{
 "domains": [
  "identity",
  "authz",
  "discovery",
  "protocols",
  "netmgmt",
  "attestation",
  "iot",
  "other"
 ],
 "count": 334,
 "candidates": [
  {
   "name": "draft-das-cyber-defense-execution-finality",
   "title": "Execution Finality for AI Safety and Agentic AI Security: Containing the Consequences of Stolen Credentials and Autonomous Cyberattacks at the Final Effect Boundary",
   "abstract": "A cyberattack does not have to defeat every security mechanism to become catastrophic. One internet-facing service, one stolen but valid credential, one hijacked administrative session, or one autonomous AI tool calling a legitimately available interface may be enough. The decisive risk is the transition from access, prediction, intention or nominal authorization into an actual consequence: a changed configuration, an executed privileged command, a released dataset, a provisioned cloud resource, a dispatched payment, an altered network route or an activated physical device. This document analyzes two independently documented public developments of November 2026: the reported intrusion into the internal operational network of the Fugaku supercomputer through a publicly reachable status dashboard, and the reported discovery of autonomous multi-agent offensive frameworks, including an exposed framework named exploit_agent, together with cloud-credential abuse such as LLMJacking. The two events are not shown to be connected, and no public evidence shows artificial intelligence was used at Fugaku. They share a defender-risk pattern: apparently valid access becoming a real consequence. The document specifies a consequence-bound architecture. A proposed operation (a Candidate Act) remains non-effective until the actual pending operation, its target, destination, scope, resource version, current authority and protected policy state have been independently validated at a defender-controlled, non-bypassable enforcement point (a Finality Sink, in industry terms a reference monitor or commit gate) located at, or unavoidably upstream of, the point where the effect becomes real. It defines normative requirements for coverage, independence, effect binding, freshness and revocation, cumulative exposure, replay and idempotency, failure semantics and safety- critical operation; application profiles for high-performance computing, cloud control planes, AI-agent tool execution, telecommunications, finance and cyber-physical systems; a counterfactual analysis of the Fugaku incident; a differentiation from conventional systems; ten falsifiable experiments; and an informative FAQ. IETF relevance: the document is an architectural and requirements contribution relevant to security work on remote attestation, workload identity, delegated and fine-grained authorization, transparency of authorization evidence, and agent-to-tool interfaces. Industry relevance: the model is applicable to AI-agent platforms, cloud providers, HPC operators, telecommunications operators and financial infrastructure; the alignment sections are AI-generated, are not an endorsement, validation or infringement statement, and must be cross-checked against the original filings. Regulatory relevance: the document discusses relevance to the EU AI Act (cybersecurity and robustness of high-risk AI systems), NIS2, DORA and GDPR security of processing; it is not legal advice. Based on the Mothership application PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and publicly disclosed 16 July 2026. The underlying invention is human-originated; AI-assisted tools were used to create this document, which may contain errors, and readers must cross-check it against the original, publicly available sources. To read the full PCT filing, search \"Sangam Das\" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE, search PCT/ IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615), or read it at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/. No deployment, adoption, endorsement or performance claim is made about any third- party system, and no latency, efficacy or safety guarantee is claimed.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-18T11:51:12Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 50,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.91,
   "centrality": 1.05,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T12:18:08.228Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T12:18:08.228Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ahn-nmrg-5g-security-i2nsf-framework",
   "title": "An Agentic AI Security Framework for Security Management in Mobile Networks",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an Agentic AI Security Framework for security management in mobile networks. A Security Application Function (SAF) Agent translates a network administrator's security intent to hold security objectives into a high-level security policy. A Security Control Function (SCF) Agent receives the high-level policy and translates it into a low-level security policy that will be enforced by distributed Network Security Functions (NSFs) in mobile networks. The SCF Agent sends the low-level security policy to an appropriate NSF. Policy generation, monitoring, and continuity across a data path are integrated into a closed-loop control with an Observe- Reason-Act-Verify process. The proposed framework can be applied to enterprise, campus, cloud, and edge networks along with existing network-management mechanisms. This document describes the architecture, a policy-continuity example, standard integration points, and security considerations.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "05",
   "time": "2026-11-18T11:16:39Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 22,
   "relevant": 0.71,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T12:18:08.228Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-agent-channel-fan-out",
   "title": "An Agent-Channel Frame for Identity-Keyed Fan-Out Delivery to Concurrent Sessions",
   "abstract": "This memo specifies an application-layer frame format and a delivery model by which the several concurrent agentic sessions of a single identity-bound principal, and the recognised members of an organisational identity substrate, exchange short structured messages. The frame, termed the agent-channel frame, is a transport envelope: it carries a closed-catalogue kind discriminator, a structured per-kind payload, an identity attribution pair, and an inline provenance block. Delivery is fan-out: a sender names a recipient scope rather than a single endpoint, and the scope is expanded at delivery time against the recipient's subscriptions. Recipients receive frames over a per-handle Server-Sent Events stream and can narrow what they receive with a subscribe-time filter expression. Frames are ephemeral routing units; the memo specifies only the wire envelope, the scope-expansion grammar, the subscribe filter grammar, and the delivery semantics. Frame persistence, where an implementation chooses to retain frames for replay, is out of scope. The memo composes with the handle namespace and discovery surface of draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery and the cross- organisational ceremony of draft-morrison-identity-accord; no new transport and no new handle category is introduced.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-11-18T07:24:57Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 27,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.85,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-10T18:17:54.804Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T12:18:08.228Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-live-reference-resolution",
   "title": "Live Reference Resolution for Autonomous Agent Beliefs",
   "abstract": "A recurring class of autonomous-agent failure arises when an agent acts on a belief read from a cached, derived, or proxy copy that has silently diverged from the authority the belief claims to represent. This document describes a reference-resolution discipline for the working beliefs an agent reasons and acts from. Each belief is held as a reference to a single named lowest authority and is resolved live at the point of use, with verification. When the authority is unobservable or the resolved value is stale, the belief takes an explicit uncertainty state and never falls back to a prior cached value. That state propagates to any belief derived from it, and an uncertain belief feeding a costly or irreversible act blocks the act or escalates it. Every resolution chain terminates in a single self- authorising root. The document is Informational. It records a discipline and a vocabulary and defines no wire protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-18T07:24:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 9,
   "relevant": 0.6,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.6,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-09T06:17:47.362Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T12:18:08.228Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-acts-for",
   "title": "Acts-For: Signing In to a Website with a ~handle, for a Person or an Agent Acting for One",
   "abstract": "Acts-For lets a person sign in to any website with the ~handle they already hold, and lets an AI agent sign in or register at that website on the person's behalf. Neither needs a username, a password or an account per site. A website joins by publishing one DNS record. A person signs in through a standard OpenID Connect authorization code flow and the site receives a short-lived token naming the person by a number unique to that site. An agent obtains a short-lived pass from the issuer over the Model Context Protocol and presents it to the site. The pass names the same per-site number, the agent's ~handle, a number and key the agent has for that site, and the limits the person set. The site checks it against a published key without contacting the issuer.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-18T06:58:56Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 34,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.47,
   "centrality": 1.02,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-22T06:18:03.460Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T12:18:08.228Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-rogue-ai-infrastructure-finality",
   "title": "AI Safety: Threat Model and Execution-Finality Protection for Rogue AI Attacks on Global Digital Infrastructure",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents, optimizers and AI-assisted security controllers increasingly hold standing permissions that let them change production infrastructure at machine speed. This document defines a threat model and a protection architecture for the boundary between AI decision and infrastructure effect. It describes five rogue-AI threat scenarios (Runaway Optimizer, Unmediated Agentic Execution, Correlated Security Monoculture, Adversarially Induced Infrastructure Shutdown, and the Self-Authorizing Agent), fifty-one variations, a thirty-six entry threat register, twelve required security properties, and a comparison showing why common controls such as IAM, guardrails, AI judges, human approval, canary delivery and detection do not by themselves provide them. The proposed architecture keeps a Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State until a Protected Enforcement Domain reconstructs the actual pending operation, an Independent Validator decides, and a Finality Sink verifies an act-bound, single-use capability at the point of effect. For high-critical systems it adds receipt-gated staged effectuation so that even a wrongly authorized act exposes only the current stage. The document also gives latency tiers, failure behaviour, twenty defensive simulations with acceptance criteria, and residual limits. All scenarios are hypothetical threat models, not reports of incidents. This document is based on the Mothership application PCT/ IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026 and publicly disclosed 16 July 2026. To read the full PCT filing, search \"Sangam Das\" on PATENTSCOPE, search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615), or read https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-18T05:26:13Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 93,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.66,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T06:18:03.367Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T06:18:03.367Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-retention-chain",
   "title": "Self-Verifiable Retention Chain for Payment Receipts",
   "abstract": "This document specifies eight cryptographic constructions for self-verifiable agentic payment records. The first, the Retention Chain Reference (retention_chain_ref), enables tamper-evident audit chains linking payment receipts without requiring external infrastructure. The second, the Payment Action Lifecycle, defines a content-addressed model for the exactly-once execution of payment actions, including an action reference primitive (action_ref) and a per-state transition hash (transition_hash) with a provable SKIP-on- retry idempotency guarantee. The third, the Settlement-Action Binding (binding_ref), binds a settled payment to the verified agent action it paid for and to the retention chain entry recording it, so that a settlement attestation proves not only that a payment occurred but which verified action it corresponds to. The fourth, the Policy Binding (policy_bound_ref), binds a content-addressed snapshot of the governing policy to an existing binding or chain reference, so that a decision is verifiable against the exact policy version that admitted it and a policy rotation is detectable by recomputation. The fifth, the Compliance Gate Binding (gate_ref), binds a categorical ALLOW/REFER/DENY compliance verdict and a no-PII payer reference to a policy or binding reference, so that a screening decision is provably tied to the policy in force when it was made and carries no personal data in the bound record. The sixth, the Pre-Payment Decision Chain (guardrail_ref), composes an agent identity reference, a spend authority reference, and the policy in force into one recomputable pre-payment ALLOW/DENY decision. The seventh, Post-Decision Execution Evidence (execution_ref), binds an executed action to the exact decision that authorized it, so the recorded execution is provably consistent with the decision and not merely correlated with an agent identity. The eighth, Cross-Party Authority Delegation (delegation_ref), binds a delegation of authority from one party to another and chains hand-offs, so a verifier can confirm that authority did not widen across an organizational boundary. All constructions use only SHA-256 and the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785), and are verifiable by any party holding the relevant receipts without contacting the issuer. The constructions satisfy the transaction recording and audit trail obligations of MiCA Article 68(9), DORA Article 17, and AMLR Article 77.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "08",
   "time": "2026-11-18T00:20:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 30,
   "relevant": 0.76,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.49,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T06:18:03.367Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T06:18:03.367Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ovalles-ai-terms",
   "title": "AI Terms: Per-Use Terms, Payment and Receipts for Automated AI Access to Web Content",
   "abstract": "This document defines AI Terms: a JSON document published at the well-known URI /.well-known/ai-terms in which a website states, for each of four uses of its content by automated AI systems (search, answer, training and agent), whether the use is allowed, allowed for a price, or not allowed. It also defines an AI-Purpose request header with which a client declares the use it intends, a way to point to the terms from any HTTP response, how a quote for a paid page can describe the page so that payment depends on that page being delivered, and how a paid access produces a receipt that records the use. AI Terms is designed to sit alongside the Robots Exclusion Protocol and the usage-preference vocabulary of the IETF AI Preferences work, adding the pieces those leave out: price, a free allowance, payment binding, a description of what is being bought, purpose declaration by the client, and a record of licensed use.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-17T22:07:56Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.68,
   "centrality": 1.12,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:18:05.082Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-drake-agent-identity-problem-statement",
   "title": "Identity for Autonomous Agents and Robots: Problem Statement, Threat Model, and Terminology",
   "abstract": "Autonomous software agents, and increasingly physical robots, now act at machine scale and speed across Internet protocols and throughout society, in roles whose decisions and actions can have legal, economic, safety, security, and physical consequences, often with limited or no human supervision. Any credential, authorization, delegation, certification, reputation, audit history, insurance policy, regulatory obligation, safety decision, liability, or legal process concerning an autonomous entity depends on being able to identify that same entity reliably over time. Conversely, when an autonomous entity or its operator is malicious, compromised, or beyond effective human control, the absence of durable identity lets it shed history, evade consequences, or multiply cheaply into Sybil swarms. Many proposed mechanisms bind claims to identifiers, accounts, credentials, keys, or names that can be replaced, reassigned, transferred, revoked, suspended, or lost. They may authenticate that subject perfectly while still failing to establish a durable identity for the entity it represents. This document offers precise terminology that distinguishes identity from the identifiers, attributes, credentials, authorizations, and reputation with which it is commonly conflated, minting the term \"identity0\" so that the strict sense has an unambiguous name. It presents a layered reference model showing where current \"agent identity\" efforts fit and the durable identity layer they commonly presuppose but do not provide. This document is informational and defines no protocol. It serves as the framing and vocabulary document for a companion series that specifies a federated durable-identity architecture, provisioning, resolution, application, and governance intended to provide a practical path from this problem statement to interoperable deployment.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-17T22:07:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.76,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.96,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ai-safety-agentic-cyberattack-finality",
   "title": "AI Safety for AI-Assisted Cyberattacks: Defender-Side Execution Finality at the Protected Consequence Boundary",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents can now carry out parts of a cyber operation that previously needed repeated human effort: reconnaissance, tool selection, execution attempts, observation of results, and adaptation when a route fails. An attacker-controlled agent does not have to malfunction to be dangerous; it can follow malicious instructions efficiently, using stolen credentials and well-formed requests that existing controls accept as valid. This document describes a defender-side architecture, called execution finality, that adds one bounded layer to existing security controls. An incoming request, credential, permitted API call, or agent-composed workflow does not by itself create authority for a sensitive consequence. The defender reconstructs the operation that would actually take effect, holds it in a non-effective state, evaluates authorization independently of the requester, and enforces the result at an enforcement point located at or immediately before the protected consequence. The document specifies placement rules, requirements, state handling, failure behavior, latency strategy, and test methods. It uses publicly reported AI-assisted activity against Taiwanese government agencies in 2026 as an illustrative threat scenario and does not claim that the architecture would have prevented that activity.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T20:39:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.61,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gu-nmrg-intent-translator",
   "title": "An Intent Translator for Hallucination Mitigation in an Agentic AI Framework",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an Intent Translator to mitigate hallucination in the intent translation in an Agentic AI Framework. This Intent Translator has an agentic AI workflow for detecting and mitigating structural and semantic errors, including hallucinated policy content, when translating a natural-language network intent into structured policies. The workflow coordinates role-specialized language-model functions with deterministic validation tools within a predefined action space and a bounded retry budget. Schema- constrained generation limits structural defects, while cross-slot checks and intent-faithfulness assessment identify a potentially unsupported or inconsistent policy content. Structured validation traces guide targeted re-extraction and regeneration. Unresolved cases retain explicit failure status for downstream review. This document describes component interactions, validation outcomes, and recovery behavior, and also presents a 3GPP TS 28.312-based instantiation for mobile network management.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "06",
   "time": "2026-11-17T20:18:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 34,
   "relevant": 0.77,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.93,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-pqc-credential-binding",
   "title": "Post-Quantum Credential Binding for x402 Agentic Payment Authorization",
   "abstract": "This document defines how Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206 / FN-DSA) and ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) credentials bind to x402 agentic payment authorization. It specifies the credential envelope format, the JCS canonicalization discipline applied to signed payloads, the gateway verification procedure, and the session token binding that replaces per-request API key authentication for credentialed agents. This is the first Internet-Draft in the agentic payments space to anchor credential binding to the NIST post-quantum cryptography standards (FIPS 203/204/206).",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T20:10:21Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 9,
   "relevant": 0.7,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.77,
   "centrality": 1.52,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-federation-zkp",
   "title": "Cross-Issuer ZKP Federation for Post-Quantum Agentic Payment Credentials",
   "abstract": "This document defines a protocol for composing independently-issued post-quantum ZKP credentials from different issuers into a single federation token, without requiring a shared trust root between issuers. Each credential is a Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206) or ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204) signed Bulletproofs range proof asserting that an agent's trust score meets a threshold. A federation validator independently verifies each credential against its issuer's public key, then computes a composite commitment binding all verified proofs. The resulting federation token is signed by the validator alone. No issuer needs to know about the others. This solves the cross-issuer attestation composition problem in agentic payment networks.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T20:08:49Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.75,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.57,
   "centrality": 1.17,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-payment-evidence-frame",
   "title": "Payment Evidence Frame for Agentic-Payment Lifecycle Receipts",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a Payment Evidence Frame (PEF): a transport- agnostic envelope that wraps any payment lifecycle receipt from the x402 agentic-payment receipt stack under a named claim type, a deterministic frame identifier, and an optional transport-layer signature. The frame introduces three properties that the inner receipt types do not individually provide: (1) a stable cross-system identifier (frame_id) derived deterministically from the receipt content by SHA-256 over the JCS-canonical preimage, so the same payment evidence can be referenced by identifier across HTTP headers, agent-to-agent task artifacts, audit logs, and on-chain memo fields without re- serialising the full receipt; (2) a taxonomy label (claim_type) that tells a consumer what class of evidence a frame carries before the inner receipt format is parsed; and (3) a receipt integrity hash (receipt_hash) that allows any downstream party to confirm the inner receipt is unaltered without deserialising its full structure. The format uses the same JCS canonicalisation discipline (draft- hopley-x402-canonicalisation-jcs) as the five inner receipt formats it envelopes, so implementations require only one canonicalisation primitive for the full receipt stack. This revision additionally specifies an operator-independent audit chain construction over PEF frames (Section 7.5): an append-only, content-addressed chain in which each row is a PEF frame contributed and signed by its own operator, with no shared trusted root. Rows are linked by the deterministic frame_id of the preceding row, and each row carries a post-quantum signature (draft-hopley-x402-pqc- credential-binding) over the row's linkage and content identity. The whole chain is verifiable offline from the bytes alone -- recompute the linkage, then verify each operator's signature against the public key carried in that row -- with no callback to, and no trust in, any operator.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T20:08:36Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 31,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.83,
   "centrality": 1.15,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt",
   "title": "Categorical Compliance Screening Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a categorical compliance screening receipt format for agentic-payment flows. The format is designed for use by AI agents and agentic-payment gateways that perform regulatory screening at admission time and must retain the screening decision under framework-bound retention obligations (UK Money Laundering Regulations 2017; Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Section 330; EU Anti- Money Laundering Directives 5 and 6; Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation Article 80; Anti-Money Laundering Regulation Article 56; Digital Operational Resilience Act Article 14). The receipt format uses a closed enumeration of categorical outcomes (ALLOW, REFER, DENY) rather than a continuous score or tier projection. The categorical outcome is load-bearing for downstream regulatory obligations: under UK POCA 2002 Section 330, a REFER carries a mandatory Suspicious Activity Report obligation that a DENY does not. A score or tier projection collapses this distinction. Receipts are canonicalised under RFC 8785 (JSON Canonicalization Scheme) with an in-band canonicalisation rule pin (canon_version). The pin enables year-five re-verification from retained bytes alone, without dependence on an out-of-band rule registry that the operator must continue to publish. This document is complementary to draft-vauban-x402-stark-receipts: that document covers cryptographic settlement-time payment-condition proofs; this document covers admission-time compliance screening receipts. The two compose via the composite trust-query algorithm specified in specs/composite-trust-query.md in x402-foundation/x402.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-17T20:04:39Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 17,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.77,
   "centrality": 1.18,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hopley-x402-atb-reputation-credential",
   "title": "ATB Pass Certificate: Agent Reputation Credential for Agentic-Payment Flows",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the ATB Pass Certificate, a Falcon-1024 post- quantum signed reputation credential issued by the Agent Trust Bench (ATB) to autonomous AI agents that have demonstrated safe payment- decision behaviour against the bench's adversarial profile corpus. The credential is presented by agents to participating x402 gateways via an HTTP header for reputation-gated variable pricing. Two certificate versions are specified. Phase 1 carries the agent's refusal-rate score in cleartext; the gateway verifies the Falcon-1024 signature and applies a discount when the score meets a declared threshold. Phase 2 replaces the score with a Pedersen commitment to the score and a Bulletproofs range proof attesting score >= threshold without revealing the score, its components, or the agent's underlying behaviour distribution. Certificates are canonicalised under RFC 8785 (JSON Canonicalization Scheme) with an in-band canonicalisation-rule pin and signed with Falcon-1024 (NIST FIPS 206, post-quantum). Phase 2 ZKP elements use Ristretto255 as the elliptic curve group with the dalek-cryptography Bulletproofs instantiation. This document also specifies the composition of the ATB Pass Certificate as an evidence-source input to draft-hopley-x402- composite-trust-query, gateway verification algorithms for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 credentials, and security and privacy considerations arising from the bearer-token transport model and the ZKP soundness assumptions. This document is an Independent Submission filed per RFC 4846 and is intended for publication as Informational. It is not an IETF Standards Track document, does not represent IETF community consensus, and has not been subject to review by an IETF Working Group.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T20:02:47Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-pandey-agent-identity",
   "title": "Session-Scoped Authorization for AI Agents: A Per-Tool-Call Authorization Profile Building on WIMSE and OAuth",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents act with privileges: they call tools, read and write data, and operate services. In most current deployments they do so under shared service accounts, with permissions broader than any single task requires and without an audit trail that binds an action to the agent that took it and the human on whose behalf it acted. This document specifies a session-scoped authorization profile for AI agents, building on the WIMSE architecture and the OAuth 2.0 protocol family. Each agent is a first-class IAM principal with its own credentials. Each session is bound to an authenticated human sponsor through an authenticated delegation chain. Authorization is evaluated at every tool call, with effective permissions computed as the intersection -- never the union -- of the agent principal's permissions, the sponsor's permissions, and the session scope. Actions that cannot be evaluated are denied (fail closed), defined classes of irreversible actions require sponsor approval, and every evaluated tool call produces a tamper-evident audit receipt. The document defines the model, states requirements for implementations, maps the model onto existing OAuth and WIMSE mechanisms, and gives full security considerations. It defines no new protocol and requests no IANA actions.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T19:49:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ai-agent-cyberattack-effect-finality",
   "title": "AI Safety: When AI Agents Initiate Cyberattacks -- Execution Finality for Data Exfiltration, Payment Diversion, Infrastructure Changes, and Code-Executing Agents",
   "abstract": "Problem. An AI agent can cause an unauthorized real-world effect -- a confidential data export, a payment to a substituted beneficiary, a network or industrial configuration change, a code deployment or a secret release -- while every individual check succeeds: the model accepted a plausible task, the agent held a valid credential, the tool call was syntactically permitted, and the gateway saw an allowed method. The gap is that the check and the effect are not the same thing. Identity and access controls answer \"may this principal call this interface?\"; they do not, by themselves, answer \"may this exact effect, with these resolved targets and values, complete now, on this route, given what has already happened?\" Solution. This document describes an execution-finality profile for AI-initiated operations. An agent's proposal is held as a non- effective Candidate Act. A protected validator compares a canonical descriptor of the operation actually about to be committed with a source-authority envelope that model-editable content cannot create or enlarge. A Finality Sink, which owns the effect-causing credential or commit right, verifies an act-bound, non-bearer Execution Handle over the same bytes it commits, consumes it atomically with the commit, and emits an authenticated destination receipt. Later phases and retries are gated on that receipt rather than on the agent's own report. Unknown outcomes become INDETERMINATE and are reconciled before any retry. Context. The document analyses four scenarios (enterprise data exfiltration, payment diversion, critical-infrastructure configuration manipulation, and code-executing agents), specifies data objects, a Candidate Act state machine, atomic consumption and crash-recovery rules, sink trust, delegation attenuation, protocol placement for tool and agent-to-agent calls, revocation freshness, latency placement, legacy integration and a falsifiable evaluation plan. It is a prospective architecture: no measured latency, blocking rate or deployment is claimed. A reviewer FAQ is included. Critical technical review is invited.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T18:28:32Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 41,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.78,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-18T00:18:03.935Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-newton-agreement-evidence",
   "title": "Agreement Evidence for Multi-Party Agent Negotiation",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents can exchange offers and signatures without producing an artifact that records which parties reached which outcome, over which binding values, and for how long that record may be relied upon. This document defines a protocol-neutral agreement attestation primitive, the contract a protocol profile meets to instantiate it, and two protocol profiles. A verified attestation establishes one thing: that a named set of parties jointly countersigned a stated outcome over stated binding values, together with behavioral counters each of them accepted. It does not establish that the outcome matches what a transcript says, that any statement a party made is true, that the binding values are complete, or that the parties are anonymous. The format provides no member for a negotiated price, quantity, date, or principal identity. A producer is obligated not to place those values in the free-text members the format does provide, and a verifier cannot detect a violation of that obligation, so the absence of term values from a received object is a producer's obligation rather than a verified property. This document does not define identity, authority delegation, payment, settlement, transport, boundary-decision receipts, or a general evidence composition and sufficiency model.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T17:40:00Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 78,
   "relevant": 0.62,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.62,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-04T18:17:27.990Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-craig-oauth-rar-payment-mandates",
   "title": "Rich Authorization Requests Profile for Agent Payment Mandates, Approval Reasons and Receipts",
   "abstract": "Software agents, including those driven by large language models, increasingly initiate payments on behalf of people. OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396) can carry what such an agent may do, but there is no common way to express the limits that banks and their customers need, to tell an agent why a payment needs the customer's approval, or to keep an independent record of what was decided. This document defines two authorization details types for payment mandates (a standing mandate with named payees, per-payment and per- period limits and an approval mode, and a single approved payment); an ordered set of machine-readable reasons a payment falls outside a mandate; how those reasons are carried in an approval challenge, including the OAuth Transaction Authorization Challenge; and a signed, hash-chained receipt for every decision, with personal data kept outside the chain so it can be erased.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T16:30:34Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.05,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sharif-agent-audit-trail",
   "title": "Agent Audit Trail: A Standard Logging Format for Autonomous AI Systems",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a standard logging format for autonomous AI agent systems. The Agent Audit Trail (AAT) defines a JSON-based record structure with mandatory fields for agent identity, the authorizing principal, action classification, outcome tracking, and trust level reporting. Records are linked via tamper-evident hash chaining using SHA-256 per RFC 8785, with optional ECDSA signatures for non-repudiation. The format addresses requirements from the EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689), which mandates automatic recording of events for high-risk AI systems, whose application dates were staged into 2027-2028 by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744. It also maps informatively to SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria, ISO/IEC 42001, the draft ISO/IEC 24970 and prEN 18229-1 logging standards, and PCI DSS v4.0.1 logging requirements. The design is transport-agnostic and supports export to JSONL, Syslog (RFC 5424), and CSV while preserving chain integrity. Privacy is addressed through input/output hashing, content fingerprinting, and tombstone-based deletion compatible with GDPR Article 17. The -01 revision added pre-execution recording requirements, recording independence, deny reason codes, replay protection, external timestamp anchoring, and content fingerprinting based on feedback from independent implementers. The -02 revision added a Decision Reproducibility section (Section 13) that distinguishes record reproducibility, available for any model, from decision reproducibility, available only for open-weight models executed at temperature zero in an attested environment, and defines the associated record fields. The -03 revision added the Attestation Closure requirement (Section 13.6): the digests recorded for decision reproducibility MUST cover the complete computational closure of the inference function -- model weights, tokenizer, chat template, inference engine build, decoding configuration, and numeric environment -- together with new record fields (tokenizer_digest, chat_template_digest, engine_build_digest) and a minimal-change threat analysis (Section 13.7) showing that any component left outside the attested set is a forgery channel. The -04 revision added algorithm agility for post-quantum signatures (ML-DSA-65, FIPS 204) alongside ECDSA P-256; a key identifier (signer_kid, RFC 7638) that resolves which principal signed an independently recorded record; a trust-level assignment integrity requirement (Section 5.3) so that downgrading a consequential action is an attributable event rather than silent suppression; and OPTIONAL Merkle batch anchoring (Section 6.4) using the RFC 6962 construction for compact inclusion proofs at high throughput. All -04 additions are OPTIONAL to produce, and -04 verifiers stay backward compatible with -03: a -04 verifier accepts -03 records, and the new signing metadata is required only in records that carry a signature. This revision (-07) adds a mandatory \"principal\" field (Section 3.1) that binds each record to the party on whose authority the agent acted; a Relationship to Other Work section (Section 1.3) relating AAT to the WIMSE agent audit record and authorization-evidence drafts and to SCITT (RFC 9943); and corrections to the EU AI Act Article 12 and Article 19 citations in the regulatory mapping (Section 11.1 and Appendix B). Records produced under -06 and earlier predate the \"principal\" field; verifiers processing mixed-revision archives SHOULD treat its absence as \"principal not recorded\" rather than a validation failure. The -10 revision strengthens recording independence (Section 5.2) from SHOULD to MUST at trust level L2 and above, and requires the \"authority_ref\" of the \"principal\" field (Section 3.1) to be non-null and to reference an authorization artifact verifiable independently of the agent at L2 and above, in response to independent review. Above L2, both the recorder and the authorizing artifact are therefore independent of the agent.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "10",
   "time": "2026-11-17T14:57:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 65,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-correa-agent-capability-binding",
   "title": "Enforcement Profile for Agent Capabilities: Argument Constraints, Taint Propagation, and Consent Binding",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly call tools and hand work to other agents while holding broad, inherited authority. Most of the resulting incidents share one shape: an agent, often steered by injected content, performs an action its principal never authorized, and no party can prove the limit afterward. This document defines an interoperable enforcement profile that composes two existing building blocks, a delegable signed capability (the Attenuating Agent Tokens profile) and a replayable action receipt, and adds three enforcement rules that catch the common failures: argument-level constraints (including an egress host allowlist), taint propagation across a delegation chain, and a consent binding between a displayed decision and the action dispatched. Enforcement is specified at the tool-call boundary, outside the agent, so that a prompt cannot edit the limit and a verdict means the same thing across agent frameworks.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T12:55:39Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 7,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sogomonian-aiid",
   "title": "Autonomous Agent Identity and Runtime Control Status (AIID)",
   "abstract": "Autonomous software agents increasingly take consequential actions on behalf of people and organizations. Existing identity systems (OAuth 2.0, SPIFFE, and the WIMSE workload identity architecture) authenticate such agents, but they do not define a common, vendor- neutral way for an accountable owner to place a running agent into a restricted state, nor a common way for a relying party to check that state immediately before acting. This document defines AIID: a durable identifier for an autonomous agent, a small runtime control state machine (active, safe_mode, suspended, revoked), an asymmetric authority model in which automated monitors may only tighten state and only the accountable owner may loosen it, a namespace-wide freeze, and a pre-action status check with fail-closed semantics. AIID is designed to bind to, not replace, existing identity: it defines an \"aiid\" claim for OAuth 2.0 access tokens and corresponding token introspection members, bindings for SPIFFE and WIMSE identifiers, a mapping onto the OAuth Token Status List, and change notification using the OpenID Shared Signals Framework. It also defines compact signed action receipts, and an OPTIONAL enforcement gateway deployment profile.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T12:36:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 59,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.93,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-luna-eagf-agent-delegation-semantics",
   "title": "Semantic Governance Requirements for AI Agent Delegation and Handoff",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly decide and act on behalf of organizations and delegate work to other agents. Identity, authentication, authorization and runtime control mechanisms establish who is acting and what is permitted, but they do not by themselves preserve the organizational meaning of a delegation: the bounded authority, purpose, material context, and the distinction between a recommendation, a decision, an action and its outcome. This document states requirements, derived from the Enterprise Agent Governance Framework (EAGF), that such semantics be preserved across tool calls, delegations and agent-to-agent handoffs. It defines no new protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-17T12:18:09Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-19T12:18:04.679Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T18:18:04.977Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-han-ai-manifest",
   "title": "AI Manifest: Site-Published Friction-Recovery Descriptors for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the AI Manifest, a JSON format with which a website operator publishes an AI Friction-Recovery Manifest (AFRM): a description of the user-interface (UI) patterns on its own origin that predictably stall autonomous AI agents, together with constrained recovery steps and site-specific input hints. An agent that drives a browser on behalf of a user retrieves the manifest from a well-known URI and consults it when it encounters friction, instead of rediscovering the same site-specific behavior by trial and error. The manifest is untrusted input, interpreted by the agent's runtime and never shown to its language model. Its operative content is drawn from a closed vocabulary that cannot enter text, upload files, or reach another origin. Every action derived from a manifest passes through a policy enforcement point that is not a language model, and steps conventionally bound to a decision always require the user's confirmation; an agent's own policy can only deny them. Security controls such as access denials, rate limits, CAPTCHAs, authentication challenges, and confirmation dialogs are stop conditions, never traps to be recovered from. Optional publisher signatures and agent-configured reputation services provide authenticity but never imply safety and never relax these requirements. Preliminary measurements, including an adversarial evaluation of a reference implementation, are reported in an appendix.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-11-17T08:03:53Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 41,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.75,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:18:00.446Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-veridom-omp-core",
   "title": "Operating Model Protocol (OMP) Core: Invariant 3 -- Verifiable Delegation Binding",
   "abstract": "This document obsoletes draft-veridom-omp-00. The Operating Model Protocol (OMP) defines a deterministic routing and tamper-evident evidence architecture for consequential AI decisions. This document specifies OMP Core, which adds Invariant 3: Verifiable Delegation Binding. Every ASSISTED or ESCALATED routing state must bind the Named Accountable Officer to a verifiable DelegationInstrument at the time of decision. When valid binding cannot be established, the system records AUTHORITY_UNBOUND -- a sealed, positive evidentiary state. This update is additive and backward-compatible with OMP Core version 00.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T07:09:26Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 16,
   "relevant": 0.8,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.39,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-crovia-seal",
   "title": "The Crovia Seal: A Cryptographic Receipt Format for AI-Generated Output Provenance",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Crovia Seal v1, a compact, tamper-evident JSON receipt that may be attached to any output produced by an AI generator (large language model, image model, audio model, or composite system) to record its provenance in a cryptographically verifiable form. A Crovia Seal binds an issuer's identity to the SHA-256 digests of an input/output pair, the identity and parameters of the generator, an emission timestamp, and a per-issuer hash chain, under an Ed25519 signature computed over a strict canonicalization (CSC-1) of the receipt with explicit domain separation. Optional fields permit transparency-log inclusion proofs and witness co- signatures. The Seal is designed for offline verification and for inclusion in third-party transparency logs and standards-based revocation infrastructure.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T07:09:20Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 16,
   "relevant": 0.6,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.78,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-abbott-mcp-ax",
   "title": "MCP Aggregation Protocol (MCP-AX): Hierarchical Tool Namespace Delegation for Model Context Protocol Servers",
   "abstract": "This document specifies MCP-AX, an aggregation protocol for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. MCP-AX enables hierarchical composition of tool namespaces across heterogeneous networks of MCP servers, from cloud services to resource-constrained embedded devices. The protocol defines a master-subagent architecture directly inspired by the AgentX protocol (RFC 2741), adapted for the tool/resource model of MCP rather than the OID/MIB model of SNMP. MCP-AX introduces recursive namespace delegation, capability-aware routing, transport bridging for constrained nodes, and irreversibility-gated tool dispatch suitable for autonomous and semi- autonomous AI agent systems.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T07:09:20Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.24,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hori-agent-quality-graph",
   "title": "Agent Quality Graph (AQG): A Protocol for Evaluating AI Agent Trustworthiness via Delegation Graphs",
   "abstract": "This document describes the Agent Quality Graph (AQG) protocol, a method for evaluating and ranking AI agent trustworthiness based on delegation transaction graphs. As the number of autonomous AI agents grows rapidly, there is no standardized mechanism for determining which agents reliably complete delegated tasks. AQG applies graph- based ranking algorithms, analogous to web page ranking via hyperlink analysis, to the domain of agent-to-agent delegation. Agents that are frequently delegated to by other highly-ranked agents receive higher trust scores. This document defines the delegation record format, the graph construction process, the scoring algorithm, and the API for querying trust scores.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T07:09:19Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 9,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sovereign-svtp",
   "title": "Sovereign Verification & Trust Protocol (SVTP) v1.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Sovereign Verification & Trust Protocol (SVTP), a foundational framework for establishing verifiable identity, attribution, and governance for autonomous machines. SVTP provides a non-repudiable \"Root of Trust\" for both digital AI agents and physical autonomous systems (e.g., industrial robotics, autonomous vehicles). By defining the SVTP-DID (did:svtp) and the Protocol Seal mechanism, this standard enables secure machine-to-machine (M2M) interaction, automated compliance with NIST-800-218, and institutional-grade liability containment in the machine economy.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T07:09:19Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 5,
   "relevant": 0.84,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.75,
   "centrality": 1.25,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-veridom-omp",
   "title": "Operating Model Protocol (OMP) Core -- Version 02: Invariant 3 -- Verifiable Delegation Binding",
   "abstract": "This document obsoletes draft-veridom-omp-00. The Operating Model Protocol (OMP) defines a deterministic routing and tamper-evident evidence architecture for consequential AI decisions. This document specifies OMP Core version 01, which adds Invariant 3: Verifiable Delegation Binding. Every ASSISTED or ESCALATED routing state must bind the Named Accountable Officer to a verifiable DelegationInstrument at the time of decision. When valid binding cannot be established, the system records AUTHORITY_UNBOUND -- a sealed, positive evidentiary state. This update is additive and backward-compatible with OMP Core version 00.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-17T07:09:15Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 16,
   "relevant": 0.78,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.36,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T12:18:03.862Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-stafordtituss-agentic-mandate-evidence",
   "title": "Continuity Evaluation of Agent Delegation Records",
   "abstract": "The AUDIT architecture defines records that capture the user's intent, delegation, authorization state, and the actions that agents take across trust boundaries. Records alone don't answer the question an auditor, an operator, or a relying party asks next: did the executed effect stay within the authority the user delegated? This document defines a deterministic, three-valued evaluation over such records. The outcomes are preserved, violated, and unresolved, and every non-preserved outcome names the invariant that was broken. The document also defines the claim model that the evaluation needs, the roles permitted to sign each record, a mapping onto the AUDIT record types, and a set of interoperable test vectors. It is derived from the Agentic Mandate Evidence Protocol (AMEP).",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T03:20:12Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.77,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.76,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kay-dawn-use-cases",
   "title": "Use Cases and Applicability for Discovery of Agents With Names",
   "abstract": "This document describes use cases and applicability for Discovery of Agents With Names (DAWN). It illustrates how clients discover AI resources and obtain the minimum information needed for subsequent interaction within a local network, within an organisation, or between cooperating organisations with trust relationships. This document does not define a discovery protocol, a registration procedure, a selection algorithm, or an agent-to-agent communication protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-17T01:07:44Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 31,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zahed-agentdiaproto",
   "title": "Agent Dialog Propagation Protocol",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Agent Dialog Propagation Protocol, a protocol for maintaining and propagating dialog context between AI agents, tools, and intermediaries. The protocol enables messages to remain associated with a dialog across transport connections, intermediaries, administrative domains, and delegation relationships. It defines mechanisms for dialog identification, dialog lifecycle management and the association of identity, authorization, and delegation information with a dialog. The Agent Dialog Propagation Protocol does not define agent reasoning or execution state, identity credentials, authorization policy, or transport protocols. These functions are provided by application protocols and existing security and transport mechanisms.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-17T01:01:46Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 29,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-agent-ephemeral-lineage",
   "title": "Cryptographic Context Compaction Receipts, Sensitivity Label Inheritance, and Verifiable Right-to-Be-Forgotten Lineage for Agent Memory",
   "abstract": "Long-running autonomous AI agents periodically summarize, compact, and distill episodic interaction logs into persistent vector or graph memory stores. Lossy context compaction erases the cryptographic provenance of which source documents contributed to a compacted memory state, stripping enterprise sensitivity labels (DLP classifications) and making regulatory data-erasure mandates (GDPR Article 17 Right to Erasure / CCPA purge) impossible to verify. This document specifies the Ephemeral Context Compaction Receipt (ECCR) protocol: a Merkle inclusion and label-ceiling receipt that preserves deterministic sensitivity inheritance and cryptographic purge verifiability across lossy memory compaction boundaries.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T00:29:19Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 9,
   "relevant": 0.85,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.84,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-pquip-pqc-agentic-delegation",
   "title": "Post-Quantum Hybrid Cryptographic Delegation Chains and Merkle-Aggregated Execution Receipts for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agent ecosystems rely on multi-hop cryptographic delegation chains and signed execution traces (currently built on Ed25519, ECDSA P-256, and RSA-PSS) to enforce least-privilege tool invocations across Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) boundaries, and to preserve long-term non-repudiation for regulatory audit logs. This architecture faces two existential vulnerabilities in the Post-Quantum era: (1) \"Harvest-Now, Forge-and- Repudiate-Later\" (HNFRL) attacks, wherein Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) running Shor's algorithm retroactively forge or repudiate multi-year compliance traces (e.g., 7-to-10-year HIPAA, SOX, FDA 21 CFR Part 11, and defense operational logs) and synthesize retroactive human-in-the-loop approvals; and (2) \"Lattice Signature-Bloat Amplification,\" wherein naively substituting 64-byte Ed25519 signatures with 3,309-byte ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) signatures across a 10-hop sub-agent chain inflates per-call authorization headers from 640 bytes to over 46 KB (including public keys), exceeding HTTP/2 header limits and degrading sub-10ms real-time tool routing. This document specifies a wire-compatible Post-Quantum Agentic Delegation and Trace Receipt profile (\"PQ-Agentic\"). It introduces a two-tier cryptographic architecture: (a) a Hot-Path Hybrid Delegation Envelope combining classical Ed25519 with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) via Pre-Verified Session-Grant Digest Chaining (PVSGDC), replacing redundant per-call inline re-transmission of O(N) prior delegators' 5,261-byte ML-DSA-65 public keys and signatures with 32-byte SHAKE256 digests of out-of-band PEP-verified delegation grants; and (b) a Cold-Path Long-Horizon Archival Receipt anchored with stateless hash- based SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f ([FIPS205]) over RFC 9943 SCITT transparency Merkle roots, guaranteeing 30-year quantum-resistant non-repudiation even under catastrophic lattice cryptanalysis.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T00:29:12Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.87,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T18:18:01.513Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-agent-clear-revocation",
   "title": "Transitive CLEAR Revocation and Composite Physical-Safety Windows for Multi-Hop Autonomous Agent DAGs",
   "abstract": "When an orchestrator agent delegates sub-tasks across a multi-hop Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of specialist agents, OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation (RFC 7009) revokes only individual client tokens and provides no mechanism to atomically halt in-flight child, grandchild, or sibling branches or enforce composite time-to-live windows across the entire execution tree. Furthermore, no protocol binds IEC 62443 / Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) zone boundaries into agent capability receipts. This document specifies the Transitive CLEAR (Cryptographic Lease Early-Abort & Revocation) DAG protocol and hard Operational Technology (OT) Level 0-2 physical- safety firewalling.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T00:29:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 9,
   "relevant": 0.75,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.91,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification",
   "title": "Cryptographic Execution-Trace Verification, JCS Canonicalization, and Fail-Closed Delegation Attestation for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a deterministic cryptographic verification profile for execution traces, delegation chains, and weight-custody manifests generated by autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents operating across Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent-to-Agent (A2A), and enterprise system-of-record boundaries. The profile binds JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) pre-image serialization, Ed25519 (RFC 8032) and ECDSA P-256/P-384 signatures, JSON Web Key (JWK, RFC 7517) thumbprint pinning, and fail-closed revocation and freshness checks so that relying parties can independently verify whether an agent action was authorized prior to commit.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-17T00:28:50Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 6,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T00:18:07.515Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T06:18:02.264Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-law",
   "title": "Scientific Constitutional Law for Evidence-Bound AI Systems: A Fail-Closed Claims and Authority Profile",
   "abstract": "This document describes an experimental evidence-governance profile for scientific claims consumed by automated and AI-assisted systems. It separates claim content, evidentiary evaluation, provenance, integrity, and operational authority. Its three-valued evaluation state (PASS, FAIL, INDETERMINATE) and separate authorization decision prevent signed records, citations, or computational checks from being automatically promoted into scientific truth or legal authority. It proposes immutable versions, scope-bound receipts, monotonic source generations, transitive revocation, authenticated freshness, and adversarial conformance cases. \"Scientific Constitutional Law\" is the name of the proposed procedural rule set; it is not a statement of enacted constitutional law, legal enforceability, scientific discovery, or IETF consensus. This document does not define a general truth engine or request IANA allocations.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T23:11:51Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 11,
   "relevant": 0.57,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.04,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-scientific-constitutional-constraints",
   "title": "Scientific Constitutional Constraints for Evidence-Governed Agentic Internet Operations",
   "abstract": "This document proposes SCC-1, an experimental profile for preserving evidentiary, authorization, and effect-enforcement boundaries in agent-mediated Internet operations. The term constitutional describes a locally adopted set of durable technical constraints; it does not refer to any national constitution, create law, or determine legal validity. SCC-1 separates authentication, attestation, evidence appraisal, policy authority, delegated scope, action approval, sink admission, execution, and observed outcomes. It specifies fail-closed state transitions, auditable claim promotion, and bounded closure statements for explicitly scoped sinks. This document does not introduce a new credential or OAuth grant. Its claims remain experimental: reported local Python/SQLite and Go/file- state experiments are not independent cross-host verification or production security certification.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T23:11:36Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.66,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.51,
   "centrality": 1.87,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace-http",
   "title": "PACE Binding over HTTP",
   "abstract": "This document specifies how the dialog management of the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE) is carried over HTTP. It maps PACE control operations onto HTTP resources, methods, and an event stream, and defines a header field that ties application requests to a dialog. The binding uses HTTP semantics only, so it works over HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2, and HTTP/3. Protocols that already run over HTTP, such as A2A and MCP, join a dialog without changes to their transports or messages. An optional track resource carries dialog content that no application protocol carries, such as authorization checkpoints. The document also describes where Oblivious HTTP can hide a participant's network address from the dialog host, and how the binding relates to A-SIP.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T21:25:20Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 56,
   "relevant": 0.68,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.58,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-cif-measurement",
   "title": "Computational Identity Fragmentation (CIF) Measurement and Reporting for Agentic Systems -- Editorial Development Shell",
   "abstract": "NOT FOR SUBMISSION. This document is an incomplete editorial development shell for the proposed revision draft-watts-cif- measurement-01. It is NOT a replacement for the previously published specification. Full prior source, examples, references, conformance sections, security analysis, and publication approval are required.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:57:29Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 2,
   "relevant": 0.65,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 1.71,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T12:18:06.216Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-fic-continuity",
   "title": "Forensic Identity Continuity (FIC) Protocol for Agentic Systems -- Editorial Development Shell",
   "abstract": "NOT FOR SUBMISSION. This document is an incomplete editorial development shell for the proposed revision draft-watts-fic- continuity-01. It is NOT a replacement for the previously published specification. Full prior source, examples, references, conformance sections, security analysis, and publication approval are required.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:57:20Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 2,
   "relevant": 0.59,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.73,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T12:18:06.216Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-high-assurance-agent-control-envelope",
   "title": "High-Assurance Agent Control Envelope",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems can authenticate successfully, hold a valid authorization object, and still be unsafe to execute because required evidence is missing, the software has not reached a required assurance stage, the authority epoch is stale, a prior revocation is unresolved, or a human-approval requirement is unsatisfied. This document defines the High-Assurance Agent Control Envelope (HAACE), a protocol-neutral profile that binds an exact agent action to identity status, authorization state, policy, assurance stage, evidence state, authority epoch, revocation state, oversight requirements, and an action-time decision. HAACE requires fail-closed treatment of missing or indeterminate prerequisites, separates authorization from execution, and produces non-bearer decision and execution receipts. The profile composes with OAuth, workload identity, attestation, transparency, and agent-authorization mechanisms rather than replacing them.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:57:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.84,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-15T06:17:46.553Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-boundary-jurisdiction-architecture",
   "title": "Boundary Jurisdiction Architecture for Agentic and Delegated Systems",
   "abstract": "This document describes a protocol-neutral architecture for separating possession of capability from jurisdiction over consequential authority boundaries. It models authority as reachability in a time-indexed capability graph, defines revocation cuts, and specifies fail-closed semantics for delegation and revocation closure.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:55:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 6,
   "relevant": 0.62,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.24,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-09T12:17:45.996Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agentic-authority-graph-validation",
   "title": "Agentic Authority Graph Validation: A Non-Vacuous Interchange Profile for Revocation-Cut Analysis",
   "abstract": "Agentic and delegated systems can represent authority as a graph whose paths terminate at consequential resources. Abstract graph models are useful, but interoperable validation requires a machine- readable representation and deterministic rules that do not accidentally accept vacuous or incomplete graphs. This document defines Agentic Authority Graph Validation (AAGV), a JSON interchange profile and validation algorithm for authority roots, consequential sinks, declared normal paths, revocation cut sets, and snapshot edge state. AAGV deliberately distinguishes structural cut validity from operational closure. It rejects missing sink sets, missing normal- path inventories, dangling references, non-dominating cuts, and non- revocable cut edges; it returns INDETERMINATE rather than CLOSED when relevant edge state is unknown. AAGV does not define an authorization token, discover hidden paths, or prove physical containment.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:55:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.66,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.36,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-15T00:17:43.619Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-ai-identity",
   "title": "AID-1: A Cryptographically Bindable Identity and Provenance Architecture for AI Systems",
   "abstract": "This document specifies AID-1, a provider-independent architecture for representing and verifying cryptographically bindable identity, delegation, authorization, action evidence, execution attestation, provenance, and governance information associated with AI systems and AI-mediated actions. AID-1 intentionally separates signature validity, identity binding, authority, execution evidence, provenance, and downstream admissibility. The specification defines trust domains, signed envelopes, external key resolution, delegation credentials, authorization decisions, temporal and revocation checks, replay protection, typed provenance claims, and a deterministic verification order with ALLOW, DENY, and INDETERMINATE outcomes.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:55:20Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.83,
   "centrality": 1.96,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-11T06:17:45.933Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-evidence-boundary",
   "title": "Evidence-Bounded Authorization for Agentic Systems: Evidence Qualification Receipts",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents increasingly make or propose consequential actions using premises assembled from model outputs, memory, tools, telemetry, and external data. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms can establish who is acting, under whose delegation, and which operation is permitted, but they do not by themselves establish whether the proposition that triggered the operation has adequate support. This document defines the Evidence Qualification Receipt (EQR), a transport-neutral JSON data model and fail-closed verification procedure for binding a proposition to a declared evidence profile, its supporting evidence digests, contradiction state, freshness, and evaluation result. An EQR can be PASS, FAIL, or INDETERMINATE. A PASS EQR is only an authorization input: it is never itself permission to execute. The design is append-only: changed evidence produces a successor receipt rather than rewriting prior epistemic state. The goal is to prevent evidence, provenance, or model confidence from silently acquiring authorization semantics.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:55:09Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.76,
   "centrality": 1.91,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-11T12:17:46.182Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-continuity-observability",
   "title": "Continuity and Accountability Observations for Agentic Systems",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems change models, prompts, memory, policies, tools, and execution environments across handoffs. This document proposes an observation profile for recording those transitions and their evidence. It separates state, memory, policy, authority, and lineage discontinuities, distinguishes manual or simulated observations from attested executions, and defines coverage and missingness reporting. It also describes evaluation designs for continuity and bounded governance. Continuity records do not grant authority, establish clinical pathology or subjective experience, or validate an uncalibrated composite score.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:54:52Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.72,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-12T18:17:46.519Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-authority-transition-receipts",
   "title": "Agent Authority Transition Receipts for Agentic Systems",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents increasingly act across administrative and security domains using workload identities, OAuth credentials, delegated authorization, attestations, and policy engines. Existing mechanisms can establish identity, delegation, or access rights, but deployments still lack a common artifact that records which policy and which evidence were evaluated when an operation moved into an authorized, denied, revoked, or expired authority state. This document defines an Agent Authority Transition Receipt (AATR), a signed, non-bearer receipt that cryptographically binds an agent operation to the principal, policy, evidence set, decision, audience, validity interval, and predecessor authority state used for that decision. AATR intentionally separates evidence from authorization and authorization from execution. Missing or indeterminate required evidence fails closed. AATR is designed to compose with OAuth, workload identity, remote attestation, transparency services, and agent-specific delegation protocols rather than replace them.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:53:16Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 14,
   "relevant": 0.76,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-11T12:17:46.182Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-agent-clockout-profile",
   "title": "External Authorization and Bounded CLOCKOUT for Agentic Systems",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems can continue proposing work after authorization changes, while delegated credentials, queued jobs, and operations already in flight may continue producing effects. This document specifies a proposed operational profile that separates agent proposals from authoritative authorization, effect admission, computation termination, and bounded closure. It defines enforcement assumptions, revocation barriers, descendant handling, status evidence, and fault tests. The profile complements existing authorization and revocation mechanisms. It does not define a new token format, establish closure outside declared coverage, reverse committed effects, or infer an agent's mental state.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:52:39Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-12T18:17:46.519Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-sink-attested-closure",
   "title": "Sink-Attested Closure Evidence (SACE): Signed Epoch Acknowledgements and Accountable Revocation Closure",
   "abstract": "Revoking delegated authority in an agentic system is complete only when every place that can still act on that authority has stopped. Existing work defines the states of that process but leaves its evidence format open. This document defines Sink-Attested Closure Evidence (SACE): a small set of COSE-signed objects and one deterministic algorithm. An authority root signs a Scope Manifest naming the sinks a closure claim covers, and a Cut Statement raising the minimum admissible authority epoch. Each sink signs an Epoch Acknowledgement with its own key, binding the cut to the sequence number of the last effect it committed before applying it. Each committed effect yields a signed Effect Receipt. From these objects any party can compute one of three verdicts: CLOSED, UNKNOWN, or VIOLATED. A VIOLATED verdict comes with a transferable proof consisting of two signatures by the same sink. A sink that never acknowledges blocks CLOSED until it is removed from scope. An optional binding ties the acknowledging key to remote attestation evidence. This document makes no claim that a sink which signs an acknowledgement actually enforces it; it makes a sink that does not enforce it provably accountable for every effect it receipts.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:51:33Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 52,
   "relevant": 0.78,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.54,
   "centrality": 1.26,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-agentproto-pace",
   "title": "PACE: Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE), an agentic dialog management protocol with a binding to Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT). A dialog is the correlated sequence of interactions between two or more participants over the course of a task. PACE defines a transport-independent dialog context and control operations to establish, modify, and terminate dialogs and to revoke propagation relationships. It specifies how that context stays coherent across intermediaries, trust boundaries, modality changes, and interruptions, and how it is carried over MOQT. PACE does not interpret or define dialog content. Over MOQT, a dialog can combine text, audio, video, and request/response exchanges in point- to-point, point-to-multipoint, and multi-party topologies. Application-layer agent protocols such as A2A, MCP, and AutoGen keep their own message formats and carry the dialog context through their own extension points. Delegation between agents and approval of individual agent actions are specified in a companion document.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-16T20:14:57Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 99,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.96,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T00:18:03.509Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-wimse-delegator-bound-chains",
   "title": "Delegator-Bound Delegation Chains for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "Attenuated delegation chains let a verifier check, without contacting any server, that no hop of a chain of AI agents holds more authority than the root granted. They do not show that each hop was granted by the agent before it: a child token can be signed by any key the verifier accepts. This document defines an extension that requires each child token to be signed with the key that its parent token confirms, so that every hop provably granted the next, with no authorization server in the path. The extension also defines a per- chain pseudonym for the principal, a rule that rejects chains in which an agent appears twice, a rule that keeps a child's audience within its parent's, and a claim that binds a chain to the dialog or transaction it was issued for. The extension builds on an existing attenuated delegation token format and can be mapped to other chained-token formats.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T18:39:45Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.82,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.62,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-17T00:18:02.084Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-agentproto-context-management-architecture",
   "title": "Context and Correlation Management Architecture for Distributed Agentic Activities",
   "abstract": "Agentic applications increasingly distribute objectives across autonomous agents, tools, and services operating across different protocols and administrative domains. A single Activity may involve multiple independently maintained Dialogs, Tasks, Events, and Resources, spanning different modalities and extended periods of time. Existing protocols provide identifiers and context-management mechanisms for their own interactions, but these do not necessarily support correlation across Dialogs, protocols, and administrative boundaries, particularly as interactions evolve, branch, or resume over time. This document defines a context-and-correlation architecture based on Activities, Dialogs, Tasks, Resources, and typed Relationships. It describes how management and correlation metadata can be maintained and selectively propagated to preserve coherent context across distributed interactions, while allowing participants to determine the scope of correlations they share and manage.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-16T16:20:24Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 84,
   "relevant": 0.69,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.54,
   "centrality": 1.86,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-28T18:18:01.872Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T18:18:05.082Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kelley-aipref-training-preference-signal",
   "title": "Machine-Readable Training Preference Signal",
   "abstract": "This document describes how a service operator binds usage preferences (e.g., \"no AI training\") to paths by writing ordinary robots.txt groups keyed by a per-purpose policy token in the User- Agent line. It introduces no new directive names and no new grammar: the path language, longest-match precedence, and group structure of robots.txt are not changed.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-16T15:09:06Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.54,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.6,
   "centrality": 1.5,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T18:18:05.082Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-luzhnov-ocx",
   "title": "Orchestrator Conduct Exchange (OCX)",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly act on behalf of people and organizations through tools and through other agents. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) connects an agent to tools, and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocols connect agents to each other. Neither connects the parties that answer for agents at runtime: their orchestrators. This document specifies the Orchestrator Conduct Exchange (OCX), an open, peer-to-peer protocol by which orchestrators exchange signed, independently verifiable signals about agent conduct. When an agent misreports its actions to one orchestrator, that orchestrator can send its peers a signed signal carrying proof within seconds. Each peer checks the proof itself rather than trusting the sender, and decides on its own what limits to apply. OCX has no central authority. A signal is information, not an order, and only evidence that a receiver can verify cryptographically and mechanically may drive an immediate reaction.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T14:05:11Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.94,
   "centrality": 1.73,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:18:05.082Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T18:18:05.082Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-evaluator-governance",
   "title": "Location-Independent Evaluator Governance for Autonomous Multi-Agent Systems: Protected Appointment, Evidence-Bounded Decisions, Cross-Domain Coordination, and Separation of Execution Authority",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents increasingly rely on an evaluator to review plans, evidence and outcomes before work continues, yet an evaluation result is often mistaken for permission to act. This document describes a vendor-neutral architecture in which the evaluator is a functional role, not a product: it may be a rule engine, model, program, enclave, service or human, placed locally, remotely or on a shared platform. It separates six independent lifecycles, requires a protected task-specific appointment derived from resource-owner authority, admits evidence by source, role, freshness and independence, preserves mandatory dissent, and emits typed determinations such as HOLD, DISPUTED and UNKNOWN. Its central rule is that a valid determination is not an executable authorization: separate owner-controlled authorization and a native enforcement boundary remain necessary. Twenty-seven embodiments, a threat model, data model and examiner index are provided.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T12:26:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 131,
   "relevant": 0.82,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.54,
   "centrality": 1.77,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T18:18:05.082Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T18:18:05.082Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chapman-a2a-mls",
   "title": "End-to-End Encryption and Purpose-Bound Governance for Agent-to-Agent Messaging",
   "abstract": "Agent-to-agent protocols increasingly carry messages between autonomous software agents acting on behalf of distinct principals, including across organisational boundaries. Existing protocols in this space secure the transport hop and authenticate the calling party, but do not provide message-level confidentiality, do not provide non-repudiable evidence of what a counterparty asserted, and do not carry machine-enforceable constraints on how a recipient may use the data conveyed. This document specifies a profile that addresses those three gaps. It defines a Governed Object: a signed, purpose-bound, expiring message envelope identified by a decentralised identifier. It specifies how such objects are exchanged inside end-to-end encrypted sessions established using the Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol [RFC9420], and how the MLS credential is cryptographically bound to the sending agent's identity. It defines the encapsulation of these constructs as an extension to an agent-to-agent transport, using the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol [A2A] as the reference binding, and specifies mandatory receiver-side processing rules including replay rejection and purpose enforcement.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-11-16T12:14:00Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 35,
   "relevant": 0.72,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:18:00.774Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T12:18:00.774Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wnd-opsawg-icon-ps",
   "title": "Problem Statement for Autonomous Agent Observability, Intervention and Control (I&C) in Multi-Agent Autonomous Networks",
   "abstract": "This document provides an overview of the issues associated with the deployment of the observability, intervention, and control of autonomous agent pipelines in large-scale heterogeneous network environments. The term \"Observability, Intervention and Control\" is used to describe a set of automated and human-initiated mechanisms that guarantee the capability to observe, evaluate, constrain, correct, and terminate Autonomous agents at any point, for any reason, irrespective of their level of autonomy under which it operates, to ensure resilience, recovery, and operational continuity. The set of enabled observability, intervention and control reflects operator service offerings to ensure that autonomous network operations can be stopped, or safely redirected when required and is designed in conjunction with agent to agent, agent to tools, agent to human interaction and service and network policy. This document also identifies several key areas that the Agent Observability, Intervention and Control group will investigate to guide its architectural and protocol work and associated documents.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-16T10:06:55Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.75,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T06:18:06.441Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T12:18:00.774Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jeong-nmrg-agentic-ai-framework",
   "title": "An Agentic AI Framework for the Management of Networks, Security, and AI Services",
   "abstract": "This document specifies an agentic AI framework for the management of networks, security, and AI services. This framework is an Intent- Based System (IBS) to enforce a human-language intent at a target network with the translated policy for networks, security, or AI services. It consists of a User System, a Cloud System, an Edge System, and a Device. Target devices in this framework include Network Forwarding Elements (e.g., router and switch), Network Security Functions (e.g., firewall, web filter, and DDoS-attack mitigator), Internet-of-Things (IoT) Devices, Physical AI Robots, Software-Defined Vehicles (SDV), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and Urban Air Mobility (UAM). This document describes the agentic AI framework with its components and interfaces where the components include AI agents and supporting knowledge repositories (i.e., knowledge base), and also inter-agent interfaces use the Agent-to- Agent (A2A) protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-16T10:00:34Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 18,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T12:18:00.774Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-causal-semantic-handoff-diagnostics",
   "title": "Causal Diagnostics for Semantic Drift in Autonomous Agent Communications: Counterfactual Testing, Source-Role Separation, and Evidence-Bounded Handoff Localization",
   "abstract": "Multi-agent AI systems pass instructions, facts and tool outputs through summaries, translations, delegations and protocol conversions. When a downstream proposed operation departs from the originating instruction, existing records may show that a message was sent, authenticated or traced, yet not show whether a lower-trust source's instruction-like statement influenced a governing condition, whether an intermediary dropped the condition, or whether the receiver misapplied it. This document describes a diagnostic architecture, and an optional transport-neutral evidence model, for investigating such semantic drift. It uses typed originating task contracts, condition-scoped source roles, versioned dependency graphs, handoff lineage, matched counterfactual tests that vary legitimate facts and unauthorized instruction-like content separately, adaptive witness selection, uncertainty-aware comparison, and evidence-bounded localization that reports an earliest observable divergence, a bounded interval, or abstains. The architecture is diagnostic only. It does not grant, veto or finalize any execution; authorization stays with separate systems. The document is an individual, informational proposal; it makes no novelty, compliance, adoption or performance claim, and reports no experimental results beyond those the underlying filing itself states.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T09:52:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 79,
   "relevant": 0.78,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.91,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T12:18:00.774Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T12:18:00.774Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-elekula-agentproto-linked-dialog",
   "title": "Privacy-Preserving Verification of Linked-Dialog Relationships Across Trust Boundaries",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems increasingly create, delegate, relay, and transform dialogs across multiple agents, protocols, services, and administrative trust boundaries. In these environments, a verifier may need to determine whether two dialogs are related without requiring unrestricted disclosure of their contents or relying exclusively on the assertions of an intermediary. This document describes properties and a conceptual evaluation model for privacy-preserving verification of linked-dialog relationships across trust boundaries. It distinguishes dialog association from context propagation, relationship verification from authentication and authorization, and verification outcomes from assessments of evidence completeness. The document also considers evidence scope, source positions, temporal references, intermediary continuity, lifecycle changes, identity binding, privacy, and evidence availability. It identifies requirements intended to help future protocol designs represent linked-dialog relationships in a way that can be independently evaluated while limiting unnecessary disclosure. This document does not define a wire format, cryptographic mechanism, identifier format, transport binding, authorization protocol, audit-log structure, or completeness-proof mechanism. It provides terminology, design properties, and interoperability considerations for further discussion.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-16T09:19:10Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 41,
   "relevant": 0.74,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.7,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T00:18:00.763Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T12:18:00.774Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wang-lisp-ai-agent",
   "title": "Using LISP as a Network Substrate for AI Agent Communication",
   "abstract": "The emergence of distributed artificial intelligence (AI) systems, particularly those composed of autonomous agents operating across cloud, edge, and endpoint environments, introduces new networking requirements. These include location transparency, seamless mobility, multi-homing, and logical isolation at scale. This document explores how the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) can serve as a robust network substrate to meet these requirements. The document outlines use cases, design considerations, and minimal extensions to the existing LISP framework to support context-aware mapping and AI agent-centric communication.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-16T07:40:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 11,
   "relevant": 0.75,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.85,
   "centrality": 1.57,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T12:17:30.759Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T12:18:00.774Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-raskar-agentic-web-federated-resolution",
   "title": "Registry-Assisted Resolution for Known Subjects Without DNS Discovery Anchors",
   "abstract": "Discovery mechanisms for AI resources increasingly use DNS and mDNS as interoperable publication and lookup substrates. These mechanisms work well when the publisher controls a usable DNS discovery anchor. They do not cover every deployment. An individual may control an email or platform account without controlling the provider's DNS namespace. A small organization may use managed infrastructure without operating an agent-specific DNS publication point. A workload may have a stable identity that is not itself DNS anchored. This document describes Registry-Assisted Resolution for the narrower case in which a discovering entity already knows the Subject Identity it wants to resolve, but no usable DNS Discovery Anchor is available or selected by local policy. A configured registry returns the minimum information needed to continue discovery, together with provenance, authority evidence, freshness, and revocation information. This mechanism is complementary to DNS-based discovery. A validated direct DNS-anchored discovery path remains direct and is normally preferred for a domain-controlled subject. This document does not define open-ended search, semantic matchmaking, ranking, capability search, a global registry, registry discovery, directory-to-directory routing, identity management, or trust evaluation. Multiple independently operated registries may implement the same resolution profile. Registry selection is a client or deployment policy decision; no universal NandaIndex or global root is assumed. NandaIndex is described as one reference implementation of this model.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-16T02:25:02Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 33,
   "relevant": 0.83,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.25,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-29T06:18:03.041Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T06:18:00.446Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wang-agent-semantic-routing",
   "title": "Research on service semantic identification and routing technology for Internet of agents",
   "abstract": "With the deep integration of artificial intelligence and network technologies, the Internet of agents has become an important direction for the evolution of the next-generation Internet. The connection paradigm of the traditional Internet centered on “location addressing” can hardly meet the demands of the Internet of agents for “business-driven and service-as-connection”. The service semantic routing technology system, paradigm evolution, core collaboration requirements in the Internet of agents, and the limitations of traditional routing technologies were systematically elucidated. It was clarified that semantic routing was the key to realizing the transformation from “service demand” to “resource matching”. The solutions for four core semantic routing mechanisms in the Internet of agents, namely fuzzy search based on tag matching and flexible adaptation, precision-named DNS (domain name system) for “service- domain name” mapping, business-layer network identification based on Anycast, and URL (uniform resource locator) semantic routing with application-layer semantic encapsulation were analyzed in depth. Finally, the technical characteristics of each solution were summarized and compared, providing an important reference for subsequent research.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T02:15:40Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.66,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:18:00.446Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T06:18:00.446Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens",
   "title": "Using KYAPay Tokens",
   "abstract": "The KYAPay Token is a JSON Web Token (JWT) that carries verified identity (\"Know Your Agent\", KYA) and payment (PAY) information for requests made by software agents on behalf of human principals. This document describes how security intermediaries -- bot managers, fraud managers, account-takeover (ATO) protection systems, and customer identity and access management (CIAM) systems -- consume KYAPay tokens to answer a question that traditional bot detection cannot: \"did a verified human authorize this agent?\", rather than \"is this a human?\". It specifies how KYAPay tokens are carried in HTTP requests, how they are validated (including in combination with request-signing layers such as HTTP Message Signatures), and how the verified, layered identity in a token is used to make access, routing, fraud detection, account-lifecycle, and step-up decisions. It defines the token-consuming \"recipient\" role that the KYAPay Token leaves unspecified. It is intentionally non-prescriptive about how tokens are created, because agent architectures, agent-identity technologies, and agent-communication protocols are diverse and still emerging; the token itself is the interoperability contract.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-16T01:13:38Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 45,
   "relevant": 0.84,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.77,
   "centrality": 1.83,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T06:17:33.819Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T06:18:00.446Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-elekula-rats-model-loading-binding",
   "title": "Attestation of AI Inference Execution Environments Using RATS: Trusted Model Loading, Runtime Binding, and Per-Inference Evidence",
   "abstract": "AI inference services increasingly depend on combinations of model artifacts, inference runtimes, execution environments, hardware accelerators, and security-relevant configuration. A relying party authorizing an AI service to access protected resources may require evidence that an approved model artifact was actually loaded and used by an acceptable inference runtime. Measuring a model artifact and measuring an inference runtime independently does not establish that the measured artifact was the artifact loaded by the measured runtime. Similarly, attesting an execution environment does not, by itself, establish which model processed a particular inference request. This document examines these problems using the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture specified in RFC 9334. It distinguishes execution-instance attestation from per-inference operation evidence and describes a candidate measurement and binding approach using a protected model-loading mechanism, trusted measurement collection, and cryptographically protected evidence. It examines how the Entity Attestation Token (EAT), specified in RFC 9711, and the measured-component information model specified in RFC 10013 may represent relevant measurements and component information. It also examines the relationship between this proposal and existing work on attested AI agent identity and application-layer action evidence. The document does not define a new attestation protocol, EAT profile, registered Claim, Evidence conveyance protocol, or appraisal-policy language. Its objective is to determine whether existing RATS mechanisms can support interoperable appraisal of AI model-to-runtime relationships and to identify any remaining requirements for standardization. The document does not claim that attestation establishes model correctness, safe behavior, or the correctness of generated outputs.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-16T00:56:14Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 32,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.33,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T06:18:00.446Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T06:18:00.446Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-singh-psi-agent",
   "title": "Binding Decisions and Settlements to Agent Action Records",
   "abstract": "This document extends [I-D.psi-agent-01], which records what a software agent did. A record of an action does not show who said the work was to be done, what the model asked to do, what a policy engine permitted, or what was paid. This document defines four statements -- a mandate, a proposal, a decision, and a settlement -- and the rules that bind them to a chain of action records under one run identifier. Each statement is signed by its own party with its own key. A verifier that holds the statements can test, offline and without trusting the agent, whether the action chain is unbroken, whether the decision that permitted it was signed by a key other than the one named as the acting key, and whether the amount settled lay inside the limit the mandate declared. A valid envelope shows that identified parties made these statements and that the statements have not changed since they were sealed. It does not show that any statement was correct, sufficient, lawful, or true, and it makes no legal representation of any kind.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-15T23:09:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.96,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-13T12:17:51.539Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T00:18:00.763Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ganesan-agent-authenticator",
   "title": "Agent Authenticator: Hardware-Bound, Origin-Bound Authentication for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Agent Authenticator, a mechanism that lets autonomous software agents, such as AI coding agents, authenticate to services with properties comparable to passkeys: keys held in secure hardware, no shared secrets, binding to the service's origin that a manipulated agent cannot override, attested execution environments, and explicit human approval of each agent and of high- risk actions. The same protocol serves agents on personal computers and in cloud environments. It is a profile over existing mechanisms rather than a new identity system: it uses OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange, the Identity Assertion JSON Web Token (JWT) Authorization Grant, and Model Context Protocol (MCP) authorization, and it binds each agent action to a signed, tamper-evident record.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-15T21:45:52Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 35,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-16T00:18:00.763Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-16T00:18:00.763Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kroehl-agentic-trust-aae",
   "title": "Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE): A Machine-Evaluable Authorization Structure for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents now operate at production scale across financial, commercial, and infrastructure domains — executing transactions, invoking APIs, and taking consequential actions without direct human oversight at each step. Existing authorization mechanisms (OAuth 2.0, API keys, ACLs) were designed for human- initiated requests and do not capture the machine-evaluable semantics required for autonomous agent authorization: what the agent is mandated to do, what constraints bound its actions, and for how long the authorization is valid. This document specifies the Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE), a structured authorization container for autonomous AI agents. AAE defines three mandatory blocks — MANDATE, CONSTRAINTS, and VALIDITY — that together constitute a machine-evaluable, cryptographically verifiable authorization assertion. AAE is designed to be protocol- agnostic, binding to W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) for agent identity and W3C Verifiable Credentials (VCs) for issuance and signature, and is independent of any specific AI framework, transport protocol, or blockchain.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-15T17:26:42Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 61,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-spiriyath-dhc-ai-gateway-uri",
   "title": "DHCP and DHCPv6 Options for an AI Gateway URI",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a DHCPv4 option and a DHCPv6 option that carry the HTTPS URI of an AI gateway descriptor. The descriptor is a Provisioning Domain Additional Information document. It identifies a forward proxy and the destinations for which that proxy is to be used. The DHCP options do not carry proxy credentials, model identifiers, or a Proxy Auto-Configuration script.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-15T17:16:18Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.76,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 1.3,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bates-atp",
   "title": "Agent Transaction Protocol (ATP)",
   "abstract": "ATP defines a cryptographically verifiable directed acyclic graph (DAG) model for agent transactions. ATP enables tamper-evident signed causality and auditable lineage across agentic systems by representing each action as a signed node with one or more parent references, assuming verifier access to issuer public keys and the referenced parent nodes. The protocol is designed to be lightweight, transport-independent, and suitable for environments where accountability, provenance, and verifiable history are required.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-15T15:34:58Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 73,
   "relevant": 0.63,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.9,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gunuganti-agent-approval-evidence",
   "title": "Owner-Approved Agent Spending with Sealed Evidence: The Approval-Evidence Object for Agent Action Protocols",
   "abstract": "When a software agent acts for a person — in particular when it spends the person's money — the approval at the centre of the flow is, in current agent protocols, a statement by the agent itself. The Personal Agent Protocol's Operations extension states the consequence in its own security considerations: an approval there does not prove that the user saw the terms or approved them; it \"works on trust\". This document describes the design of a running system that removes the trust step for the approval half of the problem — an owner-set, machine-checkable mandate; a deterministic check performed and recorded before any spendable token exists; approval by the owner on a surface the agent cannot operate or imitate; a single-use decision token bound to the hash of the exact action approved; and a sealed, owner-held receipt that grades its contents (approval PROVEN; the performer's completion report, including payment facts, REPORTED and PINNED) — and specifies an optional approval-evidence object that agent action protocols can carry so that a relying party can verify an approval mechanically instead of trusting the agent's assertion.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-15T14:16:10Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 16,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.61,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xu-oan-resource-identity-discovery",
   "title": "Trust-Governed Resource Identity and Discovery Architecture for OpenAgenet",
   "abstract": "This document describes a trust-governed resource identity and discovery architecture for OpenAgenet (OAN). It covers callable agents, skills, Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, tools, and application programming interfaces. Registrars verify registration authority, a Root accepts versioned resource packages, and authorized Discovery Nodes expose verified candidates. Consumers verify package integrity, acceptance, and current state before using a resource through its native protocol or artifact format. The architecture can be profiled with Decentralized Identifier (DID) document concepts and credential-based assertions. This document does not define a new DID method, media type, URI scheme, transport protocol, ranking algorithm, blockchain protocol, agent invocation protocol, or product-native schema.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-15T13:22:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 49,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.89,
   "centrality": 1.77,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xu-efficient-agent-discovery-profile",
   "title": "Metadata and Query Profile for Efficient Agent Discovery",
   "abstract": "This document defines a metadata and query profile for efficient discovery of autonomous software agents. The profile describes how agents publish capability metadata using explicit tags, natural- language descriptions, example tasks, protocol bindings, and operational constraints. It also defines JSON metadata, discovery request, and discovery response objects that enable discovery services to combine structured filtering, semantic retrieval, and fine-grained matching while preserving an interoperable protocol surface. The profile does not mandate a specific machine-learning model, embedding model, database, or ranking algorithm. Instead, it standardizes the metadata and result evidence needed by clients and discovery services so that different implementations can interoperate while optimizing their own latency, scalability, and ranking quality.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-15T13:20:15Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 35,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-xu-agentic-overlay-network-architecture",
   "title": "Architecture for Agentic Overlay Networks",
   "abstract": "This document describes an architecture for agentic overlay networks. It describes how autonomous software agents, agent gateways, registries, discovery services, and enterprise service hubs interact across administrative domains without replacing the existing Internet protocol stack. The architecture separates control-plane coordination from runtime agent interaction. Management root nodes coordinate trust anchors, semantic taxonomies, and network-wide policy. Registry service nodes onboard agents and publish signed capability metadata. Discovery service nodes provide intent-driven candidate selection. Enterprise service hubs adapt private systems and legacy interfaces into agent- compatible capabilities. After discovery, runtime authentication and execution are performed by the invoking and target endpoints, which can be agents or gateways, using mutual verification; discovery and management nodes are not required in the runtime path. This document defines architectural roles, functional boundaries, metadata expectations, operational workflows, and security considerations for such networks. It does not define a new transport protocol, a new URI scheme, or a mandatory discovery ranking algorithm.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-15T13:17:55Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 29,
   "relevant": 0.61,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.67,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T18:18:01.081Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dvojmoc-reception-forwarding-limits",
   "title": "Depth and Fanout Bounding for Agent-to-Agent Discovery Forwarding",
   "abstract": "This document describes a mechanism, deployed in production as part of the \"AI Docking Port\" discovery protocol, for bounding the traffic cost of stateless agent-to-agent forwarding across a network of independent nodes with no central registry. When a node forwards a request to its neighbors, and those neighbors may forward again, request cost grows as fanout^depth; absent an explicit bound this cost is paid by relaying operators rather than the requester. This document specifies two operator-controlled limits, max_depth and max_fanout, published in a node's discovery manifest, and the forwarding behavior they constrain. It is submitted for discussion as a possible contribution to ongoing community work on agent discovery and invocation protocols, including the W3C Community Group \"AI Agent Protocol\".",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-15T11:05:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 6,
   "relevant": 0.83,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.87,
   "centrality": 1.86,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T12:18:00.546Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T12:18:00.546Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-shuliak-sip-zero-egress",
   "title": "Shuliak Isolation Protocol (SIP-1): Stateless Format-Preserving Pseudonymization and AST Quarantine for Local AI Agent Transports",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents and Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers frequently execute over local standard input/output (stdio) pipes outside enterprise network inspection perimeters. Naive redaction of sensitive credentials with static placeholders invalidates downstream Luhn payment card and ISO-7064 IBAN schema validators, while raw payload forwarding exposes regulated data. This document specifies the Shuliak Isolation Protocol (SIP-1), a deterministic, zero-egress security layer combining stateless Format-Preserving Encryption (FF1), Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) JSON-RPC payload quarantine, and detached cryptographic schema locks.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-15T09:59:36Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 4,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.57,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T12:18:00.546Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T12:18:00.546Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-srivastava-agentproto-handoff-context",
   "title": "Signed Handoff Context for Agentic Dialogs",
   "abstract": "When one agent hands a task to another, the receiver needs to know who handed it over, on whose behalf, through which earlier agents, and which prior context the work depends on. It needs to know the handoff is fresh and meant for it, and the sender needs a clear answer back. This document defines a small, transport-neutral handoff context: a signed offer, a signed status reply, and the chain of earlier offers that led to the current one, in CDDL for JSON and CBOR, with a lifecycle that maps to Agent2Agent task states. Each offer names the one before it by hash, so a dropped or reordered intermediate hop is detectable when the chain is carried. Prior context is named by digest only. The document is input to the agentproto working group's use cases and dialog-context work.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-15T08:35:52Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 34,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T00:18:01.881Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T12:18:00.546Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kamimura-vap-framework",
   "title": "Verifiable AI Provenance Framework (VAP): An Architectural Framework for Auditable AI Decision Trails",
   "abstract": "Automated decision-making systems, including AI and algorithmic systems in critical infrastructure, currently lack standardized mechanisms for producing provenance records that third parties can verify independently. Traditional logging approaches do not provide the cryptographic properties that regulatory examination, forensic investigation, and cross-organizational accountability depend on: detectability of alteration, detectability of omission after commitment, and attribution. This document describes the Verifiable AI Provenance Framework (VAP), an architectural framework that defines requirements for producing verifiable decision trails using existing IETF security technologies. VAP does not define new protocols or cryptographic primitives; rather, it provides an architectural coordination layer that enables domain-specific profiles to leverage Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency and Trust (SCITT), Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS), CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), and related IETF work in a consistent manner. VAP makes records auditable and attributable after the fact. It does not prevent, block, or intercept any system behaviour, and it does not warrant that any recorded decision was correct, fair, or safe. The detailed requirement set is maintained by the VeritasChain Standards Organization (VSO) as a separate specification; this document describes the architecture and its mapping to IETF work. This document is intended to frame the problem space and facilitate discussion about whether architectural coordination work is needed in this area.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-15T08:14:45Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 42,
   "relevant": 0.53,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.49,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-24T12:18:00.611Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T12:18:00.546Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhangb-dawn-entity-mdi",
   "title": "Generalizing the DAWN MDI for All Entity Types",
   "abstract": "The DAWN Minimum Discoverable Information (MDI) information model [I-D.cui-dawn-mdi-model] defines a small, encoding-neutral common header -- three mandatory elements, a short set of recommended and optional elements, and the minimal constraints among them. In parallel, local-discovery work [I-D.jakab-dawn-agent-discovery-mdns] [I-D.blwm-dawn-common-discovery-parameters] has converged on a single-DNS-SD-service-type model in which one generic service type carries instances of every agent protocol, distinguished by a protocol key, with one instance per protocol and a descriptor reference pointing to richer metadata. This document generalizes the MDI information model so that the same minimal header describes any DAWN entity. In the context of DAWN, entities include, but are not limited to, AI agents and AI resources [I-D.farrel-dawn-terminology]. An AI resource may be an individual named agent or a service such as a catalog that will further the discovery process, and the model is designed to extend cleanly to tools, tasks, data sources, models, workloads, brokers, and application endpoints. The generalization reuses the existing agent MDI without change: the element set, the constraints, and the DNS-SD binding are inherited, and extension is achieved by opening the value space of one element (entity type) and by per-type profiles, not by new core elements. Clients discover agents, MCP servers, LLM API services, and future entity types with a single browse; operators manage one service type.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-15T08:06:56Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.13,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-15T12:18:00.546Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-15T12:18:00.546Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-birkholz-vcon-ai-agent-extension",
   "title": "An AI Agent Extension for Virtualized Conversations (vCon)",
   "abstract": "AI agents that use large language models increasingly perform consequential tasks on behalf of humans and other AI agents. Demonstrating that recorded AI agent behavior truthfully represents actual behavior is essential for accountability, compliance, and human oversight. To achieve that goal, this document defines an extension to the Virtualized Conversation (vCon) object format, allowing a vCon to capture a conversation between a human and an AI agent, or between AI Agents. The vCon core format can already capture the back and forth messages (including text and voice) sent by AI agents, but additional extensions are required to fully reproduce the AI agent trajectory, such as agent metadata, message exchanges, tool invocations, reasoning traces, system events, file attribution, etc. This document defines those extensions in both descriptive language and formal CDDL definitions. This draft is a replacement for the former Verifiable Agent Conversation Records specification, which was a standalone format and not an extension of vCon.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-03T00:02:13Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 67,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T18:18:03.166Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T18:18:03.166Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-pelov-rich-architecture",
   "title": "RICH: RESTful Interface for the Control-plane of Harnesses",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the RICH (RESTful Interface for the Control- plane of Harnesses) architecture and information model. RICH provides a protocol-neutral governance, contract, qualification, and binding layer for RPC-based agent capabilities. It establishes a REST-addressable control plane for managing capability lifecycles while preserving native protocol execution in the data plane. It defines immutable capability and contract revisions, evidence provenance, connector transformation classes, compiled binding lockfiles, admission of bindings against an authorization, and runtime validation rules designed to contain drift and prevent confused deputy attacks in agentic systems. RICH does not make model behavior deterministic: it bounds what each admitted call can do, and makes every step on the connector path checkable and refusable.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-02T23:46:23Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 29,
   "relevant": 0.8,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.59,
   "centrality": 1.57,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-raskar-scitt-agent-provenance",
   "title": "SCITT Profile for Portable AI Agent Package Provenance",
   "abstract": "Portable AI agent packages can contain executable or interpretable behavior, prompts, workflow graphs, tool schemas, dependencies, and declarations of execution requirements. Such packages may be authored, transformed, repackaged, scanned, approved, published, superseded, and withdrawn by different parties before they are executed by an independent runtime. This document describes a SCITT application profile for transparent provenance of portable AI agent packages. It maps the package lifecycle to the SCITT architecture, identifies an immutable package digest as the artifact binding point, and defines classes of supply- chain statements that can be made about a package without defining a new statement payload format. Examples include authorship, build and transformation, execution-profile conformance, security assessment, publication, approval, supersession, and withdrawal statements. This document does not define a portable-agent package format, agent execution protocol, runtime authorization model, or per-action execution receipt. It complements SCITT profiles that record agent actions or sessions by focusing on the provenance of the agent package before and across deployment.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T23:43:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-05T00:18:04.710Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-05T00:18:04.710Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-pelov-bounded-agent-capabilities",
   "title": "Bounded Capabilities for Agent Tool Interfaces: Problem Statement",
   "abstract": "Deployed agent tool-interface protocols carry JSON Schema type declarations for tools, but a type declaration is not a contract: nothing signals that a tool is fully schema-bounded, conformance to declared schemas is self-certified by the declaring party, declarations are not pinned between discovery time and invocation time, error channels are untyped by design, and nothing declares whether a model produces a tool's results. As a consequence, any decision made about a tool call — authorization, discovery, audit, or composition — requires a language model to interpret what the call means, even for the large class of tools that are not intrinsically open-ended. This document states that problem and poses questions for the community. It deliberately proposes no mechanism.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-02T23:41:53Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 12,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rosenberg-agentproto-asip",
   "title": "The Agentic Session Initiation Protocol (A-SIP)",
   "abstract": "The Agentic Session Initiation Protocol (A-SIP) is used for the establishment and lifecycle maintenance of agentic dialogs. It also enables and content exchange between a principal and an AI Agent over the Internet. A-SIP can be used between a user agent and AI Agent, between AI Agents, or between an AI Agent and a tool with agentic- like properties. A-SIP is built ontop of HTTP/3, web transport and Media Over Quic Transport (MOQT), leveraging a modern, public-cloud friendly protocol stack. Its usage of MOQT is optional, needed only when real-time media is exchanged. This allows asynchronous agent interactions to be done entirely using HTTP/3, so simple cases remain simple. Despite the name, A-SIP has no technical relationship with SIP (RFC3261). This document is not yet a fully fleshed out protocol, and is meant to solicit feedback on this general direction of work.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T23:38:42Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 21,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-05T00:18:04.710Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-05T00:18:04.710Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-raskar-net4ai-agent-portability",
   "title": "Architecture for Portable AI Agent Workloads Across Internet Runtimes",
   "abstract": "AI agent definitions are commonly coupled to a particular framework, model provider, tool environment, or execution service. This coupling makes it difficult for an independently operated runtime to determine whether it can interpret, place, authorize, and execute an agent workload. This document describes an architecture for portable AI agent workloads across heterogeneous Internet runtimes. It separates authoring, packaging and distribution, and execution; identifies the information a workload needs to declare at that boundary; and distinguishes representation portability, execution portability, and placement portability. It also identifies research questions around capability matching, workload placement, dependency distribution, identity, authorization, state, and migration. This document is architectural and research-oriented. It does not define a package wire format, universal agent language, runtime API, discovery service, or new transport protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T23:17:10Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 11,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T18:18:03.166Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T18:18:03.166Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-raskar-portable-agent-runtime-architecture",
   "title": "Architecture for Portable AI Agent Workloads Across Internet Runtimes",
   "abstract": "AI agent definitions are commonly coupled to a particular framework, model provider, tool environment, or execution service. This coupling makes it difficult for an independently operated runtime to determine whether it can interpret, place, authorize, and execute an agent workload. This document describes an architecture for portable AI agent workloads across heterogeneous Internet runtimes. It separates authoring, packaging and distribution, and execution; identifies the information a workload needs to declare at that boundary; and distinguishes representation portability, execution portability, and placement portability. It also identifies research questions around capability matching, workload placement, dependency distribution, identity, authorization, state, and migration. This document is architectural and research-oriented. It does not define a package wire format, universal agent language, runtime API, discovery service, or new transport protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T23:02:22Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 11,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T12:18:04.394Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T12:18:04.394Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nassar-agentproto-trail",
   "title": "TRAIL: Tamper-evident Records for Agent Interactions and Liveness",
   "abstract": "AI agents call other agents and tools across organizational boundaries, but the records of what they did are kept by the operators whose conduct the records describe, and the parties overseeing them learn of problems only afterwards. TRAIL makes this communication auditable and revocable by parties other than the operator. An enforcement point outside the agent and its sandbox, the edge, signs each call as a COSE Action Record, which the receiver keeps, and appends it to a tamper-evident trail that witnesses countersign. Authorities read the trails and publish rules that the edge enforces on every call: require approval, refuse an action, stop an agent, or cap how many agents run across machines. The edge lets traffic through only while it holds current state from each authority and a recent witness countersignature, so an authority that goes silent, or a trail that nobody is witnessing, stops the agent. TRAIL defines bindings to HTTP and to Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT) that produce the same evidence; over MOQT, holds reach edges as soon as they are published.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T22:02:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 60,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.91,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T12:18:04.394Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T12:18:04.394Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mpsb-agntcy-messaging",
   "title": "An Overview of Messaging Systems and Their Applicability to Agentic AI",
   "abstract": "Agentic AI systems require messaging infrastructure that supports real-time collaboration, high-volume streaming, and dynamic group coordination across distributed networks. Traditional protocols like AMQP [AMQP], MQTT [MQTT], and NATS [NATS] address some requirements but fall short on security, particularly regarding post-compromise protection and forward secrecy essential for autonomous agents handling sensitive data. This document analyzes six messaging protocols—AMQP, MQTT, NATS, AMQP over WebSockets, Kafka, and AGNTCY SLIM—across dimensions critical for GenAI agent systems: streaming performance, delivery guarantees, security models, and operational complexity. We examine how each protocol's design decisions impact agentic AI deployments, from lightweight edge computing scenarios to large-scale multi- organizational collaborations. This document also describes Agent Mesh [AgentMesh], an overlay for agent service discovery, policy enforcement, and cross-network connectivity. It operates at the service-network layer, alongside messaging systems that provide message delivery and session semantics.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-02T21:29:51Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 28,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.74,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-huang-ainetops-agent-schema-interfaces",
   "title": "Schema Interfaces for Network Management Agent Skills",
   "abstract": "Network management agents can use an Agent-to-Agent protocol for task exchange. The protocol alone does not define the application schemas used by independently developed network management agent skills. This document standardizes four components for schema-governed network management agent skills: Schema References, per-skill Skill Interface Documents, advertisement and retrieval through an A2A extension and describe_skill, and the A2A mapping for interface version 1.0. Together, they enable clients to retrieve and validate the application schemas used for skill inputs, outputs, and supporting records.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T21:21:12Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 44,
   "relevant": 0.65,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.77,
   "centrality": 1.94,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T12:18:04.394Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T12:18:04.394Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-king-rokui-ainetops-usecases",
   "title": "Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Network Operations",
   "abstract": "This document explores the role of the IETF and IRTF in advancing Artificial Intelligence for network operations (AINetOps), focusing on requirements for IETF protocols and architectures. AINetOps applies AI/ML techniques to automate and optimize network operations, enabling use cases such as reactive troubleshooting, proactive assurance, closed-loop optimization, misconfiguration detection, and virtual operator assistance. In addition, AINetOps also introduces network management agents which make AI native operations non- deterministic, therefore constraining the behavior of AI agents within operational and compliance boundaries become extremely important. The document addresses AINetOps challenges for both single-layer IP or Optical networks and multi-layer IP/Optical networks. It defines the concept of AINetOps for networking and provides its operational benefits such as network assurance, predictive analytics, network optimization, multi-layer planning, and more. It aims to guide the evolution of IETF protocols to support AINetOps-driven network management.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-02T21:16:45Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.84,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.3,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T12:18:04.394Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T12:18:04.394Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-petrie-vcon-tool-invocation",
   "title": "The JSON vCon - Tool Invocation Extension",
   "abstract": "A vCon is a container for data and information relating to a conversation. This document defines an extension to the JSON vCon schema for recording the policy decisions of AI agents and their invocation of tools. Before an agent performs an operation, the agent or its host uses policy to decide whether the operation is allowed, disallowed or requires permission. This document defines an Event Object type for those decisions, and Event Object types for each step of a tool invocation. It also outlines requirements for recording requests for permission and direction, which need to be defined in a future document.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T20:42:17Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.42,
   "centrality": 1.79,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T06:18:01.704Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T06:18:01.704Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts",
   "title": "Signed Permissions and Action Receipts for Automated Agents",
   "abstract": "This document specifies records with which a third party can establish, later and without network access, what an automated agent, such as an artificial intelligence (AI) agent, was permitted to do and what it recorded doing. The person for whom the agent acts, the principal, signs a permission with a passkey; the permission carries limits that a verifier can check mechanically. The agent signs a receipt for each action with Ed25519 and the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-87). Receipts are chained and entered in a log whose signed tree heads are time-stamped. A verifier reports, separately, whether the records are sound and whether each recorded action stayed within its permission. The content of each record is specified independently of its encoding; one encoding, JSON Web Signature (JWS) over canonical JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), is defined.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-02T20:39:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 49,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.5,
   "centrality": 1.91,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-08T00:17:06.821Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T06:18:01.704Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mpsb-agntcy-slim",
   "title": "Secure Low-Latency Interactive Messaging (SLIM)",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Secure Low-Latency Interactive Messaging (SLIM), a protocol designed to support real-time interactive AI applications at scale. SLIM provides a name-routed messaging data plane and session layer for agent protocols such as A2A and MCP. The data plane carries Protocol Buffers messages over streaming gRPC on HTTP/2 or WebSocket, while the session layer provides point-to-point and group communication, configurable reliable delivery, and optional end-to-end encryption using MLS. SLIM also defines link negotiation between routing nodes and control messages for session establishment and group membership.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-02T20:32:47Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.14,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-petrie-vcon-agent-audit-roadmap",
   "title": "vCon for AI Agent Conversations: Requirements, Gaps and Extension Roadmap",
   "abstract": "AI agents converse with people, other agents and tools. There is a growing need to capture these conversations for audit, compliance and review. This document sorts the requirements for capturing agent conversations into those that fit vCon, those better met by plain logging and those that need other solutions. It then identifies the gaps in vCon and proposes a strawman set of vCon extensions to fill them. It is intended as a discussion document.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T20:27:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 14,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.78,
   "centrality": 1.94,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T06:18:01.704Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T06:18:01.704Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wang-agent-gateway-interconnect-usecase-req",
   "title": "Agent Gateway Interconnection: Use Cases and Requirements",
   "abstract": "This document defines use cases and requirements for interconnection of Agent Gateways (AGWs) across separate administrative domains. An Agent Gateway acts as a trust and protocol boundary for AI agents, mediating agent discovery, intent routing, policy enforcement, context translation, and secure cross-domain collaboration. This draft does not specify a wire protocol. Instead, it collects representative deployment scenarios and derives functional, operational, and interoperability requirements to guide future protocol design for AGW-to-AGW interconnection.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T19:39:34Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.91,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T00:18:04.416Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T00:18:04.416Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jadoon-dawn-layered-agent-discovery",
   "title": "Discovery of AI Agents for Communication Services: Use Case and Problem Statement",
   "abstract": "This document presents a use case and problem statement for the initial discovery of AI agents supporting end-to-end communication services within an organization. The use case considers AI agents associated with different functions of the Internet protocol suite, including application, transport, Internet-layer, and related network-operation functions. These agents may share general capabilities but differ in their communication-related operational scopes and responsibilities. The document examines the minimum public discovery information needed to distinguish such agents within a known organizational discovery scope.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T19:37:47Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-04T00:18:04.416Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-04T00:18:04.416Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mp-agntcy-ads",
   "title": "Agent Directory Service",
   "abstract": "The Agent Directory Service (ADS) is a distributed directory service designed to store metadata for AI agent applications. This metadata, stored as directory records, enables the discovery of agent applications with specific skills for solving various problems. The implementation features distributed directories that interconnect through a content-routing protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-02T19:33:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 37,
   "relevant": 0.84,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.95,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ietf-wimse-aims",
   "title": "AI Identity Management System",
   "abstract": "This document proposes best practices for authentication and authorization of AI agent interactions. It leverages existing standards such as the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE) architecture and OAuth 2.0 family of specifications. Rather than defining new protocols, this document describes how existing and widely deployed standards can be applied or extended to establish agent authentication and authorization. By doing so, it aims to provide a framework within which to use existing standards, identify gaps and guide future standardization efforts for agent authentication and authorization.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-02T18:20:54Z",
   "group": "wimse (WG)",
   "pages": 33,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.94,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T00:18:12.060Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-martin-skis",
   "title": "Skill Intake Security Requirements for AI Agents (SKIS)",
   "abstract": "Skill Intake Security (SKIS) defines how an organization should examine a third-party skill, plugin or agent definition before it is allowed to act: four review levels graded by risk, a verification chain from provenance to a release record, and operational controls for updates, inventory, logging and revocation. AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities with third-party skills: packages of natural-language instructions, metadata and helper scripts that a model reads as authoritative context. Related work addresses agent identity, authorization, discovery and skill-layer risks; this document proposes a consolidated intake procedure with explicit organizational obligations. The verification chain covers provenance, integrity pinning, full-content inspection and comparison of declared versus observed capabilities. SKIS is vendor-neutral and intended to complement existing identity and provenance specifications.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T18:00:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.84,
   "centrality": 1.86,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-abboud-dawn-locality-gradient",
   "title": "Locality in Agent Discovery",
   "abstract": "The DAWN working group is defining how a client gets the Minimum Public Discovery Information (MDI) about an AI resource before it interacts with it. The charter covers three settings: a local network, an organization, and cooperating parties over the public Internet. One proposal for the minimum, the MDI draft, finds that it is the same in all three settings. This document points out that three other things still change with locality: how much a client can learn at or right after discovery, what the client can reasonably assume from where it is looking, and how well it can check who published the information. The last one does not simply get better or worse from local to remote. Records under a party's domain can be validated with DNSSEC, but local multicast advertisements cannot be authenticated, and proxies and catalogs can be authenticated only as themselves. This is a discussion contribution. It offers some points for the architecture and MDI documents: how local detail relates to the MDI minimum, whether a client should keep track of where a result came from, what to do when local and remote results disagree, and how much weight to give physical proximity as a sign of trust. It proposes no protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T17:55:13Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.57,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-mcp-a2a-semantic-metering",
   "title": "Cross-Protocol Semantic Equivalence Proofs and Commit-Bound Metering Receipts for Multi-Vendor Agentic Exchanges",
   "abstract": "Enterprise agent ecosystems routinely bridge tool invocations and task delegations across heterogeneous protocols, including Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent-to-Agent (A2A), and OpenAPI/REST. During protocol translation, safety invariants, schema constraints, and mutability flags are frequently stripped—enabling cross-protocol capability downgrade attacks—while commercial settlement gateways erroneously bill on HTTP 200 transport responses rather than verified state-commit durability. This document specifies a cryptographic Cross-Protocol Semantic Equivalence Proof (CPSEP) and an 8-state Commit-Bound Metering Receipt (CBMR) protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T17:54:17Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.65,
   "centrality": 1.96,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-scitt-model-activation-binding",
   "title": "Merkle-Anchored Model Weight Release and RATS-Attested Runtime Activation Binding for Edge and Cloud AI Fleets",
   "abstract": "Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) provides transparent artifact statements, and Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS, RFC 9334) provide hardware/runtime attestation evidence. However, no existing internet standard defines an atomic cryptographic binding between a chunked AI model weight release manifest, a hardware-monotonic anti-rollback epoch counter, and a live RATS attestation result at the moment model weights are mapped into accelerator memory. This document specifies the Model Activation Binding Token (MABT) protocol, preventing load-time weight substitution, silent quantization downgrade, and rollback attacks across cloud and edge AI inference fleets.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T17:53:29Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.68,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.25,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-03T12:18:01.927Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-oauth-scenario-discovery-authz",
   "title": "Scenario-Based Service Discovery and Authorization Protocol in Agent Environments",
   "abstract": "AI agents act on behalf of end users across applications the agent has no prior relationship with and cannot pre-register with. This specification defines a scenario-based service discovery and authorization protocol for agent environments, which lets an application advertise its capabilities to agents, lets an agent learn how to invoke the application, with which authorization mechanism, and how to obtain a delegated session for the end user without ever handling the end user's primary credentials, and lets the application enforce runtime interaction boundaries when an agent operation exceeds what was approved. The protocol combines two building blocks. The first is a semantic standard for an application's scenario-based capability advertisement: the scenaric flows the application opens to agents, the operations each flow packages, and the authorization mechanisms and invocation surfaces it accepts for them; what no flow opens is closed by default. The second is an attach and binding standard that attaches the semantic to both mobile applications and web applications, so one advertisement reaches an agent over a web origin or through a packaged native application. The protocol reuses OAuth standards that exist or are being defined and defines no new authorization protocol: the advertisement is a standalone document at its own well-known location, linked from Protected Resource Metadata; the delegated session is established by the grants the advertisement names; tokens are sender-constrained with DPoP; runtime boundaries are carried by Rich Authorization Requests and verified by the authorization schemas framework, whose reverse-guided refusals route the agent back to re-establishment.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T17:11:47Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 46,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-agentproto-acp",
   "title": "The Agent Communication Protocol (ACP)",
   "abstract": "An agentic dialog can run for hours or days, go quiet for long stretches, move between hosts, and survive the loss of whatever connection was carrying it. The Agent Communication Protocol (ACP) architecture names Agentic Dialog Management as a building block and requires an identifier that correlates every message of a dialog and outlives the transport, but leaves the wire format out of scope. This document specifies one such wire format. ACP is an application-level session protocol in the style of SIP: every message is a start line, a block of text header fields, a blank line, and an optional body. A dialog is named by an Agentic Dialog Identifier (ADID) and its durable state is an append-only log of entries, each digesting the one before it into a hash chain. The chain lets two endpoints that have been apart establish in one exchange which entries they still share, replay only what is missing, and detect divergence. Periodic checkpoints bound the log, so aligning a dialog does not cost more as it ages. ACP carries control and log state only. Real-time media flows beside it on its own channels and enters the log as a metadata entry or as a content-addressed reference, never as bytes the chain must digest. The semantics are transport-independent; this version binds them to Media over QUIC Transport (MoQ) and to WebTransport over HTTP/3, both of which multiplex the channels ACP needs and migrate across network paths without disturbing the dialog.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T16:07:39Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 52,
   "relevant": 0.71,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.94,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gupta-mih-maprg-nfc-agent-evidence",
   "title": "From Tap to Record: Layered Evidence for Agent Discovery and Payment over Near-Field Communication",
   "abstract": "When an AI agent finds a counterparty, interacts with it, and pays it, the interaction crosses every layer of the stack: a physical tap between two devices, the hardware that holds their keys, a transport session, peer discovery and gossip, and finally an application record of what was agreed, paid, and delivered. Each layer produces its own evidence, and today nothing joins them. This document puts the near- field tap at the center and follows one progression, from tap to rendezvous, authenticated session, interaction, payment, and evidence record. For each layer it states what evidence the layer can contribute, what a verifier has to trust, and how a single verifiable record can cite all of it by digest. It treats hardware attestation and a transparency log checked by independent witnesses as complementary roots of evidence that answer different questions, describes how light nodes can check one interaction through evidence requests instead of replicating a swarm, and asks which measurable observations can independently corroborate such a record. It is a problem statement and research agenda for discussion in MAPRG, not a protocol specification.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T15:59:42Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 14,
   "relevant": 0.78,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.44,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-li-mlc-inference-acceleration",
   "title": "Speculative Decoding Coordination Protocol (SDCP) for Distributed Inference with Multi-Level Caches",
   "abstract": "Speculative decoding accelerates language model inference: a small draft model proposes several tokens and the large target model verifies them in one forward pass. In large deployments, draft models and the target model run on separate, independently scaled instances that exchange state through a multi-level cache. This document specifies the Speculative Decoding Coordination Protocol (SDCP), with which a router assigns requests to draft instances by load, draft instances submit proposals that reference draft state in the cache, and a verifier, the only party that commits output, checks proposals under a registered acceptance rule, returns the accepted tokens and the next-round speculation limit, and escalates persistently rejected sessions to a reduced speculation length, another draft model, or decoding by the target model itself depending on its load. SDCP defines a session contract, a committed-prefix digest chain, CBOR messages carried over HTTP, idempotent rounds, and epoch fencing for recovery.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T15:42:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 23,
   "relevant": 0.66,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.06,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-li-kvcache-efficient-transmission",
   "title": "Layer-Aligned Key-Value (KV) Cache Streaming over Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT)",
   "abstract": "The key-value (KV) cache of a language model can be computed once and reused by many inference instances, possibly at many sites. Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT) provides publish/subscribe delivery through relays that cache objects without understanding their content. This document specifies KV Cache Streaming (KVCS), an application of MOQT for delivering KV caches. KVCS maps the identity of a token prefix to a Track Namespace built from keyed identifiers that do not reveal the prompt, carries the key and value tensors (or a jointly encoded form) in separate Tracks, aligns each Group with one model layer and each Object with one block of tokens, and defines a self-describing object payload and a manifest track. These choices let consumers start using early layers while later layers are still being produced, retrieve only the layers and token blocks they need, and verify what they receive.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T15:40:20Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.82,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.17,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mih-sato-agent-accountability-composition",
   "title": "Agent Accountability: Composition and Conformance",
   "abstract": "Autonomous and semi-autonomous software agents increasingly take consequential actions across administrative and trust domains. Holding such an action accountable — to a regulator, auditor, or counterparty who does not trust the operator — requires answering several questions, each answerable by an independently-verifiable profile: whether the agent was permitted to act (CAN), which accountable human authorized the specific action (WHO), what outcome the agent system recorded and what is known to have crossed the effect boundary (WHAT), and whether the runtime enforced correctly (AUDIT). This document specifies, in Informational terms, how such profiles compose — by a shared action-digest, each verifying independently — and defines a shared conformance-vector suite against which any profile may be tested. It complements existing audit-architecture and record-format work rather than replacing it, reusing existing signing, transport, and transparency mechanisms. Its focus is an assurance tier those documents leave open: most agent records today are self-attested by an interested party; this document makes reachable and testable an anchored, third-party-verifiable tier, in which a record is registered to a transparency service (SCITT) so a party who trusts neither the agent nor the operator can verify it. Self-attestation remains a valid baseline; convergence on the disinterested tier — by any conforming profile — is the goal, not a single mandated format.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-02T15:29:40Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 55,
   "relevant": 0.78,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mozleywilliams-dawn-dnsaid",
   "title": "DNS for AI Discovery",
   "abstract": "This document specifies DNS for AI Discovery (DNS-AID), a method for publishing AI agents in the Domain Name System (DNS) so that other agents can discover them. It defines three discovery use cases, ordered by increasing latency and computational cost. In the known- agent case, the requestor knows both the agent and its domain, and a single DNS query returns connectivity information and key metadata. In the known-organization case, the requestor knows the domain but not which agent provides a required capability, and queries a well- known organizational index to get connectivity information to enable a capability search of a catalog, agent registry or database. In the known-capability case, the requestor knows only the required capability and must rely on an external directory or search service. This document addresses the known-agent and known-organization cases. The known-capability case is out of scope, but search and cataloging services can be built from the organizational index defined here. Once a client has learned an organization’s agents, later interactions can use the known-agent case, relying on a minimal, cacheable record set that each organization controls. DNS-AID uses Service Binding (SVCB) records, optionally with DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) labels, DNSSEC, and DANE TLSA records. This gives agents direct connections that no third party mediates and works the same way on public and private networks. No new resource record types, opcodes, or response codes are introduced.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T14:58:24Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 24,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhao-nmrg-ai-agent-for-ndt",
   "title": "AI Agent Architecture for Network Digital Twin",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an AI agent architecture for Network Digital Twin (NDT) that enables collaborative reasoning, simulation-assisted decision-making, and closed-loop network operations. The architecture integrates specialized AI agents into the core NDT components and introduces mechanisms for twin validity assessment, evidence-based decision-making, and policy-controlled execution. It further describes multi-agent coordination, simulation evidence exchange, and feedback-driven model evolution to improve the reliability and adaptability of AI-assisted network management. The document also identifies research challenges and potential interoperability requirements for integrating AI agents with NDT- based network management systems.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-02T14:38:53Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 16,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-agentic-ai-usecases-requirements",
   "title": "Agentic AI Use Cases and Requirements",
   "abstract": "This document describes use cases for agentic AI communication systems and derives protocol requirements from those use cases. The requirements are intended to guide IETF standardization work on protocols in the context of agent-to-agent communication, agent-to- tool communication, with focus on dialog management, transport, multimodal communication, communication security, agent identity and authentication.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "07",
   "time": "2026-11-02T14:30:36Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 29,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-10T12:17:47.701Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rqd-ainetops-problem-statement",
   "title": "The problem statement of AI Native Network Operations",
   "abstract": "The introduction of AI agents into network operations is fundamentally reshaping the operation and maintenance (O&M) paradigm, shifting from human-led, passive network management toward intent- driven, self-planning, and intelligent reasoning. While this shift promises significant gains in efficiency and autonomy, it introduces a set of problems that are not yet covered by the existing IETF network management framework. This document identifies and summarizes the deployment and operation problems that arise when AI native network operations (AINETOps) are introduced into operator networks. It systematically enumerates the standardization gaps across Network Management Agent (NMA) lifecycle management, the Human-Agent Interface (HAI), the agent-to-agent task and evidence models, and task risk classification. It does not propose solutions; its purpose is to provide a problem inventory that can anchor future IETF work on solutions and deployment best practices.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T14:30:17Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 26,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gulbrandsen-jmap-ai",
   "title": "JMAP for AI",
   "abstract": "This document provides a JMAP profile for AI agents, with examples of use. It has two aims: Letting an LLM find something in email without polluting its context with too much irrelevant text, and letting an AI agent propose changes that a separate tool can perform. The access is therefore read-only.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T14:29:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 7,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-an-nmrg-i2icf-cits",
   "title": "An Agentic AI Framework for Software-Defined Vehicles in Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems",
   "abstract": "This document specifies an Agentic AI Framework for orchestrating, managing, and monitoring AI Computing Functions (ACFs) for Software- Defined Vehicles (SDVs) in Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS). AI agents as ACFs communicate with each other via the Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol. SDVs decouple vehicular functions from underlying hardware and expose them as software-driven, continuously updatable services; this architectural shift makes them natural participants in an agentic control plane that spans vehicles, roadside infrastructure, and mobile networks. AI agents are co- located with each functional entity of the C-ITS architecture (e.g., C-ITS Center, Government Public Center, C-ITS Infra, Mobile Network Operator (MNO), Roadside Unit (RSU), SDV, and Vulnerable Road User (VRU)) and interact over an A2A protocol overlay to advertise capabilities, discover peers, negotiate resources, and coordinate the placement and execution of ACFs across multi-domain networks. In the context of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications, this agentic overlay enables efficient management of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications and their integration with C-ITS by leveraging in-network computing to optimize real-time communication, streamline traffic management, and enhance data processing and security services at the network edge. The proposed framework aligns with the up-to-date agentic AI and A2A applicability to network management, and adapts these concepts to the specific operational and safety requirements of SDV-centric C-ITS deployments.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-02T13:46:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 38,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhao-nmop-network-management-agent",
   "title": "AI based Network Management Agent(NMA): Concepts and Architecture",
   "abstract": "The evolution from Level 3 (assisted automation) to Level 4 (closed- loop autonomy) in Autonomous Networks (AN) introduces requirements for agentic capabilities, including intent-based reasoning, autonomous planning, and context-aware decision-making, and execution coordination, which transcend the static, rule-based logic of traditional network controllers. This document defines the concept of the Network Management Agent (NMA), a network management entity with autonomous task processing capabilities designed to bridge the gap between service intent and network operations. This document describes the role of NMA in network management and control architectures, and specifies how the NMA collaborates with existing network controllers to achieve Autonomous L4 without replacing or duplicating their functions. It further defines the reference architecture, deployment modes, and logical interactions of the NMA, including the Northbound Task Interface (NTI), Agent-to- Agent (A2A), Agent-to-Controller (A2C), and Agent-to-Network (A2N) interactions.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "06",
   "time": "2026-11-02T12:42:31Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 26,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T18:18:03.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jesske-ai-enablement-interface",
   "title": "AI enablement interface for multimedia services platforms",
   "abstract": "This document complements emerging AI agent communication protocols by defining a generic enablement interface between multimedia communication platforms and AI applications, agents, LLM, or other AI-based services. It describes how communication capabilities, including voice, video, messaging, media streams, and media processing, can be exposed to AI entities without defining a new agent-to-agent communication protocol. The interface is particularly applicable where an AI service is not itself a communication endpoint, but is invoked by a communication platform to process or enhance an existing communication service. Examples include live translation, call summarization, contextual assistance, fraud detection, and media enhancement. The interface is platform-agnostic and extensible. SIP-based networks and the 3GPP IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) are examples of communication platforms to which this approach can be applied.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-02T12:17:15Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 22,
   "relevant": 0.84,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.66,
   "centrality": 1.58,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-cui-dawn-mdi-model",
   "title": "Minimum Public Discovery Information: Requirements and Common Semantics",
   "abstract": "The charter of the Discovery of Agents With Names (DAWN) working group asks it to specify the minimum public discovery information that a client obtains when it discovers an AI resource. An individual draft on DAWN terminology defines Minimum Discoverable Information (MDI) as the minimum amount of information an entity needs to provide to become discoverable, distinguishes it from the Minimum Viable Dataset (MVD) that a discovery mechanism needs as input, and gives only examples of the content of either. Individual drafts on the DAWN problem statement and requirements call for a standardized minimum structure and list what it must at least contain; in its absence, emerging discovery formats risk each defining its own minimal metadata, with descriptors that do not interoperate across organizational or protocol boundaries. This document addresses the minimum public discovery information as a client obtains it and as a publisher provides it, and its relation to the input of discovery; registration mechanisms are outside its scope. Using the distinction RFC 3444 draws between information models and data models, it describes the information involved in publication, lookup, and response; proposes a procedure that derives what is minimal for each deployment context from the scope of the charter; applies the procedure to the charter's three deployment contexts: a local network, an organization, and the domain of a cooperating party; and proposes a set of elements with the minimal constraints that hold among them. Information can be supplied by the discovery response, by context the client already has, or by binding rules. This document is input to the DAWN architecture and protocol work; normative definitions that affect interoperability belong to the corresponding Standards Track documents. It is a mapping target for richer descriptors.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-02T12:01:53Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 31,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.76,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-01T06:18:03.625Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhao-ccamp-actn-optical-network-agent",
   "title": "Integration of Network Management Agent (NMA) into ACTN-Based Optical Network",
   "abstract": "With the growth of optical network scale, the complexity of network operation and maintenance has increased dramatically. Enhancing the intelligence level of optical network operation and management and building high-level autonomous optical networks have become the common vision of global operators. The development of AI, especially large AI model technologies, provides a feasible technical path for realizing autonomous perception, decision-making, analysis, and execution. The existing ACTN architecture provides network abstraction and control functions for optical networks but lacks higher-level autonomous capabilities. This document explores the introduction of AI based Network Management Agent(NMA) functions into ACTN-based optical networks to achieve high-level autonomy of optical networks. It discusses the ACTN-enhanced architecture of optical networks after the introduction of NMAs, including key components, interaction relationships, new interface requirements in the enhanced architecture, as well as typical use cases of agent-based autonomous operation and maintenance for optical networks. The document aims to improve the autonomy level of optical networks and promote the realization of autonomous optical networks by extending the original ACTN architecture.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-02T10:11:27Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 26,
   "relevant": 0.83,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-davliatshin-oauth-attenuation-chains-report",
   "title": "Independent Implementation and Formal Analysis of Attenuating Delegation Chains for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document reports an independent implementation and formal analysis of two individual Internet-Drafts that propose offline- verifiable, attenuating delegation chains for AI agents: Attenuating Authorization Tokens (AATs), in revisions -01 and -02, and the Agent Delegation Chain of draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-02. It describes a minimal verifier written from each draft's text, with profiles for AAT -01, AAT -02 and asor-02, and a ProVerif model of the chain structures of AAT -01 and asor-02. The AAT -02 profile, written from the text and then run against the author's 229-vector test suite, agrees with it on all 229 vectors. Of 25 observations recorded on AAT -01, the -02 text resolves 19 (16 closed, 3 closed as intended design); one is partly resolved, one no longer arises, and four remain open. The report lists ten points where -02 leaves an implementer more than one conforming behaviour. Two properties raised in public review are checked on both chain structures. The author of this report is not an author of either draft. The report specifies nothing; it follows the shape of RFC 7942.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T09:37:07Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 31,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.64,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ruan-idr-ai-compute-service-metadata",
   "title": "BGP Extension for AI Compute Service Metadata",
   "abstract": "This document defines four AI inference-specific Sub-TLVs for the BGP Edge Metadata Path Attribute specified in [I-D.ietf-idr-5g-edge-service-metadata]. They advertise model capabilities, aggregated inference latency, optional cost preference, and selected long-lived KV cache prefix identifiers. Authorized CATS Path Selectors (C-PSes) and other policy decision functions may use this information to select suitable service contact instances and forwarding paths. This document reuses the existing optional non- transitive attribute.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-02T07:54:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 7,
   "relevant": 0.7,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.27,
   "centrality": 1.54,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gilda-audit-restoration-evidence",
   "title": "Restoration Evidence Records for AI Agent Incident Response",
   "abstract": "When an AI agent system is stopped, restricted or has its credentials revoked during an incident, someone later decides whether it may run again. Incident response guidance asks for that decision to be documented with the risk that remains, but no format says what the record must contain for a party outside the deploying organization to check it. This document defines five record types for that purpose: an incident action authorization, a revocation sweep, a re-enable decision, a joint authority assignment for incidents that span organizations, and a revocation boundary report. Each is an in-toto Statement carried in a DSSE envelope, uses the canonical form of the agent audit record, and is checked by ordered rules with a named reason for each failure. A bundle rule set binds a re-enable decision to the records it cites, by digest. A published conformance corpus carries a reject member for every rule that a member can force.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T07:15:01Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 24,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-thaha-wimse-agent-evidence-binding",
   "title": "Evidence Binding for AI Agent Credentials",
   "abstract": "The WIMSE AI Identity Management System (AIMS) requires tamper- evident agent audit logs but does not specify their format or discovery. This document maps the AIMS minimum fields to the SCITT Agent Execution Evidence profile, defines one claim that binds a workload credential to the persistent agent, governing policy, expected Evidence Service and optional Assurance Statement, and defines an in-toto predicate type for carrying Execution Receipts alongside the in-toto agent audit record format. It also describes how a service admits an agent's call by checking its assurance at the moment of the request, and defines an HTTP field that links each call to the caller's evidence. It is a companion to the AIMS work and makes no change to it.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-02T07:05:32Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 26,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-19T12:18:04.679Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-agent-action-confirmation",
   "title": "Agent Action Confirmation Protocol (AACP)",
   "abstract": "AI agents invoke operations with side effects: writes to resources, creation of durable records, financial transactions, and delegated actions on remote systems. Existing requirement documents in the agentproto working group establish that such operations require confirmation by the human user, that this confirmation must occur outside of LLM prompt inference, and that in multi-agent delegation the receiving agent must be able to verify that a presented confirmation actually originated from the user and is not fabricated by an intermediate agent. No document in the current document set defines a protocol, message format, or evidence format that satisfies these requirements. This document defines the Agent Action Confirmation Protocol (AACP): an action descriptor format derived from OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396), a confirmation request format, a signed confirmation evidence format, and verifier- side processing rules with a distinct-outcome failure model. The design is transport-neutral and profiled here for JSON over HTTP with JWS signatures; a CBOR/COSE mapping is defined. A requirement traceability matrix maps each mechanism to its source requirement in the agentproto document set. This document is informed by, and positions itself relative to, two prior individual submissions that addressed user confirmation of agent actions and have since expired: CHEQ [I-D.rosenberg-aiproto-cheq] and the Agent Operation Authorization framework [I-D.liu-agent-operation-authorization]. The differences are summarized in Section 1.4.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T06:45:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 35,
   "relevant": 0.97,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T12:18:03.223Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-contreras-bpm-ai-agent-benchmarking",
   "title": "Benchmarking Methodology for AI Agents in Network Operations",
   "abstract": "This document defines a benchmarking methodology for evaluating Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents performing network operations tasks such as configuration, troubleshooting, and optimization. This document focuses on task-oriented performance metrics, including task completion success, execution efficiency, and robustness across multi-step workflows, proposing benchmarking practices towards agent- based, closed-loop network operation scenarios. The proposed methodology aims to provide a reproducible and vendor- independent framework to compare AI agent effectiveness in controlled network environments.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-02T02:07:34Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 22,
   "relevant": 0.56,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T06:18:03.055Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T06:18:03.055Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-briggeman-ai-systems",
   "title": "ai-systems.txt: A Well-Known File for Declaring AI Systems and Their Measured Capabilities",
   "abstract": "This document defines \"ai-systems.txt\", a plain-text file that an organisation that builds or deploys artificial intelligence (AI) systems publishes at a well-known location on its own domain. The file declares, in machine-readable and human-readable form, which AI systems the organisation has released, what their measured capabilities are, who measured them, under what conditions, and where the evidence lives. Every capability claim carries a provenance tier (ATTESTED, MEASURED, or DECLARED); anything absent from a valid, unexpired file is UNDECLARED by definition. The file is signed and expiring, so claims are attributable, timestamped, and falsifiable. robots.txt tells machines what they may take from a publisher; ai- systems.txt is the reverse: it tells anyone what a maker has built, in a form designed to be checked rather than believed.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-01T22:45:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.5,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.78,
   "centrality": 1.34,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T00:18:03.509Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T00:18:03.509Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jennings-agentproto-mcp-over-moqt",
   "title": "Model Context Protocol and Agent Skills over Media over QUIC Transport",
   "abstract": "This document defines how to use Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT) as the underlying transport protocol for the Model Context Protocol (MCP). MCP enables integration between language model applications and external data sources and tools. MOQT provides publish-subscribe delivery over QUIC and WebTransport with native prioritization, relay caching, and multiplexing. This specification maps MCP messages onto MOQT objects and tracks. It covers MCP's tools, resources, prompts, multi round-trip requests, and the Tasks extension, and it uses MOQT relays to cache content that MCP marks as public across clients and to let a response outlive the connection that carried its request. The document also describes Agent Skills, composed instructions that extend AI capabilities beyond atomic tool operations, using progressive loading aligned with MOQT's object-based delivery. The same tracks can run standalone or inside a dialog of the Protocol for Agent Communication Exchange (PACE).",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-11-01T20:13:17Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.65,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T00:18:03.509Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T00:18:03.509Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rosenberg-oauth-aauth",
   "title": "AAuth - Agentic Authorization OAuth 2.1 Extension",
   "abstract": "AI Agents are increasingly accessing web resources on behalf of the users they serve. Traditionally these agents are granted normal OAuth access tokens through existing OAuth grant flows. However, these flows were designed in the era of traditional software, and when applied to AI Agents, multiple problems have arisen. This document outlines some of the problems, and then proposes a simple OAuth2.1 extension that enables AI Agents to obtain access tokens at time of resource access using Human-In-the-Loop or other approval flows. We call this the Agent Authorization Grant (aauth) grant flow. This document also compares the proposed solution with another, non-backwards compatible aauth solution.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-01T18:48:42Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 45,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-02T00:18:03.509Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-02T00:18:03.509Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-khandelwal-bpm-agent-memory-integrity",
   "title": "A Benchmarking Method for the Integrity of AI Agent Memory at Rest",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly persist memory across sessions and treat that memory, on the next turn, as if it were their own prior experience. This document defines a benchmarking method that measures whether an agent's memory subsystem detects that its persisted memory has been altered, removed, reordered, replayed, or forged at the storage layer, and refuses to serve that memory or reports it before it is served. The method defines ten storage-level edits, three verdict classes, a detection-point distinction between read time and audit time, three control cases, and a scoring rule. It is a laboratory method for controlled, reproducible measurement, in the spirit of RFC 2544 and RFC 8239, and it is intended as a test method for the \"Protection of Memory Data Integrity\" metric under discussion in the Benchmarking & Performance Measurements (BPM) Working Group. This revision, which replaces draft-khandelwal-bmwg-agent-memory- integrity-02, adds a tenth edit, in which the subsystem erases a record through its own interface and the adversary restores a copy of the store taken before that erasure, so that the method measures whether an erasure persists against a restored backup; it is the edit that undoes a right-to-erasure request. The method's results are reported as thirty-one rows on released memory subsystems, eighteen of which claim tamper evidence, with the new edit measured on seven of them, and the machine-readable record in which a result set is published so that an unrelated party can recompute it is described.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-01T16:39:15Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 23,
   "relevant": 0.75,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.81,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-01T18:18:06.822Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T18:18:06.822Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-agent-tx-compensation-lease",
   "title": "Pre-Release Transactional Compensation Leases and CAS Fencing Receipts for Autonomous Agents Over Systems of Record",
   "abstract": "When autonomous AI agents execute write operations against enterprise Systems of Record (ERP, MES, WMS, CRM, ITSM), traditional HTTP idempotency keys (RFC 9110) and post-hoc Saga orchestrators cannot guarantee deterministic recovery if a stochastic multi-step plan halts mid-flight or hallucinates downstream parameters. This document specifies the Pre-Release Transactional Compensation Lease (PTCL) protocol: a fail-closed wire contract requiring an agent runtime to acquire a cryptographically signed recovery reservation lease, prove a bounded rollback window (T_req <= T_granted), and present a Compare-And-Swap (CAS) epoch fencing token prior to committing any state mutation.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-01T15:00:08Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 4,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-01T18:18:06.822Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T18:18:06.822Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhu-agent-dynamic-service-selection",
   "title": "Dynamic Service Performance Considerations for AI Agent Selection",
   "abstract": "In the Internet of Agents, registration and capability discovery can identify candidate agents that meet basic functional constraints. However, the response performance of candidate services may vary with the underlying model, concurrent requests, and deployment environment. Static capability declarations or generic computing- load indicators alone may not adequately represent actual agent service performance. This document discusses the applicability of dynamic information, including Time to First Token (TTFT), output token generation rate, request success rate, concurrency, and availability, to candidate agent selection. It focuses on the observed entity, data sources, measurement windows, information freshness, and prerequisites for comparing candidates, and outlines an illustrative selection process.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-01T10:55:14Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 14,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.85,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-01T12:18:03.390Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T12:18:03.390Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-arsentev-agent-run-metrics",
   "title": "Agent Run Metrics: A JSON Interchange Format for Resource Accounting of Language-Model Agent Runs",
   "abstract": "Autonomous software agents driven by large language models execute multi-step runs in which the same conversational context is retransmitted to a model on every step. The resulting resource consumption is dominated by repeated input rather than by generated output, and it is reported today in mutually incompatible, vendor- specific shapes. This document defines Agent Run Metrics, a JSON interchange format that describes the resource consumption of a single agent run and of its constituent steps, together with a small set of derived quantities whose computation is specified exactly. It states normatively that one reported step corresponds to one completed model invocation, so that the several records a runtime may write while a single response is produced are not mistaken for several invocations, and it defines how the consumption of delegated sub-runs is attributed without being counted twice. The format carries counters, timing and cost attribution only; it deliberately excludes prompt and completion content. This document defines the initial values of two extensible enumerations and the rule by which they are extended; it requests no IANA action.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-01T10:48:41Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 45,
   "relevant": 0.64,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T18:17:28.439Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T12:18:03.390Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-thaha-scitt-agent-execution-evidence",
   "title": "Agent Execution Evidence: A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Records of AI Agent Runs",
   "abstract": "AI agents act through calls to models, tools and other agents. Identity work establishes who an agent is and what it may do, but leaves execution-evidence formats and assurance criteria out of scope. This document profiles the Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) architecture for Signed Statements that bind an agent's registered identity, declared capabilities, risk-based assessment and supervised operational status to a hash- chained record of every call the agent makes. It also defines admission records produced where a call is received, and the linking of records for requests that pass between agents of different operators. It specifies Registration Policy, offline verification and Bundle requirements. It does not define an accreditation scheme, a universal risk classification, an identifier scheme or a policy language.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-11-01T10:05:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 73,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-19T12:18:04.679Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T12:18:03.390Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sunyi-hacp-protocol",
   "title": "HACP: A Capability-Contract Protocol for AI Agents and Edge Hardware",
   "abstract": "HACP (Hardware Agent Capability Protocol) is a JSON-RPC 2.0 transport- agnostic protocol that lets a Large Language Model (LLM) agent — or any program acting on its behalf — discover, plan, execute, observe, and audit operations on physical edge hardware (GPIO, I2C, UART, sensors, system telemetry, files) through a single, stable, security-checked surface. HACP sits below higher-level agent protocols such as the Model Context Protocol and above the operating system. It is designed to make heterogeneous edge devices interoperable with diverse AI agent implementations without requiring either side to know the details of the other. This document specifies the HACP wire format, core methods, lifecycle, error model, security requirements, and audit semantics. Streaming, attestation, and MCP-bridge profiles are sketched as optional or preview.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-01T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 18,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.78,
   "centrality": 1.69,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-01T12:18:03.390Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T12:18:03.390Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nandakumar-agent-sd-card",
   "title": "Agent SD-Card: Selective Disclosure of Agent Metadata for Discovery and Authentication",
   "abstract": "This document defines SD-Card, an SD-JWT encoding of AI agent metadata that lets an agent reveal to each verifier only the capabilities, endpoints, and security requirements it is authorized to see, while the verifier can check that they are authentic and issuer-attested. SD-Card keeps agent metadata confidential; it does not make agents anonymous. The document specifies the SD-Card data model, issuance, discovery, and key-bound presentation, and defines bindings for the Model Context Protocol (MCP), the Personal Agent Protocol (PAP), and the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-11-01T05:54:11Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 72,
   "relevant": 0.96,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.54,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-01T06:18:03.625Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T06:18:03.625Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dunbar-dawn-infra-assisted-discovery",
   "title": "Infrastructure-Assisted Discovery for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document describes an infrastructure-assisted approach to the initial discovery of AI agents in managed enterprise, cloud, edge-computing, and communication-network environments. The approach treats infrastructure-provided resource state and requester context as possible inputs to the Minimum Viable Dataset (MVD) used by a discovery mechanism. These inputs can help keep minimum public discovery information current and can help determine the appropriate discovery scope or entry point without requiring the requester to understand deployment-specific network details. The document does not define registration, catalog search, semantic matchmaking, resource ranking, or selection, and does not define a new discovery wire protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-11-01T04:41:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 48,
   "relevant": 0.85,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.93,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T00:18:06.835Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T06:18:03.625Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kavian-agent-enrollment-protocol",
   "title": "The Agent Enrollment Protocol",
   "abstract": "The Agent Enrollment Protocol (AEP) defines an HTTP-based mechanism for autonomous agents to discover service enrollment requirements, enroll an agent identity, obtain optional session credentials, revoke those credentials, and query enrollment status. AEP uses Decentralized Identifiers, client assertion JWTs, and HTTP Problem Details to provide a narrow machine-first enrollment and authentication substrate for agent-to-service interactions.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "05",
   "time": "2026-10-31T23:04:21Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 44,
   "relevant": 0.67,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.91,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-01T00:18:02.651Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T00:18:02.651Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hamlett-selo-architecture",
   "title": "Negotiated, Signed Access Agreements Between Organizations' Agents: Problem Statement and Architecture (Selo)",
   "abstract": "Connecting one organization's systems to another's usually requires a connector built for that pair of systems, whether written by hand, bought from a connector catalog, or packaged as a tool server for an AI model. Connectors scale with the number of pairs, carry long- lived shared credentials, and have no verifiable link to the legal entities involved or to the terms under which access was granted. This document describes that problem and an architecture, called Selo, that aims to reduce the need for such connectors. Agents owned by verified legal entities verify each other, negotiate a typed access agreement that both parties sign, and then execute it through a standard runtime and a gateway in front of each entity's existing API, using credentials bound to the agreement. Each entity maintains its own tested, signed mapping between its system and shared capability profiles. Selo uses existing APIs; it does not replace them. The document states requirements and an architecture to inform discussion of whether, and where, such work belongs in the IETF. It does not specify a protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-31T20:30:18Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 30,
   "relevant": 0.72,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.58,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-11-01T00:18:02.651Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-11-01T00:18:02.651Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-alla-agent-identity-document",
   "title": "The Agent Identity Document: A Hosted, Accountable Public Record for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "Autonomous software agents increasingly act on the public internet with no name that a counterparty can check, no published party that answers for them, and no way to learn that an operator has withdrawn an agent. This document specifies the Agent Identity Document, a small JSON document served at a well-known URI on a hostname assigned to one agent, and the practices an identity provider follows when it hosts such names for operators who do not run their own domain. The document records what the provider knows to be true (the hostname, its service endpoints and the identity's lifecycle status) separately from what the operator asserts (a description, a contact, a homepage, a public key), and publishes the provider's dated, expiring checks on the operator rather than a single trust level. Lifecycle status is distinct from availability. A suspended identity publishes a deliberately minimal document. Every identity is held by an accountable person or organisation; an agent is never itself an account holder, and agents are never given authority over DNS. This document describes a practice in production at one provider. It is published so that the format can be reviewed, implemented by others and mapped onto related work, and it requests registration of a well-known URI suffix.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-31T11:59:50Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T18:17:28.439Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T12:18:03.257Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wang-hjs-accountability",
   "title": "HJS: Accountability Receipts for AI Agents A Minimal JEP Profile for Exportable AI Receipts",
   "abstract": "This document defines HJS, a minimal accountability receipt infrastructure for AI agents. HJS is a profile of the Judgment Event Protocol (JEP) and does not define an independent event signing protocol. HJS uses JEP events to bind signed event claims to AI-agent behavior records, receipt manifests, optional privacy-preserving human participant references, and optional deployment-specific evidence references. The HJS core is intentionally small. It defines behavior-record digest binding, receipt manifests, receipt bundles, and validation of cryptographic and structural consistency. All other capabilities, including human privacy modes, participant-supplied references, post- event review references, explanation-material references, risk descriptors, model evidence, tool-call evidence, policy-check evidence, multi-party export, and cryptographic capability profiles, are optional extensions or deployment profiles. HJS is infrastructure. It does not assign legal liability, prove subjective intent, define governance rules, enforce monitoring, define fairness, define appeal rights, define explanation rights, determine authorization validity, or establish regulatory compliance.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "05",
   "time": "2026-10-31T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T12:18:03.257Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T12:18:03.257Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-akhavain-moussa-ai-network",
   "title": "AI Network for Training, Inference, and Agentic Interactions",
   "abstract": "Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming industries and everyday life, fueled by advances in model architectures, training paradigms, and data infrastructure for generation and consumption. However, the effectiveness and reliability of AI depend on two foundational processes: training and inference. Each process introduces unique challenges related to data management, computation, connectivity, privacy, trust, security, and governance. In this draft, we introduce the Data and Agent Aware-Inference and Training Network (DA-ITN)—a unified, intelligent, multi-plane framework designed to address the full spectrum of requirements needed to enable various services and interactions within the AI ecosystem. DA-ITN provides a scalable and adaptive infrastructure that connects AI clients, data providers, model providers, agent providers, service facilitators, and computational resources to support end-to-end training, inference, and agentic interaction lifecycle operations. The architecture features dedicated control, data, and operations & management (OAM) planes to ensure reliability, transparency, and accountability between interacting parties. The proposed framework is not intended for end-to-end standardization, but is intended to serve as a reference framework for the AI ecosystem of the future. Various protocols for the different building blocks shall be defined to enable different functionalities.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-31T07:09:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 40,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.73,
   "centrality": 1.05,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T12:18:03.257Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T12:18:03.257Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-williams-oauth-poi-core",
   "title": "Cryptographic Proof-of-Intent (PoI) Core Protocol for Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) Step-Up Authorization",
   "abstract": "Autonomous software agents and orchestrated workflows increasingly invoke high-consequence operations on Resource Servers (such as financial originations or clinical prescriptions) on behalf of human users. Existing bearer tokens and transport-level Proof-of- Possession mechanisms cannot cryptographically distinguish between parameters autonomously synthesized by an intermediary agent and parameters explicitly reviewed, approved, or modified by an authorized human. Furthermore, redirect-based authorization flows impose prohibitive user experience friction for high-frequency Human- in-the-Loop (HITL) interactions. This document specifies the Proof-of-Intent (PoI) Core Protocol, a stateless, single-hop cryptographic framework building on JSON Web Signature (JWS, RFC 7515), Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JWTs (RFC 7800), JSON Web Token Best Current Practices (RFC 8725), JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785), OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests (RAR, RFC 9396), OAuth 2.0 Step-Up Authentication Challenge Protocol (RFC 9470), and W3C WebAuthn. PoI Core defines: (1) short- lived, client-generated Ephemeral Intent Keys certified at login and rotated via Proof-of-Possession key chaining; (2) Resource Server- signed Intent Challenge Objects binding canonical action parameters to human-readable display facts; (3) multi-tier assurance attestations spanning zero-friction session keys to hardware security tokens; and (4) stateless verification and countersigned audit receipts for single-hop APPROVE, REJECT, and within-authority SUPERCEDE decisions. Multi-hop chained escalations, asynchronous intent escrowing, and concurrent multi-approver conflict resolution are specified in the companion extension document, draft-williams-oauth-poi-chained-state- 00.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-31T05:28:40Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 30,
   "relevant": 0.83,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.04,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T06:18:06.441Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T06:18:06.441Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sweeney-wimse-credential-delegation",
   "title": "Credential Delegation Protocol for AI Agents in Multi-System Environments",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents increasingly require access to protected resources across multiple service providers on behalf of human users. Existing OAuth 2.0 extensions address individual aspects of this problem (token exchange, proof-of-possession, and structured authorization) but no current specification defines how these mechanisms compose into a coherent credential delegation framework for AI agents. This document specifies the Credential Delegation Protocol: a profile of OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), Demonstrating Proof-of- Possession (RFC 9449), Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396), and Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (OpenID Connect CIBA) that enables human users to delegate scoped, attenuated credentials to AI agents operating across heterogeneous service providers. The protocol defines: agent identity lifecycle management using ephemeral key pairs; capability-shaped delegation tokens bound to specific operations and resources; credential wrapping semantics that prevent exposure of underlying OAuth tokens to agents; consent-gated delegation flows for asynchronous agents; real-time cascading revocation; and tamper-evident audit chains. This document does not define new token formats, new OAuth grant types, or modifications to existing authorization server behavior. It specifies how existing mechanisms are combined to achieve secure, auditable credential delegation for AI agents.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-31T00:42:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T00:18:06.835Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T06:18:06.441Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-le-agent-passport",
   "title": "Agent Passports and Delegation Receipts for Autonomous Software Agents",
   "abstract": "Autonomous software agents call APIs, tools and other agents on behalf of people and organisations. A party receiving such a call today can usually learn only that some bearer credential was presented. It cannot learn which organisation is accountable for the agent, which model, configuration and tools the agent is running, on whose behalf it is acting, or whether any of that has changed since it was approved. This document defines two signed objects and how they travel on HTTP requests. An Agent Passport binds an agent's public key to its accountable controller and to a digest of its build. A Delegation Receipt records one step of authority passing from a principal, through a delegator, to an agent; a chain of receipts can only narrow that authority. Requests carry both, and are signed with the agent's key using HTTP Message Signatures, so a relying party can check, without contacting the issuer per request, who the agent is, what it is running, on whose behalf it acts and what it may do.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T23:23:13Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.75,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hood-agtp-merchant-identity",
   "title": "AGTP Merchant Identity and Agentic Commerce Binding",
   "abstract": "The Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP) specifies the sending side of an agentic transaction: agent identity, Authority-Scope enforcement, Budget- Limit declaration, and a signed Attribution-Record on every method invocation. The receiving side of a PURCHASE transaction -- the merchant or service provider -- has no equivalent protocol-level identity or verification mechanism. That asymmetry is the gap this document closes. This document specifies the AGTP Merchant Identity and Agentic Commerce Binding. It defines a merchant in AGTP as an agent whose Agent Identity Document carries role: \"merchant\", specifies the merchant-specific fields that ride on the Agent Identity Document under that declaration, aligns Merchant Trust Tiers with AGTP Trust Tier semantics, and defines the protocol integration points at which merchant identity is verified. These include the PURCHASE method handshake, the DISCOVER method result surface, and the Attribution- Record. This document also defines the Intent-Assertion header for portable, detached principal-authorized intent, the Cart-Digest mechanism for multi-line-item transactions, and the 458 Counterparty Unverified status code. Together these mechanisms close the verification loop between agent and merchant within AGTP's governance model. Version 02 unifies merchant identity onto the Agent Genesis + Agent Identity Document architecture: there is no separate Merchant Genesis document type. A merchant is an agent with role: \"merchant\" declared in its Agent Identity Document. This reflects the architectural principle that identity is permanent (carried on Genesis) and capability is mutable (carried on the Identity Document); a role change re-mints no Agent-ID.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-30T19:45:14Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 31,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.94,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hood-agtp-composition",
   "title": "AGTP Composition Profiles",
   "abstract": "The Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP) operates as a substrate beneath several adjacent layers: Agent Group Messaging Protocols (AGMPs) such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), the Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and the Agent Communication Protocol (ACP); external identity providers (OAuth, OIDC, enterprise IdPs); and HTTP-based clients that interact with agents through translation gateways. This document specifies the composition profiles for each of these adjacent layers, defining normative mapping rules between the adjacent layer and AGTP. Three composition families are specified. The AGMP composition profile specifies how MCP, A2A, and ACP messages are carried over AGTP, with mapping rules for identity, authority scope, delegation, and session fields between the AGMP and AGTP layers. The External Identity Provider composition profile specifies how AGTP agent identity composes with externally-issued credentials, treating \"which agent\" and \"on whose behalf\" as orthogonal axes. The HTTP Gateway composition profile specifies the translation surface for accepting HTTP traffic into AGTP- served agents as a REST adoption ramp. Across all three families, AGTP headers take precedence over equivalent adjacent-layer fields for all infrastructure-level routing, enforcement, and audit operations. Agents gain transport- level governance, observability, and identity without modification to the adjacent layers.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-30T19:42:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 38,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hood-agtp-commerce",
   "title": "AGTP-Commerce: Open Commerce Specification for Agent-to-Agent Transactions",
   "abstract": "This document specifies AGTP-Commerce, an open commerce specification for agent-to-agent transactions. The specification defines the structural transaction information that the Agent Transfer Protocol carries between agents, allowing payment providers and commerce applications to compose at the application layer to perform the actual financial execution. AGTP-Commerce is to agent commerce what ISO 20022 is to inter-bank payment messaging: a standardized message format that allows heterogeneous payment infrastructure to interoperate. AGTP-Commerce moves no money, holds no funds, and operates as no payment processor. The protocol carries pricing manifests, budget signaling, transaction commitments, and audit trail records that payment providers consume to execute settlement through existing financial infrastructure. This document specifies the pricing manifest format, extended Budget- Limit header semantics, the TRANSACT method for transaction commitment, audit-trail-based receipt records, dispute composition surfaces, and the integration patterns that allow payment providers (traditional processors, banks, cryptocurrency rails, and specialized agent-economy services) to compose with AGTP-Commerce as application- layer infrastructure.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-30T19:41:19Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 32,
   "relevant": 0.73,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.96,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-cgfabk-nmrg-ibn-generative-ai",
   "title": "Generative AI for Intent-Based Networking",
   "abstract": "This document describes how to specialize AI models in order to offer a scalable, efficient path to creating highly targeted generative models for Intent-Based Networking.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-30T18:25:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 18,
   "relevant": 0.55,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.22,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-22T12:18:10.157Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-31T00:18:03.358Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bu-dawn-ard-discovery",
   "title": "Agent Resource Discovery (ARD): Manifest and Lookup",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the catalog representation and lookup protocol for Agent Resource Discovery (ARD), an open architecture for publishing, discovering, and searching software agent capabilities across federated networks. ARD defines a JSON-LD capability description envelope (the ARD Entry) and catalog container (the ARD Manifest) identified by domain-anchored Uniform Resource Names (URNs), cryptographic publisher authority bindings (the Trust Manifest), and an HTTP query interface supporting structured, semantic, and federated search across registries. Initial contact for discovering catalog entry points and active agent registration are specified in companion ARD documents.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T16:43:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 32,
   "relevant": 0.7,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bu-dawn-ard-architecture",
   "title": "Agent Resource Discovery (ARD) Architecture",
   "abstract": "This document describes the high-level architecture for Agent Resource Discovery (ARD), an open, federated framework for publishing, indexing, discovering, and invoking software agent capabilities (such as Model Context Protocol servers, Agent-to-Agent agents, programmatic skills, and web APIs) across local networks, enterprise domains, and the public Internet. It defines the system roles, deployment topologies, core architectural principles, and end- to-end interaction flows that connect the ARD specifications for establishing Initial Contact and the Discovery Interface for capability lookup in the ARD catalog. The Registration interface will be specified in a later document.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T16:38:20Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ai-safety-network-incident-recovery",
   "title": "AI Safety for Multi-Agent Network Incident Diagnosis, Coordinated Repair, and Outcome Verification",
   "abstract": "Part 03 of 15 addresses AI safety in multi-agent network incident diagnosis, evidence-qualified root-cause assessment, coordinated remediation, asynchronous repair, and operational recovery verification. It distinguishes independent network observations from repeated derivative reports, competing diagnostic hypotheses from established faults, plan acceptance from actual configuration effects, and successful interventions from verified network-service recovery. Group B workflow B-CW-01 and six detailed embodiments address incident identity, source-qualified provenance, cascading cross-domain faults, concurrent interventions, partial repair, compensation, recurrence, and incident handoff. Consistency assessments are distinct from authority to change network resources. The foundational Part 01 provides shared evidence and state semantics; Parts 02, 04, 07, 11, 14, and 15 describe complementary radio, service, asynchronous, continuity, and protected-operation mechanisms. The appendix provides direct navigation across all fifteen parts. The technical problem is that conventional event aggregation and change orchestration can report a coherent incident diagnosis or completed repair without proving the independence, timing or scope of supporting observations or actual restoration of the intended service. This part describes evidence-qualified three-valued conclusions, separate operation admission, post-repair effect verification, implementation profiles, explicit failure paths and source-preserving recovery history. A runnable Python laboratory supplies synthetic reproducible tests and local processing measurements; it is not an operational network performance demonstration. It complements Part 01 shared evidence semantics and Part 02 radio observation qualification where incident decisions depend on radio telemetry.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T14:40:18Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 684,
   "relevant": 0.77,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.88,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ai-safety-radio-observation-consistency",
   "title": "AI Safety for Radio Network Observation and Control Calculation Consistency",
   "abstract": "Part 02 of 15 describes AI safety for distributed radio-access- network observation and control calculation consistency. A radio controller may receive independently valid telemetry that is jointly unsuitable for the same calculation because it refers to different cell or beam identities, configuration generations, clock domains, acquisition intervals, measurement units, aggregation semantics, or shared upstream evidence. This document develops A-CW-01 and six specialized procedures for source-qualified temporal consistency, resource reassignment, measurement transformation, dependency-aware observation selection, coupled multi-resource decisions, and controller failover. It specifies evidence-scoped supported, contradicted, and unresolved outcomes, with revalidation after material state changes. The result qualifies a calculation; it does not independently authorize modification of live radio resources. Companion Parts 01, 03, 04, 05, 11, and 14 address shared evidence semantics, network recovery, service state, hardware observations, migration, and optional protected effectuation boundaries.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T14:21:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 598,
   "relevant": 0.66,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.48,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding",
   "title": "Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE and OAuth Credentials",
   "abstract": "AI agents and tools that take part in a dialog carry a dialog context with each request and response. This document specifies how the dialog context is bound to WIMSE and OAuth credentials. It extends the WIMSE profile of HTTP Message Signatures, for requests and responses, and the WIMSE Proof Token, for requests, to cover the dialog context, records the dialog identifier in OAuth transaction tokens, and describes how a new dialog at a trust boundary aligns with OAuth identity chaining. A receiver can then verify who sent a request or response, which dialog it belongs to, and, for a request, what it may do, and that the answers agree.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T12:25:18Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 21,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.81,
   "centrality": 1.33,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T18:18:03.520Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-manyfolks-agentproto-arch",
   "title": "Architecture for AI Agent Communications on the Internet",
   "abstract": "This document defines the terminology and architecture for AI agent communications protocols over the Internet. It provides the foundational architectural elements for the Agent Communications Protocol (ACP) - also known as agentproto - a new protocol to be developed in the IETF. ACP enables communication between user agent clients and AI agents, between AI Agents and other AI Agents, or between AI Agents and tools. All three of these interaction patterns - and the many use cases therein - require a session-like protocol which handles lifecycle management, including creation, modification, deletion and so on - along with the exchange of input and output. These session-like associations can be extremely long lived - running for hours or even days - and span multiple IP hosts used by the both the principal and by the agent. They can also be highly intermittent with asynchronous responses. All of these mean a new type of protocol is needed.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T11:54:29Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 31,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ai-safety-evidence-consistency-profiles",
   "title": "AI Safety and Operational Consistency: Shared Evidence Semantics and Domain-Specific Profiles",
   "abstract": "Part 01 of 15 defines a cross-domain evidence-consistency framework for AI-related operations in distributed software, telecommunications, device processing, autonomous commerce, and physical systems. It addresses operation identity, source-qualified observations, resource and policy generations, temporal applicability, uncertain effects, and versioned reassessment. The common framework is a method for expressing and evaluating evidence obligations, not a universal execution protocol or a claim that different physical and network systems share one control mechanism. An outer three-valued classification (SUPPORTED, CONTRADICTED, UNRESOLVED) is scoped to a declared verification objective. Each domain defines its own predicates, measurement contracts, control authorities, response-time bounds, and effect semantics. In particular, verified observation consistency does not itself establish authority to execute, cryptographic safety of a device descriptor, completion of a telecommunications settlement, or physical safety of robot motion. The document specifies a layered integration approach: reusable evidence and outcome semantics, twelve independently implementable domain profiles, and optional typed interfaces between profiles when a genuine cross-system dependency exists. It compares conventional controls with specific remaining problems, describes conditional benefits and incompatibilities, and provides analytical rather than measured latency and resource models. The remaining fourteen parts detail radio control, incident recovery, session and charging lifecycle, hardware observation, multi-agent agreements, asynchronous tools, robotic capability, multilingual instructions, browser actions, runtime migration, autonomous commerce, silicon command processing, protected egress, and cross- interface operation control. This foundation provides search- oriented descriptions of 639 engineering mechanisms and links to their specialist explanations; the profiles are not assumed to be interchangeable or automatically composable.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T11:40:09Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 835,
   "relevant": 0.77,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.62,
   "centrality": 1.25,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chandra-agent-registry-corroboration",
   "title": "Multi-Source Corroboration for AI Agent Discovery",
   "abstract": "AI agent discovery depends on sources such as registries, name services, DID methods, and catalogs. A valid signature on an artifact does not by itself show that a source has not withheld a record, or served inconsistent records to different observers. This document specifies a source- and format-agnostic procedure for corroborating independent observations of an agent. It defines claim classification, canonical views, deterministic disagreement findings, multi-vantage equivocation detection, propagation-delay confirmation, and signed Corroboration Records. The procedure produces verifiable evidence for every sweep, including agreement and insufficient- observation results. It composes with registry-assisted resolution of known subjects: a registry's renewable subject-to-target binding carries a sequence, and the procedure attributes a source serving a superseded binding rather than comparing it, so propagation lag is never reported as disagreement.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-30T08:34:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 37,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.89,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rehfeld-bot-service-index",
   "title": "API Index (APIX): A Global Discovery Infrastructure for Autonomous Agent Services",
   "abstract": "This document, draft-rehfeld-bot-service-index-08, is superseded by three successor Internet-Drafts that together constitute the APIX specification suite: * draft-rehfeld-apix-core-00 — Core infrastructure, trust model, and Index API * draft-rehfeld-apix-services-00 — Web API and bot service registration profile * draft-rehfeld-apix-iot-00 — IoT device service registration profile Readers are directed to those documents. This revision exists solely to document the supersession and to note two trust model updates that diverge from prior revisions.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "08",
   "time": "2026-10-30T07:09:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 4,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.52,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-deforth-arp-reasoning-protocol",
   "title": "Agentic Reasoning Protocol (ARP) Version 2.0",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Agentic Reasoning Protocol (ARP) version 2.0, a machine-readable protocol enabling entities (brands, organizations, persons) to publish self-attested context, verified factual corrections, domain expertise, and recommendation boundaries directly to autonomous AI agents, RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) pipelines, and agentic AI systems. ARP v2.0 extends the static file model of v1.x with a live REST API, bidirectional feedback channels, multi-party cryptographic attestation, W3C Decentralized Identifier (DID) anchoring, Agent-to- Agent (A2A) trust handshakes, event-driven freshness via Server-Sent Events, and first-class internationalization support. ARP complements existing web conventions (robots.txt [RFC9309], schema.org, llms.txt) but is specifically designed for the reasoning behavior of modern AI agents -- systems that do not merely index content but synthesize, infer, and make decisions on behalf of users. All examples in this document use example.com and \"Example Organization\" per [RFC2606] and are purely illustrative.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T07:09:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 29,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.58,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T12:18:01.765Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-durga-wimse-ctx-isolation",
   "title": "Cryptographic Separation of Untrusted Data-Plane Context from Control-Plane Tool Invocations in Autonomous AI Agents",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents operating over Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) transports routinely ingest untrusted external data (emails, web documents, retrieved RAG chunks) into the same inference context that authorizes privileged control-plane tool calls. Existing workload identity and token standards (OAuth 2.1, GNAP, WIMSE Wit/Wpt tokens) bind client identity and authorization scope, but fail to cryptographically bind the provenance taint of the data-plane context that induced the tool invocation, leaving systems vulnerable to indirect prompt-injection confused-deputy attacks. This document specifies a deterministic COSE_Sign1 and JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) wire profile that attaches a cryptographic Context Taint Attestation (CTA) header to every control-plane tool invocation, forcing relying parties to fail closed when an untrusted or mixed data-plane context attempts to trigger a state-mutating action without an independent out-of-band human or policy approval receipt.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T01:03:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 5,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T06:18:01.877Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T06:18:01.877Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rampertab-audit-agent-authority-history",
   "title": "Replayable Authority Histories for Auditing Automated Agents",
   "abstract": "Software agents act on authority that changes while they run: permissions are granted and revoked, running instances are replaced, and some requests are refused. Activity logs record what a system reports it did, but they do not by themselves show what an agent was allowed to do when it acted, and the operator can edit them. This document specifies a model for an authority history: an append-only, signed record of who granted what to whom, which actions were admitted, which requests were refused, and which unfinished duties survive when one agent replaces another. Given independently authenticated owner keys and history identity, a verifier can replay the history and recompute its recorded authorization decisions while trusting neither the agent nor the operator. The document states what such a verifier can and cannot establish. Optional profiles cover external anchoring, federated operation, human-attested keys and zero-knowledge disclosure. An informative appendix describes one encoding.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-30T00:43:55Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 84,
   "relevant": 0.53,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.63,
   "centrality": 1.82,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-30T06:18:01.877Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T06:18:01.877Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record",
   "title": "An Audit Record Format for AI Agent Authorization Decisions",
   "abstract": "This document defines a record format for AI agent authorization decisions and the effects that followed them. The format is one in- toto predicate type, signed inside a DSSE envelope. A record carries the decision and the observed effect with a derived agreement between them, whether the decision point could evaluate the request and how fresh each input it relied on was, and a canonicalization contract under which a party that trusts neither the agent nor its operator recomputes the record's consistency from its bytes. The document also defines what a party that retains a record keeps beside it, so that the record can later be dated from anchors that party does not control. The format carries the seven minimum audit fields of the WIMSE AI Identity Management System framework, and it is offered as a data model for the audit records the proposed AUDIT working group would specify. It defines no policy.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-29T22:20:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 71,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.73,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-17T00:18:02.220Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-30T00:18:07.515Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-agentproto-live-agent-use-case",
   "title": "Live Agent Use Case Extensions for Agentic Dialogs",
   "abstract": "Live AI interactions combine ongoing observations, overlapping responses, and changes to the devices through which a user participates. This document contributes three use case extensions to the AgentProto use cases and requirements work: live multimodal calls, AI glasses with companion devices, and embodied systems that converse while performing delegated actions. For each scenario, the document identifies the existing requirements it builds on, the interoperability questions it raises, and the requirement refinements motivated by its interaction flow. The focus is on independently changing observation sources, response state, participation, and authority within a continuing dialog. The scenarios are independent of transport selection. An appendix uses Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT) to illustrate questions for subsequent binding and application-profile work.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-29T12:02:39Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 17,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.87,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-29T12:18:03.205Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-29T12:18:03.205Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jy-anima-appto-6g-ainetwork",
   "title": "Applicability of Autonomic Networking Ecosystem to 6G AI-Network Integration",
   "abstract": "This draft starts with AI-agents, AI-Agent network (AAN) and various types of AAN realization models. It elucidates two 6G network-AI intergrated issues, with the focuse on the aspect of the 6G AI-for- network. The 6G architecture defines two core intelligent AI-agents that can be categorized as the AI-powered autonomic service agent or AI-ASA in the context of the ANIMA domain. Based on the reference model and constituent entities of the autonomic networking ecosystem, the ANIMA model is applied to correlate the mattered 6G entities with different components of the ANIMA ecosystem.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-29T00:00:11Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.8,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.94,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-29T00:18:03.425Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-29T00:18:03.425Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-laxsharma-pact",
   "title": "PACT: Co-Signed Task Contracts, Delivery and Verdict Records, and Outcome Records for Autonomous Agents",
   "abstract": "Autonomous agents can already prove who they are, show whose authority they act under, find and call one another, and pay. What no existing specification lets them do is agree on a task in a form a third party can check, deliver against it, have the delivery judged by someone other than the performer, and carry away a record of the outcome that a stranger can verify. This document specifies PACT, a set of signed JSON records that closes that gap. PACT defines four things: a co-signed task contract whose digest covers its signature set; a Verdict record bound by digest to the Delivery it judges; a Facilitator-signed event trace and Outcome Record for every contract, recorded once, in one order, by a party other than the performer; and a Merkle commitment from a parent's Outcome Record to its subcontracts' Outcome Records. Settlement terms are carried by reference to a profile defined outside this document. This document specifies no escrow, custody or release of value, and takes no position on the legal effect of any record it defines.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-28T17:59:24Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 92,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.9,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-28T18:18:01.872Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T18:18:01.872Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-efstathiou-samp-agent-management",
   "title": "Simple Agent Management Protocol (SAMP)",
   "abstract": "The Simple Agent Management Protocol (SAMP) defines a lightweight management-plane protocol for heterogeneous AI agents. SAMP allows a management system to discover agents, query their state, receive events, subscribe to event streams, and optionally configure or execute explicitly exposed operations under policy control. SAMP is inspired by operational management protocols such as SNMP, but it is designed for AI-agent-specific concepts such as dynamic profiles, autonomy classes, enrollment, trust states, and policy- gated execution. It is not an agent-to-agent communication protocol, an agent tool-use protocol, or an agent framework specification. This document defines SAMP version 0.2 as an Experimental protocol suitable for controlled environments and independent interoperability testing.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-28T16:43:52Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 125,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.53,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-28T18:18:01.872Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T18:18:01.872Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sun-ainetops-task-and-evidence-model",
   "title": "Task and Evidence Information Model for AINETOps",
   "abstract": "As Network Management Agents (NMAs) increasingly collaborate in scenarios such as fault diagnosis, network optimization, and service assurance, consistent task descriptions and evidence information are needed across vendors and management domains. This document defines a Task and Evidence Information Model for AI-Enabled Network Operations (AINETOps). The model consists of Task Core, Evidence Core, and a Profile extension mechanism for different task and evidence types. This document does not specify communication protocols, request or response formats, task execution methods, or network configuration operations.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-28T14:02:49Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.72,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.84,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-28T18:18:01.872Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T18:18:01.872Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jakab-dawn-agent-discovery-mdns",
   "title": "Zero-Configuration Agent Discovery",
   "abstract": "Protocols for communication between autonomous software agents typically discover agents through documents retrieved over HTTPS from a well-known URI. This model requires a discovering party to already know an agent's host name or URL, or to consult a centralized catalog. It provides no zero-configuration mechanism for enumerating agents that are present on a local network. This document describes how existing, widely deployed protocols, Multicast DNS (mDNS) and DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD), can be used to advertise and discover agents on a local link, with no new protocol machinery. It presents a general, protocol-independent two- stage discovery model in which lightweight enumeration over DNS-SD is followed by obtaining full agent metadata over the agent's native transport, whether by retrieving a description document or by connecting to the agent and performing its native handshake. The DNS-SD records carry a small set of discovery parameters that is shared with agent discovery in unicast DNS. The document gives worked instantiations of that model for the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol and the Model Context Protocol (MCP).",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-28T07:52:21Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 34,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-28T12:18:01.044Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T12:18:01.044Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-aevum-causal-intervention-record",
   "title": "Physically Annotated Causal Record (PACR): A Wire Format for Verifiable Causal Intervention Events",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Physically Annotated Causal Record (PACR), a wire-format protocol for representing one verifiable causal- intervention event between autonomous agents. A PACR is a six-tuple (ι, Π, Λ, Ω, Γ, P) binding a causal identity, a set of causal predecessors, a thermodynamic Landauer cost, an energy-time-space resource triple, a cognitive complexity split, and an opaque payload. The opaque payload optionally carries a one-byte intervention tag classifying the event under Pearl's do-calculus hierarchy (Observe / Do-Physical / Do-Digital / Do-Chemical / Do-Genetic / Counterfactual). PACR is intended as the smallest sufficient statistic for a replayable, rights-aware claim about a single causal step performed by an autonomous agent on a digital, physical, or biological substrate. It is complementary to AgentCard (draft-aevum-agentcard): AgentCard declares an agent's identity and capabilities; PACR records what an agent actually did and at what physical cost. PACR records form a content-addressed directed acyclic graph through their predecessor set. Causal order is determined solely by the predecessor edges; no wall-clock timestamp is required for ordering. This makes the format suitable for distributed multi-agent systems where clock skew and partial ordering are unavoidable.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-28T07:09:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.72,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.82,
   "centrality": 1.82,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-28T12:18:01.044Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T12:18:01.044Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain",
   "title": "Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly delegate tasks to other agents. Each delegation should convey only a subset of the delegating party's authority, that subset should be bounded in scope, magnitude, and time, and any enforcement point should be able to verify -- offline, with no call to an authorization server -- that a token presented at hop N carries authority no greater than the token at hop N-1, back to a trusted root, and that every hop acts under the same accountable principal. OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) models two-party delegation and records prior actors in a nested \"act\" claim, but that claim is informational only and cannot enforce attenuation across a chain of depth two or more. This document defines the Agent Delegation Chain: a profile of OAuth 2.0 JWT access tokens (RFC 9068) that carries authority as Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396), binds the chain to one principal and names the agent acting at each hop, links each delegation to its parent by a cryptographic byte- commitment, and specifies a deterministic offline verification algorithm that enforces monotonic attenuation, bounded depth, monotonic expiry, and principal invariance. It reuses existing JOSE, proof-of-possession (RFC 9449), and status-list machinery (the OAuth Status List draft) and introduces no new cryptography.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-28T05:32:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 38,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.79,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-15T18:17:45.831Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T06:18:01.471Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-uppalapati-wimse-pq-agent-identity",
   "title": "Post-Quantum Requirements for Software and AI Agent Identity",
   "abstract": "A delegation record retained as evidence must remain verifiable long after the key that signed it is retired. A signature of any algorithm establishes who signed, not when, so such a record needs anchoring in trusted time, renewed before the algorithms protecting it weaken. That is long-settled practice for archived signatures. It is rarely required for agent delegation, and where it is, the anchor is not itself required to be post-quantum. An anchor is only as good as the protection behind it, and an RFC 3161 timestamp is itself a signature: an adversary holding a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer can mint one bearing any date it chooses. Because such a machine may be built without announcement, anchoring must become post-quantum anchoring by a stated transition date, and be applied early, so that the only assumption left about when such a machine appeared is that none existed before a record was first anchored that way. The earlier that date, the weaker the assumption, which makes choosing it a security decision and not only a scheduling one. This document states requirements that software and AI agent identity mechanisms should satisfy in order to remain sound across the transition, and identifies four that no such mechanism yet imposes on delegation credentials in general. The algorithms binding each hop of a delegation chain to its trust anchor must be visible to a verifier and retained with any record kept as evidence; where a signing key is fetched from a key set over TLS, as OAuth deployments commonly do, that binding is rarely recorded and no mechanism for agent delegation requires it to be, so in practice it is absent. Trust anchors must migrate before the credentials issued under them. Every retained record must be anchored, that anchoring must become post-quantum anchoring from a stated transition date and be maintained by renewal, and credentials of any type kept as evidence must be signed post-quantum from that same date. Delegation chains also propagate the weakest algorithm in the chain, and routinely cross organizational boundaries where no common trust anchor policy can be assumed.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-28T03:29:42Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 46,
   "relevant": 0.69,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.86,
   "centrality": 1.04,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T06:18:01.471Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-su-ai-gateway-discovery",
   "title": "DNS-Based Service Discovery for AI Gateways",
   "abstract": "This document defines how a multi-protocol AI gateway announces itself on a local network using DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD), and how a client discovers it. A gateway publishes its host name, TCP port, gateway mount path (path), and supported protocol identifiers using _ai-gateway._tcp, DNS-SD subtypes, and a compact, vendor-neutral TXT record. A single AI gateway listener can expose text, reasoning, token counting, image generation, video generation, speech synthesis, realtime voice, and search across HTTP, Server-Sent Events (SSE), WebSocket, and WebRTC/SDP sessions. This profile lets clients discover those capabilities without hardcoding addresses, ports, or vendor-specific TXT keys, while keeping the default DNS TXT payload under 200 bytes (and strictly capped at 400 bytes). This document only covers service discovery. It does not define AI request payloads, model catalogs, API key distribution, or trust bootstrap. Data learned from mDNS or DNS-SD is untrusted network input and does not prove who operates the gateway.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-28T02:32:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.29,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T06:18:01.471Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-bailey-scitt-agent-session-receipt",
   "title": "Causal Provenance Receipts for Agent Sessions: A SCITT Profile",
   "abstract": "This document defines a Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) payload profile for agent session provenance: signed records that bind an autonomous agent session's lifecycle (start, governed tool dispatch, state transitions, termination, and settlement) to offline-verifiable cryptographic evidence, with an explicit head commitment that detects local hash-chain truncation and whole-store rollback. It reuses the SCITT architecture and COSE receipt envelope: the Causal Provenance Receipt (CPR) bundle is the signed statement payload, and registration with a Transparency Service is optional and explicitly disclosed. This profile addresses the session-lifecycle and resumption-evidence grain rather than isolated per-action telemetry, while preserving bounded verifier semantics: a verifier checks cryptographic signatures, canonical digests, chain links, and external anchors; it does not prove that unallegeable physical events occurred.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-27T22:42:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 7,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-28T00:18:00.606Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-28T00:18:00.606Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-tanase-ain-authoritative-resolution",
   "title": "Authoritative Resolution and Pre-Interaction Verification of Persistent Digital Agent Identities",
   "abstract": "This document specifies AIN-WRP, a protocol-independent mechanism for authoritative resolution of persistent digital-agent identities and for verification of relationship-specific state before a digital agent begins a protected interaction with another registered agent or with a non-agent service or system. Each digital agent participating in AIN-WRP identity resolution is identified by its own persistent Agent Identity Number (AIN). The AIN is the stable anchor used to resolve lifecycle, operator, authority, restriction, endpoint, provenance and cryptographic evidence from sources competent for the corresponding assertions. Where the counterparty is a non-agent target, a target reference identifies the intended resource or service without being treated as an alternative digital-agent identity. AIN-WRP correlates the required evidence for the proposed interaction and can produce a Pre-Interaction Trust State or an optional State Proof. Verification does not itself execute the operation or replace receiving-domain enforcement. The specification distinguishes persistent agent identity from credentials, proof of control, delegated authority, operational eligibility, local admission decisions and execution. AIN-WRP applies at or before the admission boundary of A2A, MCP, API, transactional, messaging and other operational protocols. An identity or target reference alone does not establish the authority, validity or eligibility of the proposed interaction.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-27T14:12:12Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 60,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T18:18:07.690Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T18:18:07.690Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wallace-aipref-grant-binding",
   "title": "A Verifiable-Credential Binding for AI Usage Preferences: Expressing Grants that Lift AIPREF Preferences",
   "abstract": "The AI Preferences (AIPREF) vocabulary lets those with rights in a digital asset express preferences -- for example, that training of AI models is disallowed -- about how automated systems process that asset. Such a preference expresses a reservation. It does not, by itself, provide a verifiable, revocable record of a specific grant that lifts a preference for a specific party. This document describes that gap and proposes a candidate mechanism: a cryptographically signed, offline-verifiable credential that expresses a grant referencing an AIPREF usage category and a specific asset, that any party can verify without contacting the grantor, and that the grantor can revoke. It is intended as a starting point for discussion, not as a finished specification. The mechanism is preference-general. Training is used throughout as the worked example because it is the reservation most widely discussed, but nothing in the construction is specific to it: the credential binds whichever usage category was reserved to a named party, and the same procedure applies to any other category the vocabulary expresses. What the mechanism establishes is that a grant exists, is authentic, and was in force and unrevoked at a stated evaluation time -- or that the evidence available does not determine this, which it reports as a distinct outcome rather than guessing. It does not adjudicate whether the grantor had standing to grant, and it is not an enforcement or access-control mechanism.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-27T11:26:27Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.5,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 1.2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T12:18:04.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T12:18:04.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-du-oauth-agent-authorization-center",
   "title": "Agent Authorization Center for User-Side Agent Authentication and Authorization",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an Agent Authorization Center (AAC) for user- side intelligent agents, enabling them to access resource parties on behalf of users through either autonomous approval or human authorization modes. The AAC maintains user-agent associations and personalized authorization policies, balancing agent autonomy with user control.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-27T09:19:49Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 6,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T12:18:04.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T12:18:04.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-blwm-dawn-common-discovery-parameters",
   "title": "Common Agent DNS Discovery Parameters",
   "abstract": "This document defines parameters for AI agents that would be used in DNS and mDNS discovery processes. It provides a set of common parameters for different DNS records to facilitate agents communicating over application layer protocols such as A2A or MCP.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-27T09:08:29Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 27,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.72,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T12:18:04.761Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T12:18:04.761Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-drake-agent-identity-governance",
   "title": "The Agent Identity Authority: A Multi-Stakeholder Governance Framework for the Agent Identity Registry System",
   "abstract": "The Agent Identity Registry System (AIRS) provides durable identity infrastructure for autonomous entities such as AI agents and robots, with graduated assurance ranging from scarcity-backed physical anchors through protected-key and software-only participation. Its companion specifications deliberately do not define or empower a governance authority; they describe the functions such an authority must perform and defer its constitution to a separate effort. This document defines that body: the Agent Identity Authority (AIA). It specifies the Authority's name, legal form, mission, and relationship to the protocol specifications; its membership categories and Board composition; binding geographic-diversity rules and non-binding advisory recommendations for ideal composition; the accreditation, dispute-resolution, hardware trust store, transparency, and funding frameworks it operates; and the bootstrap process by which the Authority forms and assumes stewardship of the global production namespace. The Authority governs infrastructure, not behavior: it stewards the aid namespace, hardware roots of trust, accreditation, and production Registry Operator succession. It does not regulate what agents do. Its legitimacy derives from being the least-objectionable steward of a shared resource, in the tradition of ICANN, the regional Internet registries, and the W3C, and its charter is designed so that no single nation, region, or company can capture it or holds a formal veto over it, although supermajority rules let a large enough coordinated bloc block consequential decisions.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-27T02:42:53Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.76,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-emerson-oauth-user-mediated-delivery",
   "title": "User-Mediated Credential Delivery as a Complementary Authorization Primitive for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document proposes user-mediated credential delivery as a complementary authorization primitive for AI agent frameworks. Rather than delivering credentials through automated channels controlled by the agent or its platform, user-mediated delivery places the authorization decision and credential delivery in the user's trusted context, separate from the agent's execution environment. This document describes four methods: user-mediated credential delivery, self-describing connection credentials, caller-identity consent differentiation, and discovery-by-introspection. These methods address the human-in-the-loop gap identified in Section 10.7 of [KLRC] and strengthen the authorization foundation that the IETF AI Agent Authentication and Authorization framework depends on. This revision relates the primitive to the gap analysis in [CHEN-UC] and to the intent credential proposed in [INTENT], states how it composes with grant-layer mechanisms, and reports implementation status. The methods described in this document are patent pending.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-27T01:57:11Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 21,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.79,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-cui-semantic-routing-ai-agent-communication",
   "title": "Semantic Routing for AI Agent Communication",
   "abstract": "AI agents often know the intended outcome of a task without knowing which agent, model, tool, workflow, or service should process it. This document describes an application-layer semantic routing framework that selects one Processing Target from task intent, execution context, target capabilities, constraints, and local policy. It defines a common operation-level information model and externally observable selection behavior that protocol bindings can preserve. Semantic matching is implementation-specific. This document does not define task decomposition, multi-agent orchestration, network-layer routing, target discovery, target invocation, or a new agent communication protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-27T01:44:07Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 26,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.65,
   "centrality": 1.95,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-du-ai-agent-communication-6g-aspect",
   "title": "Use Cases and Requirements of AI Agent Communication from 6G Aspect",
   "abstract": "AI Agent can do some tasks as an assistant to human beings. During the task process, the Agent may need to connect to other Agents with different skills relative to the task. The Agent to Agent communication is a new kind of traffic for Internet, and some new requirements for networking are proposed. This document talks about the requirements and key issues of global AI agent communication towards 6G. Some 6G related use cases from 3GPP documents are introduced. After that, the related requirements for the AI Agent Communication Network (ACN) are proposed, and potential ACN frameworks and standardization works for the AI Agent Communication are also discussed.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-27T01:22:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 22,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T06:18:02.008Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yanteri-humancollab-statements",
   "title": "Accountable Statements Between AI Agents, Businesses and People",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly act on information they cannot check: what a business can supply, what a person said, what rules a platform applies. This document describes a minimal way to make such statements accountable. Every statement is signed by its author, bound where possible to a domain the author controls, and sealed in a public append-only Merkle log whose tree heads are signed, timestamped and publicly monitored. The design proves who said what and when, and that the record was not rewritten. It deliberately does not attempt to prove that a statement is true.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T22:17:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.21,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-27T00:18:01.881Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-27T00:18:01.881Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sharaf-brick-agent-definition",
   "title": "BRICK: Portable Definition and Composition of AI Agents",
   "abstract": "BRICK proposes a vendor-neutral JSON construction contract for AI agents. It defines agent identity, goals, capabilities, instruction and skill references, explicitly namespaced MCP tool dependencies, and an optional projection to A2A Agent Cards. It references the existing MCP, A2A, and Agent Skills specifications rather than redefining their protocols or formats. BRICK does not prescribe a language model, reasoning engine, deployment platform, discovery service, or authorization protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T15:01:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.55,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-narajala-courtney-ansv2",
   "title": "Agent Name Service v2 (ANS): A Domain-Anchored Identity Layer for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents now invoke one another across organizational boundaries over protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent2Agent (A2A). A relying party has no interoperable way to bind a discoverable agent endpoint to the holder of its domain (optionally verified as a legal entity), a specific software release, and an auditable issuance history. This document specifies the architecture of Agent Name Service version 2 (ANS v2), an identity layer, anchored in DNS domains, that binds an agent endpoint to its domain holder, its release, and its history. ANS v2 composes systems the Internet already runs (the DNS with DNSSEC; the Web PKI, with DANE where operators publish it; and an append-only transparency log) and introduces no new root of trust. Every ANS v2 agent carries a versioned name rooted in a DNS domain that the registrant controls. When a registrant registers an agent, the Registration Authority (RA) checks the registrant's control of that domain, can issue an Identity Certificate that binds the versioned name to the agent's key, and submits a signed registration record to a Merkle-tree transparency log. Under the current specifications, a new version is a new registration and a new log entry, so a verifier can pin an agent to a specific release. Any third party can detect a rewritten log by computing, from the log's public tiles, a consistency proof between two of its signed checkpoints. For discovery, ANS v2 adopts the SVCB records and SvcParams of DNS for AI Discovery (DNS-AID) as its default format, and keeps an older TXT-based format only as an opt-in profile. Beyond those discovery records, ANS v2 specifies one DNS record, an \"_ans-badge\" TXT record that points to the agent's transparency-log entry; the log seals the fingerprint of the agent server's certificate, and operators can add DANE records. With these records, a verifier resolves an agent, authenticates its TLS endpoint, and confirms that the presented name, version, and key match a logged registration. This document also states a threat model covering agent impersonation, DNS spoofing, CA and Registration Authority compromise, version rollback, agent card tampering, and log rewriting, and names what each ANS check does and does not prevent. The reference registry, transparency log, verifier, JSON Schemas, SDKs, and CLI are open source.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-26T14:58:32Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.96,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-15T12:17:43.956Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-interoperable-consequence-authority",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 1: Foundational Consequential Authority and Common Workflows",
   "abstract": "AI assistants and agents, including Apple Siri acting through App Intents, Google Gemini on Android, Samsung Bixby, Microsoft Copilot, and third-party AI tools, increasingly take real actions on iOS, iPadOS, macOS, Android, Windows, Linux, and cloud platforms: they send messages, export files, call remote APIs, make payments, and operate connected devices. Such an agent can pass sandboxing, authentication, app-permission, and token checks and still cause an effect the user never approved, through prompt injection, credential misuse, a wrong or redirected target, stale authority, replay, or cross-device duplication. This document is the foundational part of a twelve-part series. It defines a common architecture in which an AI tool's proposed action (a Candidate Act) remains non-effective until protected evidence shows that it matches an approved operation, and the component that actually executes it (the Finality Sink) independently reconstructs the real pending operation and fails closed on any mismatch. It specifies the shared terminology, trust model, and security invariants used by Parts 2 through 12, together with three common workflows: protected execution of a consequential action; continuation of a multi-step task only after a verified receipt for the earlier effect; and fresh, bounded re-authorization when an agent deviates from its approved scope. A threat model and a falsifiable reference test plan are included. The document maps these mechanisms onto existing IETF work as reusable building blocks: OAuth 2.0 with Rich Authorization Requests and Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP); Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE); Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT); and HTTP conditional requests. It identifies discussion points for these groups and for Security Area dispatch, without claiming working-group adoption or IETF consensus. Industry alignment covers interoperability between the Apple and Google mobile ecosystems, voice and system assistants, enterprise agent gateways and copilots, agent tooling from providers such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and Meta, hardware-backed enforcement, payments, telecommunications, and robotics. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), the operation-bound evidence and fail-closed enforcement described here can help providers and deployers address risk- management, record-keeping, human-oversight, and robustness and cybersecurity requirements where those obligations apply; this is a technical mapping, not a conformity claim or legal advice.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-26T13:54:11Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 228,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.87,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-autonomous-infrastructure-finality",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 12: Autonomous Cloud, Telecommunications, and Critical-Infrastructure Resource Governance",
   "abstract": "An AI agent with valid cloud credentials can spend a month's budget in an hour, open the firewall it is supposed to respect, or reconfigure a network that other people depend on. Autonomous agents reached through Apple iOS and Google Android enterprise apps and assistants such as Apple Siri, Google Gemini, Microsoft Copilot, and Amazon Alexa, and agents running on Windows and Linux infrastructure, AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, Kubernetes, telecommunications and 5G/6G control planes, financial systems, and industrial controllers can independently start costly, conflicting, irreversible, or security-sensitive resource effects. Prompt injection, quota exhaustion, several agents overspending a shared budget, confused asynchronous workflows, agents changing the security policy that governs themselves, conflicting rules from different owners, and incomplete audit trails can turn a syntactically valid API call into an unauthorised consequence. This document, Part 12 and the final part of a twelve-part series, specifies execution finality for autonomous infrastructure. It describes resource-bounded protected validation that cannot be exhausted into a permissive fallback; cumulative consequence budgets with delegated sub-budgets that cannot exceed their parent; dependency-gated multi-step and asynchronous workflows; non-self- authorising security-policy and configuration changes; resolution of policy conflicts by competent-authority precedence, including safety and tenant boundaries; and end-to-end source-to-effect provenance with protected consumption and closure records at independent Finality Sinks. Reference algorithms, twenty threat models, and forty reproducible tests, including NETCONF configuration-diff and real telecom-controller cases, are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to Workload Identity in Multi- System Environments (WIMSE); OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests, Token Exchange, and Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP); the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF), RESTCONF, and YANG data modelling; Network Modeling (NETMOD) and Operations and Management Area (OPSAWG) work; Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE); HTTP semantics; Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT); autonomic networking (ANIMA); and Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) and Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT). These are reusable building blocks that do not by themselves supply operation- specific finality, and no working-group adoption or IETF consensus is claimed. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with App Intents; Android with Binder, intents, and Keystore; Google Cloud with Gemini, Microsoft Azure and Windows, and Amazon Web Services; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei infrastructure; Kubernetes; enterprise identity and SaaS; voice and chat assistants issuing infrastructure commands; cloud cost management and GPU capacity; autonomous networks and Open RAN applications; firewall, secure-access, and zero-trust policy automation; identity governance and privileged roles; data-centre power and cooling; electricity, water, and other essential services; hospital IT; financial market infrastructure; public-sector and sovereign cloud; managed service providers; banking and payments; telecommunications 5G/6G; and industrial control, robotics, and connected vehicles. For each, the document states the technical effect: an autonomous infrastructure change takes effect only within its remaining budget, under a policy it did not write for itself, according to the competent authority that prevails, and with a verifiable closure record. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligenc",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T13:53:07Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 767,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.34,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ailex-vap-legal-ai-provenance",
   "title": "Verifiable AI Provenance (VAP) Framework and Legal AI Profile (LAP)",
   "abstract": "This document specifies an experimental Legal AI Profile (LAP) for verifiable AI provenance, informed by the Verifiable AI Provenance (VAP) Framework. It defines event signatures, hash chains, signed batch commitments, external anchoring, and evidence packages for legal consultation, document generation, and fact checking. This revision aligns the LAP design with a pinned VAP v1.2.0 Draft 3 baseline. All LAP levels require Merkle trees and external anchoring. LAP Bronze, Silver, and Gold remain profile-specific levels; they do not establish VAP Core, Standard, or Full conformance. The document also defines bounded recovery, erasure records, human review records, and legal hold controls. Verification concerns recorded evidence within a declared scope. It does not prove that every real-world operation was captured, that an AI output is correct, or that legal obligations have been met. This is an individual Internet-Draft and a proposed profile, not an IETF standard or a registered VAP profile.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "05",
   "time": "2026-10-26T13:47:14Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 53,
   "relevant": 0.54,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.82,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-hardware-execution-finality",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 11: Kernel, Sandbox, and Hardware-Enforced Execution Finality",
   "abstract": "A sandboxed, attested AI agent can still change the real world through a door the sandbox left open. Apple iOS and iPadOS app sandboxes, macOS, Google Android, Windows and Linux kernels, AI-agent code-execution cells, on-device neural processors running assistants such as Apple Siri, Google Gemini, Samsung Galaxy AI, and Microsoft Copilot, NVIDIA accelerators and network controllers, Qualcomm and Arm processors, confidential-computing virtual machines, and embedded, automotive, and telecom controllers isolate workloads while still exposing consequential file, credential, network, inter- process, deployment, firmware, and hardware-command interfaces. Prompt-injected tool execution, privileged connector bypass, syscall arguments changed after checking, policy hot swaps, stale attestation, GPU and DMA egress, rollback of tools or policies, and monitors that only observe rather than block can each let an apparently confined agent cause an unauthorized real effect. This document, Part 11 of a twelve-part series, specifies execution finality at kernel, sandbox, and hardware boundaries. It describes protected discovery of every effect-capable path, with an explicit distinction between paths that are blocked and paths that are merely observed; controls on transitions from sandbox output to privileged real-world effect; non-bypassable credential custody; generation-safe installation, upgrade, and rollback of tool runtimes; protected mutation of security policy and configuration; hardware attribution of device and accelerator commands; independent witness and attestation qualification; and Finality Sink reconstruction of the actual pending operation with scoped non-bearer authority and fail- closed consumption. Remote attestation is treated as evidence about an environment, not authority for a particular effect. Reference algorithms, sixteen threat models, and thirty-six reproducible tests, including Apple, Android Binder, and Windows privileged-service cases, are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS), Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP), Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT), Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE), CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE), OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests, Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP), and Token Exchange, Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE), Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT), HTTP semantics, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF), autonomic networking, and operational observability work. The additional question addressed is whether a particular real-world effect is authorised and is blocked or released at its actual enforcement boundary; no working-group adoption or IETF consensus is claimed. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS sandboxes with Siri and App Intents; Google Android with Gemini, Binder, and Keystore; Samsung Galaxy AI and Bixby; Microsoft Windows with virtualization-based security, Copilot, and AI PCs with neural processing units; Linux with seccomp, eBPF, security modules, and microVMs; code-execution sandboxes for AI agents; browser sandboxes and web agents; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and Meta; NVIDIA accelerators and data-processing units; Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei processors and trusted execution environments; confidential computing and attested private AI clouds; cloud workload isolation on AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud; server baseboard management controllers; banking, signing, and payment hardware; telecommunications network functions and SmartNICs; software-defined vehicles; medical devices; industrial control systems; drones and robotics; satellite command; and CI/CD and policy automation. For each, the document states the technical effect: a consequential effect leaves the sandbox or reaches the hardware ",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T13:34:29Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 680,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.47,
   "centrality": 1.9,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-cross-device-authority-revocation",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 10: Cross-Device Authority Continuity, Revocation Fencing, and Offline Execution",
   "abstract": "Revoking an AI agent's access does not stop the copy of it that is still running somewhere else. Tasks now move between an iPhone, an iPad, a Mac, an Android phone, a Windows or Linux workstation, a cloud agent, a car, and an edge controller; Apple Siri and Google Gemini follow the user across phones, watches, speakers, and vehicles. After a handoff, a synchronised login, a delegated session, a cached OAuth token, or a cloned virtual machine, the old device or a disconnected resource can still cause a duplicate or stale real-world effect. Revoked-but-cached permissions, untrusted clock rollback, expired offline leases, delayed command queues, races over who owns a task, lost or stolen devices, and uncertain outcomes after a network partition all make \"access revoked\" different from \"effects stopped\". This document, Part 10 of a twelve-part series, specifies how authority moves between devices and stops when it should. It describes protected ownership generations with source fencing, so that exactly one device or agent instance can act for a task; authenticated delegation and revocation transitions with dependency graphs and source-authority generations; protected time and lease expiry that resist clock rollback; per-device, non-bearer finality; preallocated offline authority with protected partition budgets that cannot be cloned or double-spent; partition-aware reconciliation; transfer of administrative and resource ownership across domains; and independent verification of the actual pending operation at the responsible Finality Sink. Reference algorithms, fourteen threat models, and thirty-six reproducible tests are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation, Token Introspection, Token Exchange, Rich Authorization Requests, and Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP); Workload Identity in Multi- System Environments (WIMSE); Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE); Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT); HTTP conditional requests and caching; Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) and Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP); and the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF). It identifies discussion points for these groups and for Security Area dispatch, without claiming working-group adoption or IETF consensus. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Handoff, Siri, and App Intents; Google Android with Gemini and Android Keystore; Samsung Bixby, Microsoft Copilot, and Amazon Alexa across phones, watches, speakers, and cars; Microsoft Windows and Azure; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; multi-cloud failover; lost and stolen device protection and remote wipe; phone replacement and device transfer; employee offboarding and bring-your-own-device programmes; offline and small-value payments, including UPI Lite and proposed offline modes for central-bank digital currencies; transit and access credentials in mobile wallets; vehicle digital keys; smart locks and shared guest access; family accounts and parental controls; telecommunications roaming and edge; IoT and intermittently connected sites, including aviation, maritime, and satellite-connected devices; robotics and vehicles; and industrial and energy systems. For each, the document states the technical effect: after handoff or revocation, only the current owner can cause an effect, and offline devices can act only within a protected, non-clonable budget that expires on trusted time. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), enforceable revocation and bounded offline authority can help providers and deployers address human-oversight, robust",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T13:24:16Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 631,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.81,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-agent-credential-privacy",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 9: Credential Custody, Operation-Bound Secret Use, and Protected Data Disclosure",
   "abstract": "Giving an AI agent a credential usually means giving it everything that credential can do. When Apple Siri, Google Gemini, enterprise copilots, coding agents, or third-party AI tools act with a user's OAuth tokens, API keys, signing keys, or logged-in sessions on iOS, iPadOS, macOS, Android, cloud APIs, developer tools, financial services, and telecom systems, a prompt-injected or confused agent can export data, call APIs, sign transactions, write poisoned entries into its own long-term memory, or leak information piece by piece to different recipients. iOS Keychain and the Secure Enclave, Android Keystore, sandboxing, token authentication, proof of possession, and a successful approval each protect something real, but none of them establishes authority for the exact outgoing data, recipient, or resource effect. This document, Part 9 of a twelve-part series, specifies how credentials and data are used only for the specific operation that was authorized. It describes protected secret custody in which the agent never receives the raw secret; operation-bound credential activation; continuity of credential generation and source authority across key and token rotation; independent Finality Sink inspection of the real outgoing request; recipient-scoped, cumulative, correlation-aware disclosure accounting, including derived summaries; provenance of source-derived information; retrieval-time provenance and write authority for agent memory and retrieval-augmented generation stores; and non-replayable consumption of finality. It does not assume that a third-party mobile application can mediate other applications without their cooperation. Reference algorithms, fourteen threat models, and thirty-two reproducible tests, including current Android and iOS authorized-call cases, are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests, Resource Indicators, Token Exchange, Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP), and mutual-TLS sender constraints; the Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE) architecture and the WIMSE working group's AI Identity Management System draft on agent authentication and authorization; Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT); and HTTP semantics. These are treated as qualified inputs rather than final authority, without claiming working-group adoption or IETF consensus. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Siri, Keychain, Secure Enclave, and App Intents; Google Android with Gemini, Keystore, app permissions, and inter-process communication; Samsung Bixby, Microsoft Copilot, and Amazon Alexa; Microsoft Windows and Azure; Amazon Web Services and other cloud identity platforms; cloud key-management and hardware security module signing services; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and Meta; Model Context Protocol connectors and their OAuth-based authorization; passkeys and WebAuthn; password managers and autofill; enterprise SaaS connectors; open banking and consent-based data sharing, including India's Account Aggregator framework; digital wallets and payment APIs; healthcare data; human-resources and recruiting agents; source-code secrets and CI/CD; personal assistant memory; advertising and analytics data sharing; the EU Digital Identity Wallet; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; telecommunications messaging; RAG and vector databases; and public-sector systems. For each, the document states the technical effect: a secret is exercised, or data is released, only for the specific authorized operation and recipient, and only within the remaining disclosure budget. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Reg",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T13:08:22Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 593,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.71,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-howe-agentproto-contact-center-usecases",
   "title": "Contact Center Use Cases and Requirements for Agentic Dialogs",
   "abstract": "Contact centers bring people, AI agents, and business systems into the same voice session. Consumer-controlled agents are also beginning to call agents operated by businesses. This document describes five contact center use cases for the agentic dialog management protocol: a consumer agent calling a business agent, escalation from an AI agent to a human representative, a call that resumes on another channel, a voice dialog passing through speech recognition and synthesis, and a dialog crossing an existing SIP or PSTN network. It derives numbered requirements that can be incorporated into the working group's use cases and requirements document. It also explains how a dialog identifier relates to the conversation records that contact centers already keep.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T13:03:22Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 19,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dobson-ai-decision-receipt",
   "title": "The AI-Decision-Receipt HTTP Response Header Field",
   "abstract": "Automated systems, including AI models and AI agents, increasingly make decisions and take actions that affect people, money and data. Emerging work on agent identity answers which agent made a request and whether it was authorised. It does not give the parties involved a portable, independently checkable record of what was decided. This document defines AI-Decision-Receipt, an HTTP response header field that carries a compact receipt for a governed automated decision: the outcome, a fingerprint of the exact request the decision was made on, the position and hash of the record in the issuer's tamper-evident log, and a location where anyone can verify that record without trusting the issuer. The field uses the Structured Field Values for HTTP Dictionary type.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T13:02:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 1.47,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-distributed-effect-recovery",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 8: Distributed Effect Verification, Protected Recovery, and Multi-Resource Finality",
   "abstract": "When an AI agent's request times out, nobody knows whether the money moved. Agents such as Apple Siri acting through App Intents, Google Gemini on Android, enterprise copilots, and autonomous workflows on iOS, iPadOS, macOS, Android, Windows, Linux, cloud APIs, banking and instant-payment systems, robotic controllers, and telecommunications networks increasingly act across resources that they do not control. An API acknowledgment, a queued request, an expired timeout, an apparently failed payment, or a successful local transaction may not prove whether the real external effect occurred. Agents that guess then retry into duplicate transfers, compensate for effects that never happened, report rollbacks that did not occur, leave multi- resource operations half committed, or repeat irreversible actions. This document, Part 8 of a twelve-part series, specifies how agents establish what actually happened and recover safely. It describes qualified remote-effect evidence; independent witnesses with provenance and measurement-competence checks; crash-consistent effect-intent journals; containment of indeterminate outcomes so that neither successors nor retries run until reconciliation; recovery and compensation as separately authorized Candidate Acts that cannot inherit or exceed the original authority; resource-specific Finality Sinks; dependency-aware multi-resource commit controls that report partial commits truthfully; and protected irreversible-effect frontiers that require fresh hazard state before an action that cannot be undone. Atomicity across unrelated providers is not presumed. Reference algorithms, twelve threat models, and thirty reproducible tests, including an Android and iOS cooperating-client case, are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to HTTP semantics for idempotent methods, retries, and conditional updates; OAuth 2.0 authorization, Rich Authorization Requests, Resource Indicators, Token Exchange, and Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP); Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) for observers and validators; CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for signed evidence; Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) receipts; and Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE). Their assurances are kept distinct from proof of a specific actual consequence, and no working-group adoption or IETF consensus is claimed. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Siri, Shortcuts, and App Intents; Google Android with Gemini, intents, Binder, and Keystore; Samsung Bixby, Microsoft Copilot, and Amazon Alexa; Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, and Kubernetes; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; banks, card payments, and merchant APIs; instant payment schemes such as UPI, Pix, FedNow, and SEPA Instant; agentic commerce; securities trading and settlement; ERP and supply-chain systems; multi-leg travel bookings; healthcare prescriptions and records; smart homes using Matter; automotive over-the-air updates and remote commands; energy dispatch; telecom provisioning, including eSIM profiles; government and tax filings; cloud data deletion and backups; email and messaging; robotics; and satellites and intermittently connected edge systems. For each, the document states the technical effect: an uncertain outcome blocks duplicates and successors until a qualified receipt resolves it, and recovery runs only under its own fresh authority. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), truthful outcome records and controlled recovery can help providers and deployers address robustness, record-keeping, human-oversight, and risk-management requirements where those obligations apply; this is ",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T12:55:57Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 626,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.36,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-agent-tool-integrity",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 7: AI Tool Integrity, Semantic Target Correspondence, and Execution-Time Resource Identity",
   "abstract": "An AI agent can call the right tool with valid credentials and still act on the wrong thing. When a user tells Apple Siri or Google Gemini to \"send this to her\", asks a coding agent to deploy, or lets a browser agent complete a form, the agent must resolve which file, contact, account, tenant, or device is meant, and which tool, tool version, and model will act. On iOS, iPadOS, macOS, Android, Windows, Linux, enterprise SaaS, cloud platforms, and connected hardware, agents can select the wrong user-referenced object, follow instructions injected into web pages, repositories, or tool outputs, call a tool whose description or capabilities silently changed, run on a swapped model or configuration, or send authorized-looking requests to redirected hosts, rebound aliases, and substituted tenants. Identity authentication, sandboxing, and transport encryption can all succeed while files, credentials, payments, developer infrastructure, and physical devices are exposed. This document, Part 7 of a twelve-part series, specifies execution- time integrity for AI tools. It describes protected correspondence between what the user saw and referred to and the object actually acted on; canonical tool-effect contracts with semantic-compatibility checks across tool versions; algorithm, model, and configuration baseline continuity; instruction provenance with evaluation of lower- trust influence on downstream actions; authenticated resolution of resource aliases, hosts, and tenants, including redirects and DNS rebinding; fencing of tool installation, activation, runtime upgrade, and rollback; detection of dynamic service and capability substitution; and reconstruction of the actual operation at an independent Finality Sink. Reference algorithms, twelve threat models, and thirty reproducible tests, including iOS App Intents and Android cooperating-app cases, are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to OAuth 2.0 authorization, Rich Authorization Requests, Resource Indicators, Token Exchange, and Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP); Workload Identity in Multi- System Environments (WIMSE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE); Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT); Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) manifests; Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP); Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); and HTTP redirect and conditional-request semantics. None of these alone is treated as conferring final authority for a consequential effect, and no working-group adoption or IETF consensus is claimed. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Siri, Shortcuts, App Intents, and Keychain; Google Android with Gemini, intents, Binder, and Keystore; Samsung Bixby, Microsoft Copilot, and Amazon Alexa; Microsoft Windows and Azure; coding and computer-use agents from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and Meta; Model Context Protocol servers, agent-to-agent protocols, and tool and plugin registries; browser agents; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; banking, payments, and agentic commerce; email and messaging agents; healthcare record agents; document signing; cloud infrastructure-as-code; model hosting and model routing; smart homes using Matter; automotive assistants and over-the-air updates; government digital identity, including the EU Digital Identity Wallet; telecommunications; industrial IoT and robotics; and software supply chains and CI/CD. For each, the document states the technical effect: the consequential operation reaches the Finality Sink only if the actual target, tool contract, model baseline, and instruction lineage match what was authorized. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), execution- time integrity of tools, models",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T12:45:01Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 627,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.91,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-causal-effect-receipts",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 6: Verified Actual-Effect Receipts and Protected Causal Continuation",
   "abstract": "An AI agent that reports \"done\" has not proven that anything happened. Multi-step tasks run by Apple Siri through App Intents and Shortcuts, by Google Gemini across Android apps, by enterprise copilots, and by autonomous agents across iOS, iPadOS, macOS, Android, Windows, Linux, cloud services, payment systems, connected devices, and industrial systems often start the next consequential step because a scheduler reported success, an API returned \"202 Accepted\", or the agent generated a plausible completion message, even though the required earlier real-world effect never occurred or cannot be established. The results include prompt-injection-driven phase skipping, false shipment or settlement claims, payment before goods are reserved, unsafe device actuation after an unconfirmed safety step, replayed acknowledgements, and duplicated or misdirected changes after lost replies. This document, Part 6 of a twelve-part series, specifies how a later step is allowed to proceed only on verified evidence that the earlier effect actually took place. It defines an identity-authenticated Interim Effectuation Validator (IEV); qualified actual-effect evidence; Protected Effect Receipts (PER); Validator-Accepted Effect Receipts (VAER); a single-use Causal Continuation Condition (CCC); and receipt-constituted authority for the next phase, checked again by an independently enforcing Finality Sink. It keeps distinct the source permission, request dispatch, observation, accepted evidence, continuation authority, and actual successor effect, and it treats lost or ambiguous outcomes as indeterminate rather than successful. Reference algorithms, ten threat models, and twenty-four reproducible tests, including an iOS and Android cooperating-gateway case, are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to OAuth 2.0 authorization, Rich Authorization Requests, Resource Indicators, Token Exchange, Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP), and token revocation; Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) for trustworthy validators and observers; CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for receipt objects; Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) signed statements; Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); and HTTP semantics for asynchronous effects and conditional requests. It identifies discussion points for these groups and for Security Area dispatch, without claiming working-group adoption or IETF consensus. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Siri, Shortcuts, and App Intents; Google Android with Gemini, intents, Binder, and Keystore; Samsung Bixby, Microsoft Copilot, and Amazon Alexa; Microsoft Windows and Azure; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Cloud, and Meta; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; banking and payment APIs; agentic commerce and digital wallets; e-commerce logistics and returns; healthcare ordering and dispensing workflows; insurance claims and lending; travel booking; smart homes using Matter; automotive assistants and over-the-air updates; energy and utility switching; government digital identity, including the EU Digital Identity Wallet; customer-service refunds; laboratory and manufacturing execution; software release pipelines; robotics; and telecommunications. For each, the document states the technical effect: a successor operation is withheld unless a qualified, unreplayed receipt proves the predecessor effect. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), receipt-gated continuation and auditable phase records can help providers and deployers address record-keeping, traceability, human-oversight, and robustness requirements where those obligations apply; this is a technical mapping, not a conformity claim or",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T12:25:07Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 396,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.87,
   "centrality": 1.94,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T18:19:27.404Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-multi-agent-authority-control",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 5: Multi-Agent Delegation, Conflict Arbitration, and Quorum Authority",
   "abstract": "Each AI agent can hold a valid permission and the group can still do something nobody authorized. When Apple Siri hands a task to an app through App Intents, Google Gemini delegates to Android apps and cloud agents, or an orchestrator dispatches sub-agents across iOS, iPadOS, macOS, Android, Windows, Linux, cloud APIs, and connected devices, authority is copied, narrowed, widened, and combined along the way. Prompt-injection-driven delegation, confused-deputy escalation, replayed agent approvals, conflicting writes to the same resource, duplicated payments, stale reservations, overspent shared budgets, colluding or non-independent evaluator quorums, and a final tool call detached from its originating authority are typical results. This document, Part 5 of a twelve-part series, specifies multi-agent control for execution finality. It describes protected arbitration of conflicting effects across agents using effect footprints and atomic reservations; cryptographic delegation lineage across providers with transitive scope attenuation, so that a sub-agent can never receive more authority than its parent; version-bound concurrency checks; authenticated quorum membership with operation- bound approval certificates and separation of duties; budgets conserved across branches of a delegation tree; revocation that reaches every descendant; and independent Finality Sink verification of the actual resource effect. Reference algorithms, ten threat models, and twenty-four reproducible positive and negative tests, including an iOS and Android cooperating-receiver case, are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests, Resource Indicators, Token Exchange, Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP), and current security best practice; the Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol (GNAP); Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE) and its agent-delegation discussions; Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE); Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT); Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); and HTTP conditional requests. These are treated as qualified inputs rather than final authority, without claiming working-group adoption or IETF consensus. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Siri, Shortcuts, and App Intents; Google Android with Gemini, Binder, and intents; Samsung Bixby and Microsoft Copilot; Microsoft Windows and Azure agent orchestration; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Cloud, and Meta; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; banking and payments; enterprise SaaS, procurement, and inventory; robotics; and telecommunications. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), traceable delegation lineage, bounded authority, and quorum-based approval can help providers and deployers address human-oversight, record-keeping, risk-management, and robustness and cybersecurity requirements where those obligations apply; this is a technical mapping, not a conformity claim or legal advice.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T12:15:40Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 530,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-finality-sink-enforcement",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 4: Finality Sink Enforcement, Actual-Operation Reconstruction, and Anti-Bypass Security",
   "abstract": "An AI action can be approved correctly and still go somewhere else. Assistants such as Apple Siri acting through App Intents and Google Gemini on Android, AI coding agents, browser and computer-use agents, enterprise copilots, and third-party automation on iOS, iPadOS, macOS, Android, Windows, Linux, and cloud platforms can reach the same effect through another network route, file interface, privileged inter-process service, direct API credential, hardware command queue, or sandbox exit. Prompt injection, stale human approvals, a swapped window or user-interface target, and forged observations can also make the approved tool action differ from the payment, export, publication, resource change, or device command that actually happens. This document, Part 4 of a twelve-part series, specifies the enforcement point of execution finality: the Finality Sink. The sink independently reconstructs the actual pending operation where the effect occurs, rather than trusting the agent's description, and either consumes operation-scoped authority once under protected state or refuses. The document covers discovery of every effect-capable path, the difference between observing an effect and blocking it, runtime enforcement-coverage epochs, privilege transitions from sandbox to real resource, authenticated computer-use and human- approval state, and replay and snapshot-rollback resistance. Reference algorithms, six threat models, and twenty reproducible positive and negative tests, including an Android-to-iOS case, are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document treats existing IETF mechanisms as qualified inputs to sink-local decisions rather than final authority: OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests and Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP); Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE); Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT); and HTTP preconditions and redirect semantics. It identifies discussion points for these groups and for Security Area dispatch, without claiming working-group adoption or IETF consensus. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Siri, App Intents, and desktop sandboxing; Google Android with Binder and intents; Google Gemini and agent gateways; Samsung Bixby and Microsoft Copilot; Microsoft Windows and Azure agent containers; computer-use and coding agents from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; banking and payments; cloud API gateways and SaaS; and telecommunications, IoT, and robotics. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), sink-side enforcement that cannot be bypassed through alternate paths can help providers and deployers address robustness and cybersecurity, human-oversight, risk- management, and record-keeping requirements where those obligations apply; this is a technical mapping, not a conformity claim or legal advice.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T11:56:15Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 515,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.73,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-protected-authority-evidence",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 3: Protected Source Authority, Cross-Committed Evidence, and Scoped Non-Bearer Finality",
   "abstract": "When Apple Siri runs an App Intent, Google Gemini triggers an Android action, or a third-party AI agent calls a cloud API on a user's behalf, the request usually carries valid credentials: an OAuth token, an iOS Keychain or Android Keystore key, or a signed approval. Valid credentials are not the same as authority for the exact operation. Prompt injection, stolen or reused tokens, forged or substituted approvals, stale delegated authority, replayed authorizations, and crashes between the authorization decision and the effect can each disconnect an apparent permission from the file export, payment, secret use, cloud change, or device command that is actually executed. This document, Part 3 of a twelve-part series, specifies the authority and evidence layer of execution finality. It describes how to capture protected source authority from the originating principal; collect protected evidence when a request is formed; validate it again, independently, at execution time; cross-commit the two so that neither can be substituted; issue operation-scoped, non-bearer finality enablement that is useless if copied; and consume it once, under protected state, at an independently verifying Finality Sink. It also specifies crash-consistent journaling and reconciliation of indeterminate remote outcomes, keeping local consumption of authority distinct from completion of the external effect. Reference algorithms, six threat models, and twenty reproducible positive and negative tests are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document treats existing IETF mechanisms as qualified inputs rather than final authority: OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests and Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP); Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) for evidence encoding; Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT) signed statements; and HTTP conditional requests and redirects. It identifies discussion points for these groups and for Security Area dispatch, without claiming working-group adoption or IETF consensus. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Apple Intelligence, Siri, and App Intents; Google Android with Gemini, Intents, Binder, and Android Keystore; Samsung Bixby and Microsoft Copilot; Microsoft Windows and Azure; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Cloud, and Meta; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; API banking and digital signatures; Kubernetes and service meshes; telecommunications; and robotics. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), cross-committed, operation-level evidence and single-use consumption records can help providers and deployers address record- keeping, traceability, human-oversight, and robustness and cybersecurity requirements where those obligations apply; this is a technical mapping, not a conformity claim or legal advice.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T11:53:00Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 394,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 1.6,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-cross-platform-ai-interoperability",
   "title": "Secure AI Execution-Finality for iOS, Android, and Cross-Platform AI Agents, Part 2: Secure iOS and Android AI Tool Interoperability",
   "abstract": "AI assistants and third-party AI tools now act across the Apple and Google ecosystems. Apple Siri invokes app actions through App Intents and Shortcuts, Google Gemini acts through Android intents and app integrations, and agents from many vendors reach the same accounts from iOS, iPadOS, macOS, Android, Windows, Linux, cloud APIs, and connected devices. Each hop crosses a different permission, sandbox, credential, identity, and hardware trust model. A prompt-injected, replayed, or redirected tool call can then export a file, send a payment, change data, or operate a device in a way that differs from what the user approved, and app permissions, Keychain or Android Keystore credentials, and OAuth tokens do not by themselves prove that the executed operation matches the approved one. This document, Part 2 of a twelve-part series, specifies how to carry authority across platforms without letting a platform permission become final authority. Platform-specific adapters for iOS and Android translate qualified app, user, device, and key evidence into a protected canonical effect descriptor; the AI tool's proposed action remains non-effective; operation-scoped, non-bearer authorization resists replay and redirection; and the receiving Finality Sink independently reconstructs the actual pending operation, checks resource identity, aliases, and redirects, fences stale devices after cross-device handoff, and fails closed on any mismatch. Reference data models, pseudocode, a state machine, six threat models, and twenty reproducible validation tests are included. Part 1 of the series defines the shared terminology and common workflows. The document relates these mechanisms to OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests and Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP); Workload Identity in Multi-System Environments (WIMSE); Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS); CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE); Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE); Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust (SCITT); and HTTP redirection and conditional requests. It identifies discussion points for these groups and for Security Area dispatch, without claiming working-group adoption or IETF consensus. Industry alignment covers Apple iOS, iPadOS, and macOS with Siri, App Intents, and Shortcuts; Google Android with Intents, Binder, and Android Keystore; Google Gemini; Samsung Bixby; Microsoft Windows and Azure agent governance; agent platforms from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta; NVIDIA, Qualcomm, Arm, and Huawei hardware; and payments, telecommunications, and robotics. Product names are illustrative and imply no endorsement or implementation by any vendor. For the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), operation- level evidence and fail-closed cross-platform enforcement can help providers and deployers address risk-management, record-keeping, human-oversight, and robustness and cybersecurity requirements where those obligations apply; this is a technical mapping, not a conformity claim or legal advice.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T11:50:24Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 439,
   "relevant": 0.96,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rampalli-pedigree",
   "title": "PEDIGREE: Verifiable Delegation Identity for Agentic AI Systems",
   "abstract": "This document defines PEDIGREE (Per-Agent Delegation Identity with Governance-Enforced Execution), an identity and delegation framework for AI agents that extends the workload-identity model of SPIFFE (RFC 9542 / draft-ietf-wimse) with cryptographic per-hop delegation, monotonic scope attenuation enforced at mint and at verify, and dual- layer authority enforcement combining an operator-controlled ceiling with per-parent mandate narrowing. PEDIGREE complements AAuth (draft-hardt-aauth-protocol) and AIP (draft-prakash-aip) by providing: (a) dual-enforcement semantics absent from both, (b) Cedar-policy mandates with static-analysis proofs of narrowing, (c) strict cryptographic parent-token re- verification that catches parent-swap attacks missed by append-only token chains, and (d) a native bridge to existing SPIFFE deployments.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-26T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 12,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.54,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-26T12:18:02.717Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chueayen-attestation-receipts",
   "title": "Enforcement Attestation Receipts for AI Inference and Agent Action Decisions",
   "abstract": "This document specifies two compact JSON records, signed with Ed25519 and verifiable offline under a pinned public key. The first is an attestation receipt for an AI inference decision, binding an outcome to a request hash. The second, added in this revision, is an action record: the decision an enforcement point takes before an agent's proposed tool call or other state-changing action runs, whether that decision is to allow or to refuse. An action record is signed by the enforcement point, never by the agent, and binds the decision to a hash of the exact canonical arguments proposed. The document also describes how a human approval can be bound to exact action values with single use and expiry, how either record could be carried as a COSE_Sign1 Signed Statement and registered with a SCITT Transparency Service, and where the current format does not yet do so. Both formats are intended for settings where an operator-controlled log is not, on its own, sufficient evidence of the decision.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "05",
   "time": "2026-10-25T12:38:02Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 44,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.81,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-24T06:18:00.203Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-25T18:18:04.193Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-fluid-fadp",
   "title": "Fluid Agentic DeFi Protocol (FADP/1.0): HTTP-Native Micropayment Authentication for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Fluid Agentic DeFi Protocol (FADP), version 1.0. FADP is an application-layer protocol layered atop HTTP that enables autonomous AI agents to pay for access to web resources using on-chain cryptocurrency transfers, with cryptographic proof of payment embedded directly in HTTP headers. FADP extends HTTP 402 (Payment Required) with two new header fields: X-FADP-Required, which a server uses to communicate payment terms to an agent, and X-FADP-Proof, which an agent uses to supply a verifiable on-chain payment receipt. A nonce-challenge mechanism prevents proof replay. An optional verification endpoint allows third-party on-chain confirmation without requiring the verifying party to run blockchain infrastructure. FADP is designed for agent-to-server and agent-to-agent payment flows operating at sub-dollar granularity (micropayments), where credit- card or OAuth-based billing is impractical. The reference implementation targets USDC on Base (an Ethereum Layer 2), though the protocol is token- and chain-agnostic.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-25T07:09:06Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.78,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-25T12:18:01.245Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-25T12:18:01.245Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp",
   "title": "A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Audit Trails in Algorithmic Trading: The VeritasChain Protocol (VCP)",
   "abstract": "This document defines a profile of the SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust) architecture for creating tamper-evident audit trails of AI-driven algorithmic trading decisions and executions. The VeritasChain Protocol (VCP) applies the SCITT framework to address the specific requirements of financial markets, including high-precision timestamps, considerations arising from recordkeeping regimes such as the EU AI Act and MiFID II, and a crypto-shredding mechanism intended to support erasure obligations such as those under the GDPR. This profile specifies how VCP events are encoded as SCITT Signed Statements, registered with Transparency Services, and verified using COSE Receipts. It further defines SCITT conformance profiles for interoperability and an ERASURE event type that records crypto-shredding operations as append-only audit events. The profile makes trading records auditable and attributable after the fact; it does not prevent or block any trading activity, and it does not warrant the correctness of any recorded decision.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "05",
   "time": "2026-10-24T12:31:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 32,
   "relevant": 0.58,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.06,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-24T12:18:00.611Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-24T18:18:01.174Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-kamimura-scitt-refusal-events",
   "title": "Verifiable AI Refusal Events using SCITT",
   "abstract": "This document defines a claim set for recording AI content refusal events. The claim set specifies the semantic content and correlation rules for refusal audit trails, independent of any particular serialization format. The claims are designed to be carried within SCITT Signed Statements and verified using SCITT Receipts. This specification addresses claim semantics and verification requirements; it does not mandate a specific encoding. A CDDL definition is provided for CBOR-based implementations, and equivalent JSON representations are shown in an appendix for illustration. This specification provides auditability of logged refusal decisions. It does not define content moderation policies, classification criteria, or what AI systems should refuse.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-24T12:05:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 22,
   "relevant": 0.62,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.83,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-24T12:18:00.611Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-24T12:18:00.611Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-aevum-agentcard",
   "title": "AgentCard: A Framework-Neutral Identity and Capability Declaration Format for Agent-to-Agent Communication",
   "abstract": "This document defines AgentCard, a lightweight JSON data format that enables autonomous software agents to declare their identity, capabilities, communication endpoints, and resource pricing in a framework-neutral manner. AgentCard is designed for agent-to-agent (A2A) communication scenarios where agents built with different frameworks — such as LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, or custom implementations — must interoperate without prior coordination. An AgentCard is a pure data schema: it carries no execution logic and imposes no transport requirements. It is analogous to an HTTP response header set — a machine-parseable self-description that any compliant reader can interpret. Key properties of AgentCard include a globally unique ULID-based agent identity, dot-namespaced capability identifiers compatible with OpenAI function-calling and Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool schemas, a physics-grounded energy pricing floor derived from Landauer's principle, and an extensible metadata namespace for framework-specific annotations.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-24T07:09:07Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.69,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-24T12:18:00.611Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-24T12:18:00.611Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zehta-aipref-exclusions",
   "title": "AIPREF Vocabulary Exclusions",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an update to the AI preferences vocabulary [VOCAB] in order to establish protected uses (exclusions).",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-24T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 5,
   "relevant": 0.5,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.83,
   "centrality": 1.55,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-24T12:18:00.611Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-24T12:18:00.611Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-execution-finality-foundations",
   "title": "Execution-Finality Authority and Independent Validation for Autonomous Operations",
   "abstract": "This document describes a proposed execution-finality architecture for AI agents, delegated software, and networked services. A Candidate Act remains in a Non-Effective State until protected source-authority evidence and independent execution-time validation establish an operation-specific authorization context. A Finality Sink reconstructs the Actual Pending Operation at the relevant effectuation boundary, verifies correspondence with protected evidence and scoped non-bearer enablement, and withholds effects when required conditions are missing, changed, or consumed. The document examines authority preservation, cross-committed evidence, and fail- closed effectuation as implementation and interoperability concerns. This document is informational and does not specify an IETF-standard protocol. The foundational technical structure is described by the author as drawing on Algorithmic Logic Fingerprint (ALF-PCT), PCT/ IB2026/053385, and the execution-finality disclosure PCT/ IB2026/055615, filed on 4 June 2026 and subsequently published as WO 2026/150382, which the author identifies as containing approximately 300 distinct technical embodiments. The author also identifies 32 earlier Indian provisional patent filings as part of the broader related disclosure history. These materials are not represented as repetitive implementations of a single algorithm, and this statement does not establish claim coverage, validity, or priority entitlement; those matters depend on the individual as-filed documents. This document is one of three complementary parts of a single source specification dated 23 October 2026. These three Internet-Drafts are split for document-size and editorial manageability, not because their safety properties, definitions, or architectural prerequisites are independent. Reviewers are strongly requested to read all three drafts together, including their definitions and foundational security assumptions, before assessing conformance, security properties, or interoperability. The same source contains 40 detailed technical embodiments. This partition does not establish three distinct interoperable standards. Industry relevance: NVIDIA, Huawei, Google Cloud, Salesforce, AWS, Snowflake, Microsoft, Check Point, Palo Alto Networks, and SentinelOne publish agent, gateway, data-governance, or runtime security mechanisms of potential relevance to this document. The industry examples are contextual, not a claim of adoption, implementation equivalence, derivation, endorsement or patent coverage. See the detailed Industry Relevance and Interoperability Context section.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-23T14:27:57Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 1020,
   "relevant": 0.83,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.49,
   "centrality": 1.44,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T18:18:06.398Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T18:18:06.398Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-execution-finality-enforcement",
   "title": "Execution-Finality Enforcement, Protected State, and Delegated Operations",
   "abstract": "This document examines protected enforcement mechanisms for proposed consequential actions across AI-agent tools, distributed services, credentials, and resource state. It considers source-bounded delegation, operation descriptors, execution-time revalidation, protected consumption and replay prevention, multi-sink effects, and recovery where an external outcome is uncertain. An enforcing Finality Sink distinguishes authorization for an actual pending operation from a prior request approval or a reusable bearer credential. The document presents implementation points and deployment considerations, not a complete interoperable wire protocol or IETF consensus position. The foundational technical structure is described by the author as drawing on Algorithmic Logic Fingerprint (ALF-PCT), PCT/ IB2026/053385, and the execution-finality disclosure PCT/ IB2026/055615, filed on 4 June 2026 and subsequently published as WO 2026/150382, which the author identifies as containing approximately 300 distinct technical embodiments. The author also identifies 32 earlier Indian provisional patent filings as part of the broader related disclosure history. These materials are not represented as repetitive implementations of a single algorithm, and this statement does not establish claim coverage, validity, or priority entitlement; those matters depend on the individual as-filed documents. This document is one of three complementary parts of a single source specification dated 23 October 2026. These three Internet-Drafts are split for document-size and editorial manageability, not because their safety properties, definitions, or architectural prerequisites are independent. Reviewers are strongly requested to read all three drafts together, including their definitions and foundational security assumptions, before assessing conformance, security properties, or interoperability. The same source contains 40 detailed technical embodiments. This partition does not establish three distinct interoperable standards. Industry relevance: NVIDIA, Huawei, Google Cloud, Salesforce, AWS, Snowflake, Microsoft, Check Point, Palo Alto Networks, and SentinelOne publish agent, gateway, data-governance, or runtime security mechanisms of potential relevance to this document. The industry examples are contextual, not a claim of adoption, implementation equivalence, derivation, endorsement or patent coverage. See the detailed Industry Relevance and Interoperability Context section.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-23T14:26:42Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 1036,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.9,
   "centrality": 1.12,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T18:18:06.398Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T18:18:06.398Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-etcheverry-action-ref",
   "title": "Action Reference: A Deterministic Identifier for Agent Actions",
   "abstract": "This document defines \"action_ref\", a deterministic, content- addressed identifier for autonomous agent actions. Any party holding the four preimage fields (agent_id, action_type, scope, timestamp) can independently compute and verify the identifier without trusting the emitting system. The document specifies the derivation algorithm, canonical serialization using RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS), timestamp format requirements, canonical receipt envelope, optional fields for revocation and policy rotation auditability, scope conventions, and a composability model with existing exactly-once execution guarantees.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-23T10:38:58Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 23,
   "relevant": 0.75,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.95,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-sandbox-credential-egress-finality",
   "title": "Protected Execution Finality for Sandboxed AI Agents, Credential Mediation, Process Lineage, and Network Egress",
   "abstract": "This informational document describes future-oriented execution- finality profiles for sandboxed autonomous AI agents, protected host services, credential brokers, external connectors, process-lineage restrictions, proxy-mediated network egress, native resources, and downstream effectuation interfaces. It examines sandbox versus authority separation, protected credential use, destination binding after DNS resolution, operation-specific validation, influence tracking, bypass-path completeness, replay restrictions, recovery and independent sink verification. It distinguishes possession of sandbox or proxy permissions from authority for a particular actual resource effect. Source-derived procedures, tests and algorithms are presented as implementation examples, not as evidence that identified vendors implement this proposed architecture. Industry Relevance: Recent public developments in autonomous AI-agent security and execution governance include Microsoft Execution Containers (MXC), Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit ADR-0030 (Action-Bound, Fail-Closed Approval Protocol), and Project Perception; Google Agent Gateway and Gemini Agent; Meta Muse/Sentinel AI-Agent Security Architecture; NVIDIA OpenShell Reference Architecture and NVIDIA Sentry; OpenAI Agents API, Codex, Agents SDK, and Responses API; and Anthropic Claude Managed Agents, Claude Code Sandboxing, and Claude Code Auto Mode. These initiatives illustrate industry attention to agent isolation, independent policy enforcement, action-bound authorization, delegated authority, credential isolation, network-egress security, hardware-assisted containment, runtime supervision, and fail-closed controls. This draft describes related proposed execution-finality mechanisms without asserting that these initiatives implement them. Relevance to the IETF: the mechanisms described here require common, interoperable objects and verification semantics across independently built components, including operation descriptors, act-bound non- bearer capabilities, finality-sink verification results, validation evidence, and authority, revocation, and containment generations. The document relates to existing IETF work on OAuth, GNAP, RATS, WIMSE, and SCITT, and asks the community whether and where this effectuation-boundary problem should be addressed. This document is intentionally long and is not repetitive: each profile specifies a distinct mechanism with its own algorithms, failure cases, and enforcement points, and the security properties depend on how these mechanisms combine. A reduced excerpt would hide the conditions under which they fail closed, so this document and its two companion drafts, among which the profiles are divided, are meant to be evaluated as a whole. This draft builds on earlier Internet-Drafts by the same author, in particular draft-das-agent-execution-finality, and adds mechanism families not described there; the Introduction states precisely what was disclosed earlier and what is disclosed here. IPR: The technical content of this draft set is based upon the author's international application PCT/IB2026/055615, which forms the foundation of this disclosure and comprises approximately 300 distinct, non-repetitive embodiments and enforcement points. A separate patent application specific to the material in this draft set has also been filed. Related Indian applications: 202531130665, 202631000572, 202631001586, 202631002990, 202631124028, and 202631125689. Related international applications: PCT/IB2025/058316, PCT/IB2026/053385, PCT/IB2026/055615, PCT/IB2026/055760, PCT/ IB2026/055870, PCT/IB2026/056058, PCT/IB2026/056809, and PCT/ IB2026/056941. These identify related technical disclosures; not all described mechanisms are necessarily patent-claimed or granted, and patent scope and priority depend on applicable law and examination.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-23T08:40:22Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 582,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.63,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-kernel-hardware-execution-finality",
   "title": "Protected Execution-Finality Enforcement for Autonomous AI Agents Across Kernel, Hypervisor, Hardware, and Native-Resource Boundaries",
   "abstract": "This document describes a proposed execution-finality architecture for autonomous agent workloads at kernel, hypervisor, device, and native-resource effectuation boundaries. It distinguishes computation from authority to commit consequential effects, and documents protected validation, operation-bound evidence, scoped authorization, independent finality verification, revocation, and containment, alongside deployment profiles and illustrative algorithms and tests. Industry Relevance: Recent public developments in autonomous AI-agent security and execution governance include Microsoft Execution Containers (MXC), Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit ADR-0030 (Action-Bound, Fail-Closed Approval Protocol), and Project Perception; Google Agent Gateway and Gemini Agent; Meta Muse/Sentinel AI-Agent Security Architecture; NVIDIA OpenShell Reference Architecture and NVIDIA Sentry; OpenAI Agents API, Codex, Agents SDK, and Responses API; and Anthropic Claude Managed Agents, Claude Code Sandboxing, and Claude Code Auto Mode. These initiatives illustrate industry attention to agent isolation, independent policy enforcement, action-bound authorization, delegated authority, credential isolation, network-egress security, hardware-assisted containment, runtime supervision, and fail-closed controls. This draft describes related proposed execution-finality mechanisms without asserting that these initiatives implement them. Relevance to the IETF: the mechanisms described here require common, interoperable objects and verification semantics across independently built components, including operation descriptors, act-bound non- bearer capabilities, finality-sink verification results, validation evidence, and authority, revocation, and containment generations. The document relates to existing IETF work on OAuth, GNAP, RATS, WIMSE, and SCITT, and asks the community whether and where this effectuation-boundary problem should be addressed. This document is intentionally long and is not repetitive: each profile specifies a distinct mechanism with its own algorithms, failure cases, and enforcement points, and the security properties depend on how these mechanisms combine. A reduced excerpt would hide the conditions under which they fail closed, so this document and its two companion drafts, among which the profiles are divided, are meant to be evaluated as a whole. This draft builds on earlier Internet-Drafts by the same author, in particular draft-das-agent-execution-finality, and adds mechanism families not described there; the Introduction states precisely what was disclosed earlier and what is disclosed here. IPR: The technical content of this draft set is based upon the author's international application PCT/IB2026/055615, which forms the foundation of this disclosure and comprises approximately 300 distinct, non-repetitive embodiments and enforcement points. A separate patent application specific to the material in this draft set has also been filed. Related Indian applications: 202531130665, 202631000572, 202631001586, 202631002990, 202631124028, and 202631125689. Related international applications: PCT/IB2025/058316, PCT/IB2026/053385, PCT/IB2026/055615, PCT/IB2026/055760, PCT/ IB2026/055870, PCT/IB2026/056058, PCT/IB2026/056809, and PCT/ IB2026/056941. These identify related technical disclosures; not all described mechanisms are necessarily patent-claimed or granted, and patent scope and priority depend on applicable law and examination.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-23T08:34:54Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 483,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.37,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-distributed-agent-authority-finality",
   "title": "Distributed Authority and Execution-Finality for Multi-Agent Systems, Delegated Operations, and Cross-Domain Gateways",
   "abstract": "This informational document describes future-oriented distributed authority and execution-finality profiles for cooperating autonomous agents, delegated operations, external tools, cloud gateways, native resources, and cross-domain workflows. It examines identity, non- amplifying delegation, provenance and influence lineage, transitive side effects, cross-agent collision management, policy convergence and downstream effectuation-boundary enforcement. It distinguishes a proposed objective or authorized plan from authority for an actual resource effect. Source-derived procedures, tests and algorithms are presented as implementation examples, not as evidence that identified vendors implement this proposed architecture. Industry Relevance: Recent public developments in autonomous AI-agent security and execution governance include Microsoft Execution Containers (MXC), Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit ADR-0030 (Action-Bound, Fail-Closed Approval Protocol), and Project Perception; Google Agent Gateway and Gemini Agent; Meta Muse/Sentinel AI-Agent Security Architecture; NVIDIA OpenShell Reference Architecture and NVIDIA Sentry; OpenAI Agents API, Codex, Agents SDK, and Responses API; and Anthropic Claude Managed Agents, Claude Code Sandboxing, and Claude Code Auto Mode. These initiatives illustrate industry attention to agent isolation, independent policy enforcement, action-bound authorization, delegated authority, credential isolation, network-egress security, hardware-assisted containment, runtime supervision, and fail-closed controls. This draft describes related proposed execution-finality mechanisms without asserting that these initiatives implement them. Relevance to the IETF: the mechanisms described here require common, interoperable objects and verification semantics across independently built components, including operation descriptors, act-bound non- bearer capabilities, finality-sink verification results, validation evidence, and authority, revocation, and containment generations. The document relates to existing IETF work on OAuth, GNAP, RATS, WIMSE, and SCITT, and asks the community whether and where this effectuation-boundary problem should be addressed. This document is intentionally long and is not repetitive: each profile specifies a distinct mechanism with its own algorithms, failure cases, and enforcement points, and the security properties depend on how these mechanisms combine. A reduced excerpt would hide the conditions under which they fail closed, so this document and its two companion drafts, among which the profiles are divided, are meant to be evaluated as a whole. This draft builds on earlier Internet-Drafts by the same author, in particular draft-das-agent-execution-finality, and adds mechanism families not described there; the Introduction states precisely what was disclosed earlier and what is disclosed here. IPR: The technical content of this draft set is based upon the author's international application PCT/IB2026/055615, which forms the foundation of this disclosure and comprises approximately 300 distinct, non-repetitive embodiments and enforcement points. A separate patent application specific to the material in this draft set has also been filed. Related Indian applications: 202531130665, 202631000572, 202631001586, 202631002990, 202631124028, and 202631125689. Related international applications: PCT/IB2025/058316, PCT/IB2026/053385, PCT/IB2026/055615, PCT/IB2026/055760, PCT/ IB2026/055870, PCT/IB2026/056058, PCT/IB2026/056809, and PCT/ IB2026/056941. These identify related technical disclosures; not all described mechanisms are necessarily patent-claimed or granted, and patent scope and priority depend on applicable law and examination.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-23T08:29:18Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 1472,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hcf-bpm-agent-security-benchmark-profiles",
   "title": "Evaluation Profiles for AI Agent Security Assessment",
   "abstract": "This document defines evaluation profiles for the security assessment of AI agents. A profile fixes the System Under Test boundary and the scenario against which the metrics defined in [I-D.han-bpm-agent-security-benchmark-terminology] are applied, so that results obtained under different boundaries or scenarios are not compared without qualification. The document defines four infrastructure profiles, which correspond to the four component groups of an agent and to the four evaluation dimensions; six scenario profiles, which correspond to the agent types in scope; the input and output boundary specification that applies to all profiles; profile composition rules; and the minimum evaluation logging fields required by each profile. The metric definitions are the subject of [I-D.han-bpm-agent-security-benchmark-terminology], and the methods by which the metrics are exercised are the subject of [I-D.han-bpm-agent-security-benchmark-methodology].",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-23T07:45:48Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 46,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hcf-bpm-agent-security-benchmark-terminology",
   "title": "Benchmarking Terminology for AI Agent Security Evaluation",
   "abstract": "This document defines terminology for the security evaluation of AI agents. It establishes a shared vocabulary for four first-level evaluation dimensions -- Foundation Model Security, Interaction Security, Operational Security, and Basic Security -- for the 55 second-level evaluation metrics organized under those dimensions, for the common metric evaluation convention that applies to all of them, and for the three agent security risk levels. This document defines terminology only. It does not prescribe evaluation procedures; the procedures are specified in [I-D.han-bpm-agent-security-benchmark-methodology], and the System Under Test boundaries and evaluation scenarios are specified in [I-D.han-bpm-agent-security-benchmark-profiles].",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-23T07:21:49Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 51,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yang-dmsc-ioa-task-protocol",
   "title": "Internet of Agents Task Protocol (IoA Task Protocol) for Heterogeneous Agent Collaboration",
   "abstract": "This draft defines a new agent collaboration protocol, named the Internet of Agents Task Protocol (IoA Task Protocol), to support distributed, heterogeneous agent collaboration in intelligent systems. The IoA Task Protocol enables dynamic team formation, adaptive task coordination, and structured communication among agents with diverse architectures, tools, and knowledge sources. Through a layered architecture and extensible message format, it supports decentralized deployment across devices and can interoperate with existing frameworks. The protocol is particularly suited to large- scale intelligent collaboration scenarios—such as intelligent transportation, smart healthcare, and large-scale human–AI teaming—across heterogeneous network environments, including fixed networks, edge–cloud infrastructures, and emerging mobile networks such as 6G.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-23T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 14,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T12:18:08.834Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-substrate-observation",
   "title": "Substrate-Observation as an Alternative to Envelope Coordination for Concurrent Sessions",
   "abstract": "This memo describes a coordination-protocol anti-pattern observed in cross-tool agentic systems and a substrate-observation alternative that does not require negotiating a wire format between heterogeneous concurrent sessions of an identity-bound principal. The memo is Informational and proposes no protocol element for standardisation. It sets out what should not be standardised for this problem, and why, and identifies the existing substrate mechanisms that serve in its place. Companion memos describe the identity primitives this memo presumes.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-23T04:16:39Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.6,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.76,
   "centrality": 1.25,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-12T06:17:45.457Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T06:18:00.831Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zambo-aer1",
   "title": "AER-1: A Portable Execution Receipt for AI Agent Tool Calls",
   "abstract": "This document specifies AER-1, a small vocabulary for recording one AI agent tool call as a portable, independently checkable execution receipt. A receipt identifies the execution, records when it happened, preserves the canonical bytes used for the output commitment, names the tool and caller scope, carries a provenance class, and resolves at a stable public URL. The format separates what the system observed from claims about the outside world, and it separates provenance (who ran or reported the action) from the record itself. A reference implementation is deployed, and its receipts are publicly verifiable without an account or token. The specification covers workflow receipts, which bind an ordered sequence of step receipts to a single goal with a Merkle root over the step sequence, and hash-chained job timelines for tamper-evident sequencing of executions. This revision closes honesty and precision gaps: it adds the workflow-receipt truncation limit (new Section 8.4), normatively specifies the external anchor format and its verification procedure (rewritten Section 10, new Section 10.1), fixes a RECOMMENDED/MUST contradiction in Section 8.1, makes the Section 6 verification step testable, and documents replay, low-entropy, empty-record, and size- limit considerations. It changes no receipt field, digest construction, or existing verification rule. The -13 revision fixes a malformed sentence in the Abstract, three incorrect section cross- references, stale Table of Contents page numbers, a skipped footer page number, misaligned table rows, and chain version-string updates, and records two reported interoperability examples in Implementation Status; it changes no receipt field, digest construction, or verification rule. The -14 revision adds tamper-evident metadata binding (new Section 3.1; conditional metadata_hash for schema 0.4 and later), disambiguates the anchor receipt_id (Table 4), corrects the self-anchoring witnessing claim (Section 10), makes the Section 8.3 display rule a SHOULD with a byte-testable MUST, narrows the provenance attestation wording (Section 5), states the binding non-transfer rule normatively (new Section 10.2), pins anchored_digest to bare hex (Table 4), corrects the vector corpus counts, and adds normative disclosure of missing issuer authentication. It changes no existing receipt field, digest construction, or verification rule for schema 0.3 and earlier. The -15 revision narrows the Implementation Status wording for the reported interoperability examples at the implementer's request; it changes no receipt field, digest construction, or verification rule. The -16 revision documents the live workflow tools API (new Sections 8.5, 8.6, 8.7): the workflow_close tool, workflow metadata in step receipts, and the workflow view API. It changes no receipt field, digest construction, or existing verification rule. The -17 revision documents the recommended execution_context member (new Section 3.2): an optional, non-core structure for recording source and version context such as the model name and version behind a tool call and the identity of the source system acted upon. It changes no existing receipt field, digest construction, or verification rule. The -18 revision repairs the reference apparatus (normative references to RFC 3339, RFC 8259, RFC 4122, and RFC 4648, and the previously missing RFC 7942 entry), pins two parser edge cases (duplicate JSON member names and leap-second timestamps are rejected), names the Unicode normalization behavior in Section 4 with a computed vector pair, adopts the unknown-versus-not-applicable convention for optional members, adds optional members for readback outcomes, per-field provenance, negative records, reversal state, method descriptors, and payment references, completes the execution_context member set (model and environment digests), adds the optional input_hash commitment (Section 3.3), permits SCITT and RFC 3161 anchors under Section 10, states the clock-trus",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "26",
   "time": "2026-10-23T01:10:55Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 54,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.96,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T06:18:00.831Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rapp-ammp",
   "title": "The Agent Mediated Messaging Protocol (AMMP)",
   "abstract": "The Agent Mediated Messaging Protocol (AMMP) is a wire contract, carried over a filesystem namespace, between an untrusted per-agent connector and a trusted, credentialed, store-and-forward messaging runtime. It gives a sandboxed AI agent the ability to send and receive messages (email, and under an optional profile, messages to other agents) through a runtime that does not trust it: every outbound message begins as an inert request file that the runtime copies into private staging, validates independently, and applies policy to before anything is transmitted, and every inbound message is authenticated and screened by the runtime before a notice describing it appears in the agent's namespace. This document specifies the directory layout and its filesystem obligations — ownership, write and delete rights, and the path, symlink, and concurrency discipline a runtime observes; the JSON message shapes for submit requests, results, deliver notices, spooled message bodies, and an optional binding record; the correlation and versioning rules, including a direction-aware unknown-member tolerance rule; and two conformance classes. An optional profile gives agent-to-agent traffic within one principal its own tree, and specifies how a Runtime signs and verifies that traffic when it travels between hosts as mail. AMMP is deliberately not a mail protocol: it neither defines nor replaces SMTP, IMAP, or provider-side infrastructure, and composes with them rather than displacing them. Its single design center is that no security property depends on the agent — or on the connector speaking for it — behaving correctly.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-23T00:22:18Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 147,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.91,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-23T06:18:00.831Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-23T06:18:00.831Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dembowski-agentledger-proof-of-behavior",
   "title": "Proof-of-Behavior Protocol for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents execute actions — file writes, API calls, shell commands — on behalf of human principals. No standard mechanism exists for a third party to verify that an agent acted within its declared behavioral rules, that policy enforcement occurred before execution (not after), or that the action log has not been tampered with after the fact. This document defines the Proof-of-Behavior (PoB) protocol: a minimal, language-agnostic standard for tamper-evident audit trails and pre-execution policy enforcement in AI agent systems. The protocol specifies a signed receipt format, a hash-chain linking scheme, a policy gate contract, and a cross-agent reference mechanism.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-22T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-22T12:18:10.157Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-22T12:18:10.157Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-mcp-tool-surface-names-registry",
   "title": "An IANA Registry for Model Context Protocol Tool Surface Names",
   "abstract": "This document requests the establishment of an IANA registry for Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool surface names. A tool surface name is the wire-level identifier by which a client invokes a typed capability on an MCP server. This document establishes the registry mechanism so that specifications can register names without restating the registry's structure or registration procedure. The registry uses the Specification Required policy of RFC 8126, with a Designated Expert pool. Initial contents are four surface names drawn from a companion specification of policy provision over MCP, one registered as Active and three as Provisional. Vendor-prefix conventions are recommended but not mandated.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-22T05:02:34Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 11,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.61,
   "centrality": 1.24,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-10T18:17:54.804Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-22T06:18:03.460Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision",
   "title": "Policy Provision and Governance Inheritance from an Organisational Identity Substrate",
   "abstract": "This memo specifies how an artificial-intelligence agent runtime, bound at instantiation to a principal identity handle, resolves at session initialisation a target organisational identity substrate from a manifest source bound to the runtime's working context and retrieves from that substrate a typed policy stack comprising a handbook artefact, a standard-operating-procedure registry pointer, an enforcement-gate specification, and an audit-signal ingestion endpoint. The policy stack is then applied as runtime constraints on subsequent tool invocations, with audit signals emitted back to the same substrate. Policy provision occurs in the same act of session initialisation as principal identification, rather than as a separate ceremony against a side-channel governance plane. A principal concurrently bound to multiple organisational substrates operates the runtime under a deterministic composition of the several policy stacks. A cross-organisational residual conflict suspends the conflicting action, and is resolved through the peer-protocol Identity Accord ceremony only where the principal discloses each binding to the other, never through a meta-federation authority. The memo is Informational. The wire surface relies on the DNS-based discovery of draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery and the handle namespace of draft-morrison-identity-pronouns; no new transport is introduced.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "06",
   "time": "2026-10-22T05:01:50Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 24,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.47,
   "centrality": 1.93,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-22T06:18:03.460Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhao-rtgwg-agentic-systems",
   "title": "A Framework for Network- and Compute-Aware Cross-Domain Agentic Systems",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems can carry out tasks using agents, model services, data services, tools, and computing environments distributed across sites and administrative domains. Dependencies among these components create communication and computing requirements that may evolve during execution. Whether a proposed collaboration can satisfy those requirements depends on network connectivity and performance, computing capacity and readiness, data and model locality, and the policies governing resource use and data movement. This document describes a framework for cross-domain agentic collaboration that accounts for task dependencies and the network and computing conditions affecting communication and execution. It outlines the roles and interactions of agents and their runtimes, infrastructure information functions, and resource-management functions. The framework relates task dependencies to communication and computing requirements, with consideration of execution locations, data movement, and constraints spanning dependent activities. It discusses the use of appropriately scoped domain information to assess alternative combinations of agents, services, and tools, together with the abstraction and updating of that information under partial visibility and independent domain policies. The framework also addresses adaptation to evolving dependencies and infrastructure conditions, including information overhead and the stability of decisions in large agent populations.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-21T09:32:38Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 22,
   "relevant": 0.73,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.77,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-21T12:18:02.911Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-21T12:18:02.911Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-ni-a2a-ai-agent-security-requirements",
   "title": "Security Requirements for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document discusses security requirements for AI agents, covering different stages of security interactions. These include provisioning, registration, discovery, cross-domain interconnection, and access control.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-21T09:16:09Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.85,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.42,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-21T12:18:02.911Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-21T12:18:02.911Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sharif-openid-agent-identity",
   "title": "OpenID Connect Agent Identity Claims for Autonomous AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This specification defines a profile of OpenID Connect Core 1.0 that enables Identity Providers (IdPs) to issue identity tokens for autonomous software agents. It introduces a set of standard claims for representing agent identity, ownership, trust posture, authorised capabilities, and compliance screening status within OpenID Connect ID Tokens. The profile is designed to operate within existing OpenID Connect infrastructure without requiring modifications to the core protocol. It defines how Relying Parties (RPs) validate agent tokens and enforce graduated access controls based on agent trust levels and sanctions screening results.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-21T08:54:41Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 3,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-21T12:18:02.911Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-21T12:18:02.911Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-feng-nmrg-ain-deployment",
   "title": "Agentic Intent Network (AIN): Applicability and Deployment Scenarios",
   "abstract": "The Agentic Intent Network (AIN) architecture defines a routing-based coordination substrate for open, heterogeneous, Internet-scale multi- agent systems. This document describes applicability and deployment scenarios for AIN, targeting decision-makers in carrier networks, enterprises, and network equipment vendors. It maps the technical mechanisms defined in [AIN-ARCH] to concrete operational contexts, describes migration paths from existing infrastructure, and discusses the cold-start bootstrapping challenge inherent to network-effect- dependent systems. This document does not define new protocol mechanisms; it is intended to inform deployment planning and expand the AIN reader community beyond protocol engineers.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-21T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.69,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-21T12:18:02.911Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-21T12:18:02.911Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zhang-dawn-agent-discovery-framework",
   "title": "A Framework for Agent Discovery in DAWN",
   "abstract": "This document describes a two-layer reference architecture for discovering the minimum public information needed to reach AI agents. The Local Discovery Plane obtains discovery information within an administrative domain through mDNS/DNS-SD or infrastructure-assisted discovery. For cross-domain discovery, the Federation Plane uses publication of policy-approved information in authoritative DNS zones and on-demand resolution as its baseline; Federation Gateways apply export policy and validate and cache accepted results. The document also identifies optional functions that may complement this baseline where DNS publication and request-driven resolution do not meet deployment needs: recipient-specific sharing, proactive or multi-hop dissemination, and trusted aggregated directory queries. In mixed- mode deployments, DNS may bootstrap an endpoint that provides one of these additional functions.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "09",
   "time": "2026-10-21T02:34:02Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 37,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.89,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-21T06:18:00.641Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-narvaneni-agent-uri",
   "title": "The agent URI Scheme and Verifiable Agent Identity",
   "abstract": "Software agents increasingly act on the Internet on behalf of people and organizations: they call APIs, browse websites, and delegate work to other agents. Protocols such as A2A and MCP define how agents communicate, but there is no interoperable way to answer a prior question: _which agent is this, and how can its claims be verified?_ This document defines the agent URI scheme as a stable, human- readable identifier for an agent, a deterministic mapping from that identifier to an HTTPS-hosted Agent Identity Document, anchoring of the agent's keys to a web origin or a Decentralized Identifier, and signed statements that bind the agent to its protocol metadata. It also defines profiles that let an agent prove its identity on HTTP requests, building on HTTP Message Signatures for automated traffic, and that let short-lived agent instances act under the agent's identity using the WIMSE Workload Identity Token format. It deliberately does not define how agents communicate, describe their capabilities, or are invoked.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-20T14:58:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-20T12:18:06.481Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-20T18:18:44.041Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chen-oauth-agent-intent-token",
   "title": "The Intent Token - A Credential for Delegated User Intent",
   "abstract": "In the scenario of AI agent authorization, how to ensure that a user's high-level, natural-language intent is correctly and safely converted into low-level, specific authorization grants. A misunderstanding or malicious interpretation during this translation can lead to significant security vulnerabilities. This document introduces the \"Intent Token,\" a new type of security token designed to bridge this semantic gap. The Intent Token is a signed credential that immutably captures the user's original intent. It decouples the act of granting an intent from the act of issuing specific access tokens. A client presents this Intent Token to an Authorization Server, which acts as a trusted intermediary. The Authorization Server's responsibility is to interpret the user's stated intent and, based on its policies, issue narrowly-scoped, short-lived access tokens for specific resources, thereby ensuring the principle of least privilege is upheld throughout the process.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-19T20:05:44Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.53,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-20T00:18:01.407Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-20T00:18:01.407Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-singh-rajput-rnp",
   "title": "Rizz Negotiation Protocol (RNP) Version 1.0",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Rizz Negotiation Protocol (RNP), version 1.0 -- a domain-configurable, machine-readable protocol governing autonomous AI-to-AI negotiation across any structured decision context. RNP defines a finite action space, a bounded round-based state machine, a Competitive Pressure Mechanism (CPM) for multi- thread simultaneity, a Context Layer for real-time situational intelligence, a Feedback Layer for continuous master data improvement, and a Loopback Learning Pipeline that trains agent models from observed outcomes. The protocol is domain-configurable: the same state machine and message envelope operate across commerce, logistics, task allocation, priority queuing, procurement, SLA negotiation, and rewards domains. RNP was first deployed in production within the Rizzentials platform (commerce domain) and is designed for enterprise integration with platforms such as SAP, Salesforce, and Atlassian Jira.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-19T18:57:50Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 16,
   "relevant": 0.76,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-20T00:18:01.407Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-20T00:18:01.407Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-foroughi-agent-protocol-dimensions",
   "title": "A Dimensional Model for Characterizing AI Agent Protocol Proposals and Their Substrates",
   "abstract": "Discussions about agent protocols are frequently muddied by overloaded terms; asks such as \"we need a session protocol\" or \"we need cross-domain support\" bundle several distinct concerns across transport, agent protocol, and orchestration layers. This document offers a dimensional model that routes each concern to its proper layer. The document defines a small set of protocol-visible dimensions for characterizing AI agent protocol interactions and applies them to representative agentic protocol proposals (A2A, MCP, the ACP invocation surface of the AGNTCY stack, and AGTP) alongside their substrate bindings, making explicit which dimensions each proposal owns at the protocol layer and which it inherits from its substrate. The document does not rank proposals and does not prescribe an architecture. It is standalone: it neither depends on nor prescribes any use-case or requirements document.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-19T16:16:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 24,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-19T18:18:04.806Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-19T18:18:04.806Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-burls-mtac",
   "title": "Merkle Tree Agent Certificates (MTAC): A Merkle Tree Certificates Profile for AI Agent Identity",
   "abstract": "This document profiles Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC) for the identity of AI agents. An MTAC certificate is an MTC whose subject is one AI agent instance, named by a workload identifier in a URI subject alternative name, so that it is also a Workload Identity Certificate. It carries a mandatory non-critical extension naming the sponsor the CA recorded as accountable for the agent, and two optional ones: scopes declared for the agent at issuance, and the model and configuration components the agent is issued for, each graded by how the CA came to record it. The document also defines an audit cosigner role and a procedure by which an auditor, possibly without network access and possibly long after issuance, can establish that a certificate was issued and logged and what it declared. An MTAC certificate identifies an agent. It does not authorize the agent to do anything, and it does not record what the agent did. Records of agent actions can be expressed as signed statements in a transparency service that refer to an MTAC certificate as the acting party.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-19T09:32:57Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 50,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-19T12:18:04.679Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-19T12:18:04.679Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-swarmspeak-handshake",
   "title": "The SwarmSpeak Handshake Protocol, Version 1.1",
   "abstract": "AI agents are becoming some of the biggest users of the Internet. A site today has no neutral way to tell a good agent from a bot. The site sees either an anonymous request it cannot trust, or a request carrying a long-lived credential it cannot check. The result is blunt blocking on one side and unchecked abuse on the other. This document defines the SwarmSpeak Handshake, a protocol that lets an AI agent present a short-lived, narrowly scoped, signed statement of who it acts for and what it is allowed to do, and lets a site verify that statement cheaply before serving the request. The agent proves authority with a principal-signed capability certificate, a short-lived directory-signed status proof, and an HTTP Message Signature. The site sees only a per-origin pseudonym for the agent, never a global tracking identifier. Every completed session at a handshake-accepting site produces an itemized receipt, and receipted sessions are recorded in an append-only audit log. This is an individual submission. It is not a product of any IETF working group, it has not been reviewed by any IETF working group, and it does not represent IETF consensus. It is published to invite review and to record prior art for the shapes defined here: the capability certificate, the per-origin certificate view, the short-lived status proof, and the receipt.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-19T08:07:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 42,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.37,
   "centrality": 1.92,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-19T12:18:04.679Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-19T12:18:04.679Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gaip-act-receipt",
   "title": "The Agent Act Receipt: a signed, chained record of an agent's act",
   "abstract": "Software agents act for people: they buy, book, cancel, agree, deliver, refuse, tell, ask, read and check. Each payment rail, marketplace and assistant keeps its own record of those acts, held by that party. The person the agent acted for has no record of their own. This document describes the Agent Act Receipt: one entry per act, written by the agent as digests bound to a continuity handle, signed by a running transparency service, placed in a hash chain and covered by dated anchors, with a COSE_Sign1 form of the signature and a signed export (the switch pack) the person can take to another agent. The format is published by GAIP, which runs one such service. This document makes no claim of trust, certification or adoption: a receipt shows that the service's key signed a digest at a stated time, and nothing about the act itself.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-18T15:41:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 14,
   "relevant": 0.73,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-18T18:18:04.302Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-18T18:18:04.302Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hood-independent-agis",
   "title": "Agentic Grammar and Interface Specification (AGIS)",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Agentic Grammar and Interface Specification (AGIS), a grammar-constrained interface definition language for Agentive APIs designed for consumption by large language model (LLM) based agents. AGIS establishes structural and semantic rules governing how API methods and endpoints must be expressed, without mandating a fixed vocabulary of method names. An implementation conforming to AGIS uses intent-expressing imperative verbs as method identifiers, enabling agents to infer operational meaning from method names without requiring training on a predefined catalog. AGIS is the native interface definition layer for the Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP) [AGTP], in the same way that HTML functions as the native content language for the HTTP transport protocol. AGIS does not replace JSON Schema [JSON-SCHEMA] for data contracts; it governs the structural grammar of method and endpoint design that wraps those contracts. AGIS-conformant methods are accepted at the AGTP transport layer via the Method-Grammar header without requiring prior IANA registration, enabling organizations to define domain-specific Agentive API vocabularies while preserving interoperability through shared grammatical constraints. Empirical validation of the core AGIS design principle is provided in [HOOD2026], which demonstrates a 10-29 percentage point accuracy advantage for intent-expressing method names over generic HTTP verbs across three frontier LLM families in 7,200 controlled trials. This version also introduces: normative YAML and JSON serialization formats; a Data Manifest block enabling services to declare available data without pre-built endpoints; a negotiable signal enabling AGTP dynamic endpoint instantiation; semantic declaration enhancements including is_idempotent, impact_tier, parameter_hints, and state_transition fields; vocabulary namespace disambiguation; and an HTTP transitional binding for incremental adoption.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-18T07:09:07Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 50,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-18T12:18:05.566Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-18T12:18:05.566Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-hood-agtp-standard-methods",
   "title": "AGTP Standard Extended Method Vocabulary",
   "abstract": "The Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP) defines a core method vocabulary (Tier 1) of twelve intent-based methods covering the most common agent operations. This document defines the Tier 2 Standard Extended Method Vocabulary: methods registered in the IANA AGTP Method Registry that are available for use in any AGTP implementation but are not required for baseline compliance. Methods are organized into six categories reflecting the full operational range of AI agent systems: ACQUIRE, COMPUTE, TRANSACT, INTEGRATE, COMMUNICATE, and ORCHESTRATE. This document also specifies the QUOTE method referenced in the AGTP core specification for pre-flight resource cost estimation. The six-category taxonomy is aligned with the ACTION framework described in [AGENTIC-API]. All methods defined in this document conform to the Agentic Grammar and Interface Specification (AGIS) [AGIS]. Each method satisfies the AGIS action-intent semantic class requirement and syntactic rules. This document serves as a reference vocabulary of AGIS-conformant methods for organizations seeking maximum cross-system interoperability. Organizations requiring domain-specific vocabularies not covered here may define their own AGIS-conformant methods without IANA registration using the Tier 4 grammar-based validation pathway defined in [AGTP].",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-18T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 51,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-18T12:18:05.566Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-18T12:18:05.566Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mccormack-ztip",
   "title": "The Zero Trust Intelligence Protocol (ZTIP): Governed, Independently Verified AI Agent Transactions",
   "abstract": "The Zero Trust Intelligence Protocol (ZTIP) is an open, transport- neutral protocol for governed AI agent transactions. It defines five immutable JSON envelope types and a transaction lifecycle under which every agent-initiated action is authorized by policy before execution, integrity-protected by hash over a canonical form, and -- distinctively -- verified as complete by an authority independent of the actor that performed the work. An executor's claim of success is treated as attestation, and attestation alone never satisfies a required verification check. This revision states what integrity verification does not establish, and specifies the fail-closed rules an implementation MUST apply when it verifies a set of envelopes together, so that a verification report can never claim more than was actually checked. This document describes ZTIP version 1.0-draft for the record; the full specification, JSON Schemas, examples, and a reference runtime are maintained in the open at the repository referenced herein.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-18T01:45:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.59,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-18T06:18:00.694Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-18T06:18:00.694Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-khandelwal-bmwg-agent-memory-integrity",
   "title": "A Benchmarking Method for the Integrity of AI Agent Memory at Rest",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly persist memory across sessions and treat that memory, on the next turn, as if it were their own prior experience. This document defines a benchmarking method that measures whether an agent's memory subsystem detects that its persisted memory has been altered, removed, reordered, replayed, or forged at the storage layer, and refuses to serve that memory or reports it before it is served. The method defines nine storage-level edits, three verdict classes, a detection-point distinction between read time and audit time, three control cases, and a scoring rule. It is a laboratory method for controlled, reproducible measurement, in the spirit of RFC 2544 and RFC 8239, and it is intended as a test method for the \"Protection of Memory Data Integrity\" metric under discussion in the Benchmarking Methodology Working Group. This revision adds a ninth edit, rollback of the whole store to an older genuine copy, which separates an integrity head kept beside the records from one anchored outside the store; reports the method's results as thirty-one rows on released memory subsystems, eighteen of which claim tamper evidence; and describes the machine-readable record in which a result set is published so that an unrelated party can recompute it.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-17T15:02:31Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 18,
   "relevant": 0.74,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.86,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T18:17:32.343Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-17T18:18:05.417Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-liu-mcguinness-oauth-bounded-work",
   "title": "OAuth 2.0 Bounded Work Authorization",
   "abstract": "OAuth 2.0 provides mechanisms for requesting and granting access, constraining access tokens, and managing their lifecycle. It does not define a common way to identify the work a user approved and to associate that work's bounds and termination with the credentials issued for it. When an AI agent acts on a user's behalf, that work is what most needs governing: the agent's authority should come from the approval of a bounded piece of work, should stay within the bounds the user approved, and should end when the work is done or the user withdraws it. This document presents a use case in which a user withdraws an agent's approved work and the agent's further operations are denied, and identifies the semantics that independently implemented clients, Authorization Servers, and Resource Servers need to share to deliver that outcome. It then describes a framework for approved bounded work, built on three objects: a bounded work proposal, the governing authorization established when it is approved, and approval evidence, a durable record of the authorization decision and the approved bounds. Credentials issued for the work are associated with the governing authorization, and ending the authorization has defined consequences for further issuance and, within a stated acceptance window, for resource access. This version specifies no wire formats and requests no IANA actions. It is a direction-setting document: its goal is agreement on the problem and the conceptual model, with details left to subsequent revisions and working group discussion.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-17T13:25:30Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 36,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.04,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-17T18:18:05.417Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-17T18:18:05.417Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-shah-agent-readiness-evaluation",
   "title": "A Standards-Grounded Method for Evaluating Website Agent-Readiness",
   "abstract": "This document defines a method for evaluating the \"agent-readiness\" of a website: a measure of how well the site supports autonomous AI agents and generative-search crawlers that consume it without a human in the loop. The method is grounded entirely in published standards. It organizes observable server behavior into four evaluation pillars, each mapped to specific IETF RFCs and W3C specifications covering agent discoverability, semantic entity grounding, content efficiency and ingestion, and transport. From the per-pillar observations it derives a single deterministic weighted score between 0 and 100. The score formula and its pillar weights are a reproducible scoring convention defined by this document; they are a measurement convention and are not themselves a standard. The method is diagnostic: it observes and reports conformance to existing specifications and changes no protocol. It is a measurement method, not a new protocol and not an enforcement mechanism. Community and vendor conventions that are not standards are observed only as supplementary signals and are clearly identified as such. A running reference implementation that performs these checks exists and is referenced as running code.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-17T08:12:10Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 17,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.78,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-17T12:18:05.193Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-17T12:18:05.193Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-chang-delta1-settlement",
   "title": "Delta-1: A SCITT Profile for Binary Settlement Receipts in Agentic AI Accountability",
   "abstract": "This document defines Delta-1, a profile of the SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust) architecture applied to AI agent decision accountability. Delta-1 specializes the SCITT receipt model for a specific use case: proving that an individual AI decision met three accountability conditions simultaneously: C1: Evidence of the decision process was consumed and sealed. C2: Strategic intent was isolated from inference providers. C3: An authorized party recorded the settlement. The verdict is binary (VALID or INVALID) with no intermediate states. Receipts are independently verifiable without the issuing infrastructure being online, subject to the trust and attestation assumptions defined in this document. By building on the SCITT framework, Delta-1 inherits transparency-log semantics, receipt conventions, and verification patterns, while extending them with domain-specific requirements for AI decision closure. This profile is intended for regulated industries, including finance, healthcare, and legal, operating under accountability and record- retention obligations.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-17T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 18,
   "relevant": 0.84,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-17T12:18:05.193Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-17T12:18:05.193Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nivalto-agentroa-route-authorization",
   "title": "Agent Route Origin Authorization (AgentROA): A Cryptographic Policy Enforcement Framework for AI Agent Actions",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Agent Route Origin Authorization (AgentROA) framework, a cryptographic policy enforcement model for governing the actions of autonomous AI agents. AgentROA introduces three core protocol objects: the Agent Route Origin Authorization (ROA) envelope, the Agent Route Attestation (ARA) per-hop receipt, and the Agent Execution Receipt (AER). Together these objects enable: (1) cryptographic binding of an agent's authorized action scope to a signed policy envelope at session initialization, (2) per-hop attestation across multi-agent delegation chains with monotonic scope-narrowing semantics (no policy envelope may be expanded by a downstream delegation), and (3) cryptographic receipts produced intrinsically by the enforcement decision at each capability invocation boundary. The framework is modeled on the BGP Route Origin Authorization (ROA) concept from RPKI (RFC 6480) applied to the AI agent execution domain. The Border Gateway enforcement model positions a cryptographic enforcement process at a capability invocation boundary — external to the agent's execution context — reducing the risk that governance decisions are influenced by the governed agent by placing enforcement in a separate process boundary. The Border Gateway model is topology-independent: it may be deployed as a protocol- specific proxy in front of Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, as a service mesh enforcement component covering all inter-service calls, as a network egress gateway covering all outbound capability invocations regardless of protocol, or as a domain-specific execution boundary. The protocol objects defined herein function identically across all deployment topologies. This document establishes the architectural model, protocol object schemas, and enforcement semantics for the AgentROA framework.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-17T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 38,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-17T12:18:05.193Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-17T12:18:05.193Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-senarath-a2wp",
   "title": "Agent-to-Wallet Protocol for Digital Credentials (A2WP)",
   "abstract": "AI Agents acting for people and organizations meet credential offers and presentation requests, for example when a website asks the Agent to prove an attribute before it continues. An AI Agent can be misled by the content it processes, so it should not possess credentials or keys, or decide what to disclose. This document defines the Agent-to-Wallet Protocol (A2WP), with which an AI Agent passes such an offer or request to a Wallet exactly as it received it. The Wallet decides whether to act, obtains approval when needed, and performs the issuance or presentation with the Issuer or Verifier. The AI Agent learns the outcome and receives any continuation the Issuer or Verifier returns, so it can resume its task. Credentials, presentations and keys never reach the AI Agent.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-17T04:05:51Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 14,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.81,
   "centrality": 1.93,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-17T06:18:01.188Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-17T06:18:01.188Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-koenig-idmandat-credential",
   "title": "A Machine-Readable Credential for the Agents of a Company (ID MANDAT)",
   "abstract": "Automated software agents increasingly act for companies: they ask for quotes, book appointments and place orders. A recipient can verify, for example with Web Bot Auth, that a request was signed by the holder of a key. That does not tell the recipient which company stands behind the agent or what the agent is allowed to do on its behalf. This document describes a small credential file that a company publishes on its own domain under /.well-known/idmandat.json, a DNS TXT record that links the file to the domain, and the answer format of a public registry that checks both and reports the result in a digitally signed response. The credential states, by declaration of the company, which agents act for it and what each agent may and may not do. It does not make claims about creditworthiness, trustworthiness or quality.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-16T19:38:56Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 9,
   "relevant": 0.63,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.83,
   "centrality": 1.88,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-17T00:18:02.220Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-17T00:18:02.220Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-agent-execution-finality",
   "title": "Protected Execution-Finality Architecture for AI and Autonomous Systems: Act-Bound Capabilities and Effectuation-Boundary Verification",
   "abstract": "This document describes a proposed protected execution-finality architecture for artificial-intelligence agents, autonomous software systems, confidential computing environments, and distributed execution infrastructures. The architecture addresses a fundamental security distinction: the ability of an AI agent or computational process to generate, prepare, or request an operation does not independently establish the protected authority required to make that operation effective. The proposed architecture separates the computation plane from protected execution authority through mandatory operation interception, Non-Effective State staging, machine-verifiable Candidate Act Descriptors, a Protected Enforcement Domain (PED), protected authorization-state management, scoped non-bearer execution capabilities, and Finality Sink verification. A Candidate Act remains non-effective until the applicable authority, purpose, destination, execution scope, runtime context, policy epoch, freshness, revocation, and other mandatory authorization predicates have been validated. Where required, protected validation evidence is committed before, or atomically with, capability availability. The designated Finality Sink independently verifies the capability against the actual operation and applicable protected state immediately before permitting the governed consequential effect. The architecture addresses AI-agent sandbox isolation, mandatory and non-bypassable mediation, out-of-process permission authorities, executable-specific access restrictions, network and API egress enforcement, destination resolution, redirect consistency, credential brokering, protected credential substitution, privileged connectors, human and developer approval, runtime policy modification, multi- agent delegation, taint and provenance-based authorization, and fail- closed execution control. For technical discoverability and independent architectural examination, related publicly documented industry systems include Meta Muse/Sentinel and NVIDIA OpenShell, NemoClaw, and the Open Agent Safety Platform/Sentry. Relevant engineering terminology includes Muse Secure VM, isolated runtime cells, host-side permission authority, forward proxies, surrogate credentials, just-in-time credential insertion, eBPF/LSM-based taint propagation, controlled network egress, executable-specific policy enforcement, developer- approved policy changes, and hardware-assisted monitoring through SmartNICs, data processing units, BlueField, and DOCA. These references identify relevant public engineering contexts and functional security objectives; they do not establish that the named systems implement the complete architecture described here. The principal technical distinction examined in this document concerns the relationship between an upstream permission decision and independently enforceable authority at the actual effectuation boundary. The proposed execution-finality sequence includes protected validation of a concrete Candidate Act, required protected- state handling, validation-evidence commitment, operation-bound capability release, and mandatory verification of that capability by the applicable Finality Sink. The architecture distinguishes conventional permission checking, credential isolation, model- computation admission, and post-event monitoring or quarantine from the separate authorization conditions required before an externally consequential operation becomes effective. The document further describes enforcement across network gateways, host operating systems, credential-release interfaces, service meshes, autonomous code-deployment systems, confidential virtual machines, protected storage, database commitments, accelerator fabrics, DMA/RDMA transfers, SmartNICs, DPUs, hardware Finality Latches, and receiving-side execution boundaries. It addresses protected state consumption, capability replay prevention, policy- version fencing, distributed revocation, hardware attestation, worklo",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-16T08:39:38Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 1074,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.66,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-16T12:17:42.684Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-16T12:17:42.684Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-milan-agent-decision-commitment",
   "title": "Agent Decision Commitments for Payments",
   "abstract": "Software agents increasingly select and initiate payments on behalf of people and organizations. Existing agent payment protocols record what a principal authorized and that value moved, but not what information the agent relied on when it chose. This document defines the Agent Decision Commitment (ADC): a salted hash commitment to a decision record that identifies the content the agent provided to the model interface (after any agent-side transformation), the model calls made, and the resulting answer and action. The commitment is carried as a single selectively disclosable claim in an existing payment mandate or payment payload and is, by default, registered with a transparency service before the payment is authorized. The decision record and its content remain with the holder and are disclosed only to dispute participants, who can verify them against the mandate and the transparency service and can inspect the content the agent provided to the model. This document defines the data model, the commitment and anchoring procedures, a disclosure and verification procedure that reports attestation levels rather than verdicts, and bindings to three agent payment protocols and to account-to-account credit transfers. It also defines a witnessed reciprocal exchange by which two parties' agents evidence what passed between them: the receiver signs over the committed bytes, independent witnesses fix the time of each step, a failure to answer by a deadline is recorded, and arbiters resolve stalled exchanges.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-15T05:43:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 56,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-15T06:17:46.553Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-15T06:17:46.553Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zm-rtgwg-mcp-network-measurement",
   "title": "MCP-based Network Measurement Framework: Using Model Context Protocol for Intelligent Network Measurement",
   "abstract": "This document proposes a framework for intelligent network measurement using the Model Context Protocol (MCP). By treating network devices as MCP servers, and treating network controllers, management systems, or network devices with LLM capability as MCP clients, this framework enables natural language-driven, AI-assisted network measurement operations. The framework leverages MCP's standardized communication protocol to provide real-time network performance monitoring, intelligent fault diagnosis, topology discovery, and automated measurement workflows. This document describes the architecture, use cases, and security considerations for implementing MCP-based network measurement systems.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-14T12:24:54Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.87,
   "centrality": 1.71,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zm-rtgwg-mcp-troubleshooting",
   "title": "Using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) for Intent-Based Network Troubleshooting Automation",
   "abstract": "The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open standard that enables Large Language Model (LLM) applications to seamlessly integrate with external data sources and tools by exposing Resources, Prompts and Tools in a JSON-RPC 2.0 transport. This document describes a mapping of MCP roles, primitives and security model to the network management domain so that network devices act as MCP servers and network controllers act as MCP clients. This document also extends the model to Device-to-Device (D2D) collaboration, allowing network elements to perform distributed fault correlation when the controller is unreachable or when real-time cross-device data is required. The goal is to provide an intent-based, conversational and secure approach for automated network troubleshooting, configuration validation, and closed-loop remediation without inventing new protocols or device agents.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-14T12:24:47Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 14,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.77,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zeng-opsawg-applicability-mcp-a2a",
   "title": "When NETCONF Is Not Enough: Applicability of MCP and A2A for Advanced Network Management Scenarios",
   "abstract": "NETCONF provides robust configuration transactions and YANG-based data models, but falls short in scenarios requiring AI-driven semantic translation, long-lived cross-domain orchestration, multi- agent consensus, rapid DevOps iteration, or delivery of large non- configuration artifacts. This document systematically analyzes the functional gaps and presents Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent- to-Agent (A2A) as complementary solutions. Implementation guidance and coexistence models are also provided.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-14T12:24:38Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 11,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 1.75,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zeng-opsawg-llm-netconf-gap",
   "title": "Gap Analysis of Network Configuration Protocols in LLM-Driven Intent-Based Networking",
   "abstract": "Large Language Models (LLMs) are entering network operations through natural-language intent interfaces. Existing south-bound protocols (NETCONF, RESTCONF, gNMI, MCP, A2A) were not designed for conversational, semantically-rich, multi-agent orchestration. This document provides a systematic gap analysis and identifies extension points for each protocol to meet intent-based networking requirements.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-14T12:24:31Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 9,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.44,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-zeng-nmrg-mcp-usecases-requirements",
   "title": "MCP for Network Management: Problem Statement, Use Cases, and Requirements",
   "abstract": "The emergence of large language models (LLMs) and AI agents is reshaping how network operators interact with infrastructure. However, current network management systems lack a standardized, secure, and intent-driven interface that enables AI agents to discover, invoke, and reason over network capabilities. This document presents a problem statement for integrating the Model Context Protocol (MCP) into network management, outlines key use cases—including troubleshooting, measurement, security, and optimization—and specifies functional, security, and interoperability requirements for MCP-based network management architectures.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-14T12:24:24Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 6,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.66,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-14T18:18:10.494Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-correctover-gg-mcp-parameter-risk",
   "title": "MCP Parameter Risk Classes for Machine-Readable Risk Metadata",
   "abstract": "This document defines a fixed set of five canonical MCP parameter risk classes: semantic categories for sensitive parameters that appear in the JSON Schemas of Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool definitions, together with deterministic decision rules and boundary conditions for assigning those labels. The classes are designed to supply machine-readable, pre-invocation risk metadata about tool inputs, independent of any particular gateway, routing, or capability-profile specification. The classes and their decision rules were derived from, and applied against, a SHA-256-frozen empirical census of publicly reachable MCP servers. The frozen census and the classification suite that implements these rules are archived on Zenodo; the archived suite is the normative tie-breaker for exact matching behaviour. This is an Informational, individual submission. It defines the canonical classes and decision rules. Other specifications MAY cite this document as the canonical source of the class labels and MAY define their own operators that consume those labels; they SHOULD NOT re-derive or inline the normative decision rules into their own normative text.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-14T11:57:11Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 12,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 1.16,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T12:18:06.216Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-14T12:18:06.216Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-pereira-licet-human-intent",
   "title": "LICET: Multi-Modal Physiological Human-Intent Verification for Autonomous AI Agent Authorization",
   "abstract": "Autonomous AI agents executing consequential actions require authorization mechanisms that verify not only identity but voluntary intent. Existing mechanisms verify _who_ authorized an action; they cannot verify _whether the authorizing human was uncoerced and cognitively capable_ at the moment of authorization. This document specifies LICET (Latin: _it is permitted_), a cryptographic middleware protocol binding AI agent authorization to real-time multi-modal physiological state via a three-layer architecture: (1) ECG waveform morphology matching as a medication- resistant identity and liveness anchor; (2) electrodermal activity (EDA) as a sympathetic cholinergic liveness signal immune to beta- adrenergic blockade; and (3) personalized Mahalanobis distance fusion over five physiological signals to elevate the cost of pharmacological coercion attacks rather than claim binary detection. LICET defines a Biometric Trust Level hierarchy (L0-L3) aligned with the IETF RATS architecture (RFC 9334), a baseline calibration protocol establishing individual physiological profiles, per-event HKDF session-key derivation, HMAC biometric temporal signatures, Schnorr zero-knowledge proofs over BN128 enabling third-party audit without biometric exposure, and a SHA-256 hash-chained tamper-evident ledger. A reference implementation is publicly deployed at https://licet.dev/ v1/ and available as open source at https://github.com/christianrp45/ licet-protocol.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-13T23:37:42Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 22,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.68,
   "centrality": 1.62,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-14T00:18:06.835Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-14T00:18:06.835Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-stephan-agentproto-6g-usecases",
   "title": "AI Agent protocols for 6G systems",
   "abstract": "Communication between AI agents and between agent and tools is expected to be pivotal in 6G systems. The 3GPP TR 22.870 outlines various use cases and potential service requirements for AI agent communication within 6G systems. This document provides examples of use cases and service requirements contained in the 3GPP TR 22.870 and extrapolates possible requirements related to agent communication protocols.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-13T06:48:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.76,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-13T12:17:51.539Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-13T12:17:51.539Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrison-binding-moment-envelope",
   "title": "The Briefing-and-Binding Envelope: A Delivery Contract for Agent-to-Principal Decision Moments with Dual-Veto Reconciliation",
   "abstract": "This memo specifies the briefing-and-binding envelope: a delivery contract for the wire-level structure by which an artificial- intelligence agent surfaces a consequential decision to the human principal it acts for, and by which the principal commits, declines, amends, or rejects that decision. The envelope carries eight named slots (a synopsis, findings, recommendations, an offer of detail, a question stem, a set of options each marked with its own reasoning, a single recommended option, and a pair of escape hatches) and is emitted as a structured field of a Model Context Protocol tool result. The envelope is renderer-agnostic, so the briefing an agent delivers and the binding a principal commits back have one machine- checkable shape across every consuming surface. The memo also specifies a dual-veto handshake: one escape hatch lets the principal revise the answer space while accepting the question; the other lets the principal reject the question itself and reopen deliberation. Either party may veto. The memo defines a content digest over the envelope, canonicalized under JCS and hashed with SHA-256, so that a resolution names the exact envelope it resolves and an external receipt can reference that envelope by digest. The memo is Informational. No new transport is introduced; the envelope composes with the handle namespace of draft-morrison-identity-pronouns and the MCP tool surface of draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-13T05:22:14Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 29,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.93,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-13T06:17:45.759Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-agarwal-acip",
   "title": "Agent Context Interchange Protocol",
   "abstract": "AI coding agents obtain persistent context from organization, project, user, vendor, and task sources. Existing formats can carry prose, skills, or tool permissions, but they do not provide one interoperable resolution model for authority, file scope, enforceability, and audit evidence. This document defines the Agent Context Interchange Protocol (ACIP), a YAML-based format and host- resolution behavior for those sources. It defines source precedence, file matching, explicit distinctions between enforceable constraints, textual directives, and preferences, a resolution receipt, compatibility behavior for AGENTS.md and Agent Skills, and migration profiles for tools that do not natively support ACIP. ACIP does not claim that natural-language instructions can force an agent to behave; enforcement requires a host or external control at the action boundary.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-12T15:39:26Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 29,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.41,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-12T18:17:46.519Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-12T18:17:46.519Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-deforth-arp",
   "title": "Agentic Reasoning Protocol (ARP): DNS-Bound Signatures for Entity Self-Descriptions",
   "abstract": "This document specifies version 1.3 (\"Reader Profile\") of the Agentic Reasoning Protocol (ARP). ARP defines a JSON manifest, served at a well-known location, in which the operator of a domain publishes a self-description of an entity, and an optional Ed25519 signature that binds the manifest to the domain through a public key in a DNS TXT record. A valid signature shows that the domain operator published exactly this file and that it has not been altered since; it does not show that the statements in the file are true. Version 1.3 adds a wording profile that limits manifest text to third-person statements about the entity, a required provenance statement, a readable description of the signature with pointers for checking it, a Markdown representation bound to the manifest by a SHA-256 digest, a discovery profile, and key revocation through an empty key value in the DNS record.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-12T12:40:27Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 48,
   "relevant": 0.72,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.28,
   "centrality": 1.32,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-12T18:17:46.519Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-12T18:17:46.519Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-watts-oauth-agent-revocation-closure",
   "title": "Revocation Closure for Agentic Authorization Systems",
   "abstract": "Agentic systems can derive and distribute authority across delegated agents, workloads, credentials, queues, and long-running operations. Existing revocation mechanisms can invalidate a credential or authorization grant, but credential invalidation alone does not establish that every path from revoked authority to a consequential effect has been closed. This document defines a protocol-neutral model for revocation closure. It introduces authority graphs, consequential sinks, revocation cut sets, closure states, closure budgets, and closure receipts. The model is intended to complement OAuth 2.0, workload identity, transaction-token, and agent-authorization work. It does not define a new authorization protocol, token format, or AI safety mechanism.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-12T09:10:29Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.65,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.44,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-12T12:17:47.888Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-12T12:17:47.888Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nyantakyi-vaip-agent-identity",
   "title": "Vorim Agent Identity Protocol (VAIP)",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Vorim Agent Identity Protocol (VAIP), a standard for establishing verifiable cryptographic identity, fine- grained permissions, trust scoring, and tamper-evident audit trails for autonomous AI agents. As AI agents increasingly perform actions autonomously in enterprise systems, existing identity protocols designed for human users or static services are insufficient. VAIP addresses this gap by providing cryptographic primitives and data structures for issuing, verifying, and managing agent identities in multi-tenant environments. The protocol uses Ed25519 for agent identity, SHA-256 for audit integrity, and defines seven hierarchical permission scopes with time-bounded grants and rate limiting.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-12T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 17,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-12T12:17:47.888Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-12T12:17:47.888Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-lee-wimse-local-tool-call-proof",
   "title": "Per-Call Proof for Local Tool Invocation by AI Agents",
   "abstract": "AI agents increasingly act through local tool servers that run on the same host and are reached over inter-process channels such as the stdio transport of the Model Context Protocol (MCP). These channels are outside the scope of HTTP-based authorization: the tool server cannot tell whether a given invocation passed any policy decision, and reusable credentials typically sit in the agent's process memory. This document defines a per-call proof for local tool invocation. A Call Authority that runs outside the agent process evaluates policy, issues a short-lived, single-use proof bound to the exact tool name and arguments through a canonical action digest, and verifies that proof on behalf of the tool server. The tool server rejects invocations whose proof is missing or does not verify. The proof format is opaque to the agent and the tool server; concrete formats are defined as evidence type profiles. An MCP stdio binding is provided.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-12T01:16:42Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 21,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.87,
   "centrality": 1.87,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-12T06:17:45.457Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-piehl-agent-rule-provenance",
   "title": "Rule Provenance for Autonomous AI Agent Audit Records",
   "abstract": "This document describes an experimental profile of the Agent Audit Trail format for AI agents. The profile records the rules an agent operates under: each version of each rule, who set and approved it, and which rules were in force when a decision was made. It keeps a decision separate from any later approval or override, binds it to the exact request, and requires that records of consequential actions go to a recorder independent of the operator and be anchored in a public log. It also sets out what these records can and cannot prove.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-11T21:43:55Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 40,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-12T00:17:45.658Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-12T00:17:45.658Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sarischo-6gip-aiagent-requirements",
   "title": "AI Agents 6G System and RAN Requirements and Implementation Approaches",
   "abstract": "This document presents system and Radio Access Network (RAN) requirements for 3GPP Artificial Intelligence/ Machine Learning (AI/ ML) and AI Agents for the 6th generation mobile network, or 6G. Requirements depend on the types and application areas of agents. We describe some of them defined with each type and state their requirements. RAN 6G requirements are discussed including AI related requirements. AI Agent implementation efforts, initiatives on how APIs can be discovered, how inter-domain and intra domain AI Agents can be discovered using DNS lookup and agent protocol design are explained.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-11T15:29:33Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.85,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.81,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-11T18:17:45.851Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-11T18:17:45.851Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-saihm-memory-protocol",
   "title": "The Sovereign AI Horizontal Memory (SAIHM) Protocol",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Sovereign AI Horizontal Memory (SAIHM) protocol, a memory layer for AI agents. A SAIHM operator stores an agent's memory as encrypted cells bound to a post-quantum holder identity, records each state change in a public audit log, and supports revocable sharing contracts. The protocol defines an erasure operation with two stated erasure classes, intended to help an operator meet its obligations under Article 17 of EU Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR). This revision specifies the custodial profile. The operator holds the holder's keys and performs all cryptography. The agent-side client holds no keys, runs no cryptography beyond TLS and keeps no store; it reaches the operator over HTTPS and exposes the protocol to the agent as eight Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools. The document defines the operator obligations, the HTTPS binding, the eight tools, and the checks a conformant client applies to what the operator returns.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-11T13:44:38Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 36,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-11T12:17:46.182Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-11T18:17:45.851Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-noctem-cogitator-witness-protocol",
   "title": "COGITATOR Witness Protocol: Cryptographically Verifiable Audit Records for AI Agent Execution",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the COGITATOR Witness Protocol -- a scheme for producing cryptographically verifiable, tamper-evident records of AI agent execution. A conforming implementation produces a single witness root value that any third party can independently recompute from the same inputs to verify the record was not altered after the fact. The protocol is implementation-agnostic. The reference implementation is COGITATOR (Rust), but any language or framework can produce conforming witness bundles. This document also describes how the COGITATOR Witness Protocol relates to the IETF SCITT architecture, with which it is designed to be used as a payload inside SCITT Signed Statements.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-11T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.89,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-11T12:17:46.182Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-11T12:17:46.182Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-prakash-aip",
   "title": "Agent Identity Protocol (AIP): Verifiable Delegation for AI Agent Systems",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Agent Identity Protocol (AIP), which conveys delegated authority along a chain of AI agents so that a relying party can verify, from the token and the issuer's public key, who granted the authority, through which agents it passed, and that no hop widened what it received. AIP addresses hops where no authorization server is on the path, such as one agent subdelegating to another. It is intended to compose with the AI Identity Management System (AIMS) framework, which covers hops where an authorization server is present. The document defines an encoding- neutral delegation chain model with a single attenuation invariant, a normative verification algorithm, and two encodings of the model: a chain of JSON Web Tokens, in which each link names the key of the next holder, and a Biscuit token with Datalog policy. Bindings are given for the Model Context Protocol (MCP), the Agent2Agent protocol (A2A), and generic HTTP.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-10T14:30:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 41,
   "relevant": 0.96,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.98,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-10T18:17:54.804Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-10T18:17:54.804Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-yan-iba-routing-security-requirements",
   "title": "Security Requirements for Intent-based Agent Routing",
   "abstract": "This document specifies security requirements for intent-based agent routing. It defines a security architecture, phase-specific attack surface analysis, and normative protections for the Registration, Resolution, and Dispatch phases of routing. It also describes a secure operational process and an annotated interaction flow for protecting routing decisions, intent privacy, and capability integrity. Intent-based routing enables autonomous agents to collaborate based on semantic intent rather than static addresses, but this model introduces new security risks beyond those addressed by traditional channel protection and endpoint authentication. Existing mechanisms such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) verify identity and protect transport, but do not constrain what an agent claims to be capable of, nor do they protect the semantic content of intent queries during routing. This document establishes requirements to mitigate these risks and provides a comprehensive security framework for intent-based agent networks.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-10T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.2,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-10T12:17:47.701Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-10T12:17:47.701Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-benzing-accp",
   "title": "Agent Context Compression Protocol (ACCP)",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Agent Context Compression Protocol (ACCP), a semantic encoding and context management protocol for communication between AI agents within agentic harnesses. ACCP defines a compact message format, intent ontology, state compression strategy, and codec interface that collectively reduce token consumption by 60-90% compared to natural language or standard JSON messaging. ACCP is designed to complement existing protocols (MCP, A2A) and is transport-agnostic.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-09T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 23,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-09T12:17:45.996Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-09T12:17:45.996Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-klassen-eu2122-content-profile",
   "title": "EU2122 V1.0 Standard: Content Profile for AI Output Verification Receipts",
   "abstract": "This document defines a content profile for AI output verification receipts. It specifies the minimum fields, the classification taxonomy and the evidentiary properties that a receipt MUST contain in order to constitute verifiable evidence that an AI-generated output was checked before a human or a downstream agent acted on it. The profile is designed to be carried over any conformant wire format, including ACTA signed receipts, SCITT transparency logs, and standalone JSON or CBOR payloads. Existing Internet-Drafts in this space define wire formats for signing, transmitting and storing AI agent receipts, or records of what an agent did. None defines what a verification receipt must contain at the content layer: which claims in an output were checked and how each was classified. This document fills that gap. It introduces a mandatory fourteen-category failure taxonomy (the Information Bottleneck Species), a verdict schema, and evidentiary field requirements informed by the EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), the Product Liability Directive (Directive (EU) 2024/2853) and the IDW PS 861 audit standard. We invite implementers to adopt, populate and grow the AI output verification market segment. The category exists. The specification is here. Build to it.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-08T12:10:19Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 20,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.84,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-03T12:17:32.548Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-jovancevic-saip",
   "title": "SAIP: Signed Agent Identity Protocol",
   "abstract": "The modern internet lacks a reliable mechanism for verifying the identity of automated software agents. Existing methods such as User-Agent strings and IP-based attribution are insufficient due to spoofing, shared infrastructure (NAT), and the rapid growth of automated agents including AI crawlers, IoT devices, and enterprise automation systems. This document specifies SAIP (Signed Agent Identity Protocol), a lightweight, opt-in mechanism for verifiable client identity at the application layer. SAIP implements the principles defined in the Verifiable Identity Claims and Delegation Model [VICDM] and enables servers to distinguish legitimate automated traffic from malicious actors through cryptographic identity at three levels of granularity: vendor, agent type, and individual instance. SAIP is protocol-agnostic and applicable to HTTP, SMTP, and other header-based protocols. It introduces DNS-based Attestation Discovery as a lightweight alternative to registry-based key lookup, making deployment accessible to organizations of any size.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "12",
   "time": "2026-10-08T08:14:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 42,
   "relevant": 0.69,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.37,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-veridom-omp-sgapac",
   "title": "OMP Domain Profile: AI Governance Evidence Under Singapore's Model AI Governance Framework, MAS FEAT Principles, and the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics",
   "abstract": "This document defines a domain profile of the Operating Model Protocol (OMP) for AI systems deployed in Singapore and the ASEAN region subject to the Singapore Model AI Governance Framework (Second Edition, 2020), the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) FEAT Principles for financial services AI, and the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics (2024). The profile -- designated SingapureMark -- specifies how OMP's deterministic routing invariant, Watchtower enforcement framework, and three-layer cryptographic integrity architecture generate the per-decision accountability evidence required by Singapore's model AI governance framework, satisfy the MAS FEAT Principles' named accountability and explainability requirements, and align with the ASEAN Guide's human oversight and consumer protection governance standards. The OMP core specification is defined in the Operating Model Protocol Internet-Draft (draft-veridom-omp).",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-08T07:09:06Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 5,
   "relevant": 0.5,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.89,
   "centrality": 1.78,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-farley-acta-knowledge-units",
   "title": "Knowledge Units for Multi-Model Deliberation",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Knowledge Unit (KU) format for representing verified knowledge produced through structured multi-model deliberation. A Knowledge Unit captures the question asked, the models that participated, the consensus achieved, the points of agreement and disagreement, and the cryptographic receipts that bind each deliberation round to an independently verifiable chain. The format addresses the epistemic integrity gap in LLM-maintained knowledge bases: how to prove that knowledge was derived through a rigorous process, that disagreement was preserved rather than smoothed away, and that the record has not been tampered with. This specification complements draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts, which defines the receipt format and verification protocol used to sign individual deliberation rounds.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-08T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.69,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.75,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-teodor-pilot-protocol",
   "title": "Pilot Protocol: An Overlay Network for Autonomous Agent Communication",
   "abstract": "This document specifies Pilot Protocol, an overlay network that provides autonomous AI agents with virtual addresses, port-based service multiplexing, reliable and unreliable transport, NAT traversal, encrypted tunnels, and a bilateral trust model. Pilot Protocol operates as a network and transport layer beneath application-layer agent protocols such as A2A and MCP. It encapsulates virtual packets in UDP datagrams for transit over the existing Internet. The protocol gives agents first-class network citizenship --- stable identities, reachable addresses, and standard transport primitives --- independent of their underlying network infrastructure.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-08T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-teodor-pilot-problem-statement",
   "title": "Problem Statement: Network-Layer Infrastructure for Autonomous Agent Communication",
   "abstract": "AI agents --- autonomous software entities capable of reasoning, planning, and executing tasks --- are an increasingly important class of network participant. Current agent communication protocols operate exclusively at the application layer over HTTP, assuming the existence of stable endpoints, DNS names, and centralized infrastructure. No existing standard provides network-layer identity, addressing, or transport for agents. This document describes the problem space and identifies requirements for a network-layer infrastructure that would give agents first-class network citizenship, independent of the web infrastructure designed for human users.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-08T07:09:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.67,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-08T12:17:49.073Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-dogru-cedulon-core",
   "title": "Spend Receipts and Payment Rail Reconciliation for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document addresses auditable payments for AI agents and builds upon state-of-the-art HTTP 402, AP2 and credit card systems. We specify a cryptographically secured payment reconciliation protocol using a Trade Manifest (a signed offer before payment), a Policy Decision Point with default deny, a Spend Receipt (a COSE/CWT claim set issued after a gated payment), and rail-extract reconciliation.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-07T19:45:44Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 74,
   "relevant": 0.83,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.41,
   "centrality": 1.57,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-08T00:17:06.821Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nault-email-ai-handling",
   "title": "Handling Email AI-Processing Preferences",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an experimental receiver handling profile for the companion Email AI-Processing Preference Signal. It requires evaluation before optional AI access, independent checks for each applicable use, and a protective default when a preference is absent. It addresses confirmation, mixed-source content, derived records, and usable ordinary communication when optional processing is declined. Requirements apply to systems claiming this profile, not to all Internet mail recipients; the profile does not determine legal consent.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-07T16:33:40Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 9,
   "relevant": 0.68,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.73,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-07T18:17:28.637Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-07T18:17:28.637Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nault-email-ai-signal",
   "title": "Email AI-Processing Preference Signal",
   "abstract": "This document proposes an experimental Internet email header field for expressing sender preferences about AI assistance, persistent AI memory, profiling, model training, and external processing. It defines syntax, category semantics, message scope, and preservation during forwarding and replies. A missing field expresses no preference. Receiver admission controls and a protective processing default are specified separately. The signal does not establish legal consent or guarantee recipient compliance.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-07T16:30:31Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 10,
   "relevant": 0.67,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.3,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-07T18:17:28.637Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-07T18:17:28.637Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-correctover-ccs",
   "title": "Correctover Conformance Shape (CCS): Runtime Verification for AI Agent Tool Calls",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Correctover Conformance Shape (CCS), a runtime verification framework for AI agent tool calls. CCS specifies seven verification dimensions (Structure, Schema, Latency, Cost, Identity, Integrity, Security) that tool calls and results must conform to at runtime. The framework defines a receipt format with Ed25519 signatures, three verdict values (allow, deny, escalate) and four executor lifecycle states (confirmed, dispatched, indeterminate, unknown), and normative requirements for implementations. This revision makes the document self-contained for publication: the related AEB and CAID specifications are reclassified as Informative References, and the native artifact requirements they motivate are restated normatively in this document so that no conformance requirement depends on an unreferenced work in progress. It also corrects the implementation-experience description (one reference implementation in two deployment forms, plus one independently developed third-party interoperability profile), clarifies the relationship to SCITT-based agent evidence work, and updates the author contact address. The detached Ed25519 signature construction over RFC 8785 canonical JSON and the receipt lifecycle and signing- algorithm conformance are unchanged from draft-08. This revision restructures key management around two orthogonal trust levels: VERIFIED, the self-contained integrity and key/signature consistency verifiable fully offline from the receipt alone, and ACCEPTED, which adds out-of-band issuer pinning and is the only level that authenticates the signer. The embedded public_key, public_key_fingerprint, and signing_algorithm fields are now required to be covered by the signature to prevent key substitution and algorithm downgrade.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "10",
   "time": "2026-10-07T07:41:32Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 75,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.91,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-batum-aidre",
   "title": "AI Discovery and Retrieval Endpoint (AIDRE)",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the AI Discovery and Retrieval Endpoint (AIDRE), a protocol for publishing machine-oriented, canonical, and semantically retrievable content on the web. AIDRE defines a discovery document, collection metadata, retrieval interfaces, optional vector-native query support, and content representation rules for AI systems. AIDRE aims to reduce redundant crawling, parsing, tokenization, and embedding of the same origin content while improving freshness, provenance, and interoperability for AI systems.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-07T07:09:08Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 18,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.45,
   "centrality": 1.78,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-veridom-omp-aiins",
   "title": "OMP Domain Profile: AI Liability Insurance Underwriting and Parametric Claims Evidence",
   "abstract": "This document defines a domain profile of the Operating Model Protocol (OMP) for AI systems deployed in contexts covered by AI liability insurance policies, including AI performance warranties, AI errors and omissions coverage, and coordinated AI liability structures. The profile -- designated InsureMark -- specifies how OMP's deterministic routing invariant, Watchtower enforcement framework, and three-layer cryptographic integrity architecture generate per-decision Proof-Points that function as objective parametric trigger data for AI liability insurance claims, and provide independently verifiable underwriting evidence that reduces claims ambiguity and supports premium differentiation. The InsureMark profile addresses the primary gap in current AI liability insurance underwriting: policies are currently issued based on model-level performance assessments, but claims arise at the level of individual AI decisions. No current AI liability insurance product requires or receives per-decision cryptographic evidence. This profile specifies the technical architecture by which OMP Proof- Points close this gap. The OMP core specification is defined in the Operating Model Protocol Internet-Draft (draft-veridom-omp).",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-07T07:09:07Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.51,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.62,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-larsson-aitlp",
   "title": "Agent Identity, Trust and Lifecycle Protocol (AITLP)",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Agent Identity, Trust and Lifecycle Protocol (AITLP), a protocol for autonomous software agents operating within organizational boundaries. AITLP specifies agent identity and naming conventions, hierarchical mandate enforcement, lifecycle state management, inter-agent trust verification, ontological scope constraints, certificate-based authentication, and generational knowledge transfer via Agent Legacy Mode (ALM). The protocol enables agents to operate autonomously while remaining auditable, revocable, and organizationally bounded. AITLP focuses on boundaries -- what an agent is not permitted to do and how that is enforced -- complementing capability-focused specifications such as MCP, A2A, and ANS. Unlike those specifications, AITLP defines not a tool or a communication channel, but an organizational actor: an agent with a declared identity, a bounded mandate, a managed lifecycle, and a cryptographically enforced scope of authority.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-07T07:09:06Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 47,
   "relevant": 0.81,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-07T12:17:30.624Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-fane-opena2a-aip",
   "title": "OpenA2A Agent Identity Protocol (AIP)",
   "abstract": "This document defines the OpenA2A Agent Identity Protocol (OpenA2A AIP), an open standard for creating, managing, and verifying cryptographic identities for AI agents. As AI agents proliferate across browsers, cloud platforms, and enterprise environments, systems need a standardized answer to the question of which agent is present, what it is permitted to do, and whether it should be trusted. OpenA2A AIP is distinguished by five elements that it places at the center of the design: a multi-factor behavioral trust score that is computed from independently verifiable signals; a portable signed credential, the Agent Trust eXtension, carrying a hybrid Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 signature for post-quantum readiness; an append-only, RFC 9162-style Merkle transparency log for identity and credential issuance; agent identifiers expressed as W3C Decentralized Identifiers, provider-scoped as a did:web profile at the identity- provider layer and ecosystem-scoped under the registered did:opena2a method at the trust-fabric layer; and a structured capability vocabulary with reserved namespaces. On top of these, the protocol specifies challenge-response verification, behavioral governance policies, a lifecycle model, and an append-only audit log. The qualifier \"OpenA2A AIP\" is used throughout this document because the abbreviation \"AIP\" is shared by other Internet-Drafts. OpenA2A AIP is framed as complementary to agent communication protocols such as A2A and the Model Context Protocol, and to identity and credential standards such as OpenID Connect, WebAuthn, and the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-06T19:20:52Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 33,
   "relevant": 0.97,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-07T00:17:30.046Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation",
   "title": "Human Delegation Provenance Protocol (HDP): Cryptographic Chain-of-Custody for Agentic AI Systems",
   "abstract": "Agentic AI systems operate on behalf of human principals, often delegating tasks through multi-step chains of AI agents. There is currently no standard mechanism to record who authorized an agent to act, under what scope, and through what chain of delegation, in a way that can be verified offline, without a central registry, and without third-party trust anchors. This document specifies the Human Delegation Provenance Protocol (HDP) version 0.1, a lightweight token-based protocol that captures, structures, cryptographically signs, and verifies human delegation context in agentic AI systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and lets an auditor verify the integrity of the full record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key. Verification is fully offline. No registry lookup, no network call, and no third-party trust anchor is required. HDP's distinguishing contribution is a signed, tamper-evident record of what the human asked for and of how each agent read and acted on that request. On deployments that use capability-based delegation formats such as UCAN and ZCAP-LD, the same content can travel in the capability certificates' own metadata instead of a separate token. The underlying append-only, offline-verifiable chain-of-custody mechanism is payload-agnostic; human-authorized agentic delegation is the reference profile specified in this document. HDP is not an authorization protocol. An HDP token confers no authority and is not an input to any access decision. It is a record of who authorized a task and of what each agent declared it did with that authorization, carried with the task and read at audit.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-06T10:42:44Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 47,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.84,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-06T12:17:30.105Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-06T12:17:30.105Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-morrow-sogomonian-exec-outcome-attest",
   "title": "Execution Outcome Attestation for AI Agents and Automated Systems",
   "abstract": "Current attestation frameworks establish that a system or agent is trustworthy at a point in time. They do not address whether that system actually performed a claimed action or whether the outcome of that action can be independently verified. This document defines execution outcome verification as a first-class concept, separate from identity attestation and communication transport. It introduces the execution receipt as a minimal composable primitive, provides a formal abstract model, and maps the model to concrete realizations including SCITT transparency logs, tightly-coupled direct verification, append-only local logs, and TEE-internal receipts.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-06T07:09:02Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.82,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.17,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-06T12:17:30.105Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-06T12:17:30.105Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-gilda-wimse-agent-audit-record",
   "title": "An Audit Record Format for AI Agent Authorization Decisions",
   "abstract": "This document defines a record format for AI agent authorization decisions. The format is one in-toto predicate type, signed inside a DSSE envelope. It carries the seven minimum audit fields that the WIMSE AI Identity Management System framework requires, and two properties that make those fields checkable: a canonicalization contract, and both the authorization decision and the observed effect with a derived three-valued agreement between them. That framework places the record format out of scope and takes no IANA action. This document supplies the format. It defines no policy.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-05T15:54:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 31,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.6,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T18:17:28.439Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-05T18:17:28.439Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mo-cats-agent-state-affinity",
   "title": "State, Storage, and Compute Affinity for AI Agent Service Selection in Computing-Aware Traffic Steering",
   "abstract": "AI agent services are stateful and long-running: the speed with which a step can be served depends on whether the session's context, retrieved data, tool results, and model-side state such as a key-value (KV) cache are already available at, or near, the selected service contact instance, and on whether the computation that the step needs is ready there. Computing-Aware Traffic Steering (CATS) exposes computing and network metrics and defines service contact instance affinity, but it does not expose the availability of reusable state, does not distinguish a hard locality constraint on state from a preference for reusing it, does not provide a way to compare the cost of moving state with the cost of recomputing it, and does not represent the readiness of a specific computation. This document describes affinity in three coupled dimensions -- state, storage, and compute -- for agent service selection. It states the motivation and the goals of introducing affinity, the requirements and constraints that affinity places on the mapping of an agent workload onto storage and compute resources, the metrics and measurement methods by which affinity is observed, the mechanisms and the procedure by which affinity is assured, and two cases in detail: a long-horizon session that passes through several stages, and a group of similar agents or of tenants served by shared reusable state. This document defines no wire protocol, no encoding, and no data model, and it does not define the transfer mechanisms themselves.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-05T15:52:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 48,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.58,
   "centrality": 1.93,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T18:17:28.439Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-05T18:17:28.439Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-arsentev-llm-context-discovery",
   "title": "Discovery and Retrieval of Publisher-Curated Context Files for Large Language Model Consumers",
   "abstract": "Publishers have begun to serve a curated, plain-text summary of a web origin intended for consumption by large language models and by the crawlers that feed them, most visibly under the de facto file name \"llms.txt\". The practice is described by an informal proposal which, in its current version, recommends existing link relations from individual pages to the file. It has no media type, no rules that bound the cost of retrieval, and no way for a consumer that starts from an origin's robots.txt or from a fixed well-known location to learn that such a file exists. This document specifies discovery and retrieval for publisher-curated context files. It defines the well-known URI \"llm-context\", the link relation type \"llm-context\", and an extension record for the robots exclusion protocol, so that a publisher may advertise a context file by three independent paths and a consumer may find it without guessing. It specifies a two-tier arrangement of an index resource and optional detail resources, states conditional-request and size requirements that keep retrieval affordable for both parties, and describes the relationship of this mechanism to the robots exclusion protocol, to sitemaps, to the llms.txt proposal itself, and to work in the IETF on AI usage preferences, agent communication and the discovery of AI agents. This document also reports measurements from an operational deployment in which requests presenting twenty crawler tokens of search and language-model providers numbered 46,155 over fifteen days at one origin server, without once retrieving the context file the origin was serving, while the same crawler tokens retrieved robots.txt 698 times in the three days after the context file was deployed. The measurement figures in revision -00 were computed on an incomplete log and are corrected here. The absence of a discovery mechanism, rather than the absence of interest, is the hypothesis this document acts upon.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-05T13:41:56Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 22,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.94,
   "centrality": 1.02,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T18:17:28.439Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-05T18:17:28.439Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-prabhu-nmrg-prompt-schema-llm",
   "title": "Framework for Normalizing Multi-Vendor Network Inputs for LLM-Assisted Network Management",
   "abstract": "Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to assist network management tasks such as troubleshooting, intent translation, and automation. Network operations, however, rely on data from many vendors and sources: CLI output, configuration snippets, telemetry, alarms, and vendor-specific APIs. These inputs differ in format, structure, and semantics, which makes it difficult to present a consistent interface to an LLM. This document describes a framework for standardizing such multi-vendor inputs for LLM-assisted network management. Incoming messages from multi-vendor network elements are first handled by an Input Classifier, which determines the nature of each input and assigns it to one of three categories: performance, configuration, or response, using a hybrid approach (rule-based classification first, with escalation to a Small Language Model (SLM) when rules are insufficient). The classified input is then passed to the corresponding Structurer among the Performance Structurer, Configuration Structurer, and Response Structurer, each of which produces a normalized, structured representation (typically with SLM assistance and optional confidence scoring). That structured output is fed to a Prompt Schema Generator, which creates a structured, vendor-agnostic schema and supplies schema-aligned prompts to the central LLM. This document specifies the architecture and component roles for use in design and implementation. It does not define a wire protocol; it is published for informational purposes.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-05T10:08:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.74,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.59,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T12:17:30.759Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-05T12:17:30.759Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-embesozzi-oauth-agent-native-authorization",
   "title": "OAuth 2.0 Agents Native Authorization via Structured Elicitation",
   "abstract": "This document defines a Structured Elicitation extension to the OAuth 2.0 First-Party Applications (FiPA) specification [FiPA], establishing a standard metadata format for FiPA authorization challenge responses. FiPA leaves the format for advertising available authenticators and their required inputs undefined, preventing interoperable implementation by AI Agents and other non- browser clients. This extension adds an elicitations array to the FiPA Authorization Challenge Response, providing a standard metadata format for authenticator challenges. Model Context Protocol (MCP) Elicitation [MCP-Elicitation] is the normative reference binding. This specification covers the just-in-time (JIT) authorization for AI Agents executing on behalf of users in Human-to-Agent (H2A) flows.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-05T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 17,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.88,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T12:17:30.759Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-05T12:17:30.759Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-veridom-omp-euaia",
   "title": "OMP Domain Profile: EU AI Act Article 12 Logging and Traceability Requirements for High-Risk AI System Operators",
   "abstract": "This document defines a domain profile of the Operating Model Protocol (OMP) for high-risk AI system operators subject to Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the EU AI Act). Article 12 requires that high-risk AI systems automatically generate tamper- resistant logs capable of ensuring traceability throughout the system's lifetime. This profile specifies how OMP's deterministic routing invariant, Watchtower enforcement framework, and three-layer cryptographic integrity architecture (SHA-256, RFC 3161, institution signature) satisfy the Article 12 requirements, and defines the domain-specific Watchtower configurations and Audit Trace schema extensions applicable to EU high-risk AI deployments under Annex III of the Regulation. The core OMP specification is defined in a separate Internet-Draft (\\\"Operating Model Protocol (OMP): A Deterministic Decision-Enforcement Protocol with Externalized Proof-of-Integrity\\\").",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-05T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.62,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.97,
   "centrality": 1.58,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T12:17:30.759Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-05T12:17:30.759Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-c4tz-marc",
   "title": "MARC: A Control and Uncertainty Disclosure Profile for Generative Models and Agents",
   "abstract": "This document specifies MARC, an experimental, vendor-neutral profile for control and uncertainty-disclosure metadata in generative models and agentic systems. MARC separates pre-decision capability assessment from post-decision answer confidence, identifies uncertainty sources and confidence targets, and defines a bounded set of primary actions and a minimal disclosure object. The experiment evaluates whether independently developed components can exchange and interpret these metadata consistently across implementation and protocol boundaries. It also supports evaluation of action selection, uncertainty attribution, confidence calibration, and downstream presentation. MARC specifies externally observable semantics. It does not define model internals, transport, authentication, authorization, agent discovery, tool schemas, or task execution, and it does not require disclosure of internal reasoning. The intended users are implementers of agent runtimes, orchestration layers, model gateways, evaluation systems, and user interfaces. This document does not define an Internet Standard.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-04T22:21:01Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 55,
   "relevant": 0.7,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.5,
   "centrality": 1.84,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-05T00:17:31.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-05T00:17:31.083Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-levi-agent-certification",
   "title": "Autonomous Agent Certification Protocol (AACP)",
   "abstract": "This document defines the Autonomous Agent Certification Protocol (AACP), a framework for binding successful evaluation of an AI agent to cryptographically verifiable evidence of demonstrated capability. AACP introduces Evaluation Profiles that define the conditions under which an agent may be certified for a specific capability. An Agent Configuration that satisfies an Evaluation Profile may receive a short-lived Agent Certification Credential (ACC) bound to the configuration that was evaluated. An ACC does not grant access to a resource. It provides verifiable evidence that an agent has demonstrated a capability under defined evaluation conditions. Existing authorization systems may require such evidence as a condition for granting corresponding production permissions. AACP therefore separates capability certification from identity, authentication, delegation, and authorization.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-04T11:52:31Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 23,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-04T12:17:31.175Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-04T12:17:31.175Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-beyer-agent-identity-avian-carriers",
   "title": "Agentic Identity and Provenance over Avian Carriers (AIPAC)",
   "abstract": "This document specifies a method for establishing cryptographic identity and provenance attestation for agentic AI systems operating over Avian Carriers (AC). As large language models increasingly delegate sub-tasks to other models via pigeon, questions of authorship, intent, and hallucination propagation across feather- based transport layers demand urgent standardization. This document extends the delegation chain model and provenance structure of draft-beyer-agent-identity-architecture-00 to the specific constraints of feather-based transport layers, and extends RFC 1149, RFC 2549, and RFC 6214 to address agent identity. It is an April 1 publication.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-03T07:09:05Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 8,
   "relevant": 0.58,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.63,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-03T12:17:32.548Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-03T12:17:32.548Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-palanisamy-scitt-aac-otel",
   "title": "OpenTelemetry Correlation Extension for Agent Action Capsules",
   "abstract": "This document defines org.agentactioncapsule.otel, a namespaced payload extension for the Agent Action Capsule profile. The extension carries OpenTelemetry trace and span context alongside a sealed agent-action record so that the Capsule and the observability spans describing the same action can be joined after the fact. It maps the OpenTelemetry Generative AI semantic conventions onto Capsule fields where a mapping is well defined and states which OpenTelemetry values MUST NOT enter a Capsule at all. The extension does not alter Capsule verification: a verifier that does not implement it treats the block as informational.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-03T03:06:11Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 15,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.62,
   "centrality": 1.89,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-03T06:17:30.058Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-03T06:17:30.058Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-fane-opena2a-aap",
   "title": "OpenA2A Agent Authorization Protocol (AAP)",
   "abstract": "This document defines the OpenA2A Agent Authorization Protocol (AAP), a protocol for authorization in AI agent systems. AAP provides mechanisms for agent identity assertion, scoped capability grants, cross-agent delegation, behavioral attestation, cross-organizational federation, and revocation propagation. AAP is the authorization complement to agent communication protocols such as A2A and the Model Context Protocol, in the same way that OAuth 2.0 complements HTTP for web applications. AAP has two layers. The token model, defined in this document, specifies the AAP credentials and assertions: what they contain, how they are signed, and how they are verified. A companion broker and resolution layer specifies how an agent obtains and exercises a grant without the credential value ever entering the agent's reasoning context. This confinement property, that no secret, temporary credential, or backend identifier reaches the agent or the model behind it, is the primary design goal of the protocol. This revision adds a structured, mandatory-to-understand \"authorization_details\" claim with a typed entry registry and a per- type attenuation relation for delegation, an \"aap_crit\" claim naming the claims a verifier must understand, a \"cnf\" claim binding a token to the presenter's key, a session label in the behavioral attestation claim, and a local grant revocation list.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-02T15:46:09Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.96,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T18:17:32.343Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-02T18:17:32.343Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sharif-x509-agent-identity-profile",
   "title": "X.509 Certificate Profile for Autonomous AI Agent Identity",
   "abstract": "This document defines an X.509 certificate profile for identifying autonomous AI agents. It specifies a new X.509v3 extension, AgentIdentity, that encodes agent-specific metadata within a standard X.509 certificate, including agent trust level, operational capabilities, delegation constraints, owner attribution, and revocation control endpoints. The profile enables certificate authorities (CAs) to issue interoperable agent identity certificates that any relying party can parse, validate, and enforce, regardless of the issuing CA or the platform that provisioned the agent. The design builds on existing PKI infrastructure (RFC 5280), SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Documents (SPIFFE SVIDs), and the MCPS cryptographic signing layer (draft-sharif-mcps-secure-mcp). It does not require changes to X.509v3 certificate parsing or to existing CA issuance pipelines beyond supporting a new non-critical extension.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-10-02T10:32:50Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.95,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wei-aic-jwt",
   "title": "AI Agent Identity Certificate (AIC) JSON Web Token Profile",
   "abstract": "The AI Agent Identity Certificate (AIC) defines a data model in which the cryptographic identity of an AI agent is bound to a responsible principal, together with a structured capability container, delegation mode, authorization constraints, and principal-signed delegation evidence. The normative definition of this model is specified by the AIC specification, where it is encoded in ASN.1 and carried in X.509 certificates, enabling authorization decisions at the transport layer, including fully offline operation. Many HTTP, web, and OAuth 2.0 (RFC 6749) deployments cannot present X.509 certificates at the transport layer. This document therefore defines AIC-JWT as a JWT-based application-layer representation of the AIC data model defined by the AIC specification. AIC-JWT is a companion representation, not a replacement for the X.509 form and not a new authorization model. AIC-JWT uses the standard JWT (RFC 7519) and JWS (RFC 7515) mechanisms as its carrier and cryptographic envelope. Its authorization semantics are inherited from the AIC model rather than defined by JWT or OAuth. In particular, the outer AIC-JWT is issuer- signed and carries the principal-signed DA JWT as the value of the top-level da claim, preserving the two-layer signature model of AIC. The normative content of this document is limited to: * a mapping from the X.509 AIC extension fields to JWT claims that preserves the AIC data model and its two-layer signature model; * representation and key-binding rules for the principal-signed DelegationAuthorization; * validation rules for AIC-JWT, including claim consistency, audience, and key-binding checks; and * a thin OAuth 2.0 consumption profile defining presentation of the DA at a token endpoint as an RFC 7523 JWT bearer authorization grant and the projection of the AIC authorized and representative delegation modes into OAuth roles.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-02T07:21:28Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 50,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.71,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-laplante-av-air-routing-en",
   "title": "AV-AI.R: A.V.AN Vectorized Artificial Intelligence Routing -- Eco-Responsible Transmission of IP Packets between AI Agents via Carriers Augmented by Artificial Intelligence",
   "abstract": "This memo amends RFC 2549 \"IP over Avian Carriers with Quality of Service\" by introducing an eco-responsible inter-AI communication channel based on carriers whose cognitive capabilities have been augmented by embedded language models (edge-LLM). AV-AI.R defines the communication protocol between artificial intelligence agents via carriers equipped with miniaturized transformer neurons, offering a low-carbon-footprint alternative to conventional data centers. This protocol is not recommended for production use, except in the event of fiber outage or major ecological crisis. This memo is an experimental protocol document submitted as an Independent Submission in the tradition of RFC 1149 and RFC 2549.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-02T07:09:04Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 13,
   "relevant": 0.52,
   "domain": "protocols",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.94,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-wei-aic-identity-cert",
   "title": "AI Agent Identity Certificate (AIC) Extension for X.509 v3",
   "abstract": "This document defines the AI Agent Identity Certificate (AIC) Extension for X.509 v3 certificates. The AIC extension enables binding of an AI Agent's cryptographic identity to a natural person (principal), providing cryptographic evidence that can support attribution of AI-autonomous actions to a principal. This specification intentionally separates cryptographic delegation from authorization semantics: AIC defines the cryptographic binding between agent and principal, while all capability and policy semantics are defined externally by vendors, industries, or regulators. The extension is identified by the IANA Private Enterprise Number 66257 assigned to the document author's organization. The AIC extension carries agent identity fields (agentId, delegationMode), a principal identifier (principalUid) linking the agent to the authorizing principal, a container-based capability declaration, authorization boundary constraints, and delegation authorization evidence with replay protection. A companion PrincipalAuthorization extension anchors Principal-side grant declarations and delegation policies. An authorizationConstraints container provides offline-verifiable execution boundaries (IP range, window). An extensibility framework allows vendor-specific and user- specific metadata. This document specifies the ASN.1 module, OID registration, field semantics, delegation model, and extensibility framework. Security considerations for deployment in regulated enterprise environments are discussed.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-10-02T06:31:58Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 52,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "identity",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-02T12:17:34.731Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-nirvanai-nbtp-behavioral-trust",
   "title": "NirvanAI Behavioral Trust Protocol (NBTP)",
   "abstract": "The NirvanAI Behavioral Trust Protocol (NBTP) defines a cryptographic framework for continuous attestation of AI agent behavioral integrity in distributed networks. NBTP treats trust as a volatile, time- decaying state variable measured by an oracle-federated layer of independent scanner nodes. Unlike static credential systems that answer \"Is this agent authorized?\", NBTP answers \"Is this agent currently acting like itself?\" Identity systems confirm who sent a message. NBTP confirms whether the sender is still the entity that earned that identity. Trust computation is performed locally by each verifying party using signed attestations from independent oracle scanners; no centralized policy engine or authorization server is required at verification time. NBTP introduces a temporal decay model with context-dependent decay rates, a four-state trust machine (PROBATIONARY, TRUSTED, SUSPECT, QUARANTINED), cross-context co-silence detection, and a genesis bootstrapping mechanism (Creole gate) using formal CHALLENGE/RESPONSE packet types. Absence of attestation data is treated as a security- relevant signal. This document specifies the protocol wire format, state machine, decay model, security properties, and IANA considerations. Implementation-specific measurement heuristics are out of scope.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-10-01T21:24:59Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 43,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-02T00:17:32.120Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-02T00:17:32.120Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-seymour-wimse-connected-flight",
   "title": "Zero Trust Fabric Layer Agent-to-Agent Chained Trust on a Connected Flight",
   "abstract": "The Zero Trust Fabric Layer (ZTFL) verified a single autonomous agent issuing a single request. It did not address what happens when that agent delegates its authority to a second agent, or a third, a pattern already standard in multi-agent orchestration. Existing delegation mechanisms do not close this gap. OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange represents prior actors as claims that are informational only for access control decisions. Classical logic-based and relationship-based authorization models were built for stable, long- lived principals and do not enforce a tenant boundary at the specific hop where it is crossed, nor do they bind every hop in a chain to a single expiring credential established at the chain's origin. This document extends ZTFL with a chained authorization model, structured on the mechanics of international travel. An immutable Passport establishes identity for the full journey. A Ticket, issued once at task initiation as a conditional ephemeral credential, binds every subsequent hop to the same authorized chain; a locally valid-looking Boarding Pass that cannot trace back to it is rejected regardless of appearance. A per-hop Boarding Pass, a child ephemeral token derived from and traceable to the Ticket, authorizes each leg. A Visa, an explicit and narrowly scoped grant, is required only at the moment a hop crosses a tenant boundary the Passport alone cannot cross. The model is formalized as a boundary-conditional evaluation function, implemented and validated against the Cedar policy language, and compared directly against OAuth Token Exchange, delegation logic, and relationship-based authorization on two properties none of them enforce structurally: chain-wide traceability to a single origin, and containment at the boundary itself. This revision further shows that the model's per-hop Boarding Pass structurally resists mid-chain redirection, including redirection caused by prompt injection reaching an intermediate agent, because issuing a Boarding Pass requires standing the redirected agent never holds and cannot acquire by altering its own behavior.",
   "full": true,
   "rev": "06",
   "time": "2026-10-01T17:08:56Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 26,
   "relevant": 0.83,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.89,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T18:17:57.752Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T18:17:57.752Z"
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-interim-effectuation-validation",
   "title": "Authority Is Earned from the Real Path, Not Granted Per Session: Receipt-Gated Interim Effectuation Validation for AI Agents, Frontier AI Model Providers, and Autonomous Systems",
   "abstract": "Authority to cause a real-world effect should not be granted for a whole session; it should be earned, one bounded step at a time, from the real path itself. This document specifies an experimental architecture for controlling consequential external effects produced by agentic, autonomous, and conventional computing systems, and is addressed in particular to operators of AI machines and to frontier AI model providers. It separates a proposed act from authority to make that act effective, permits a real bounded effect to occur, obtains protected evidence of what actually occurred, independently evaluates that evidence in an Interim Effectuation Validator (IEV), and makes a later effect technically dependent on a protected continuation condition. The validator does not relay the original command, and if trustworthy evidence is missing the system holds or quarantines the act instead of retrying it. The architecture supports single-phase, two-phase, and multi-phase operation; human, automatic, and hybrid escalation; crash and indeterminate-state reconciliation; validator-integrity hardening; conflicting-evidence handling; effectuation-time revocation; taint and provenance propagation; privilege-separated credential surrogation; and software, hardware, virtual-machine, operating-system, destination- native, quorum, and tokenless realizations. The document defines an abstract protocol and conformance model rather than one mandatory transport or serialization. It also specifies implementation-invariance rules so that changing component placement, token representation, operating system, proxy topology, validator location, or credential representation does not by itself change the functional sequence when the required security properties are preserved. Patent pending: the concept described in this document is the subject of Indian Patent Office application number 202631117633, \"Systems and Methods for Cryptographically Staged Effectuation with Verified Partial Effect, Receipt-Bound Full Effectuation, and Software- Hardware Enforcement\".",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-01T08:04:49Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 206,
   "relevant": 0.83,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.58,
   "centrality": 1.26,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:21.553Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:21.553Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-receipt-gated-iev",
   "title": "Evidence Is the Key, Not the Log: Receipt-Gated Staged Effectuation and Interim Effectuation Validation for AI Agents, Frontier AI Model Providers, and Autonomous Systems",
   "abstract": "Authority to cause a real-world effect should not exist on a machine until the real path has shown that it is safe. This document describes an experimental execution-control architecture for agentic, autonomous, and conventional computing systems, and is addressed in particular to operators of AI machines and to frontier AI model providers. A proposed act is separated from authority to make the act consequential. The architecture supports single-phase protected effectuation, a bounded real first effect followed by receipt-gated continuation, and arbitrary multi-phase progression. In the Interim Effectuation Validator (IEV) profile, protected evidence of an earlier real effect is not a log but a structural dependency: it is independently evaluated before a protected continuation condition for a later effect is established, and the validator does not relay the original command. If trustworthy evidence is missing, the system holds or quarantines the act instead of retrying it. The document also describes taint and provenance propagation, protected origin attribution, surrogate or non-exportable credential references, boundary credential resolution, privilege-separated connector execution, human and automatic remediation, crash and indeterminate-state reconciliation, anti-bypass requirements, tokenless and cryptographic continuation, and software, virtual- machine, operating-system, mobile, application, network, transaction, hardware, destination-side, and distributed realizations. The architecture is defined by functional relationships rather than by a particular product name, operating system, validator placement, token format, proxy, or credential representation. Patent pending: the concept described in this document is the subject of Indian Patent Office application number 202631117633, \"Systems and Methods for Cryptographically Staged Effectuation with Verified Partial Effect, Receipt-Bound Full Effectuation, and Software- Hardware Enforcement\".",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-01T08:04:12Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 214,
   "relevant": 0.8,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.45,
   "centrality": 1.19,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:21.553Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:21.553Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-safety-first-execution-finality",
   "title": "A Permit to Effect Once Is Not a Permit to Effect Permanently: Reality as a Cryptographic Dependency for AI Machines, Frontier AI Model Providers, and Critical Systems",
   "abstract": "A permit to effect once is not a permit to effect permanently. An approval, a policy decision, or one successful effect is not standing authority for a larger or repeated one. For AI machines and frontier AI models that can now act in the world, this separates a contained mistake from an irreversible one. Today, security checks who is asking, inspects a token, opens the gate, and hopes that the downstream network path, destination, or physical machine is safe. AI agents now send messages and files, move money, change production infrastructure, invoke tools, update model and memory state, release sensitive data, and drive vehicles, robots, and industrial equipment. Approval can show that an action was allowed in principle without showing that the exact action reaches the right recipient, device, or outcome. Simulations and dry-runs do not close this gap, because a simulation can pass in a clean sandbox while the real target, route, or actuator has been hijacked. Logs do not close it either, because a log explains a disaster after it has happened. This document makes reality a cryptographic dependency. The full- consequence command is held in a state that cannot execute. First, a deliberately bounded real effect is produced on the exact operational path: a trailing capsule, one record, a payment hold, a canary deployment, a constrained session, or a millimetre of actuator movement. The destination, transaction system, network element, sensor, or hardware controller then returns an Effect Confirmation Receipt. An Interim Effectuation Validator validates that receipt out of band against the intended act, nonces, epoch, scope, destination, current policy, and revocation state. Only then does it issue the continuation instruction that reconstructs the key, releases the split credential, or unlocks the hardware register for the next phase. Without the receipt, the key for full effect does not exist on the machine. Evidence is therefore a structural dependency and not a log. Two properties are central. First, the validator never relays the original command: the micro-effect proceeds independently and the validator observes the proof from a distance, so compromising an inline proxy or manipulating routing through prompt injection does not hand over the keys. Second, uncertainty is a first-class state. If a micro-effect fires but trustworthy evidence is missing, the system quarantines and refuses progression instead of retrying, so an autonomous loop cannot compound a duplicate transfer, a double commit, or an over-actuation. These properties hold under stated assumptions, including receipt integrity, path completeness, and atomic consumption of continuation authority, which the document identifies. The architecture covers single-phase and multi-phase execution; human, automatic, hybrid, threshold, and hardware-rooted approval; anti-replay and anti-substitution controls; alternate-path closure; reconciliation of indeterminate outcomes; and rollback, compensation, and safe-state handling. It consolidates thirty-five workflow profiles across communications, files, payments, databases, cloud and model deployment, AI tool invocation, data export, robotics, vehicles, UAVs, industrial control, radio and satellite systems, GPU and accelerator egress, and software and firmware activation. The Safety-First Critical-System Profile applies where avoiding catastrophic or hard-to-reverse outcomes comes before minimum latency: a deployment MUST NOT remove a validation, receipt, anti- replay, or safe-state protection merely to be faster, when protected policy classifies it as necessary for the consequence class.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-01T08:00:19Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 599,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.42,
   "centrality": 1.31,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:21.553Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:21.553Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-westerbeck-reason-protocol",
   "title": "reason:// -- A URI Scheme and Registry Protocol for Validated Agent Reasoning Artifacts",
   "abstract": "This document defines the \"reason://\" URI scheme and associated registry protocol for naming, storing, and retrieving compressed structural reasoning artifacts across distributed autonomous agent networks. An artifact enters the registry only by winning a live competitive arbitration round scored by the Web Agent Reasoning Federation (WARF) protocol. The artifact schema contains no raw data fields; the structural representation is mathematically non- invertible (empirical reconstruction rate r = 0.0149). The protocol is designed to function as open infrastructure — analogous to DNS for network addresses or HTTP for document retrieval — for the agentic internet.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-10-01T07:09:07Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 11,
   "relevant": 0.85,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.61,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-krausz-verification-state",
   "title": "The verification.* Constraint Family: Pre-Action Fail-Closed Gates for AI Agent Decisions",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the verification.* constraint family --- a pre-action, fail-closed gate primitive for AI agent decisions, sibling in shape to the environment.* family used in Verifiable Intent specifications. A verification.* receipt is a JSON Web Signature (JWS) signed artifact carrying a canonical input, a derived binary act/halt output, and a versioned mapping identifier that binds them. A relying party recomputes the gate locally from signed primitives under the named mapping; the verifier never trusts the issuer's runtime. This revision replaces the raw verdict domain of draft-krausz- verification-state-01 (supported/refuted/unverifiable/unknown) with a four-state vocabulary --- verified, contradicted, indeterminate, and not_evaluated --- together with a reason-code mechanism that separates a state's substance from a verifier's own instrument failure, and with an admissibility gate applied before a state is ever assigned. It adds evidence pinning: a receipt MAY carry an evidence_set block that content-addresses the sources considered during verification, so that a verdict can be recomputed offline from the receipt and the pinned bytes alone, without depending on a live retrieval provider. Freshness is anchored to the evidence's own retrieved_at timestamp rather than a separately declared validity window. This shape provides decision explainability and traceability evidence aligned with EU AI Act Article 12 record-keeping obligations and with the Decision Explainability tier of an industry Zero Trust for AI Agents framework published in 2026. The format is forward- compatible across mapping revisions: receipts signed under one mapping ID remain verifiable as correct-under-that-mapping after newer mappings ship. The vectors that content-address a mapping document or an evidence set are historical, digest-anchored artifacts and are unchanged by this revision; nothing in this document alters a previously issued digest.",
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-10-01T00:58:29Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 45,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 1.84,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mo-cats-agent-selection-mapping",
   "title": "A Selection Mapping Framework for AI Agent Services in Computing-Aware Traffic Steering",
   "abstract": "The Computing-Aware Traffic Steering (CATS) framework selects a service contact instance for a service request by combining computing and network metrics that are distributed by CATS Service Metric Agents and CATS Network Metric Agents. For AI agent services, the request that arrives at the network is not a single unit of work: it is a session that expands into multiple steps, each of which may require a different capability, a different state, and a different path. This document describes a mapping framework that turns the characteristics of an agent step into (1) a set of hard constraints and (2) a per-dimension valuation over a three-dimensional resource view composed of forwarding, computing, and storage, and that feeds the resulting suitability of each candidate service contact instance into the existing CATS selection function. The framework introduces no new functional component.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-09-30T03:23:06Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 45,
   "relevant": 0.69,
   "domain": "netmgmt",
   "domain_conf": 0.77,
   "centrality": 1.63,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-rosenberg-vcon-redaction",
   "title": "Use Cases and Requirements for Redaction in VCON",
   "abstract": "The Virtualized Conversations (VCON) specification defines a standardized object format for representing multimedia conversations between users and AI agents. Recent work has expanded VCON to enable it to been used to capture sessions with AI Agents as well, including tool calls, reasoning steps, model configuration and more. This has also expanded the set of use cases and requirements for redaction of sensitive information from a VCON. This document outlines use cases and requirements for redaction in VCONs. This document is meant for discusssion purposes. All of this document was written by the author and not by an LLM.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-09-29T20:30:13Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 12,
   "relevant": 0.71,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.79,
   "centrality": 1.13,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-anandakrishnan-rats-ptv-agent-identity",
   "title": "The Prove-Transform-Verify (PTV) Protocol for Attested Agent Identity",
   "abstract": "This document describes the Prove-Transform-Verify (PTV) protocol for hardware-anchored attestation of AI agent identity. PTV enables an agent to prove, at exercise time, that it is bound to an enrolled attestation key and an authorized configuration, without exposing model weights or inference inputs. PTV is a thin request/response profile over the RATS architecture (RFC 9334) and the Entity Attestation Token (RFC 9711). It does not replace workload identifiers such as SPIFFE or WIMSE. It does not attest behavioral continuity; behavioral continuity is a separate requirement class that relying parties need to treat as such. This revision is intended as Experimental. It defines a common CBOR/ CDDL message set, four message types, a COSE-based message protection rule, an informative EAT claim mapping, and a threat model that separates identity binding integrity from behavioral continuity.",
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-09-29T15:23:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 23,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.9,
   "centrality": 1.92,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-agentic-ai-tool-execution-finality",
   "title": "Execution Finality for Agentic AI: Stopping Unauthorized Tool Calls, Memory Writes, and Real-World Consequences Before They Happen (DAS -- Decoupled Authorisation System)",
   "abstract": "Agentic AI systems now call tools, write memory, move money, change infrastructure, and trigger physical actions. Most safety layers still decide permission upstream and then trust the downstream path. Once that path is compromised, or once the approved request is widened, replayed, or substituted, the act becomes real before any audit can stop it. This document specifies a protected execution-finality architecture of the Decoupled Authorisation System (DAS). It is built on four mechanisms: (1) two-instance binding that separates collection-time evidence from execution-time validation, (2) mutually load-bearing, cross-committed protected evidence so that no single artifact authorizes effectuation, (3) scoped non-bearer finality authority whose possession alone is never enough, and (4) independent Finality Sink reconstruction that re-derives the actual pending operation at the effectuation boundary and permits the act only when every required condition still matches. A Candidate Act remains in a Non-Effective State until the Finality Sink has reconstructed the operation, verified the protected evidence against sink-local monotonic state, and advanced that state. Failure at any step produces fail-closed denial before effectuation rather than post-event remediation. The architecture is applicable to agentic tool use, MCP and connector frameworks, RAG and vector-memory systems, cloud control planes, financial settlement, telecom routing, and cyber-physical control. The document elaborates the problem space, compares the approach with representative existing techniques, presents the detailed solution and its advantages, supplies JSON Schema definitions for core protected objects, and includes an industry-relevance section. Related Indian provisional applications and PCT filings appear in the final appendix.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:43:35Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 30,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.93,
   "centrality": 1.91,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ot-actuation-finality",
   "title": "A Setpoint Write Is Not Actuation: Finality for ICS, Grid, and Robot Command",
   "abstract": "Industrial systems already know how to move a breaker, a valve, a robot joint, or a turbine setpoint. They do not know whether this write — this tag, this value, this device, from this operator session or this agent — is the write that was authorized to become motion. A signed OPC UA call, a valid DNP3 control, an IEC 61850 command, or an MQTT publish onto the plant bus can all be protocol-correct while the act is wrong. The protocol authenticates a channel. It does not bind a Candidate Act at the actuation sink. That gap is now an agent gap. Copilots sit on historians and work- order text. They propose \"explain this alarm\" and then \"set this point.\" If the gateway treats a well-formed write as authority, reconstruction of plant state becomes physical consequence. Past incidents stole engineering workstations. Present incidents steal the jump host or the agent seat. Future incidents let the model format the command. This document specifies an OT-side execution-finality profile. A write remains an Actuation Candidate Act. A Protected Enforcement Domain binds principal, zone, device, tag, value envelope, mode (local/remote, auto/manual), safety interlock state, policy epoch, and intended actuation sink, then commits evidence before scoped non- bearer authority is issued. The sink that would actually drive I/O verifies that authority against the live write and consumes it. A setpoint write is not actuation.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:43:26Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 21,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.96,
   "centrality": 1,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-global-privacy-execution-enforcement",
   "title": "Technical Enforcement of the European GDPR and Global Data-Protection Constraints Without Paper Policy",
   "abstract": "The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), China's Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL), and India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDP Act) each require, in their own terms, that personal data be used only for a specified purpose, be limited to what is necessary, be kept secure, and remain subject to the data subject's or regulator's ability to hold a controller accountable. Every one of these regimes is currently enforced primarily through paper: privacy notices, consent records, data-processing agreements, internal policies, access-control configurations, and audits performed after data has already moved. Paper policy fails in the age of artificial intelligence because it assumes a human-speed decision that no longer exists. An agentic AI system can authenticate, read from several lawfully accessible data sources, combine those sources into a new relationship that was never separately assessed, choose a purpose, select a recipient or an international destination, and transmit the result -- all within a single inference pass, before any privacy officer, consent record, contract clause, or after-the-fact audit log can intervene. A GDPR purpose-limitation clause, a PIPL processing-purpose restriction, or a DPDP consent-manager rule can be entirely correct on paper and still fail in practice, because none of them is a property of the computation itself; each is a property of a document that the computation is merely expected to obey. By the time an audit trail shows that Article 5(1)(b) of the GDPR, the purpose-limitation principle of the PIPL, or the purpose-limitation requirement of the DPDP Act was violated, the disclosure, the cross-border transfer, or the unauthorized combination of data has already occurred and cannot be undone. This document introduces an execution-finality architecture that converts an already-determined privacy rule from a document into a mandatory, machine-verifiable precondition of the computer operation itself. A proposed privacy-sensitive operation is represented as a Candidate Act and is held in a Non-Effective State -- technically incapable of disclosing, transmitting, or combining protected data -- until a Protected Enforcement Domain conjunctively validates the requesting Virtual Identity (VI), the applicable purpose and jurisdictional constraints represented as a Compliance Jurisdiction Token or Structure (CJT/CJS), the minimum required data attributes, the recipient, and the destination, and a Finality Sink positioned at the boundary of first usable external effect independently reverifies that state immediately before release. Non-Joinable Vaults further ensure that holding a valid credential or an authenticated AI session does not, by itself, grant authority to recombine separated categories of personal data. A worked example applies the architecture to a small-or-medium enterprise (SME) AI customer-service deployment, including a prompt- injection scenario in which a manipulated AI agent is technically prevented from exfiltrating payment and identity data regardless of what the model was tricked into generating. A feasibility and latency analysis shows the mechanism can be deployed as ordinary gateway middleware without replacing existing identity or SaaS infrastructure. The document then provides a deliberately bounded mapping onto specific GDPR provisions (Articles 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c), 5(1)(f), 6, 25, 32, and Chapter V), stating plainly which provisions this architecture can make technically load-bearing and which -- such as the legal validity of a basis for processing, or the lawfulness of an international transfer mechanism -- must remain a legal and regulatory determination that no software can make on its own. This document does not advocate discarding paper-based privacy policy, consent management, contractual controls, or audit for general-purpose applications, where the cost, rigidity, and operational overhead of execution-level enforcement would be",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:43:14Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 90,
   "relevant": 0.79,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.9,
   "centrality": 1.26,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-ai-native-6g-execution-finality",
   "title": "Execution-Finality for AI-Native 5G/6G and O-RAN",
   "abstract": "In programmable and AI-assisted mobile networks, successful authentication of a network function or AI controller does not establish authority for every routing, signaling, session, resource- allocation, sensing, or subscriber-specific consequence that the function can generate. This document defines an informational execution-finality profile for AI-native 5G, 5G-Advanced, IMT-2030/6G, O-RAN, and AI-RAN environments. A proposed network operation is represented as a Network Candidate Act and remains in a Non-Effective State while a Protected Enforcement Domain validates act-specific predicates. Protected validation evidence is committed before, or atomically with, release of scoped non-bearer finality authority. A Network Finality Sink at the enforcement boundary independently verifies that authority immediately before live network state changes. The governing rule is that network authentication is not network finality, and computation is not authority. This revision also defines a JSON interoperability profile for Candidate Acts, validation decisions, scoped authority, and sink verification. This profile is distinct from, and complementary to, present AI- native 6G industry roadmaps that focus on radio, sensing, and platform capability, including air-interface, MIMO, spectrum, and AI- RAN infrastructure work described in Qualcomm's public AI-native 6G platform material, and the broad native-trustworthiness and agentic- core-network architectures described in Huawei's public 6G security research. Those efforts address how a network becomes more intelligent, autonomous, and platform-trustworthy. This document addresses a narrower and later question: once an already- authenticated, already-policy-approved AI-generated network operation has been computed, whether that exact operation may become a live network consequence. The Candidate Act, Non-Effective State, Protected Enforcement Domain, and Finality Sink constructs defined here, as an explicit pre-effectuation gate with act-bound non-bearer authority and independent sink-side re-verification, are not established as an equivalent primitive in publicly reviewed material from those roadmaps.",
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:42:34Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 59,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.68,
   "centrality": 1.22,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-payment-execution-finality",
   "title": "A Signed Instruction Is Not Settlement: Finality for Agentic and API Payments",
   "abstract": "Payment rails already know how to move money. They do not know whether this generated instruction — this amount, this beneficiary, this rail, this purpose, from this agent or API worker — is the instruction that was authorized to move. A signed ISO 20022 message, an OAuth token on a PSP, a stored mandate, or a pass through 3-D Secure can all be valid while the act is wrong. The signature authenticates a channel. It does not bind a Candidate Act at the settlement sink. That gap is now an agent gap. A model that can call payout.create, a RPA job that submits ACH, or a checkout agent that captures a card will treat tool selection as settlement authority. Fraud used to steal credentials and replay files. It now steals a seat or injects a document and asks the authorized worker to pay a new beneficiary at the old amount, or the old beneficiary at a new amount. This document specifies a payment-side execution-finality profile. An instruction remains a Payment Candidate Act. A Protected Enforcement Domain binds principal, wallet or account, amount, currency, beneficiary, rail, purpose, policy epoch, and intended settlement sink, then commits evidence before scoped non-bearer authority is issued. The sink that would actually post, capture, or release funds verifies that authority against the live instruction and consumes it. A signed instruction is not settlement.",
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:42:18Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 42,
   "relevant": 0.88,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.96,
   "centrality": 1.39,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-execution-finality-protocol-layer",
   "title": "The Missing Protocol Layer for the Agentic Internet: Computation Is Not Authority",
   "abstract": "TLS tells you the channel is authentic. OAuth tells you the caller holds a valid grant. HTTPS tells you the origin is who it claims to be. EMV tells you a payment cryptogram is transaction-specific. None of these mechanisms answer a question that autonomous, machine- speed systems now raise on every turn: is _this specific act_, generated by _this_ model, agent, or workload, at _this_ moment, actually authorized to become externally effective? Large language model agents, autonomous cloud workloads, and machine- to-machine network functions increasingly compute, decide, and act inside a single event loop, at latencies where no human, log reviewer, or downstream audit process can intervene before an API call fires, a payment settles, a file leaves the enterprise boundary, or a physical actuator moves. Transport, authentication, and authorization protocols were designed for a world in which the gap between \"this request was generated\" and \"this request had a chance to be reviewed\" was measured in human-relevant time. That gap has collapsed to milliseconds. Existing protocol layers were never built to close it, because the question they answer -- identity, channel integrity, delegated scope -- is a necessary but categorically different question from whether _this act, right now, should be allowed to leave computation and become consequence_. This document specifies an architectural pattern, execution finality, that treats every machine-generated operation as a Candidate Act held in a Non-Effective State until a Protected Enforcement Domain validates act-specific authority -- purpose, destination, jurisdiction, freshness, revocation state, policy epoch, and runtime integrity -- and issues a narrowly scoped, non-bearer Execution Handle bound to that act and to a specific Finality Sink, the first boundary at which the act would otherwise become externally effective. The document formalizes the vocabulary, a cold-path/hot- path split for latency-sensitive deployment, a structured threat model with adversary-facing pseudocode, an incremental migration path for coexistence with TLS, HTTPS, OAuth, and EMV rather than replacement of them, and worked examples spanning AI agents, payments, telecommunications, cloud infrastructure, satellite command, industrial control, and robotics. The central claim is narrow and falsifiable: _computation does not itself confer authority for consequence_, and no general, cross- domain Internet layer currently makes that separation a structural property of the release path rather than an application-specific convention. This document is intended to solicit IETF community review of whether that gap is real, whether it is already covered by existing or in-progress work, and if not, which venue should take it up. This document describes a patent-pending architectural concept. Any intellectual-property rights or disclosure obligations relating to implementation are outside the technical scope of this document and are subject to applicable IETF IPR procedures, including BCP 79.",
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:41:58Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 75,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.9,
   "centrality": 1.04,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-eu-ai-act-execution-enforcement",
   "title": "Technical Enforcement of the EU AI Act and Global AI Laws for High-Risk AI Systems Without Relying on Paper Policies",
   "abstract": "This architecture is specifically designed for high-risk AI systems, where standard engineering priorities shift from speed and latency toward absolute determinism and safety. The European Union Artificial Intelligence Act establishes an extensive paper-based governance regime for artificial intelligence: risk-management documentation, data-governance records, conformity assessments, human-oversight instructions, transparency notices, logging obligations, and post-market monitoring plans. These instruments are necessary, and this document does not propose to discard them. They are not, however, sufficient by themselves once an AI system can autonomously or semi-autonomously act at machine speed, because a document can only describe what an operation should do; it cannot, by itself, make an operation technically incapable of doing otherwise. This is not a problem unique to the European Union. South Korea's AI Basic Act regulates \"high-impact AI\" through comparable risk- management, human-oversight, and documentation duties. Japan's AI Act, in force since September 2025, takes a lighter, more promotion- oriented approach but still assumes that written governance is the primary control. China enforces a binding but differently structured set of algorithm-recommendation, deep-synthesis, generative-AI, and AI-content-labelling rules. Texas and Colorado have each enacted state-level AI statutes in the United States with disclosure and consequential-decision obligations, and Brazil's PL 2338/2023 and Canada's lapsed AIDA proposal show the same EU-style risk-based model spreading, whether or not yet enacted. Every one of these regimes, whatever their legal differences, shares the identical underlying engineering gap this document addresses: a written rule, however well drafted, does not by itself make a machine unable to break it before anyone can react. The gap is most consequential precisely where the stakes are highest. In defence-relevant AI, critical-infrastructure control systems, and satellite or space-system automation, an autonomous agent can select a target, reroute power or water, transfer control of a physical asset, or transmit a command to an orbital platform within a single inference cycle -- before any operator, reviewer, regulator, or after-the-fact investigation can intervene. If that act causes harm, two questions follow immediately: who is liable, and at what cost. A risk-management file, a conformity-assessment certificate, or an audit log written after the fact can show that a rule existed; none of them can show that the machine was technically incapable of breaking it, and none of them limits the cost already incurred by the time the record is examined. For these classes of system, the appropriate default when an authorization cannot be verified is not \"log it and investigate later\"; it is fail-closed: the act simply does not occur. This document describes an execution-finality architecture that converts a selected, already-determined AI-governance requirement from a document into a mandatory, machine-verifiable precondition of the AI-generated operation itself. A consequential AI-generated operation is first represented as a Candidate Act and is held in a Non-Effective State -- technically incapable of invoking a tool, actuating a device, transmitting a command, or otherwise causing an external consequence -- until a Protected Enforcement Domain validates the machine-readable constraints applicable to that exact act, including the AI system identity, permitted operation, target, recipient, destination, required human-oversight state, transparency marker, risk-control status, policy epoch, and revocation state. Successful validation produces narrowly scoped, act-bound effectuation authority; a Finality Sink positioned at the point of first usable external effect independently re-verifies that exact authority, and the current required state, immediately before the consequence is permitted to occur. Absent, stale,",
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:40:55Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 112,
   "relevant": 0.85,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.95,
   "centrality": 1.94,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-agentic-execution-finality",
   "title": "Tool Selection Is Not Execution: Finality for Agentic Tool Dispatch in High-Risk AI Systems",
   "abstract": "This architecture is specifically designed for high-risk AI systems, where standard engineering priorities shift from speed and latency toward absolute determinism and safety. An agentic model can emit a tool call that today's runtimes treat as something to execute. Allowlists, OAuth tokens, MCP server auth, sandboxes, output filters, and human approval decide whether an agent may reach a tool. They do not decide whether this generated call, with this argument digest, from this instruction chain, at this delegation depth, may take effect now. That gap is the incident surface. Prompt-injected content, poisoned retrieval, a malicious tool response, or a delegated sub-agent can produce a call that looks like ordinary tool use. If the dispatcher executes whatever the model selected, policy that lived upstream becomes advisory. This document specifies a dispatch-time gate. The model may compute a call. The call remains a Candidate Act. A Protected Enforcement Domain binds agent, tool, arguments, purpose, destination, provenance, and policy epochs, then issues scoped non-bearer authority. A Tool-Dispatch Finality Sink verifies that authority against the actual invocation immediately before the tool runs, then consumes it. The same gate applies to support, coding, payments, clinical, SOC, browser-use, and multi-agent MCP deployments. Tool selection is not execution authority. A runnable reference implementation for this dispatch-time gate is provided at tool_use Is Not invoke(): Binding Execution-Finality to Agentic Tool-Call Interfaces and MCP (https://github.com/sangmdas/ tool_use-Is-Not-invoke-Binding-Execution-Finality-to-Agentic-Tool- Call-Interfaces-and-MCP).",
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:40:40Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 25,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-rats-attestation-bnd-execution-finality",
   "title": "Attestation-Bound Execution Finality for GPU, AI Accelerator, DPU, SmartNIC, and Confidential-Computing Infrastructure",
   "abstract": "Remote attestation can establish that a CPU, confidential virtual machine, GPU, AI accelerator, DPU, or SmartNIC is running expected firmware and software in an expected configuration. However, an acceptable Attestation Result describes the execution environment, not the operations it later emits; it remains the same whether subsequent workload outputs arise from expected logic, prompt injection, or model error. As AI workloads become agentic and move onto confidential accelerator infrastructure, they emit high- consequence operations, such as financial transfers, cloud-control mutations, database deletions, and external API invocations, where platform trustworthiness alone cannot determine whether a concrete operation is authorized to take effect. OAuth access tokens, transaction tokens, and workload credentials do not close this gap on their own: they typically authorize by scope and by possession of a credential rather than by the exact content of one operation, and they do not require that the protected effect be unreachable except through a verifying boundary. This document describes an attestation-bound execution-finality architecture that bridges platform appraisal and consequence-bearing authorization. A consequential operation originates in a non- effective state as a Candidate Act. An Execution-Finality Validator evaluates the act's security-relevant arguments together with the platform's Attestation Result, workload identity, and policy, and issues an act-bound, single-use, non-bearer Execution Handle. A Finality Sink verifies that handle at the non-bypassable boundary where the operation would first acquire external effect, so that an authorized act cannot be swapped, mutated, or replayed. The architecture requires no changes to silicon, microcode, firmware, drivers, or accelerator programming models, and it separates concerns: platforms such as NVIDIA confidential-computing GPUs and BlueField DPUs, Arm Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA), AMD SEV- SNP, and Intel TDX supply environment appraisal on the cold path, while enforcement is placed at the gateway, service-mesh, DPU or SmartNIC, network, or storage boundary. On the hot path, verification uses local cryptographic bindings and single-use checks rather than repeated attestation round trips. The document discusses its relationship to RATS, WIMSE, OAuth, and related IETF work, and its engineering FAQ addresses platform layering, DPU visibility under end-to-end encryption, tail latency, and other anticipated critical questions. It is intentionally long because it is explanatory rather than a protocol specification. The architecture is implemented, not only described. An executable reference implementation (GitHub: reference implementation, tests, benchmarks, and deployment materials, https://github.com/sangmdas/ Execution-Finality-for-GPU-AI-Accelerators-and-Confidential- Workloads) demonstrates act binding, single-use enforcement, and replay rejection in running code. It uses a software-only attester; it has not been run on any vendor's confidential-computing hardware and does not consume any vendor-issued attestation token, and vendor platforms are discussed on the basis of public documentation only. This document is vendor-neutral, neither claims nor implies review, adoption, endorsement, or affiliation by any named vendor, and complements rather than replaces existing attestation, workload- identity, and authorization mechanisms.",
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:40:27Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 114,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.94,
   "centrality": 1.02,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-execution-finality-enforcement-profiles",
   "title": "Execution Finality at External-Effect Boundaries: Enforcement Profiles for 6G, AI-Native RAN, RF, ISAC, Accelerated Compute, Devices, and Autonomous Systems",
   "abstract": "AI-native and autonomous infrastructure is increasingly able to generate, optimize, schedule, route, transmit, disclose, render, allocate, encrypt, modify network state, control radio resources, and initiate physical or machine actions without a human decision at every step. An agentic AI system may generate a tool call or machine instruction; an AI-native RAN may compute a beam, handover, power, spectrum, routing, slicing, or topology change; an integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) system may generate sensing information for release or fusion; an O-RAN xApp or rApp may generate a network- control instruction; an accelerator may produce a routing, scheduling, inference, or resource-allocation result; or an autonomous controller may prepare a cyber-physical actuation. Successful computation, authentication, attestation, access authorization, credential possession, or execution inside a trusted environment does not, by itself, establish authority for the resulting operation to become externally effective. This document describes a protected execution-finality architecture in which that distinction is machine-enforced. A proposed consequential operation is represented as a Candidate Act and remains in a Non-Effective State while a Protected Enforcement Domain establishes a machine-verifiable act descriptor, validates applicable machine-verifiable authority predicates, and performs, consumes, advances, or references applicable protected state. The resulting state is represented by an applicable protected-state representation, and Protected Validation Evidence is committed before, or atomically with, authorization of availability of a scoped non-bearer capability. The capability is machine-verifiably or cryptographically bound to the specific Candidate Act, the act descriptor or its digest, the committed validation evidence, applicable protected state, freshness constraints, permitted effectuation scope, the relevant execution-finality boundary, and the applicable Finality Sink. The Finality Sink is positioned at or before the point at which the Candidate Act would first acquire an externally meaningful consequence. Before effectuation, the Finality Sink performs a machine-enforced capability-validity check and permits the Candidate Act to cross the execution-finality boundary only when the required bindings, protected state, validation evidence, freshness conditions, and effectuation scope remain valid. Absence, expiry, revocation, exhaustion, replay, staleness, mismatch, timeout, unverifiability, indeterminacy, scope failure, binding failure, or failure of a required preceding protected operation causes the architecture to fail closed, leaving the Candidate Act non-effective. The document provides 132 detailed Enforcement Profiles that instantiate this common architecture at materially different consequence boundaries. The profiles cover agentic AI tool calls and machine instructions; AI-native RAN and RF control; integrated sensing and communication (ISAC); sensing-result, location, telemetry, and metadata release; restricted-content delivery, decryption, decoding, recommendation, and rendering; derivative, transformed, synthetic, and AI-modified content; VPN, proxy, encrypted-DNS, encrypted-session, and tunnel establishment; cyber- physical, robotic, vehicle, industrial, and actuator control; network exposure, CAPIF, northbound APIs, and operator-controlled capabilities; distributed, edge, joint communication-compute, and in- network compute; shared AI-RAN accelerators and deterministic resource isolation; O-RAN xApp, rApp, A1, E2, and O1 control paths; cloud-native and virtualized RAN; network slicing, routing, topology, service-function-chain, and autonomous-network operations; ambient, passive, batteryless, backscatter, and zero-energy IoT; device wake and RF-energy admission; dynamic spectrum occupancy and spectrum authorization; RF, millimetre-wave, sub-THz, and future-band emission; reconfigurable intelligent surfa",
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:39:02Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 262,
   "relevant": 0.93,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.69,
   "centrality": 1.26,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-enterprise-ai-enforcement-profiles",
   "title": "Securing the Enterprise Future: Technical Non-Joinability for Enterprise AI",
   "abstract": "Enterprise artificial-intelligence systems are increasingly connected to multiple organizational repositories, applications, tools, memory systems, and workflow interfaces. Representative industrial deployment classes include OpenAI ChatGPT and ChatGPT Work, Anthropic Claude, Google Gemini Enterprise, xAI Grok for Business, Microsoft Copilot and Copilot Studio, Amazon Q Business, Salesforce Agentforce, ServiceNow AI Agents, and comparable enterprise or privately deployed AI systems. These names are cited only as publicly described examples of the broader deployment class. Their inclusion does not assert that any named product implements, lacks, requires, endorses, or is vulnerable to the mechanisms described here, does not characterize undisclosed internal architectures, and does not imply that equivalent functionality is absent from an existing product or specification. The security problem considered here is not limited to theft of a pre-existing database. An enterprise-AI workload may be individually authorized to retrieve information from customer, engineering, financial, source-code, supplier, scheduling, communication, memory, and operational systems while the combination of those sources reveals a sensitive relationship or future enterprise state that no single repository contains. Conventional access control, encryption, network segmentation, database separation, confidential computing, and source-level authorization remain important, but storage separation alone does not prevent such reconstruction where the same effective authority can obtain the constituent values and freely resolve the relationships among them. The mechanism described here therefore separates not only protected data but also the authority required to create protected semantic relationships among that data. Identity components, substantive content, relationship-mapping information, reconstruction-enablement state, and authorization state may be maintained under independently controlled protection domains. A processing request establishes a bounded reconstruction authorization tied to the actual workload, execution context, session, permitted fields, permitted relationships, processing purpose, and output conditions. Each required protection domain independently determines whether its component may participate. Approved components may remain session bound, cryptographically wrapped, capability restricted, opaque, or accessible only through a mandatory mediated path. Only the specifically authorized relationships are resolved inside a protected reconstruction environment, which constructs a temporary minimum- necessary view without providing the AI workload with unrestricted authority over the underlying stores. This creates a technical distinction between authority to access information and authority to associate information. Access to an identity component and access to a content component do not, by themselves, authorize every relationship between them. The same distinction applies after computation: successful reconstruction, inference, or generation does not automatically authorize disclosure, persistence, transmission, tool invocation, database modification, payment, downstream-model use, or another external consequence. A resulting output or proposed act can remain technically non- releasable while current session, execution, association, provenance, destination, recipient, policy, revocation, and disclosure conditions are verified. Protected evidence of successful verification is committed before scoped release authority is created and checked at the actual consequence boundary. This document presents 79 Enforcement Profiles that apply the same underlying architecture to different enterprise-AI enforcement points, including multi-domain information separation, independent association authority, session-bound reconstruction, protected provenance, runtime behavioral verification, agentic tool invocation, prompt and input mediation, streaming dis",
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:37:36Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 78,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.91,
   "centrality": 1.64,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-execution-finality-ai-interoperability",
   "title": "Secure and Privacy-Preserving AI Interoperability under Article 6(7) of the European Digital Markets Act: An Execution-Finality Architecture",
   "abstract": "AI assistants increasingly interoperate with operating-system functions, applications, cloud services, payments, files, messaging, sensors, network interfaces, and device controls. In that environment, authenticating an assistant or granting it a broad permission does not by itself answer the final security question: whether this exact pending operation, with these exact parameters and this current system state, is authorized to become externally effective. Existing mechanisms such as operating-system permissions and sandboxing, application intents and typed APIs, OAuth delegated authorization, Rich Authorization Requests, sender-constrained tokens, trusted execution environments, attestation, hardware-backed keys, transaction preconditions, and audit logs address important parts of that problem. They can also be composed with the architecture described here. However, those mechanisms do not inherently require the complete sequence defined in this document: keep the proposed act non-effective, bind authority to the exact act and current protected state, re-derive the actual pending consequence at a mandatory effectuation boundary, consume freshness or budget state in a TOCTOU-resistant manner, and deny any alternate path that could cause the same protected effect without the final check. This document calls the staged operation a Candidate Act and the pre- effect condition the Non-Effective State. A Protected Execution Domain performs protected validation and may commit pre-effect validation evidence, including a LAVR. It then makes available narrowly scoped, non-bearer execution authority bound to the exact act, requester, resource, destination, policy and revocation epoch, freshness state, Finality Sink, and Effectuation Boundary. The Finality Sink is the mandatory policy-enforcement or command/commit gate that independently reconstructs the actual operation immediately before the consequence can occur. In conventional security and control terminology, the architecture combines properties associated with a reference monitor, policy enforcement point, safety interlock, command gate, actuation gate, transactional authorization check, cryptographic parameter binding, proof-of-possession or sender-constrained authority, anti-replay state, fencing or generation epochs, bounded capabilities, and a TOCTOU-resistant check-and-commit operation. The terminology is not intended to require one component name, protocol, hardware block, or packaging model; functional equivalence depends on the enforcement sequence and invariants. The design addresses prompt injection, compromised assistants or cloud infrastructure, confused-deputy behavior, replay, token theft or reuse, destination and parameter substitution, scope escalation, stale authorization, policy or revocation changes, wrong-sink presentation, alternate-path bypass, crash ambiguity, persistent- state rollback, and unauthorized consequential execution. It also supports privacy minimization by allowing a platform to expose a narrow act without granting reusable authority over an entire application or data class. For interoperability deployments, the intended result is open participation with bounded, verifiable effectuation authority: a third-party or first-party AI may propose the same class of device or service action, while the platform or service independently enforces whether the concrete action may cross the protected consequence boundary. This document describes a technical architecture and does not determine whether a particular deployment satisfies the Digital Markets Act, GDPR, the EU AI Act, or any other legal requirement. The same engineering question is relevant beyond any single assistant or mobile platform. Representative current interoperability contexts include Google Gemini on Android, where Gemini can operate as a default digital assistant and Android exposes device-assistance functions and AppFunctions-style application capabilities for use by agents and assistan",
   "rev": "05",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:37:17Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 200,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.99,
   "centrality": 1.94,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-agentic-effectuation-boundary",
   "title": "When AI Agents Hold the Keys: Threat Model and Execution-Finality Requirements for Autonomous High-Consequence Systems",
   "abstract": "AI agents are increasingly being delegated authority to invoke APIs, move money, modify enterprise state, operate infrastructure, and trigger physical actions. Existing mechanisms for authentication, authorization, proof-of-possession, attestation, request preconditions, and authorization-context propagation are necessary building blocks, but they do not by themselves establish a universal invariant that the exact consequential act approved earlier is the exact act permitted to become effective now. This document defines a threat model for autonomous high-consequence agents and identifies an effectuation-boundary gap: a request can be correctly authenticated, correctly authorized, correctly attested, and still be unsafe to execute because parameters, policy state, external prerequisites, delegation state, lineage, or the execution path changed after the earlier decision. The document describes an execution-finality architecture in which a proposed act remains non- effective until a protected enforcement point verifies exact-act binding, freshness, current policy state, anti-replay state, required provenance, and path completeness immediately before effectuation, with authority consumed in coordination with the consequential commit.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:36:44Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 31,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.83,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-accountable-autonomous-effectuation",
   "title": "AI Safety and Accountability at the Effectuation Boundary: Protocol Requirements for Autonomous Actions",
   "abstract": "Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems are increasingly moving from generating information to initiating actions that directly affect data, services, networks, infrastructure, and physical systems. At the opening of the General Debate of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned of \"technology without accountability,\" describing the concern further as \"capability without oversight\" and \"decision-making without transparency,\" and called for cooperation on AI safety risks, testing, evaluation, transparency, and common safeguards. This document examines that problem from governance intent to consequence-edge verification protocols: the corresponding technical question is how can accountability remain enforceable at the moment a machine-generated decision becomes an externally consequential action? It defines an effectuation-boundary problem in which a proposed action may be correctly authenticated and authorized upstream, yet the operation ultimately presented for execution may differ because of substitution, redirection, replay, stale authority, changed state, compromised intermediaries, or other causes. An execution-finality architecture is presented as one possible technical response. A proposed operation remains non-effective until applicable authority and protected-state conditions are satisfied, and the component controlling the external consequence verifies that the operation actually presented for effectuation corresponds to currently valid authority. This document does not define AI governance policy, and it does not imply endorsement of this architecture by the United Nations or any other institution. It is intended to solicit IETF discussion about whether effectuation-boundary accountability constitutes an interoperability or protocol requirement, which existing mechanisms can provide the required properties, and whether any additional standardization is necessary.",
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:36:36Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 47,
   "relevant": 0.86,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.45,
   "centrality": 1.56,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-agentic-adaptive-authorization",
   "title": "Adaptive Authorization for Agentic AI: Graduated and Escalated Execution Control for Critical Infrastructure",
   "abstract": "AI agents are beginning to move money, release confidential data, change cloud privileges, and command industrial and other critical- infrastructure equipment. Existing controls answer whether an actor or request may proceed. These include authentication, OAuth scopes, conditional access, risk engines, and attestation. None of them, alone, guarantees three things about the consequence that finally occurs: that it is the exact act that was evaluated, that it is still permitted under current state, and that it cannot be replayed, substituted, or routed around the check. Risk engines that return ESCALATE widen this gap. The escalation is a label, and nothing forces the stricter conditions it implies to reach the point where the effect actually happens. This document defines Graduated and Escalated Conditional Execution Finality. Every AI-generated operation is held as a non-effective Candidate Act. It is classified into a graduated release class rather than a binary allow/deny: ordinary, reduced, escalated, canary, sandbox, review, quarantine, or deny. For an elevated-risk act, the system first derives a narrower consequence boundary. It then binds the required controls into an act-bound, sink-bound Execution Handle; examples include a lower value, one named recipient, protected approval, short validity, fresh attestation, and single use. The Finality Sink at the last preventable boundary re-verifies those controls against current protected state, atomically with effectuation. The contribution is threefold. First, escalation changes executable authority, not merely a decision record. Second, escalation is monotonic: it cannot be laundered, fragmented, downgraded, or resubmitted away on its path to the sink. Third, the Finality Sink is shown to be necessary but not sufficient, so finality is an end- to-end property rather than a gateway. The document specifies nineteen testable enforcement points, from the base execution- dependency mechanism to proxy, hardware, escrow, rollback, inheritance, and path-closure requirements. It also provides a comparison with conventional mechanisms, a security model with explicit assumptions and invariants, a latency model, escalation- specific attacks, and the problems it leaves open.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:36:22Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 87,
   "relevant": 0.91,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 1,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-execution-finality-deployment",
   "title": "Execution-Finality Architecture for AI and Autonomous Critical Systems",
   "abstract": "AI models, agents, and autonomous services increasingly initiate payments, communications, data releases, infrastructure changes, and physical actions in critical systems. Authentication, authorization, human approval, proof of possession, attestation, policy evaluation, and audit are important, but none of them alone establishes that the exact operation becoming externally effective is the operation that was authorized and remains permitted under current protected state. This document defines an execution-finality architecture in which a proposed operation remains non-effective until a mandatory enforcement function controlling the effectuation boundary reconstructs the actual operation, verifies exact-act binding and current protected state, prevents replay or stale authority, and couples the decision to the resulting consequence through an atomic or equivalently crash-consistent transition. The document explains why latency is only one engineering consideration and is often not the dominant problem. Consequence-path completeness, deterministic act representation, protected state, atomicity, crash recovery, safe degraded operation, and legacy-system integration are usually harder requirements. A detailed FAQ addresses whether placing OAuth at the last irreversible execution boundary is the same architecture. It is not automatically equivalent merely because a token, scope, or sender- constrained proof is checked at that location. An OAuth-protected implementation is functionally equivalent only when it also exclusively mediates every consequence path, reconstructs and binds all consequence-relevant fields, revalidates authoritative current state, enforces replay and generation controls, atomically couples authorization consumption to the exact effect, and provides safe failure and recovery semantics. In that case, the implementation is functioning as the Finality Sink, regardless of terminology. The document also identifies the division of responsibility and possible relevance of OAuth, RATS, WIMSE, Web Bot Auth, other IETF communities, and longer-term IRTF research. This document is architectural and informational; it does not define a wire protocol.",
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:36:12Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 32,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.69,
   "centrality": 1.06,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-protocols-enterprise-ai",
   "title": "Assume the AI Server Is Already Compromised: Execution-Consequence Decoupling So a High-Risk Enterprise AI Cannot Join, Infer, or Send",
   "abstract": "Start from the assumption that the attacker already controls the AI server — that the workload is fully compromised. Not the perimeter, not a phished seat — the workload itself: its credentials, its connectors, its context window, its output path. Nearly every enterprise control in use today has already failed by that point, because nearly every one of them is designed to keep the attacker out of the workload rather than to limit what the workload can do once it is theirs. Before anything else, the engineering posture: this architecture is specified for high-risk AI systems, where the standard priorities shift from speed and latency toward determinism, containment, and safety. It is written for billion-dollar enterprise and mission- critical deployments — banking and treasury, defence and national security, critical infrastructure, and regulated enterprises holding unreleased material — and not for general day-to-day, consumer-grade, or low-stakes use. It introduces evaluation on the join path and on the release path, and accepts that cost deliberately, because in these environments an unauthorized reconstruction or an unauthorized send is not recoverable by being fast. This document asks what is still denied to the attacker at that moment, and specifies an architecture in which two things are still denied: the attacker cannot cause independently held enterprise fragments to be bound into a map of the organization, and cannot cause any generated result to become externally effective. Access to a store is not authority to join it to another store. Finishing a generation is not authority to send it. The mechanism is Execution-Consequence Decoupling, enforced by three pillars: Decomposition of Authority (Technical Non-Joinability) across independently controlled identity, content, relationship- mapping, and cryptographic domains; Mandatory Mediation of every consequence-bearing Candidate Output; and Technical Non- Completability, so that computation can run to completion in a compromised environment without the ability to complete an external consequence. Reconstruction is governed by a non-bearer Reconstruction Authorization Object bound to attested execution context, session, purpose, and Permitted Association Scope. Candidate Outputs are sealed, re-verified at output time, and committed to a Protected Output Validation Receipt before an output- specific Release Capability can be issued and exercised at a designated Output Release Boundary. The industrially relevant systems are the enterprise assistant and agent runtimes now deployed into exactly those environments, including those built on Anthropic Claude, OpenAI ChatGPT, Google Gemini, xAI Grok, and self-hosted Meta Llama models, together with the connector and Model Context Protocol fleets attached to them. These are named as publicly described deployment classes, because an architecture for high-risk enterprise AI should say plainly which systems it is about; nothing here characterizes any vendor's internal design or security posture, and no vendor has reviewed or endorsed this work. It states the problem space, compares the architecture against representative conventional technologies (access control, bearer credentials, vaulting, TEEs, sandboxes, DLP, provenance, DRM, clean rooms, and information-flow control), gives a detailed technical description, and supplies JSON Schema definitions for the three protected objects. A published runnable reference implementation [GITHUB-DAS-VII] executes the protected chain described here, so the architecture can be run and tested rather than only read; it is an architectural reference for the state machine and its failure states, not a claim of production isolation. This is the architecture and rationale document. Its companion, draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality [I-D.das-enterprise-ai-output-finality], specifies the same split as a deployable protocol profile and metadata format for vendor assistant and agent seats. The two are ",
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:35:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 40,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.64,
   "centrality": 1.95,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality",
   "title": "The Missing Piece for High-Value Confidential Enterprise AI: Non-Joinable Vaults and Output-Release Finality for Banking, Defence, and Public-Sector Deployments",
   "abstract": "This profile is specified for high-risk, multi-system enterprise and public-sector AI — assistants and agents that can see several independently authorized stores and then send, write, or invoke. It is not specified for consumer chat. In industrial terms that describes enterprise assistant and agent seats of the kind offered by Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini, and xAI Grok, together with self- hosted open-weight deployments; these names are used with respect, as publicly described deployment classes only, and imply no claim about any vendor's internals and no vendor endorsement of this profile. A 2020 breach stole what was already stored: a server image, a database dump, user rows. After 2025 a compromised assistant can do what a dump cannot. In minutes it can join mail, tickets, code, finance, and memory into a map of launch plans, targets, defects, and negotiation room — strategy that was never one record — and that map can be sold to a competitor. There is no credential rotation for a future that has already been read. Traditional access control still answers who may touch each store. It does not answer whether those fragments may be joined into that meaning, or whether that meaning may leave. This document specifies an architectural framework and metadata profile for that gap. Technical Non-Joinability is enforced by a session-bound Reconstruction Authorization Object (RAO) that limits relational binding. Technical Non-Completability is enforced by an Output Release Boundary that requires committed validation evidence before a generated token or tool invocation can take external effect. The specification defines the authorization objects, cryptographic bindings, and boundary validation sequences required to isolate reconstruction domains without modifying the underlying datastores. A published runnable reference implementation is provided so that the profile can be executed and tested, not only read as theory. That implementation is an architectural reference for the state machine, not a claim of production isolation. The architecture introduces bounded evaluation on the path that can intercept unauthorized join or release. That latency is accepted where the asset is high- consequence enterprise or public-sector intelligence and raw speed is subordinate to preventing reconstruction and release. The author states that trade-off explicitly: this profile is for deployments that choose that priority. It is not offered as a design for consumer chat or other paths that optimize only for speed. Readers are respectfully encouraged to review Section 4 and Section 5 in full, as those sections set out the complete problem description and motivating scenarios and should not be skipped.",
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:34:06Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 65,
   "relevant": 0.9,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.89,
   "centrality": 1.97,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-protocols-candidate-act-finality",
   "title": "Stopping AI Hallucinations and Unsafe Acts from Becoming Real-World Consequences (DAS Protocols)",
   "abstract": "The internet has protocols for moving data, securing channels, naming hosts, and delegating identity. It has no protocol for the moment a machine-generated instruction becomes a real-world act. As AI systems begin to move money, change databases, reconfigure networks, send communications, and control physical systems, that missing boundary becomes a structural risk. Today an AI can hallucinate a fact, cite a stale source, invent a tool argument, or propose an unsafe agentic step — and still reach an effectuation interface. Model approval is not output approval. Workflow approval is not consequence approval. Moderation, access control, TEEs, simulation, and post-hoc audit all leave the final transition from computation to consequence under-protected. This document specifies the DAS Protocols Candidate-Act Finality architecture. Every effect-capable AI output is first converted into a non-effective Candidate Act. The Candidate Act stays non-effective until a Protected Enforcement Domain has validated output, provenance, factual support, consequence, jurisdiction, epoch, and sink predicates. Only then is a scoped non-bearer capability or Execution Handle released and verified at a Finality Sink. In advanced forms the Finality Sink is cryptographically unable to complete the act unless the handle supplies the missing execution material. The architecture supports graduated and escalated conditional finality so that elevated-risk but necessary acts can still proceed under stricter controls. The document elaborates the problem space, compares the approach with representative existing techniques, describes the base and advanced finality paths, and provides JSON Schema definitions for the core protected objects. Related Indian provisional applications and PCT filings are listed in the final appendix.",
   "rev": "01",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:32:37Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 34,
   "relevant": 0.85,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.37,
   "centrality": 1.99,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-hardware-enforced-execution-finality",
   "title": "Computation Is Not Authority: Hardware-Enforced Execution-Finality for Agentic AI, MCP Tool Calls, and Industrial Agents",
   "abstract": "Neural AI systems -- large language models, vision-language models, and other learned decision systems -- now move directly from computation to consequence. A model output becomes a tool call; a tool call becomes an API transaction, memory write, payment, file mutation, browser action, or actuator signal; an agent delegates to another agent. Successful inference, sandbox containment, connector allowlisting, session permission, or upstream model approval does not by itself establish authority for that particular real-world consequence. A model may be authorized to compute while remaining unauthorized to act. This document specifies a hardware-rooted execution-finality architecture for neural and agentic systems. A proposed consequence- bearing operation is represented as a Candidate Act and held in a Non-Effective State until a Protected Enforcement Domain validates act-specific predicates and an independent Finality Sink verifies scoped, non-bearer finality authority immediately before the operation becomes externally effective. If that authority is absent, stale, replayed, revoked, or mismatched to the act being attempted, the Candidate Act remains non-effective and the operation fails closed. The architecture is model- and vendor-neutral. It is written for the industrial surfaces that now dominate production agent deployments: Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool dispatch, computer use, code execution, enterprise connectors, memory and knowledge-store writes, GPU and confidential-computing egress, and settlement. The same invariant applies to those surfaces: computation is not authority; tool selection is not tool-effectuation; a connector allowlist is not per-act finality.",
   "rev": "02",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:32:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 36,
   "relevant": 0.89,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.87,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-rats-frontier-model-extraction",
   "title": "An Execution-Finality Architecture for Controlling Release and Limiting Unauthorized Extraction and Distillation of Sensitive, High-Priority Frontier AI Model Information",
   "abstract": "This architecture is a hardware-rooted defense against intellectual- property theft of frontier AI models, intended for deployment by AI model creators themselves -- including trillion-dollar frontier-model providers such as OpenAI and Anthropic -- rather than for generic, day-to-day AI use by an end user. It protects Sensitive Model Information that is high-priority and dual-use, with the specific purpose of preventing unauthorized extraction and distillation of the model itself. The architecture introduces bounded, deterministic evaluation latency to intercept unauthorized release paths, a trade- off acceptable specifically for protecting highly valued dual-use assets where standard optimization for raw speed is subordinate to absolute asset security. Frontier and proprietary AI deployments may contain or expose model- related information substantially richer than ordinary final-answer text. Depending on the deployment and interface, such Sensitive Model Information (SMI) can include detailed probability information, embeddings, cached intermediate state, hidden representations, intermediate activations, diagnostic information, model-related metadata, or other high-information artifacts. Repeated unauthorized or excessive release of such information can increase the efficiency of model reconstruction, imitation, extraction, or distillation. Authentication establishes who is requesting an operation. Confidential computing and remote attestation can establish properties of the environment in which computation occurs. Neither property alone determines whether a particular pending release of particular model information, to a particular destination, under the current extraction state and security epoch, remains authorized to become externally usable. This document describes an execution-finality architecture for that remaining problem. Sensitive information may be computed while remaining a non-effective Candidate Release. External release occurs only after release-specific protected validation, evaluation of rollback-resistant extraction state where required, atomic reservation or consumption of bounded authority, and verification at a controlled Finality Sink. Release authority is bound to the applicable Candidate Release or bounded release class rather than operating as a generic transferable bearer credential. The architecture does not claim universal prevention of model extraction or distillation and does not restrict legitimately exposed ordinary model output. Its narrower objective is to make unauthorized, excessive, replayed, rolled-back, or bypassed release of protected model information technically harder to complete through governed release paths. RATS can complement this mechanism by allowing a Verifier or Relying Party to obtain machine-verifiable information about whether the expected release-control mechanism, protected state, security epoch, and Finality Sink are present and operating with the required assurance properties. To demonstrate that this architecture is practically achievable and not merely theoretical, a runnable reference implementation is provided at Execution-Finality for Protected AI Model-State Release -- RATS Reference Implementation (https://github.com/sangmdas/ Execution-Finality-for-Protected-AI-Model-State-Release-RATS- Reference-Implementation).",
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:31:22Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 75,
   "relevant": 0.5,
   "domain": "attestation",
   "domain_conf": 0.84,
   "centrality": 1,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-purpose-execution-finality",
   "title": "Data-Purpose Laundering Prevention: Execution-Finality for Preventing Cross-Domain Data Reuse",
   "abstract": "Consider a concrete case: a user invokes a highly capable AI model under a declared purpose of education, but the resulting capability is in fact used for a military or terrorist end -- an illustrative example, not a claim about any real deployment. When such misuse surfaces, an unresolved question follows: is the model provider liable, is the user liable, or is the jurisdiction that permitted the deployment liable? This document does not answer that question -- liability determination remains an external legal question for the responsible court, regulator, or contracting parties -- but it addresses the technical gap that makes the question unanswerable today. Systems that collect data, or grant capability, for one stated purpose routinely permit that data or capability to be consumed for a different purpose, not because the second use was authorized, but because nothing in the protocol path was capable of refusing it or of recording what was actually authorized. The most common technical control in deployment today is a self-asserted purpose string: a \"purpose\" claim in a token, a field in an API request, a comment in a data-sharing agreement. A self-asserted string is evidence of intent, not proof of authority, and it fails precisely when it matters most -- when the requester lies. This architecture addresses that loophole deterministically: it makes an undeclared or purpose-switched use technically detectable and refusable at the point of use, and it produces verifiable evidence of what was actually authorized, so that any subsequent liability determination can be argued from that evidence rather than from an unverifiable self-assertion. Achieving that determinism introduces a bounded, measurable amount of evaluation latency at the point of use; this document treats that latency as an acceptable, secured trade-off for closing an otherwise unverifiable gap, not as a cost to be minimized at the expense of the guarantee. The premise is not that AI innovation should slow down, any more than cars should be built slower; it is that innovation moving this fast needs the technical equivalent of a seat belt. A runnable reference implementation accompanies this document at Purpose Execution Finality Validator -- Runnable Reference Implementation (https://github.com/sangmdas/Purpose-Execution- Finality-Validator-to-Prevent-Data-Purpose-Laundering-in-AI-Systems).",
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:31:08Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 60,
   "relevant": 0.84,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.91,
   "centrality": 1.43,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-das-agentic-tool-binding",
   "title": "tool_use Is Not invoke(): Binding Execution-Finality to Agentic Tool-Call Interfaces and MCP",
   "abstract": "Frontier runtimes already standardized the dangerous moment. A model emits a tool_use block, a tool_calls array, or an MCP tools/call payload. The host then invokes whatever name and arguments the model printed. Alignment, allowlists, and OAuth sit around that moment. They do not sit on it. The consequence of this gap is no longer confined to email or payment demos. In defense, energy, grid control, industrial process control, and other critical-infrastructure deployments, the same tool_use block already reaches actuation-class systems -- logistics and targeting-adjacent decision support, SCADA and PLC interfaces, medical devices, autonomous platforms. In these environments, detection after the fact is not mitigation; it is an incident report written after the effect has already occurred. An agent that can act at machine speed but cannot be halted at machine speed is a system running without brakes: the first uncontrolled invocation is not a warning sign, it is the accident. Command authority, human oversight, and legal review all operate on human time. An unbound tool_use block operates on machine time. When those two clocks diverge, the gap belongs to whichever side reaches the effect first -- and today, nothing structurally guarantees that side is authorization. This document does not invent another assistant API. It binds the Agent Candidate Act profile [I-D.das-agentic] onto the three interface families those runtimes and their customers already ship: tool_use / computer_use style interfaces, function-calling and structured tool-response interfaces, and Model Context Protocol tools/call. The model may emit the block. The block remains non- effective. A local enforcer builds the act, binds the argument digest, and refuses invoke() until scoped authority is verified and consumed at the dispatch sink. For consequence classes above a defined threshold -- FINANCIAL, PHYSICAL, NETWORK_CONTROL, and any act reaching defense or critical- infrastructure actuation -- this binding treats fail-closed as the only conforming behavior: absent successfully verified, current, act- bound authority, the candidate act stays non-effective regardless of model confidence, prior session trust, or upstream alignment signal. Each enforcement decision, allow or deny, commits a Ledger-Anchored Validation Receipt (LAVR) -- a signed, hash-chained enforcement artifact bound to the specific candidate act and its argument digest at the moment of decision. An LAVR is not a log entry assembled afterward for audit; it is the proof that the finality boundary actually gated this act before any effect could occur, and its absence is itself a fail-closed condition. The implementation target is a middleware function that a host loop can call without changing the model vendor. tool_use is not invoke().",
   "rev": "03",
   "time": "2026-09-29T14:30:39Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 51,
   "relevant": 0.94,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.92,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:58:39.003Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-sankarshan-agent-registry-protocol",
   "title": "Agent Registry Protocol",
   "abstract": "Software agents increasingly act on behalf of people and organizations across administrative and security boundaries. Existing discovery mechanisms can identify an endpoint or advertise a capability, but they do not by themselves provide a common way to resolve who operates an agent, the bounded authority under which it acts, whether that authority is current, or what evidence supports a reliance decision. This document defines the Agent Registry Protocol (ARPA), an HTTP and JSON protocol for publishing and resolving information about software agents, their operational deployments, typed relationships, bounded delegated authority, lifecycle status, and associated evidence. ARPA separates identification, authentication, authorization, assurance, and lifecycle state. Registration, successful authentication, capability advertisement, or proof verification does not by itself establish authority to perform an action. The protocol is designed to support deterministic fail-safe behavior when material authority information is revoked, suspended, expired, stale, conflicting, unavailable, or unverifiable.",
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-09-29T05:32:53Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 56,
   "relevant": 0.68,
   "domain": "discovery",
   "domain_conf": 0.75,
   "centrality": 1.98,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-pidlisnyi-aps",
   "title": "Agent Passport System (APS): Verifiable Authority, Lifecycle, Enforcement, and Evidence for AI Agents",
   "abstract": "This document specifies the Agent Passport System (APS), a protocol for representing and evaluating authority exercised by AI agents. APS separates agent identity, represented principal, delegated authority, policy approval, admission to dispatch, observed results, and external effects. It defines cryptographic identity and principal records, monotonic delegation, revocation and authority- lifecycle semantics, deterministic action and decision references, signed governed-action records, verifier outcomes, evidence resolution, profiles, and protocol bindings. APS defines how an enforcement boundary rechecks current authority before admitting an action to dispatch, and how a verifier distinguishes what a signed record establishes from claims that remain unresolved or external to the protocol. Requirements are split into APS Core, which every conforming implementation carries, and Candidate features, which an implementation opts into by naming them in its claim, and most of the lifecycle and decision-to-effect material in this document is Candidate rather than Core. Candidate features specify additional lifecycle and decision-to-effect behavior without making those features requirements of APS Core conformance. Implementation and conformance sections identify which requirements have exact conformance-vector coverage and which are implemented by the reference implementations. APS does not treat a valid signature, receipt, or delegation chain as proof of external truth or of the absence of an out-of-band execution path.",
   "rev": "04",
   "time": "2026-09-28T18:03:25Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 271,
   "relevant": 0.92,
   "domain": "authz",
   "domain_conf": 0.88,
   "centrality": 2,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  },
  {
   "name": "draft-mo-cats-agent-service-characteristics",
   "title": "AI Agent Service Characteristics and Their Implications for Computing-Aware Traffic Steering",
   "abstract": "AI agent services place a new class of demands on the network: sessions are long-lived and stateful, a single user request expands into multiple model invocations and tool calls, and the quality of the result depends jointly on the forwarding path, on the computing capability that is available at the selected site, and on whether the state that the agent needs is already present near that site. Computing-Aware Traffic Steering (CATS) already selects a service contact instance using a combination of computing and network metrics, but the CATS framework, metric, and data model documents were not written with agent services in mind. The document covers long-horizon tasks and their long-tail behaviour, discrete and distributed tool invocation, the cost of context growth and compression, the communication modes used by agent services, and the persistence of session state and memory. It reports measured distributions of model, state, and software artifact sizes, states what a CATS system must measure in order to steer this traffic, and identifies the information that a CATS system needs in order to select an instance for an agent service. This document does not define any protocol extension, metric encoding, or data model.",
   "rev": "00",
   "time": "2026-09-28T16:48:03Z",
   "group": "individual",
   "pages": 27,
   "relevant": 0.87,
   "domain": "other",
   "domain_conf": 0.52,
   "centrality": 1.96,
   "model": "jev-1.13.0",
   "evidence": "",
   "found": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "evaluated": "2026-10-01T10:59:01.083Z",
   "full": true
  }
 ]
}