blockchain.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kroehl-agentic-trust-aae/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kroehl-agentic-trust-aae",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kroehl-agentic-trust-aae"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-spiriyath-dhc-ai-gateway-uri",
   "title": "DHCP and DHCPv6 Options for an AI Gateway URI",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T17:16:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T17:47:06.648Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "spiriyath",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a DHCPv4 option and a DHCPv6 option that carry the HTTPS URI of an AI gateway descriptor. The descriptor is a Provisioning Domain Additional Information document. It identifies a forward proxy and the destinations for which that proxy is to be used. The DHCP options do not carry proxy credentials, model identifiers, or a Proxy Auto-Configuration script.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-spiriyath-dhc-ai-gateway-uri/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spiriyath-dhc-ai-gateway-uri",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-spiriyath-dhc-ai-gateway-uri"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-psk",
   "title": "LAKE Authenticated with Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs)",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T17:14:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T17:47:06.648Z",
   "pages": 36,
   "group": "lake",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "lake",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication method for the Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) protocol. The PSK method provides mutual authentication, ephemeral key exchange, identity protection, and quantum resistance while incurring lower computational costs than the public-key authentication methods specified for LAKE. It is suited for systems where nodes share a PSK provided out-of-band (external PSK) and enables efficient session resumption with less computational overhead when the PSK is provided from a previous LAKE session (resumption PSK). This document details the PSK message flow, key derivation changes, message formatting, processing, and security considerations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-psk/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-psk",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-psk"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-lake-private-use-ranges",
   "title": "Additional Private Use Ranges in the IANA Registries of the Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) Protocol",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T17:06:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T17:47:06.648Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "lake",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "lake",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.9,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.84,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document adds Private Use ranges to IANA registries that pertain to the Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange (LAKE) protocol. Discussion Venues This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Discussion of this document takes place on the Lightweight Authenticated Key Exchange Working Group mailing list (lake@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/lake/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/lake-wg/private-use-ranges.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-private-use-ranges/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-private-use-ranges",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-lake-private-use-ranges"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results",
   "title": "Geographic Attestation Results",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:55:48Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T17:47:06.648Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "rats",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "rats",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Many workloads have limitations on what geography they are allowed to operate in. This is often due to a regulation that requires that the computation occur in a particular jurisdiction. There are many mechanisms by which Evidence of location may be created and then evaluated by a Verifier. No matter which mechanism is appropriate for a given situation, the result of the Verification can be expressed in a similiarly defined EAT Attestation Result. This document is about encoding a variety of geographical conclusions conclusions in an Attestation Result. In addition, one mechanism of directly creating a geographic result in the form of an Endorsement is described in an appendix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-ace-coap-pubsub-profile",
   "title": "CoAP Publish-Subscribe Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:48:33Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T17:47:06.648Z",
   "pages": 67,
   "group": "ace",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "ace",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.51,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines an application profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework, to enable secure group communication in the Publish-Subscribe (Pub-Sub) architecture for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) specified in draft-ietf-core-coap-pubsub, where Publishers and Subscribers communicate through a Broker. This profile relies on protocol-specific transport profiles of ACE to achieve communication security, server authentication, and proof of possession of a key owned by the Client and bound to an OAuth 2.0 access token. This document specifies the provisioning and enforcement of authorization information for Clients to act as Publishers and/or Subscribers, as well as the provisioning of keying material and security parameters that Clients use for protecting their communications end-to-end through the Broker. Note to RFC Editor: Please replace \"draft-ietf-core-coap-pubsub\" with the RFC number of that document and delete this paragraph.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-coap-pubsub-profile/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-pubsub-profile",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-ace-coap-pubsub-profile"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination",
   "title": "P10 Underdetermination Profile: Adjudication Statements over SCITT",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:38:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 67,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "nestorov",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.84,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "P10 defines a third-party-verifiable binding for NotDemonstrated(reason=underdetermined). A conforming P10 Adjudication Statement carries two canonical witness worlds that are compatible with the same closed evidence set and produce different values for the same frozen claim. The witness result is checked against committed profile semantics and bound into a SCITT Transparent Statement containing an in-toto Statement v1 predicate. The result establishes underdetermination only relative to the declared profile and does not identify the actual world or establish either claim value as true.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-nestorov-scitt-p10-underdetermination"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-mpls-mna-ioam",
   "title": "MPLS Network Actions for In Situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance",
   "rev": "17",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:31:21Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "mpls",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "mpls",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "In situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM), defined in RFC 9197, collects operational and telemetry information in the packet using IOAM-Data-Fields while the packet traverses a path between two points in the network. Several IOAM Option-Types are available, including Pre-allocated Trace, Proof of Transit (POT), Edge-to-Edge (E2E), and Incremental Trace. These Option-Types can be used to collect information for calculating various performance metrics. RFC 9326 defines the IOAM Direct Export (IOAM-DEX) Option- Type, which is used as a trigger for IOAM data to be directly exported or locally aggregated without being pushed into in-flight data packets. MPLS Network Action (MNA) mechanisms indicate actions to be performed on any combination of Label Switched Paths, MPLS packets, and the node itself, and transport the data needed for these actions. This document defines MNAs to collect and transport the operational state and telemetry information using IOAM-Data-Fields as well as IOAM-DEX.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mpls-mna-ioam/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mpls-mna-ioam",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-mpls-mna-ioam"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-nmop-message-broker-telemetry-message",
   "title": "Extensible YANG Model for Network Telemetry Messages",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:25:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 33,
   "group": "nmop",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "nmop",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines an extensible message schema in YANG to be used at data collection to transform Network Telemetry messages into external systems such as Message Brokers. The extensible message schema enables data collectors to add metadata for the provenance of the operational network data.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nmop-message-broker-telemetry-message/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nmop-message-broker-telemetry-message",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-nmop-message-broker-telemetry-message"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-spring-stamp-srpm-srv6",
   "title": "Performance Measurement Using Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP) for Segment Routing over the IPv6 (SRv6) Data Plane",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:25:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 63,
   "group": "spring",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "spring",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Segment Routing (SR) can be used to steer packets through a network employing source routing. SR can be applied to both MPLS (SR-MPLS) and IPv6 (SRv6) data planes. This document describes the procedures for performance measurement in SRv6 networks using the Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP), as specified in RFC 8762, along with its optional extensions specified in RFC 8972 and the SR- specific extensions specified in RFC 9503. These procedures measure links and SRv6 paths including Segment Lists of SR Policies, SRv6 IGP best paths, and SRv6 IGP Flexible Algorithm (Flex-Algo) paths, as well as Layer-3 and Layer-2 services carried over those paths. This document updates RFC 8972 for the definition of the STAMP session identifier for SRv6.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-spring-stamp-srpm-srv6/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-spring-stamp-srpm-srv6",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-spring-stamp-srpm-srv6"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-schrock-oauth-exact-action-identifiers",
   "title": "Exact-Action Identifiers in OAuth Authorization Details",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:25:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "schrock",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines an action_id member for OAuth Rich Authorization Requests authorization details types that explicitly adopt it. The member carries a scheme-qualified identifier of an action description. A resource server derives an identifier from the operation it is about to perform and compares it with the identifier in the granted authorization details. The document requests a registry of exact-action identifier schemes and an initial entry for version 1 of the Canonical Action Identifier. It specifies authorization server processing, resource server comparison, and discovery metadata without choosing a universal action vocabulary or digest construction. Identifier equality is an additional condition on authorization; it does not establish permission, a single-use grant, execution, or the truth of externally supplied action data.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schrock-oauth-exact-action-identifiers/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-schrock-oauth-exact-action-identifiers",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-schrock-oauth-exact-action-identifiers"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-gpon-gem",
   "title": "Export of Gigabit Passive Optical Network Encapsulation Method in IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:18:06Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "opsawg",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "opsawg",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document introduces new IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Information Elements to identify a set of G-PON Encapsulation Method entities in the Passive Optical Transport of the Optical Distribution Network.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-gpon-gem/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-gpon-gem",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-gpon-gem"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-spring-stamp-srpm-mpls",
   "title": "Performance Measurement Using Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP) for Segment Routing over the MPLS Data Plane",
   "rev": "14",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:15:54Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 52,
   "group": "spring",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "spring",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Segment Routing (SR) can be used to steer packets through a network employing source routing. SR can be applied to both MPLS (SR-MPLS) and IPv6 (SRv6) data planes. This document specifies procedures for performance measurement in SR-MPLS networks using the Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP), as specified in RFC 8762, along with its optional extensions specified in RFC 8972 and the SR- specific extensions specified in RFC 9503. These procedures measure SR-MPLS paths, including Segment Lists of SR Policies, SR-MPLS IGP best paths, and SR-MPLS IGP Flexible Algorithm (Flex-Algo) paths, as well as Layer-3 services and point-to-point Layer-2 services carried over those paths.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-spring-stamp-srpm-mpls/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-spring-stamp-srpm-mpls",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-spring-stamp-srpm-mpls"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-moq-msf",
   "title": "MOQT Streaming Format",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T16:13:11Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 100,
   "group": "moq",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "moq",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.59,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the MOQT Streaming Format, designed to operate on Media Over QUIC Transport.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-moq-msf/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-moq-msf",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-moq-msf"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gandhi-bpm-stamp-signaling",
   "title": "Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP) Extensions for Signaling Parameters",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:57:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T16:47:06.896Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gandhi",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.79,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP) specified in RFC 8762 supports active measurement of network performance without a control channel to pre-signal session parameters. RFC 8972 defines optional extensions in the form of Type-Length-Value (TLV) elements for STAMP. This document defines a STAMP Type-Length-Value (TLV) that allows a Session-Sender and a Session-Reflector to exchange measurement capabilities and configuration parameters in STAMP-Test packets. The Session-Sender uses the returned parameters to configure a STAMP session.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gandhi-bpm-stamp-signaling/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gandhi-bpm-stamp-signaling",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gandhi-bpm-stamp-signaling"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-opsawg-yang-provenance",
   "title": "Applying COSE Signatures for YANG Data Provenance",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:47:01Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T15:47:06.692Z",
   "pages": 51,
   "group": "opsawg",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "opsawg",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.85,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a mechanism based on CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) signatures to provide and verify the provenance of YANG data, so it is possible to verify the origin and integrity of a dataset, even when those data are going to be processed and/or applied in workflows where a crypto-enabled data transport directly from the original data source is not available. As the application of evidence-based OAM automation and the use of tools such as AI/ML grow, provenance validation becomes more relevant in all scenarios, in support of the assuring the origin and integrity of data. The use of compact signatures facilitates the inclusion of provenance strings in any YANG schema requiring them.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsawg-yang-provenance/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-yang-provenance",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-opsawg-yang-provenance"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yuyou-moq-v3c",
   "title": "Transport of V3C Bitstreams over Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT)",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:46:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T15:47:06.692Z",
   "pages": 64,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "yuyou",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.87,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.57,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a mapping and packaging for transporting ISO/ IEC 23090-5 Visual Volumetric Video-based Coding (V3C) bitstreams over Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT). The mapping uses the MOQT Streaming Format (MSF): V3C configuration is MSF initialization data, each independently consumable V3C component is an MSF track, a run of V3C composition units that starts at a random access point is a MOQT Group, and the coded data of one component for one composition unit is a MOQT Object. Relays remain unaware of V3C syntax. V3C knowledge is confined to the streaming-format layer.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yuyou-moq-v3c/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yuyou-moq-v3c",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-yuyou-moq-v3c"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bates-atp",
   "title": "Agent Transaction Protocol (ATP)",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:34:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T15:47:06.692Z",
   "pages": 73,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "bates",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "ATP defines a cryptographically verifiable directed acyclic graph (DAG) model for agent transactions. ATP enables tamper-evident signed causality and auditable lineage across agentic systems by representing each action as a signed node with one or more parent references, assuming verifier access to issuer public keys and the referenced parent nodes. The protocol is designed to be lightweight, transport-independent, and suitable for environments where accountability, provenance, and verifiable history are required.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bates-atp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bates-atp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-bates-atp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bates-atp-test-vectors",
   "title": "ATP Core Test Vectors",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:34:21Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T15:47:06.692Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "bates",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.87,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.52,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.48,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document publishes golden test vectors for the Agent Transaction Protocol (ATP). The vectors cover canonicalization (RFC 8785 JCS), nodeId computation, and Ed25519 signature generation and verification. ATP Core conformance requires that conformant implementations pass all vectors in this document for canonicalization, nodeId computation, and Ed25519 signature verification.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bates-atp-test-vectors/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bates-atp-test-vectors",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-bates-atp-test-vectors"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-mailmaint-unobtrusive-signatures",
   "title": "Unobtrusive End-to-End Email Signatures",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:30:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T15:47:06.692Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "mailmaint",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "mailmaint",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document deals with end-to-end cryptographically signed email. It introduces a structure for signed email that is designed to avoid creating any disturbance in legacy email clients. This \"unobtrusive\" signature structure removes disincentives for signing email.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mailmaint-unobtrusive-signatures/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mailmaint-unobtrusive-signatures",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-mailmaint-unobtrusive-signatures"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-claise-opsawg-ipfix-ordered-mpls-ie",
   "title": "Generic MPLS Information Elements for Ordered Export in IPFIX",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:27:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T15:47:06.692Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "claise",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.88,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines new generic IPFIX Information Elements for MPLS label stacks and label attributes, intended for use with the ordered set mechanisms that provide an explicit ordering guarantee for repeated Information Elements.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-claise-opsawg-ipfix-ordered-mpls-ie/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-claise-opsawg-ipfix-ordered-mpls-ie",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-claise-opsawg-ipfix-ordered-mpls-ie"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-meunier-webbotauth-capacity-management",
   "title": "PACE: Capability Management for Agents",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:21:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T15:47:06.692Z",
   "pages": 24,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "meunier",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.88,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.55,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.33,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document addresses the noisy neighbour problem without requiring a stable client identifier at the origin. Separately allocated budgets let origins limit consumption beneath a shared platform identity. It describes PACE: a framework for managing budget continuity across requests using a composition of the Web Bot Auth with the Moderation of unLinkable Endorsements (MOLE) architecture [MOLE-ARCH] and protocols [MOLE-PROTOCOLS]. This composition allows for per-client capacity management in a way that allows origins to serve clients above an otherwise constrained public baseline.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-meunier-webbotauth-capacity-management/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-meunier-webbotauth-capacity-management",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-meunier-webbotauth-capacity-management"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-claise-opsawg-ipfix-ordered-ie",
   "title": "Ordered Information Element Export in IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T15:05:01Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T15:47:06.692Z",
   "pages": 37,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "claise",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.96,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) protocol allows the same Information Element to appear multiple times in a Template Record. RFC 7011 states that multiple occurrences of the same Information Element SHOULD follow the logical order of their treatments by the Metering Process; however, no protocol mechanism exists for the Exporting Process to explicitly signal to the Collecting Process that this ordering is guaranteed. Without such a guarantee, the Collecting Process cannot safely interpret repeated Information Elements as ordered observations. This document describes the problem, presents use cases, analyzes candidate solutions, and specifies a mechanism, a new Ordered Set type, that establishes an end-to-end ordering guarantee: the Metering Process records repeated Information Element values in the order the corresponding observations are made, the Exporting Process preserves and signals this guarantee, and the Collecting Process interprets the n-th occurrence of an Information Element as corresponding to the n-th observation by the Metering Process at the Observation Point. This document updates RFC 7011, RFC 5476, and RFC 6183.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-claise-opsawg-ipfix-ordered-ie/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-claise-opsawg-ipfix-ordered-ie",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-claise-opsawg-ipfix-ordered-ie"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wang-ipsecme-kem-auth-ikev2",
   "title": "KEM-based Authentication for IKEv2 with Post-quantum Security",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T14:39:06Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "wang",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This draft specifies a new authentication mechanism, called KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism) -based authentication, for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2). This is motivated by the fact that some post-quantum KEMs (like ML-KEM) are more efficient than post-quantum signature algorithms (like ML-DSA).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wang-ipsecme-kem-auth-ikev2/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wang-ipsecme-kem-auth-ikev2",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-wang-ipsecme-kem-auth-ikev2"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xiao-v6ops-eds",
   "title": "Enhanced Dual Stack: Connection-Informed IPv6/IPv4 Selection",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T14:33:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "xiao",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.9,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.35,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes Enhanced Dual Stack (EDS), a framework intended to reduce the operational risk and upfront workload of introducing IPv6 into existing IPv4 networks. EDS provides a connection-informed method for implementing RFC 6724 Rule 1, \"Avoid unusable destinations\", by remembering recent TCP/QUIC connection- establishment failures and avoiding repeated selection of affected IPv6 destinations. It also provides operational diagnostics so administrators can identify and correct IPv6 problems. EDS is complementary to Happy Eyeballs and does not require connection racing. By starting with selected EDS-capable pioneer hosts, performing practical validation, and expanding IPv6 gradually, EDS can be deployed incrementally without requiring all hosts to support EDS. With EDS, enterprises' IPv6 introduction can change from a heavy upfront validation process toward an incremental improvement process.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-xiao-v6ops-eds/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-xiao-v6ops-eds",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-xiao-v6ops-eds"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gandhi-lsr-stamp",
   "title": "IS-IS, OSPF, BGP-LS, and BGP Extensions for Advertising STAMP Session-Reflectors",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T14:30:31Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 14,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gandhi",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Simple Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP), as defined in RFC 8762, can be utilized for active measurement without relying on a control channel to pre-signal session parameters. This document defines extensions to IS-IS, OSPF, BGP-LS, and BGP to advertise information for discovering STAMP Session-Reflectors in a network. The advertised information can be used by STAMP senders to set up appropriate performance measurement sessions for delay and packet loss metrics.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gandhi-lsr-stamp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gandhi-lsr-stamp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gandhi-lsr-stamp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-banffy-httpbis-not-a-freezer",
   "title": "The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Status Code 483 (I'm Not a Freezer)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T14:30:09Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "banffy",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.94,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.92,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Hypertext Transfer Protocol status code 483 (I'm Not a Freezer). A server returns this status code when it understands a request that requires freezing or refrigeration capabilities but is not capable of providing those capabilities. This document also clarifies the distinction between a freezer, a refrigerator, a server operating at a low temperature, a frozen software process, and an online service advertising \"cold storage\".",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-banffy-httpbis-not-a-freezer/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-banffy-httpbis-not-a-freezer",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-banffy-httpbis-not-a-freezer"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gunuganti-agent-approval-evidence",
   "title": "Owner-Approved Agent Spending with Sealed Evidence: The Approval-Evidence Object for Agent Action Protocols",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T14:16:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 16,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gunuganti",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.64,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.69,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "When a software agent acts for a person — in particular when it spends the person's money — the approval at the centre of the flow is, in current agent protocols, a statement by the agent itself. The Personal Agent Protocol's Operations extension states the consequence in its own security considerations: an approval there does not prove that the user saw the terms or approved them; it \"works on trust\". This document describes the design of a running system that removes the trust step for the approval half of the problem — an owner-set, machine-checkable mandate; a deterministic check performed and recorded before any spendable token exists; approval by the owner on a surface the agent cannot operate or imitate; a single-use decision token bound to the hash of the exact action approved; and a sealed, owner-held receipt that grades its contents (approval PROVEN; the performer's completion report, including payment facts, REPORTED and PINNED) — and specifies an optional approval-evidence object that agent action protocols can carry so that a relying party can verify an approval mechanically instead of trusting the agent's assertion.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gunuganti-agent-approval-evidence/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gunuganti-agent-approval-evidence",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gunuganti-agent-approval-evidence"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-arsentev-crawler-traffic-reporting",
   "title": "Reporting Crawler Traffic by Verification Level",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T14:09:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "arsentev",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.29,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.72,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.36,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The User-Agent header is written by the client. It is a claim, not an identity. Reports of crawler and AI crawler traffic that count requests by User-Agent token alone present claims as activity. This document defines four counts a crawler traffic report should give per crawler token: declared, route-consistent, verified, and unverifiable. It states which verification check was possible at the vantage point where the log was taken. It also defines a small JSON report object.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-arsentev-crawler-traffic-reporting/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arsentev-crawler-traffic-reporting",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-arsentev-crawler-traffic-reporting"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hamr-oauth-agent-delegation",
   "title": "An Attenuated Delegation Profile for Automated Agents",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:58:20Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 38,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "hamr",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.91,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document builds on HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) for requests that automated agents send on behalf of people. RFC 9421 shows who signed a request. It does not show who the agent acts for, or what the agent may do. This document defines an HTTP header field, Agent-Delegation, that carries a chain of delegation links. Each link can only narrow the scope, floors, and expiry of the link before it, and a verifier checks every link. Floors cover two things. The first is the person or account behind the agent: an Attestation Issuer, such as a mobile network operator or an identity- document check, answers with a signed yes or no, bound to the verifier's nonce and to an expiry, and never returns the value behind the answer. The second is what the agent may do: each call has a class, r, w, or x, read as in chmod, with an optional count per class, and a signed menu gives the class of each call. A deployment can set this scope for each job when the job starts. This document does not define a credential format, an identity system, or revocation.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hamr-oauth-agent-delegation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hamr-oauth-agent-delegation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-hamr-oauth-agent-delegation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-saum-rtgwg-mtu-propagation-evpn-overlays",
   "title": "MTU propagation over EVPN Overlays",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:53:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 32,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "saum",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.39,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.67,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Path MTU Discovery between end-host-devices/Virtual-Machines/servers/ workloads connected over an EVPN-Overlay Network in Datacenter/Campus/enterprise deployment, is a problem, yet to be resolved in the standards forums. It needs a converged solution to ensure optimal usage of network and computational resources of the networking elements, including underlay routers/switches, constituting the overlay network. This documents takes leads from the guidelines presented in [RFC4459]. The overlay connectivity can pan across various sites (geographically seperated or collocated) for realizing a Datacenter Interconnect or intersite VPNs between campus sites (buildings, branch offices etc). This literature intends to solve problem of icmp error propagation from an underlay routing/switching device to an end-host (hooked to EVPN overlay), thus facilitating \"accurate MTU\" learnings. This document also leverages the icmp multipart message extension, mentioned in [RFC4884] to carry the original packet in the icmp PDU.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-saum-rtgwg-mtu-propagation-evpn-overlays/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-saum-rtgwg-mtu-propagation-evpn-overlays",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-saum-rtgwg-mtu-propagation-evpn-overlays"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-app-testing",
   "title": "Recommendations for IPv6 Testing of Applications",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:48:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T14:47:06.787Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "v6ops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "v6ops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides guidance for application developers and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) providers on how to approach IPv6 testing in Dual-stack (IPv4+IPv6), and IPv6-only scenarios, including \"IPv6-only-strict\" scenarios without any connectivity towards any relevant IPv4 endpoint. The document also discusses common misconceptions about the degree to which Operating Systems and libraries can abstract IPv6 issues away and explains common regressions to avoid when deploying IPv6 support.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-app-testing/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-app-testing",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-app-testing"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-green-power-and-energy-yang",
   "title": "Power and Energy YANG Module",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:42:27Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 52,
   "group": "green",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "green",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a YANG data model for Power and Energy monitoring and control of devices within or connected to communication networks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-green-power-and-energy-yang/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-green-power-and-energy-yang",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-green-power-and-energy-yang"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-grund-khatoun-pujolle-serhrouchni-smrp",
   "title": "Stapled Merkle Revocation Proofs for Pseudonymous ITS Credentials (SMRP)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:34:02Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 124,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "grund",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Pseudonymous Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) credentials are short-lived and numerous. Verifiers decide at message-reception time, often without connectivity, which makes revocation status hard to deliver. This document specifies Stapled Merkle Revocation Proofs (SMRP). For each partition of a revocation domain, an authorized issuer signs a compact checkpoint that commits to the complete sorted set of revoked credential tokens. A credential holder staples a logarithmic-size proof that its token is absent from that set, and a verifier checks the proof offline against the current checkpoint. Freshness is carried by the checkpoint, which is public, shared by every credential of the partition, and deliverable by any party. Within one stream, a proof remains usable across checkpoints for as long as the set commitment is unchanged and the current checkpoint is admissible. The same commitment supports proofs of revocation that anyone can relay, complete authenticated lists for capable verifiers, and public audit. The document defines a credential identity that does not depend on the certificate signature, a Merkle tree over the intervals of the sorted revoked set with one authentication path per proof, the checkpoint and staple encodings, conservative time validation with a conditional bound on the last affirmative decision after revocation, verifier state with terminal revocation, and carriage in V2X secured messages and in TLS 1.3. It positions SMRP against the companion pOCSP mechanism: pOCSP signs one statement per certificate and validity window, whereas SMRP signs one statement per partition and issuance period. This document is Experimental and allocates no identifier in ETSI, IEEE, or SAE namespaces.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grund-khatoun-pujolle-serhrouchni-smrp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-grund-khatoun-pujolle-serhrouchni-smrp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-grund-khatoun-pujolle-serhrouchni-smrp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jones-scitt-dual-receipt",
   "title": "A Dual-Receipt Profile for Binding a Decision Statement to an Independent Policy Evaluation Statement",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:24:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 27,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "jones",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.89,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a dual-receipt profile for recording one disbursement decision as two signed statements, made by two different parties and registered with the same Transparency Service. An approver acting for a fiscal sponsor signs a Decision Statement. A validator acting for a receiving institution signs a Policy Evaluation Statement that binds to the Decision Statement's identifier, receipt, and signature, and records the outcome of a named policy. The profile defines the JSON members of both statements, a canonical encoding based on the JSON Canonicalization Scheme, SHA-256 statement identifiers, a composite identifier, Merkle tree receipts that use the hashing rules of RFC 9162, and a verification procedure. It also states the limits of the evidence: a bundle of statements cannot show that no conflicting evaluation exists, and the times inside the statements are claims made by their signers.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jones-scitt-dual-receipt/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-jones-scitt-dual-receipt",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-jones-scitt-dual-receipt"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts",
   "title": "Decision Receipts for Approvals, Declined Actions and Executed Actions in Agent Audit Records",
   "rev": "09",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:24:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 57,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gruszka",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.78,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.39,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The architecture for auditing agent delegation and interactions proposed for the AUDIT effort names Interaction Records, Action Records and Authorization Transition Records and leaves their encoding open. This document maps an existing pair of signed records, the decision receipt and the outcome receipt of the open- source proofbundle project, onto those record types for three cases, a human approval, a declined action and an executed action with its result, and gives each record exact bytes, a signature and digest bindings that a third party can check offline. Each receipt is created when the decision or the outcome occurs and is checked by an Auditor post hoc, and a declined or refused action is a record of its own. For each case the document states what the receipt adds and what it does not show, and it gives a verification procedure that runs offline. It requires that an approval be honoured at most once, even after the record of consumed approvals is rotated. Test vectors for all three cases, each with a counterexample, are included. The document also describes, informatively, how a receipt can be registered with a Transparency Service under RFC 9943 and what a SCITT Receipt then shows and does not show. It uses existing receipt formats and defines no new predicate or registry. How the issuer of a receipt enforces its decision is out of scope.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xu-oan-resource-identity-discovery",
   "title": "Trust-Governed Resource Identity and Discovery Architecture for OpenAgenet",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:22:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 49,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "xu",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.49,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a trust-governed resource identity and discovery architecture for OpenAgenet (OAN). It covers callable agents, skills, Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, tools, and application programming interfaces. Registrars verify registration authority, a Root accepts versioned resource packages, and authorized Discovery Nodes expose verified candidates. Consumers verify package integrity, acceptance, and current state before using a resource through its native protocol or artifact format. The architecture can be profiled with Decentralized Identifier (DID) document concepts and credential-based assertions. This document does not define a new DID method, media type, URI scheme, transport protocol, ranking algorithm, blockchain protocol, agent invocation protocol, or product-native schema.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-xu-oan-resource-identity-discovery/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-xu-oan-resource-identity-discovery",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-xu-oan-resource-identity-discovery"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xu-efficient-agent-discovery-profile",
   "title": "Metadata and Query Profile for Efficient Agent Discovery",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:20:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 35,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "xu",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.48,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.89,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a metadata and query profile for efficient discovery of autonomous software agents. The profile describes how agents publish capability metadata using explicit tags, natural- language descriptions, example tasks, protocol bindings, and operational constraints. It also defines JSON metadata, discovery request, and discovery response objects that enable discovery services to combine structured filtering, semantic retrieval, and fine-grained matching while preserving an interoperable protocol surface. The profile does not mandate a specific machine-learning model, embedding model, database, or ranking algorithm. Instead, it standardizes the metadata and result evidence needed by clients and discovery services so that different implementations can interoperate while optimizing their own latency, scalability, and ranking quality.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-xu-efficient-agent-discovery-profile/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-xu-efficient-agent-discovery-profile",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-xu-efficient-agent-discovery-profile"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xu-agentic-overlay-network-architecture",
   "title": "Architecture for Agentic Overlay Networks",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:17:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "xu",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.4,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an architecture for agentic overlay networks. It describes how autonomous software agents, agent gateways, registries, discovery services, and enterprise service hubs interact across administrative domains without replacing the existing Internet protocol stack. The architecture separates control-plane coordination from runtime agent interaction. Management root nodes coordinate trust anchors, semantic taxonomies, and network-wide policy. Registry service nodes onboard agents and publish signed capability metadata. Discovery service nodes provide intent-driven candidate selection. Enterprise service hubs adapt private systems and legacy interfaces into agent- compatible capabilities. After discovery, runtime authentication and execution are performed by the invoking and target endpoints, which can be agents or gateways, using mutual verification; discovery and management nodes are not required in the runtime path. This document defines architectural roles, functional boundaries, metadata expectations, operational workflows, and security considerations for such networks. It does not define a new transport protocol, a new URI scheme, or a mandatory discovery ranking algorithm.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-xu-agentic-overlay-network-architecture/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-xu-agentic-overlay-network-architecture",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-xu-agentic-overlay-network-architecture"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-grund-v2x-pocsp",
   "title": "Pseudonymous Stapled Certificate Status Evidence for V2X and TLS with ITS Certificates (pOCSP)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T13:02:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 83,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "grund",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) systems authenticate broadcast and unicast messages with short-lived pseudonymous certificates. Revocation status validation is difficult in this environment: Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) can be costly to distribute at pseudonym scale, while verifier-initiated OCSP requests introduce online dependencies, latency, metadata leakage, and denial-of-service exposure. This document specifies pOCSP, an OCSP-derived response type and a set of deployment profiles for short-lived certificate-status evidence that is obtained by the certificate holder and stapled to an authenticated message or TLS CertificateEntry. A verifier validates pOCSP evidence locally, without contacting a responder at message- reception time. pOCSP retains the OCSP status semantics good, revoked, and unknown; defines an explicit signed usage context; defines a compact context-specific certificate identifier; and specifies deterministic, bounded validation, caching, and failure behavior. pOCSP does not claim that its identifier is unlinkable. The identifier is deterministic and can be correlated whenever the underlying certificate is observable or inferable. The V2X profiles therefore require single-certificate evidence and prohibit transmitting pOCSP evidence more frequently than the corresponding full certificate. The document prohibits future-active good evidence, bounds replay by mandatory thisUpdate and nextUpdate values, and makes an authenticated revocation terminal at the verifier: omitted, expired, unknown, or higher-versioned good evidence cannot mask it. It defines profiles for ETSI CAM/DENM, SAE J2735 messages, and TLS 1.3 with ITS certificates, requests an OCSP response-type object identifier, and establishes a registry of pOCSP profile identifiers.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grund-v2x-pocsp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-grund-v2x-pocsp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-grund-v2x-pocsp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-taylor-cose-receipts-rfc9162-sha384-sha512",
   "title": "SHA-384 and SHA-512 Binary Merkle Tree Verifiable Data Structures for COSE Receipts",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T12:48:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 12,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "taylor",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.88,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "RFC 9942 defines COSE Receipts and registers one verifiable data structure, RFC9162_SHA256, the binary Merkle tree of RFC 9162 instantiated with SHA-256. This document registers two more: RFC9162_SHA384 and RFC9162_SHA512, the same tree instantiated with SHA-384 and SHA-512, each with its inclusion and consistency proof types. The tree construction, proof formats, and verification algorithms are unchanged apart from the hash function and the resulting digest size.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-taylor-cose-receipts-rfc9162-sha384-sha512/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-taylor-cose-receipts-rfc9162-sha384-sha512",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-taylor-cose-receipts-rfc9162-sha384-sha512"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-bpm-alt-mark-deployment",
   "title": "An Alternate Marking Deployment Framework",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T12:47:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T13:47:06.580Z",
   "pages": 23,
   "group": "bpm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "bpm",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "measurement",
   "topic_label": "Measurement/OAM",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides a framework for Alternate Marking deployment and includes considerations and guidance for the deployment of the Alternate Marking methodology.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bpm-alt-mark-deployment/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bpm-alt-mark-deployment",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-bpm-alt-mark-deployment"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-alt-mark",
   "title": "IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Alternate-Marking Information Elements",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:53:51Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T12:47:06.325Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "opsawg",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "opsawg",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.71,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Information Elements (IEs) to export Alternate Marking measurement data.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-alt-mark/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-alt-mark",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-alt-mark"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-abak-ai-evaluation-claim-preservation",
   "title": "Claim-Preserving Exchange of AI Evaluation Evidence",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:51:58Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T12:47:06.325Z",
   "pages": 31,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "abak",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.36,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 0.79,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "AI evaluation records can pass through evaluation frameworks, exporters, evidence services, independent reviewers, and systems that make decisions. A conversion can retain a score while losing whether the measurement ran, which result was selected, whether a criterion existed, or which evidence was unavailable. Authenticating the converted record does not recover these distinctions. This document specifies format-neutral requirements for mapping profiles and consumers that exchange AI evaluation evidence. It separates source assertions, explicit derivations, and later policy judgments; requires claim-relevant loss and uncertainty to remain visible; and describes consumer behavior when preservation cannot be established. It includes synthetic counterexamples and guidance for composition with existing evidence mechanisms. It defines neither a wire format nor an evaluation benchmark, safety certification, authorization protocol, or new cryptographic envelope. A concrete mapping profile is needed for interoperable implementation.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-abak-ai-evaluation-claim-preservation/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-abak-ai-evaluation-claim-preservation",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-abak-ai-evaluation-claim-preservation"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gruszka-scitt-statement-identification",
   "title": "Requirements and Test Cases for Identifying SCITT Signed Statements",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:51:50Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T12:47:06.325Z",
   "pages": 61,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gruszka",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "requirements",
   "kind_label": "requirements / use cases",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes proposed requirements and test cases for identifying SCITT Signed Statements. It distinguishes reference matching from statement retrieval, signature verification, issuer authorization, and evidence of registration. It examines how alternative identification schemes treat changes to statement encodings and registration context. The requirements are input to technical discussion and do not represent working group consensus. This document does not define a common reference format, allocate a COSE header parameter, or establish a relationship vocabulary. Its examples illustrate selected properties rather than demonstrate interoperability between deployed transparency services.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gruszka-scitt-statement-identification/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-scitt-statement-identification",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gruszka-scitt-statement-identification"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-detnet-tcqf",
   "title": "Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Data Plane - Tagged Cyclic Queuing and Forwarding (TCQF) for bounded latency with low jitter in large scale DetNets",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:27:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 48,
   "group": "detnet",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "detnet",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This memo specifies a forwarding method for bounded latency and bounded jitter for Deterministic Networks. It is a variant of the IEEE TSN 802.1Q(ch) Cyclic Queuing and Forwarding (CQF) method, called Tagged CQF (TCQF), in which the cycle number is indicated in an existing or new packet header field, called the cycle tag. This tag allows more than two cycles to be used and replaces the cycle mapping of CQF, which is based purely on the synchronized reception clock. Whereas CQF supports low end-to-end jitter across limited-scale networks with link speeds mostly up to 10Gbps, TCQF supports the same low end-to-end jitter across large-scale, wide-area networks with high per-hop latency and jitter (which is not possible with CQF), and enables high-speed hardware implementations above 10Gbps without requiring more accurate clock synchronization. Like CQF, TCQF eliminates the need for per-DetNet-flow state on midpoint routers, requiring only flow-agnostic cycle state. Because it is specified as a DetNet scheduling method, TCQF can be deployed not only as a sub- network method, but also as part of a DetNet forwarder. This memo standardizes TCQF as a mechanism independent of the tagging method used. It also specifies tagging via (1) the existing MPLS packet Traffic Class (TC) field for MPLS packets, (2) the IP/IPv6 DSCP field for IP/IPv6 packets, and (3) a new TCQF Option header for IPv6 packets.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-detnet-tcqf/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-detnet-tcqf",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-detnet-tcqf"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-detnet-glbf",
   "title": "Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Data Plane - guaranteed Latency Based Forwarding (gLBF) for bounded latency with low jitter and asynchronous forwarding in Deterministic Networks",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:26:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 45,
   "group": "detnet",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "detnet",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "iot",
   "topic_label": "IoT",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.87,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This memo proposes a mechanism called \"guaranteed Latency Based Forwarding\" (gLBF) as part of DetNet for hop-by-hop packet forwarding with per-hop deterministically bounded latency and minimal jitter. gLBF is intended to be useful across a wide range of networks and applications that need high-precision deterministic networking services, from in-car networks and networks for industrial automation on factory floors all the way to country-wide networks at 100 Gbps and beyond. Unlike other mechanisms, gLBF does not require network-wide clock synchronization, nor does it require per-flow state on network nodes. It thereby avoids the drawbacks of other known methods while retaining their advantages. Specifically, gLBF uses the queuing model and calculus of Urgency Based Scheduling (UBS, [UBS]), which is used by TSN Asynchronous Traffic Shaping [TSN-ATS]. gLBF is intended as a plug-in replacement for, or a mechanism in parallel to, TSN-ATS, because it allows reuse of the same controller-plane design that selects paths for TSN-ATS, sizes TSN-ATS queues, calculates latencies and admits flows onto the calculated paths with the calculated latencies. In addition to reducing jitter compared to TSN-ATS through additional buffering (dampening) in the network, gLBF also eliminates the per- flow, per-hop state maintenance required by TSN-ATS. This avoids having to signal per-flow state from the controller-plane to every hop, and the associated scaling problems. It also reduces the implementation cost of high-speed networking hardware, because it avoids the additional high-speed read/write memory accesses needed to retrieve, process and update per-flow state variables for a large number of flows.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-detnet-glbf/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-detnet-glbf",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-detnet-glbf"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-dmm-udp-tunnel-acaas-extn",
   "title": "A YANG Data Model Extension for Attachment Circuit as a Service with UDP Tunnel Support",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:26:35Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "dmm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "dmm",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Delivery of network services over a Layer 3 tunnel assumes that the appropriate setup is provisioned over links that connect the customer termination points and provider network. The required setup to allow successful data exchange over these links is referred to as an attachment circuit (AC) while the underlying link for carrying network services is referred to as \"bearer\", in this case a Layer 3 UDP tunnel. This document specifies an extension for UDP tunnel as Layer 3 bearer to the YANG service data model for AC.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dmm-udp-tunnel-acaas-extn/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmm-udp-tunnel-acaas-extn",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-dmm-udp-tunnel-acaas-extn"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator",
   "title": "An Agentic AI Framework for Hallucination Mitigation in Network Intent Translation",
   "rev": "05",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:20:22Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 34,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "gu",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.93,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.85,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.84,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes an agentic AI workflow for detecting and mitigating structural and semantic errors, including hallucinated policy content, when translating a natural-language network intent into structured policies. The workflow coordinates role-specialized language-model functions with deterministic validation tools within a predefined action space and a bounded retry budget. Schema- constrained generation limits structural defects, while cross-slot checks and intent-faithfulness assessment identify a potentially unsupported or inconsistent policy content. Structured validation traces guide targeted re-extraction and regeneration. Unresolved cases retain explicit failure status for downstream review. This document describes component interactions, validation outcomes, and recovery behavior, and also presents a 3GPP TS 28.312-based instantiation for mobile network management.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-song-broadband-ancp-tsf",
   "title": "TSF Extensions to ANCP in CU Separation Broadband Networks",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:17:25Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "song",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.44,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.8,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a Traffic Steering Function (TSF) capability extension to the Access Node Control Protocol (ANCP), to discover and manage disaggregated user-plane (UP) functions in control/user plane separated networks, including the Access Network User Plane (AN-UP) and the Network Access Server User Plane (NAS-UP).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-song-broadband-ancp-tsf/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-song-broadband-ancp-tsf",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-song-broadband-ancp-tsf"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-opsawg-collected-data-manifest",
   "title": "A Data Manifest for Contextualized Telemetry Data",
   "rev": "17",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:09:31Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 71,
   "group": "opsawg",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "opsawg",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Network platforms use Network Telemetry, such as YANG-Push (RFC 8641), to continuously stream information, including both counters and state information. This document describes the metadata that ensure that the collected data can be interpreted correctly. This document specifies the Data Manifest, composed of two YANG data models (the Platform Manifest and the non-normative Data Collection Manifest). These YANG modules are specified at the network level (e.g., network controllers) to provide a model that encompasses several network platforms. The Data Manifest must be streamed and stored along with the data, up to the collection and analytics systems to keep the collected data fully usable by the data scientists and relevant tools. Additionally, this document specifies an augmentation of the YANG-Push model to include the actual collection period, in case it differs from the configured collection period.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsawg-collected-data-manifest/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-collected-data-manifest",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-opsawg-collected-data-manifest"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dvojmoc-reception-forwarding-limits",
   "title": "Depth and Fanout Bounding for Agent-to-Agent Discovery Forwarding",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:05:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "dvojmoc",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.36,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.88,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a mechanism, deployed in production as part of the \"AI Docking Port\" discovery protocol, for bounding the traffic cost of stateless agent-to-agent forwarding across a network of independent nodes with no central registry. When a node forwards a request to its neighbors, and those neighbors may forward again, request cost grows as fanout^depth; absent an explicit bound this cost is paid by relaying operators rather than the requester. This document specifies two operator-controlled limits, max_depth and max_fanout, published in a node's discovery manifest, and the forwarding behavior they constrain. It is submitted for discussion as a possible contribution to ongoing community work on agent discovery and invocation protocols, including the W3C Community Group \"AI Agent Protocol\".",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dvojmoc-reception-forwarding-limits/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-dvojmoc-reception-forwarding-limits",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-dvojmoc-reception-forwarding-limits"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-song-lamps-cms-composite-frodokem",
   "title": "Composite FrodoKEM for use in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T11:04:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 61,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "song",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the conventions for using Composite FrodoKEM algorithms with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). Composite FrodoKEM combines FrodoKEM with traditional algorithms (RSA-OAEP, X25519, X448) to provide hybrid post-quantum key encapsulation.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-song-lamps-cms-composite-frodokem/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-song-lamps-cms-composite-frodokem",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-song-lamps-cms-composite-frodokem"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-song-lamps-pq-composite-frodokem",
   "title": "Composite FrodoKEM for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T10:59:44Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 153,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "song",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Composite FrodoKEM defines combinations of FrodoKEM with RSA-OAEP, X25519, and X448. This document specifies the algorithm definitions, key formats, and certificate conventions for using Composite FrodoKEM in the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-song-lamps-pq-composite-frodokem/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-song-lamps-pq-composite-frodokem",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-song-lamps-pq-composite-frodokem"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kozuka-quic-stateless-punch",
   "title": "Stateless Server-Assisted Hole Punching for QUIC",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T10:57:55Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 20,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kozuka",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a QUIC extension that lets two endpoints connected through a relay establish a direct path between them when one or both are behind Network Address Translators (NATs). The client asks the server, over the existing connection, to send a single small \"punch\" packet toward one of the client's address candidates. The server keeps no per-attempt state and does not initiate validation of candidate paths. After a short delay, the client validates the direct path using ordinary client-initiated path validation as defined in RFC 9000, or ordinary path creation as defined in RFC 10069 when QUIC multipath is in use, and can then migrate the connection to it.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kozuka-quic-stateless-punch/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kozuka-quic-stateless-punch",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kozuka-quic-stateless-punch"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-melo-dap-visual-oob-auth",
   "title": "Dynamic Authorization Protocol (DAP): Out-of-Band Visual Transaction Authorization for Untrusted Terminals",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T10:48:51Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T11:47:06.340Z",
   "pages": 40,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "melo",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Dynamic Authorization Protocol (DAP), an Out-of-Band (OOB) visual transaction authorization protocol, used as a second factor, for electronic financial transactions initiated on untrusted terminals. The terminal displays a cryptographically protected challenge as a Quick Response (QR) code. A trusted mobile device of the user, which needs no network connection, scans the code, verifies it with HMAC-SHA-256, shows the transaction details for confirmation (\"What You See Is What You Sign\"), and then reveals a one-time authorizer code protected with AES-256. Each challenge is bound to one transaction and expires within 120 seconds. The document also describes the provisioning of the shared key through a dual-channel XOR split-key exchange, its activation, and the templates used to display transactions. DAP targets Man-in-the- Middle (MITM) and Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) adversaries that control the terminal and alter transaction parameters.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-melo-dap-visual-oob-auth/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-melo-dap-visual-oob-auth",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-melo-dap-visual-oob-auth"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-harano-xb64",
   "title": "XB64: A Lightweight Reversible Obfuscation Encoding",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T10:36:14Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T10:47:06.385Z",
   "pages": 8,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "harano",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.73,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.9,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies XB64 (XORed Base64), a lightweight reversible obfuscation encoding scheme for situations where immediate readability of source data is undesirable but cryptographic confidentiality is not required. To provide a key-dependent yet fully reversible representation, XB64 applies repeating-key XOR to arbitrary octet sequences and encodes the result as printable ASCII text using Base64 as specified in RFC 4648. The resulting text itself preserves the source information, allowing exact reconstruction with the same key without external data lookup, while remaining suitable for human handling and exchange through text-oriented systems. By specifying a common encoding format for this level of obfuscation, this document aims to enable interoperable use across different applications, platforms, and implementations.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harano-xb64/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-harano-xb64",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-harano-xb64"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bonica-macneil-singh-ipv6-firewall-metadata",
   "title": "Verifiable Firewall and Security-Enforcement Metadata in IPv6",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T10:27:15Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T10:47:06.385Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "bonica",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.46,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines a way to carry a verifiable record of security enforcement inside IPv6 packets. Each firewall (or other security enforcement point) that handles a packet writes a small, authenticated note saying which rule it matched and what action it took. The notes are protected by a chained Integrity Check Value (ICV), reusing the construction defined for In-situ OAM (IOAM) data integrity. A checker can then prove two separate things: that the notes are authentic (not forged or changed on the way), and that the recorded actions match the intended policy. Because the two checks are independent, a firewall that honestly diverges from policy -- for example because of a stale rule or an implementation bug -- still produces an authentic note, and the divergence is reported rather than hidden. Operators thus gain precise per-hop evidence that every enforcement point was traversed and applied the intended policy, so an EP that was skipped or did not enforce is revealed.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bonica-macneil-singh-ipv6-firewall-metadata/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bonica-macneil-singh-ipv6-firewall-metadata",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-bonica-macneil-singh-ipv6-firewall-metadata"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-palet-happy-reporting-considerations",
   "title": "Considerations for Happy Eyeballs Error Reporting",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T10:16:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T10:47:06.385Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "palet",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.39,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 0.69,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.84,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document introduces different aspects to be considered for the Happy Eyeballs error reporting.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-palet-happy-reporting-considerations/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-palet-happy-reporting-considerations",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-palet-happy-reporting-considerations"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-shuliak-sip-zero-egress",
   "title": "Shuliak Isolation Protocol (SIP-1): Stateless Format-Preserving Pseudonymization and AST Quarantine for Local AI Agent Transports",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T09:59:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T10:47:06.385Z",
   "pages": 4,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "shuliak",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.9,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.71,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents and Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers frequently execute over local standard input/output (stdio) pipes outside enterprise network inspection perimeters. Naive redaction of sensitive credentials with static placeholders invalidates downstream Luhn payment card and ISO-7064 IBAN schema validators, while raw payload forwarding exposes regulated data. This document specifies the Shuliak Isolation Protocol (SIP-1), a deterministic, zero-egress security layer combining stateless Format-Preserving Encryption (FF1), Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) JSON-RPC payload quarantine, and detached cryptographic schema locks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shuliak-sip-zero-egress/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-shuliak-sip-zero-egress",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-shuliak-sip-zero-egress"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-lake-authz",
   "title": "Lightweight Authorization using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (ELA)",
   "rev": "08",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T09:55:50Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T10:47:06.385Z",
   "pages": 45,
   "group": "lake",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "lake",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.86,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) is a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol intended for use in constrained scenarios. This document specifies Lightweight Authorization using EDHOC (ELA). The procedure allows authorizing enrollment of new devices using the extension point defined in EDHOC. ELA is applicable to zero-touch onboarding of new devices to a constrained network leveraging trust anchors installed at manufacture time.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-authz/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-authz",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-lake-authz"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-v6ops-prefix-to-end-sites",
   "title": "IPv6 Prefix Assignment to End-Sites",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T09:55:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T10:47:06.385Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "v6ops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "v6ops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes different alternatives and best current practices for assignment of IPv6 prefixes for end-sites in broadband networks, including considerations about point-to-point links, their size, numbering choices, pool choices, customer prefix assignment size and persistence of those assignments.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-v6ops-prefix-to-end-sites/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-prefix-to-end-sites",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-v6ops-prefix-to-end-sites"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-v6ops-rfc7915-bis",
   "title": "IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T09:45:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T09:47:07.029Z",
   "pages": 40,
   "group": "v6ops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "v6ops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes the Stateless IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm (SIIT), which translates between IPv4 and IPv6 packet headers (including ICMP headers). This document obsoletes RFC 7915.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-v6ops-rfc7915-bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-rfc7915-bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-v6ops-rfc7915-bis"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-srv6ops-bfd-srv6-policy-encap",
   "title": "Operational Guidelines for BFD Monitoring in SRv6 Policies",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T09:27:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T09:47:07.029Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "liu",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.71,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.88,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides operational guidelines for Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) when applied to Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Policies. While the packet encapsulation mechanisms are standardized, this document focuses on the decisions network operators must make regarding mode selection, address management, traffic engineering integration, and troubleshooting strategies to ensure reliable service protection and efficient resource utilization. It addresses practical challenges such as handling diverse tail-end node capabilities (IPv4/IPv6), managing BFD session overhead in large-scale segment lists, and diagnosing failure detection anomalies in source-routed paths.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-srv6ops-bfd-srv6-policy-encap/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-srv6ops-bfd-srv6-policy-encap",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-liu-srv6ops-bfd-srv6-policy-encap"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-only",
   "title": "IPv6 Terminology Definitions",
   "rev": "07",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T09:17:26Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T09:47:07.029Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "v6ops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "v6ops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "ip",
   "topic_label": "IP/addressing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.82,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the terminology regarding the usage of expressions such as \"IPv6-Only\" and \"IPv6-Mostly\", in order to avoid confusions when using them in IETF and other documents. In particular, a goal is to provide a reference that describes the actual \"IPv6-Only\" functionality being used in a given scope, not the installed protocol stack support.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-only/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-only",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-only"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-atwood-mimi-provider-auth",
   "title": "Provider Authentication for More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI)",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T09:13:28Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T09:47:07.029Z",
   "pages": 19,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "atwood",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.94,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The MIMI protocol requires each provider to authenticate the provider that sends it a request. It specifies mutually authenticated TLS for this, but not where the client certificates come from or which trust anchors check them. The public Web PKI has stopped issuing such certificates. This document defines how MIMI providers authenticate each other without it. The mechanism every provider implements is a key published in DNS under the provider's domain, used to sign each request with HTTP Message Signatures. DANE client certificates, client certificates from configured PKIX trust anchors, and locally configured trust lists are defined as additional mechanisms that a provider can accept by local policy.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-atwood-mimi-provider-auth/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-atwood-mimi-provider-auth",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-atwood-mimi-provider-auth"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-dmm-mup-architecture",
   "title": "Mobile User Plane Architecture for Distributed Mobility Management",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T09:10:47Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T09:47:07.029Z",
   "pages": 35,
   "group": "dmm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "dmm",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.61,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.55,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Mobile User Plane (MUP) architecture for Distributed Mobility Management (DMM). MUP meets the DMM requirements in [RFC7333] in a routing fashion. MUP provides a normative mechanism that makes it possible to avoid traversing a single user plane anchor far from the optimal route, by turning mobile user plane session information into routing information and integrating the user plane into the dataplane. MUP is designed as a pluggable user plane part of existing mobile service architectures, with auto-discovery. Although the architecture is dataplane-independent, this document describes MUP with an SRv6 dataplane (SRv6 MUP), whose programmability and large address space suit scalable mobile services. This mechanism is specified in terms of the semantics of MUP segments and of the routing information, how that information is distributed among MUP PEs and the MUP Controller and resolved by a MUP PE, and the behaviour required of them. It does not define the wire encoding of any routing protocol; such an encoding may be defined in other documents.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dmm-mup-architecture/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmm-mup-architecture",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-dmm-mup-architecture"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ye-srv6ops-sfc-deployment",
   "title": "SRv6 SFC Deployment Options",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:53:23Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T09:47:07.029Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ye",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document outlines the critical factors for deploying Service Function Chaining (SFC) using Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6). It addresses deployment architectures, including both SRv6-aware and SRv6-unaware scenarios, and details the end-to-end provisioning lifecycle. Furthermore, it proposes reliability mechanisms and provides strategic recommendations for network operators transitioning from legacy NSH-based SFC to a modern, scalable SRv6 framework.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ye-srv6ops-sfc-deployment/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ye-srv6ops-sfc-deployment",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ye-srv6ops-sfc-deployment"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rkr-synthetic-twin-header",
   "title": "The Synthetic-Twin HTTP Field",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:51:19Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T09:47:07.029Z",
   "pages": 11,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "rkr",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.97,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Synthetic-Twin HTTP field. A sender adds the field to an HTTP request or response to say that the message was made by, or for, a synthetic twin and is not real user activity. A synthetic twin is a software model of a network estate, existing or planned. The field says which kind of synthetic message it is and can carry one opaque identifier. This lets operators keep synthetic messages apart from production messages in logs, analytics, billing, and alerting.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rkr-synthetic-twin-header/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rkr-synthetic-twin-header",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-rkr-synthetic-twin-header"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zambo-aer1-wimse-mapping",
   "title": "AER-1 Receipts as Audit Records for WIMSE AIMS",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:48:40Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T09:47:07.029Z",
   "pages": 10,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zambo",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.97,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.6,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The WIMSE AI Identity Management System (AIMS) framework requires deployments to produce durable audit logs covering authorization decisions and subsequent remediations, requires those audit records to be tamper-evident, lists the minimum fields an audit event records, and calls for reconstruction of complete execution chains across service boundaries. AIMS deliberately specifies no audit record format. This document supplies one candidate: it maps each AIMS audit requirement onto the AER-1 execution receipt, field by field, shows how AER-1 hash-chained timelines and workflow receipts reconstruct an execution chain, and defines an optional carriage of AER-1 receipts as SCITT statements for deployments that operate a transparency service. The mapping changes no AER-1 field, digest construction, or verification rule, and it states plainly what a receipt does not prove.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zambo-aer1-wimse-mapping/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zambo-aer1-wimse-mapping",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zambo-aer1-wimse-mapping"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-lisboa-ctpip",
   "title": "Causal Time Protocol (CTP/IP): Proof of Transformation Seal Verification and Wire Protocol",
   "rev": "01",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:41:30Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "lisboa",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.87,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.96,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes how any party verifies a Proof of Transformation seal issued under the Causal Time Protocol (CTP/IP), and the wire protocol used to invoke a LUX Runtime and to request seal verification over a network. A seal attests that a transformation declared in advance by a Human Agency, through a signed Intention Signature (IntentSig), was validated by the LUX Runtime, and that the resulting certificate was committed to a Merkle batch anchored on the Solana and Bitcoin public ledgers. The document specifies the certificate fields, the five layer verification procedure, the artifact identity check, the message types and envelope of the wire protocol, and the IANA registrations the protocol requests. It does not specify the measurement method by which a LUX Runtime computes the Coherence Index; that method is outside the scope of this document. One seal attests intent, human origin, decision authority, authorship, substance, causal time and anchoring, for a Human Agency and for any agent acting under it. The protocol has been in development since 2020 and is deployed. Its canonical specification is published as Corpus Delta 1 under DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21950371.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lisboa-ctpip/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lisboa-ctpip",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-lisboa-ctpip"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-shyam-vlsmtrp",
   "title": "VLSM Tree Routing Protocol",
   "rev": "17",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:39:08Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "shyam",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This is a light weight routing protocol applicable inside a network that appears in the form of a tree and distribution of address space takes place with the approach of VLSM. It is based on setting default route inside VLSM tree. With this approach, routing information of the external world need not be passed down to the VLSM tree. Thus, load inside a router gets reduced substantially. This document includes IP-VPN with MPLS inside VLSM tree by extending RSVP-TE.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shyam-vlsmtrp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-shyam-vlsmtrp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-shyam-vlsmtrp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-srivastava-learnlog",
   "title": "Learnlog: An Assistance Capture Profile and Event File Format",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:36:13Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 58,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "srivastava",
   "area": "other",
   "area_label": "Other",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.62,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.73,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "When a learner works with an AI tutor or assistant, or earns a credential or completes training with software in the loop, the formats learning systems share do not by themselves fix how to record what help was asked for, offered, shown, or accepted, or which of those facts were observed, self-reported, or inferred. Learnlog is a capture profile for that: a small set of assistance states, a declared observation boundary, explicit unknowns, and a basis for every assertion, carried inside xAPI and Caliper, which learning systems already use. It also defines an optional event file format for deployments that need integrity: entries chained by hash, signed heads, and redaction that leaves every hash verifiable.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-srivastava-learnlog/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-srivastava-learnlog",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-srivastava-learnlog"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-srivastava-agentproto-handoff-context",
   "title": "Signed Handoff Context for Agentic Dialogs",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:35:52Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 34,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "srivastava",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.63,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.97,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "When one agent hands a task to another, the receiver needs to know who handed it over, on whose behalf, through which earlier agents, and which prior context the work depends on. It needs to know the handoff is fresh and meant for it, and the sender needs a clear answer back. This document defines a small, transport-neutral handoff context: a signed offer, a signed status reply, and the chain of earlier offers that led to the current one, in CDDL for JSON and CBOR, with a lifecycle that maps to Agent2Agent task states. Each offer names the one before it by hash, so a dropped or reordered intermediate hop is detectable when the chain is carried. Prior context is named by digest only. The document is input to the agentproto working group's use cases and dialog-context work.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-srivastava-agentproto-handoff-context/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-srivastava-agentproto-handoff-context",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-srivastava-agentproto-handoff-context"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-knauer-secure-webhook-token",
   "title": "Secure Webhook Token (SWT)",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:35:30Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "knauer",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.98,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.96,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Secure Webhook Token (SWT) is a specialized JSON Web Token (JWT) format designed for securely authorizing and verifying webhook requests. It defines a set of claims to ensure that the token is explicitly tied to webhook events and that its integrity can be reliably validated by the recipient. A key feature of SWT is the introduction of a unique claim, webhook, which encapsulates webhook- specific information, such as the event type. By providing a structured and secure approach to webhook authentication, SWT aims to be a lightweight and flexible solution while maintaining compatibility with typical JWT structures. It is designed with the best practices in mind and may serve as a foundation for future standardization efforts.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-knauer-secure-webhook-token/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-knauer-secure-webhook-token",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-knauer-secure-webhook-token"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-besleaga-agentic-knowledge-wellknown",
   "title": "The 'knowledge-linkset' Well-Known URI for Publishing Knowledge Artefacts",
   "rev": "02",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:33:29Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 29,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "besleaga",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.87,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the \"knowledge-linkset\" well-known URI, at which a web origin publishes one link set describing the knowledge artefacts it makes available: graph serializations, a JSON-LD context, an agent-facing text file, a chunk export, a change ledger, and related resources. Each artefact link may carry a SHA-256 digest, expressed with the syntax of HTTP digest fields, so that a client can check that a retrieved artefact is the one the publisher described. A profile URI identifies the conventions the link set follows. The mechanism defines no new media type and no new link relation type: a page points at the resource with the existing \"describedby\" relation. The profile URI is registered in the IANA \"Profile URIs\" registry. This document requests no IANA action.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-besleaga-agentic-knowledge-wellknown/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-besleaga-agentic-knowledge-wellknown",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-besleaga-agentic-knowledge-wellknown"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-abbas-vrp-offer-verification",
   "title": "The Vacation Rental Protocol (VRP): Host-Domain Discovery and Verification of Signed Stay Offers",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:27:18Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 24,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "abbas",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.84,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The Vacation Rental Protocol (VRP) lets an AI agent or other client verify, directly from a vacation-rental host's own domain and with no intermediary, that a stay offer was signed by a key that domain publishes, has not been altered, and is within its stated lifetime. The signed offer carries the host domain's own statements of availability and exact price for the stay asked for. A valid signature proves the provenance and integrity of those statements; it does not guarantee that the stay is in fact available. A host domain publishes a discovery document at a well-known URI, an Ed25519 key set, and signed stay offers (compact JSON Web Signatures). Verification requires no central registry, issuer, accreditation program, or gatekeeper: control of the host domain is the root of trust. This document specifies the discovery document, key publication and rotation, the signed verified stay offer, and the verification procedure, including fail-closed behavior and a three-state verification model. It also describes the existing provisional registration of the \"vacation-rental.json\" well-known URI suffix.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-abbas-vrp-offer-verification/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-abbas-vrp-offer-verification",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-abbas-vrp-offer-verification"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kamimura-vap-framework",
   "title": "Verifiable AI Provenance Framework (VAP): An Architectural Framework for Auditable AI Decision Trails",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:14:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 42,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "kamimura",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.48,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.77,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Automated decision-making systems, including AI and algorithmic systems in critical infrastructure, currently lack standardized mechanisms for producing provenance records that third parties can verify independently. Traditional logging approaches do not provide the cryptographic properties that regulatory examination, forensic investigation, and cross-organizational accountability depend on: detectability of alteration, detectability of omission after commitment, and attribution. This document describes the Verifiable AI Provenance Framework (VAP), an architectural framework that defines requirements for producing verifiable decision trails using existing IETF security technologies. VAP does not define new protocols or cryptographic primitives; rather, it provides an architectural coordination layer that enables domain-specific profiles to leverage Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency and Trust (SCITT), Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS), CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), and related IETF work in a consistent manner. VAP makes records auditable and attributable after the fact. It does not prevent, block, or intercept any system behaviour, and it does not warrant that any recorded decision was correct, fair, or safe. The detailed requirement set is maintained by the VeritasChain Standards Organization (VSO) as a separate specification; this document describes the architecture and its mapping to IETF work. This document is intended to frame the problem space and facilitate discussion about whether architectural coordination work is needed in this area.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kamimura-vap-framework/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kamimura-vap-framework",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-kamimura-vap-framework"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-alivar-spring-icmp-error-srv6-vpn",
   "title": "ICMP Error Handling for VPNs in SRv6 Networks",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:12:05Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 30,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "alivar",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.9,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.87,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The document specifies procedures for handling ICMP error messages in SRv6-based Virtual Private Network (VPN). It describes three methods to improve the ICMP Error Handling for SRv6-VPNs.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-alivar-spring-icmp-error-srv6-vpn/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-alivar-spring-icmp-error-srv6-vpn",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-alivar-spring-icmp-error-srv6-vpn"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhangb-dawn-entity-mdi",
   "title": "Generalizing the DAWN MDI for All Entity Types",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:06:56Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 25,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "zhangb",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.8,
   "topic": "ai",
   "topic_label": "AI/agents",
   "topic_confidence": 0.89,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.99,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "The DAWN Minimum Discoverable Information (MDI) information model [I-D.cui-dawn-mdi-model] defines a small, encoding-neutral common header -- three mandatory elements, a short set of recommended and optional elements, and the minimal constraints among them. In parallel, local-discovery work [I-D.jakab-dawn-agent-discovery-mdns] [I-D.blwm-dawn-common-discovery-parameters] has converged on a single-DNS-SD-service-type model in which one generic service type carries instances of every agent protocol, distinguished by a protocol key, with one instance per protocol and a descriptor reference pointing to richer metadata. This document generalizes the MDI information model so that the same minimal header describes any DAWN entity. In the context of DAWN, entities include, but are not limited to, AI agents and AI resources [I-D.farrel-dawn-terminology]. An AI resource may be an individual named agent or a service such as a catalog that will further the discovery process, and the model is designed to extend cleanly to tools, tasks, data sources, models, workloads, brokers, and application endpoints. The generalization reuses the existing agent MDI without change: the element set, the constraints, and the DNS-SD binding are inherited, and extension is achieved by opening the value space of one element (entity type) and by per-type profiles, not by new core elements. Clients discover agents, MCP servers, LLM API services, and future entity types with a single browse; operators manage one service type.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-zhangb-dawn-entity-mdi/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zhangb-dawn-entity-mdi",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-zhangb-dawn-entity-mdi"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-lmtlssss-exact-state-contraction",
   "title": "ta. (TAA): Exact State Contraction and Source-Bound Exact-Computation Statements",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:05:04Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 18,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "lmtlssss",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.92,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.5,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.75,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the computer-science term ᑕ. (U+1455 U+002E), spoken TAA. It denotes exact state contraction: a replacement of a computational representation by a retained state that preserves a declared observation contract for every admissible input. The retained transition and observation maps commute with the full system, through a surjection onto the retained state, and this identity preserves every finite observation trace. The document also specifies a portable certificate for a checked result: a COSE_Sign1 statement with a deterministic CBOR payload that binds the exact artifact bytes to a registered predicate, its domain, a verdict, the exact checker implementation and the evidence. The statement can be registered with a SCITT Transparency Service. A signature authenticates the issuer's statement; a separate checker establishes whether the evidence supports it; a transparency receipt establishes registration, not mathematical correctness.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lmtlssss-exact-state-contraction/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lmtlssss-exact-state-contraction",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-lmtlssss-exact-state-contraction"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ranjbar-regext-rdap-subordinate-referrals",
   "title": "Referrals to Holder-Designated RDAP Services for Subordinate Resources",
   "rev": "03",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:04:22Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 17,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "ranjbar",
   "area": "int",
   "area_label": "INT",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.67,
   "topic": "dns",
   "topic_label": "DNS/naming",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.95,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "An RDAP query can be followed from the IANA bootstrap registries down to the most specific object a registry operator holds, and no further. When the holder of a registered resource keeps registration data for resources below it, such as names below a registered domain or more-specific networks below an address allocation, and publishes that data from an RDAP service of its own, a client has no in-band way to find that service. This document describes how a registry operator refers clients to such a holder-designated service. The registry redirects lookups for subordinate resources to the holder's service, so an unchanged client receives the most specific record as it would from any other redirect. On top of that, the covering object can advertise the holder's service, so a client that cares can discover the delegation and cross the authority boundary knowingly. The document uses the redirect controls and object relations of draft-ietf-regext-rdap-referrals and the service relations of draft- ietf-regext-rdap-extensions, and defines no new ones.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ranjbar-regext-rdap-subordinate-referrals/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ranjbar-regext-rdap-subordinate-referrals",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ranjbar-regext-rdap-subordinate-referrals"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-atwood-jmap-updates",
   "title": "Updates to JMAP: Localized Display Text, Text Handling, URIs, and Problem Details",
   "rev": "00",
   "new": true,
   "revised": "2026-11-15T08:02:24Z",
   "found": "2026-11-15T08:47:06.418Z",
   "pages": 22,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "atwood",
   "area": "art",
   "area_label": "ART",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 0.99,
   "topic": "email",
   "topic_label": "Email/messaging",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "JMAP (RFC 8620) carries all data as UTF-8 I-JSON, lets a client name a collation for sorting, and lets a server localize user-visible strings from the request's Accept-Language header. It has no way to store or return display text, such as the name of a mailbox, address book, or quota, in more than one language, and no way to say which language a stored string is in. This document defines the urn:ietf:params:jmap:i18n capability, which adds locale and localizations properties, modelled on JSCalendar (RFC 8984), to the display text of existing JMAP data types, and a language argument with which a client asks for one language. For clients that use that argument, this document updates RFC 9425, which selects the Quota description by Accept-Language. It also updates RFC 8620 with guidance for all JMAP specifications on text profiles, Unicode normalization, truncation, and the use of display text, and asks that URI-valued properties follow RFC 3986 and that every JMAP HTTP resource report errors as RFC 9457 problem details.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-atwood-jmap-updates/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-atwood-jmap-updates",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-atwood-jmap-updates"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-irtf-iccrg-ledbat-plus-plus",
   "title": "LEDBAT++: Congestion Control for Background Traffic",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-14T01:42:01Z",
   "found": "2026-11-14T01:47:06.658Z",
   "pages": 13,
   "group": "iccrg",
   "group_type": "rg",
   "submitter": "iccrg",
   "area": "irtf",
   "area_label": "IRTF",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "transport",
   "topic_label": "Transport",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 0.55,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This memo describes LEDBAT++, a set of enhancements to the LEDBAT (Low Extra Delay Background Transport) congestion control algorithm for background traffic. The LEDBAT congestion control algorithm has several shortcomings that prevent it from working effectively in practice. LEDBAT++ extends LEDBAT by adding a set of improvements, including reduced congestion window gain, modified slow-start, multiplicative decrease and periodic slowdowns. This set of improvement mitigates the known issues with the LEDBAT algorithm, such as latency drift, latecomer advantage and inter-LEDBAT fairness. LEDBAT++ has been implemented as a TCP congestion control algorithm in the Windows operating system. LEDBAT++ has been deployed in production at scale on a variety of networks and been experimentally verified to achieve the original stated goals of LEDBAT. This document is a product of the Internet Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG) of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF).",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-iccrg-ledbat-plus-plus/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-iccrg-ledbat-plus-plus",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-irtf-iccrg-ledbat-plus-plus"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker",
   "title": "Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-13T23:49:00Z",
   "found": "2026-11-14T00:47:06.385Z",
   "pages": 7,
   "group": "sidrops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sidrops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.98,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate. Over time, Relying Parties (RP) may have acquired multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same TA operator. This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path validation. This document updates RFC 8630.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi",
   "title": "Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) Reference APIs",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-12T20:24:43Z",
   "found": "2026-11-12T20:47:08.446Z",
   "pages": 26,
   "group": "scitt",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "scitt",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "web",
   "topic_label": "Web/HTTP",
   "topic_confidence": 0.66,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a REST API with the HTTP resources, request and response messages, and error handling needed for an interoperable implementation of a SCITT Transparency Service, as defined by the Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) Architecture.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp",
   "title": "Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in BGP Path Attributes",
   "rev": "12",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-12T20:24:42Z",
   "found": "2026-11-12T20:47:08.446Z",
   "pages": 15,
   "group": "sidrops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sidrops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.99,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) derived validation states in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE being sent across external BGP (EBGP) sessions. Annotating routes with BGP Path Attributes carried across EBGP sessions signaling validation states may cause needless flooding of BGP UPDATE messages through the global Internet routing system, for example when Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are issued, or are revoked, or when RPKI-To-Router sessions are terminated. Operators should ensure RPKI-derived validation states are not signaled in BGP Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE being sent across EBGP sessions. Specifically, operators should not associate Prefix Origin Validation state with BGP routes using any form of BGP Communities carried across EBGP session.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rswg-rfc7997bis",
   "title": "Text in RFCs",
   "rev": "11",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-12T20:00:43Z",
   "found": "2026-11-12T20:47:08.446Z",
   "pages": 6,
   "group": "individual",
   "group_type": "individual",
   "submitter": "rswg",
   "area": "gen",
   "area_label": "GEN",
   "area_source": "classifier",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "process",
   "topic_label": "Process",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 0.57,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document sets policy for the inclusion of characters in the definitive versions and publication formats of RFCs. The policy for the RFC Series is that all displayable text is allowed as long as there is a high expectation that readers of an RFC will be able to interpret its text as intended. This document obsoletes RFC 7997.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rswg-rfc7997bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rswg-rfc7997bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-rswg-rfc7997bis"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-httpapi-privacy",
   "title": "Protecting Credentials with HTTP APIs",
   "rev": "06",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-12T19:53:45Z",
   "found": "2026-11-12T20:47:08.446Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "httpapi",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "httpapi",
   "area": "wit",
   "area_label": "WIT",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 0.56,
   "kind": "informational",
   "kind_label": "informational / guidance",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "Redirecting HTTP requests to HTTPS is a common pattern for human- facing web resources. When done for authenticated HTTP API traffic, client credentials are exposed to the network. This document discusses the pitfalls of the redirect approach and makes deployment recommendations for authenticated HTTP APIs. It does not specify a protocol.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpapi-privacy/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpapi-privacy",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-httpapi-privacy"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis",
   "title": "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 2",
   "rev": "29",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-12T16:21:48Z",
   "found": "2026-11-12T16:47:06.789Z",
   "pages": 51,
   "group": "sidrops",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "sidrops",
   "area": "ops",
   "area_label": "OPS",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 0.74,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "In order to validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes) and Autonomous System relationships behind BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI, RFC 6480) prefix origin data, Router Keys, and Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver them. This document describes version 2 of the RPKI-to-Router protocol. RFC 6810 describes version 0 while RFC 8210 describes version 1. This document is compatible with both.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-pce-flexible-grid",
   "title": "PCEP Extension for Flexible Grid Networks",
   "rev": "22",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-12T16:16:53Z",
   "found": "2026-11-12T16:47:06.789Z",
   "pages": 24,
   "group": "pce",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "pce",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "routing",
   "topic_label": "Routing",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document provides the Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) extensions for the support of Routing and Spectrum Assignment (RSA) in Flexible Grid networks.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pce-flexible-grid/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pce-flexible-grid",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-pce-flexible-grid"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-josefsson-sshsig-format",
   "title": "Lightweight Secure Shell (SSH) Signature Format",
   "rev": "04",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-12T09:57:10Z",
   "found": "2026-11-12T10:47:06.585Z",
   "pages": 9,
   "group": "sshm",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "josefsson",
   "area": "sec",
   "area_label": "SEC",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "security",
   "topic_label": "Security",
   "topic_confidence": 1,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format that is compatible with SSH keys and wire formats.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-josefsson-sshsig-format/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-josefsson-sshsig-format",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-josefsson-sshsig-format"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-rtgwg-vrrp-rfc8347bis",
   "title": "A YANG Data Model for the Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP)",
   "rev": "23",
   "new": false,
   "revised": "2026-11-12T03:15:36Z",
   "found": "2026-11-12T03:47:06.236Z",
   "pages": 46,
   "group": "rtgwg",
   "group_type": "wg",
   "submitter": "rtgwg",
   "area": "rtg",
   "area_label": "RTG",
   "area_source": "datatracker",
   "area_confidence": 1,
   "topic": "netmgmt",
   "topic_label": "Net management",
   "topic_confidence": 0.95,
   "kind": "spec",
   "kind_label": "specification",
   "kind_confidence": 1,
   "classifier": "jev-1.13.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a YANG data model for the Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP). Both versions 2 and 3 of VRRP are covered. The VRRP terminology has been updated to conform to inclusive language guidelines for IETF technologies. This document obsoletes RFC 8347.",
   "links": {
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rtgwg-vrrp-rfc8347bis/",
    "html": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rtgwg-vrrp-rfc8347bis",
    "analyzer": "https://ietf.jaime.win/is-it-ai?draft=draft-ietf-rtgwg-vrrp-rfc8347bis"
   }
  }
 ]
}